You're the FO

I dunno, me as the FO would sure as heck be reaching forward for the thrust levers yelling "REJECT" at the top of my lungs.

:yeahthat: Those brakes are pretty danged effective, too, even with the throttles at takeoff power. Get on the brakes, try to get the throttles back to idle, and scream "abort!" at the dumbass Captain. There are very few times when I think a copilot should override a Captain's decision, but this girl could have gotten a bunch of people killed. Monumentally stupid thing to do.

I would think that "red warning panel message" would be added to the above briefing of abortable reasons between 80 and V1.

Not in my briefing. I can think of a whole hell of a lot of things in the CRJ that could cause master warnings that I wouldn't abort for above 80 knots. My briefing was simple: "above 80 knots, we're only aborting if the airplane is on fire or won't be able to make it into the air and back around for a landing." High speed aborts are dangerous as hell, especially when you're using FLEX takeoffs most of the time and rotation is happening very close to the end of the runway at lots of these smaller outstations.
 
This situation is pretty clear-cut in my estimate.

Per the Aircraft Limitations at my company, Thrust Reversers are to be used ONLY for Aborted/Rejected Takeoff or braking during Landing Roll-Out.

Once the thrust reversers have been deployed, the Limitations require that the aircraft be brought to a stop, ie, no thrust-reverser touch-'n-goes... or, in this case, RTO-then-screw-it-let's-go.

The captain just violated the published limitations of the aircraft. Whoops!

Secondly, HE briefed the GO/NO GO criteria for V1. Once the ABORT call is made, that's it. You're not going. Done. Taxi clear, take it around, and go again.

So what do you do? Well, fighting the captain for the stick right then and there is a bad idea. Assuming you live through this horrid decision making, you sit quiet, and do your job. Keep in mind that your job as FO is to make sure the Captain doesn't screw up. Sure, he or she might have 100 times the experience you do, but that doesn't mean they would never make a mistake, by intent or accident. It doesn't mean you wouldn't know the difference, either. If the Captain does something inadviseable, outside limitations, or just plain stupid, it's your JOB to question that. Be diplomatic, to be sure, but be ready to question. Your question might be the moment's pause the Skipper needs to get their head out of his/her ass.

After you land, you dial up the Union and throw his ass to Pro Standards. They can straighten him out. After all, let's face it. He aborts for a windshield heat failure AFTER 80 knots and then changes him mind after full reverser deployment? DUMB DUMB DUMB.

I'd also seek counsel from the Union Pro Standards folks about filing a NASA/Pipeline/Other Appropriate Report. Cover YOUR ass, cause that captain is clearly out of his mind.

I'd also see what the union recommends about getting yourself removed from the trip and avoiding flying with that Captain again. While your scenario may vary (probation/non-probation, etc) that would seem to be wise.

Note: Some of you may be going "What's a Pro Standards Department?" It's the section of ALPA where pilots with professional concerns about a fellow aviators decision making, skills, or performance can go to deal with the problem. It's kept in-house, between the pilots, within the Union. This avoids involving the Company, which may or may not do anything other than cover its own ass. Pro Standards gives pilots a chance to police their own without ratting anybody out to the 'man'.

Clear skies and tailwinds.
 
I've heard this story before from Nick, but since it's out here....

Boring systems analysis:
To the big jet pilot: The E145 doesn't have the autobrake system

I can't remember the number, but the E145 has the Takeoff Inhibition logic (In the E145 systems book) blocks out the messages. I want to say it begins at V1-15, but I could be mistaken

One philosophy I heard was the Below 80 knots abort for anything vs. above 80 for fire/failure or anything that will keep it out of the sky was due to the low speed / high speed (speed = energy of course you knew that though) regime and potential for damage.

Truthfully, in old school airplanes, like the Jurrassic Classic, it's a great idea. Removing the size of the machine, and looking at the lack of SA during TO for decisions. We have lights all over the cockpit, annuciator lights that blink on and off, and No master warning/caution system of anysort (other than the FE, really). In that instance, you're barrelling down a runway, see an annunciator and have to stop, recognize what it says, interpret what it means, make a decision, all while you're accelerating to V1.

<groundschool instructor mode = on> So, the criteria for V1 is from the point takeoff power is SET to accelerate to the decision speed, have a failure AT V1, 3 second decision/action time to react and slow the beast. Of course the performance criteria is with test pilots in brand new equipment preparing for the maneuver. </off>

In newer jets, even the E145 (although at higher weights the inhibition logic may start later than I'd like. Honeywell must have assigned the JV squad to the Primus 1000 program....), have inhibition logic that makes me question the need for the above/below 80. If you go thru the inhibited messages (yes I did), the ones left over really are ones you should stop for.

IMHO, on a new-age glass jet, EICAS message = stop unless stopping would cause you to die. LGA on a snowy runway comes to mind. Otherwise, mash the crap out of the brakes, make sure the spoilers are up and stop the SOB.

In this situation:

Many saying call the REJECT on the radio were good, that should solve 99% of the scenarios in this case. Just human error leading to a bad chain.....

If the above was done, and the take off continued:

I am not one to vote for usurping the CA. Hell, I try to out apathy them for what leg to fly if they ask. However, in this instance, the CA was trying to kill everyone on the plane. This is one of the .0001% of the scenarios where you should grab the thrust levers, as soon as they go back up, and smash the brakes.

In light of that, after the T/O, the F/O shoulda asked "What the HELL was that? Let me fly the leg, cause we're done." Get to the destination, pack up your bag, get off the plane, and call pro-stands.

You will have ALOT of explaining to do, but rightly so. A CA screwed up so badly that you had to take over. If you were a CP, how'd you take that? Pretty surreal, and a once in an airline's existance type of deal.

I can say with confidence that these scenarios are so far at the end of the bell curve that this will prolly be the only time you hear of this in your career....
 
Re: Second Takeoff Attempt

But would it be safe, even in the plane you fly, to go up to 100 knots, deploy reverse thrust, speedbrakes, and use footbrakes, and then decelerating through 80 knots, try to turn all that around and takeoff again?

Definitely not.
But one I'm saying, in my airplane all of that stuff is deployed manually. If it's deployed your committed. But if I got a plane with straight pipes (No T/Rs) and no Drag Chute, knowing the crapness that are lear brakes, my tendency is to go because I can get it into the air pretty quickly with a fully working airplane (High thrust to weight ratio). That's why in my brief, especially at shorter fields, I don't brief the below 80kts stop for anything.
I've seen lears over run runways when trying to abort because of the lack of brakes.
It's all runway dependent, how much is available.
The point I'm trying to make is it isn't as cut and dry with every airplane as everyone is making it out to be.
 
As a relatively low time Lear 24/25/35 SIC, I have to say this is a great thread. Hard for me to imagine grabbing the throttles from the CA, but it is interesting to contemplate this scenario while safely at my computer. Thanks to all the experienced guys that commented.
 
You guys are set up a little different from how I/we operate. We are trained to abort for any adnormality prior to V1. If there is a red or amber annunciator, engine fire or failure, I have to scratch my nose and etc... we're aborting. It's fairly easy to do since I'm flying a turbo prop.

It seems like our rules are more concrete while your rules give you more discretion. I don't know if thats good or bad. You definitely require more thinking while roaring away at 100 +kts.

On those hot and heavy Sunday's out of BED, I don't want to be doing this reject and change my mind halfway through the take off business. I'd definitely end up in the trees at the end of the runway.
 
On the 19hondo we differentiated between a low speed and high speed abort.

On the megawhacker any abnormality prior to V1 we are aborting.
 
Yep that is what they want us to do.

I agree with what you are saying but, they never asked me my opinion.
 
To all you people who are saying "just call the abort to the tower," I'll offer a change to the scenario. You're at a non-towered airport. And for the jet-jocks who can't imagine that scenario, KUTA is a non-towered airport and has airline service from Sky King (SGB) on 737s and Allegiant Air (AAY) on MD87s every day.
 
Seggy, that sucks. But SOP is SOP... I guess.

And being at a non towered airport doesn't really matter. You still are going to make the radio call, even if it's only on unicom or CTAF.
 
To all you people who are saying "just call the abort to the tower," I'll offer a change to the scenario. You're at a non-towered airport. And for the jet-jocks who can't imagine that scenario, KUTA is a non-towered airport and has airline service from Sky King (SGB) on 737s and Allegiant Air (AAY) on MD87s every day.

Doesn't matter...

Do it the same way every time, regardless if it is a towered or non-towered airport (even if there is no other traffic at the time).

Let me throw you this scenario back...you are IFR enroute to UTA, cut loose from MEM approach control... wouldn't it be nice if someone on CTAF could advise you of a rejected takeoff... might get you looking for someone stopped on UTA's single runway if you are visual, or let you go missed on the approach before you hit minimums and have to go missed at the last minute.
 
Firstly, I doubt any pilot would reverse a STOP decision. That being said...let's say we're in a 76...

Once the levers are back, the brakes are on...plane starts to buckle...

Once the reversers are out, the spoilers are extended

Once you go back to takeoff power, the brakes are off and the spoilers go back down, so you're back in TO config (sort of)

Here are the problems:

How much runway did you use to complete that whole cycle of stopping then starting again?

The reversers take up to 5s to restow. In that time, you'll be gliding down the runway at idle- more runway lost.

Unless it's a 15,000ft runway, I'm grabbing the controls and standing on those brakes.
 
OK....super simple words of wisdom from a guy who has forgotten far more than I'll ever know.

If you abort above V1 or abort, add power and go, it equals...and read carefully:

SKIP, SKIP, DIRT

Are there exceptions to every rule? Yes, but years of accidents, incidents and analysis boiled it all down to below V1 stop, after V1 go, because it MINIMIZES risk, not eliminates it.
 
Doesn't matter...

Do it the same way every time, regardless if it is a towered or non-towered airport (even if there is no other traffic at the time).

Let me throw you this scenario back...you are IFR enroute to UTA, cut loose from MEM approach control... wouldn't it be nice if someone on CTAF could advise you of a rejected takeoff... might get you looking for someone stopped on UTA's single runway if you are visual, or let you go missed on the approach before you hit minimums and have to go missed at the last minute.

As I understand the argument, the FO makes the call to the tower, and then no CA would be so foolish as to continue with the call on tape. That doesn't happen at a non-towered airport. So that pressure on the CA goes away. He can still "reverse" the decision without worrying about the tapes.
 
As I understand the argument, the FO makes the call to the tower, and then no CA would be so foolish as to continue with the call on tape. That doesn't happen at a non-towered airport. So that pressure on the CA goes away. He can still "reverse" the decision without worrying about the tapes.

It will be on the CVR, so it will still be recorded.
 
Here's the problem with the "just call the abort to tower" solution: any Captain that is moronic enough to try continuing a takeoff after already initiating an abort isn't going to be bright enough to think about not continuing just because you called the abort. We're dealing with monumental stupidity here, people. The guy (gal) is a few cards short of a deck. Grab the throttles, mash the brakes, and try to control yourself to keep from smashing the idiot's head in with the crash axe.
 
Interesting situation. As the FO unless we were going to run out of runway I would not be questioning the capt on the runway. At my company and I think at most the captain is the only one that can call for a reject. Now once you have made the decision to reject (you're on the radio calling it to tower) that is that. Even if it is a stupid mistake you complete the reject taxi back and take off again. I'd be very worried as well about spoilers deploying, having enough runway, ect.

After the flight on the ground I'd have a talk with the capt about how I didn't like the situation and that it was against SOP and could have been unsafe. For all you know the PAX could have been freaked out and will complain to the company.

I also think that this is not something that would normally happen. I know that anyone in a bigger aircraft would never try to take off again after the decision to reject.

Then I must be have been flying for the minority, because at my companies, either can call for a reject. Nothing says keep your mouth shut more then leaving that call to the captain. What if you're about to have an incursion? Tell the captain about the plane that is crossing from right to left and let them decide? Your companies need to revisit the CRM concept. A reject can be a split second decision and should not be questioned when called for within the takeoff briefing parameters. Funny thing is, FOs don't exist mainly to manipulate gear and flaps. They exist to make the flight more safe and leaving them out of a reject call does not make a takeoff in a complex turbine aircraft more safe.
 
Then I must be have been flying for the minority, because at my companies, either can call for a reject. Nothing says keep your mouth shut more then leaving that call to the captain. What if you're about to have an incursion? Tell the captain about the plane that is crossing from right to left and let them decide? Your companies need to revisit the CRM concept. A reject can be a split second decision and should not be questioned when called for within the takeoff briefing parameters. Funny thing is, FOs don't exist mainly to manipulate gear and flaps. They exist to make the flight more safe and leaving them out of a reject call does not make a takeoff in a complex turbine aircraft more safe.

Aborts are extremely dangerous maneuvers in jet aircraft. For something that serious, the final decision needs to be up to the Captain. The FO can call out what he sees and suggest an abort, but the Captain makes the decision. If you think that he's making a bad decision, then do what you think is necessary, but be ready to suffer the consequences.
 
Aborts are extremely dangerous maneuvers in jet aircraft. For something that serious, the final decision needs to be up to the Captain. The FO can call out what he sees and suggest an abort, but the Captain makes the decision. If you think that he's making a bad decision, then do what you think is necessary, but be ready to suffer the consequences.

I've aborted from both sides. I've found aborts to be more squirrely in turboprops and we only were going about 10 knots slower. The consequences of a scolding or pro standards will suffice over a burning aircraft. I'm speaking in a general manner about aborts, however. A high speed abort after a master caution is likely not a good idea, but I would imagine there's a reason a company SOP dictates call the abort first and then say reason. Reason being, you may need to get started on that abort immediately in some cases. An FO or Capt freaking out over a master caution issue is hopefully limited to a small group. The pretakeoff briefing takes care of all that to abort and to not abort abort crap. If someone feels the need to call for an abort outside of the briefing criteria, then maybe they need to revisit their training.
 
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