Rant

I wanted to wait until I had an actual keyboard to write a more detailed reply. I think that as we move into the future of flight training, we really need to explore the idea of using simulators and virtual reality to enhance our ability to expose students to things they won't actually experience in an airplane. Airplanes and technology have greatly increased safety, but a side effect is now there is an expectation developing that nothing will go wrong. When we have an abnormality, emergency, or irregular operations, it's hard to critically think your way through the situation if you've never been challenged. The freight dogs flying ratty-old Beech 18's in icing conditions developed skills and decision making through experience. Now, we have 1500-hour pilots flying high-performance jets coming straight from the CFI world.

I do blame the 1500-hour ATP rule partially for this. We need to find a way to get our sub-1500 pilots some actual decision-making challenges. In the college program I teach in, I have redeveloped our curriculum to focus a LOT on aerodynamics and flight controls at the very beginning. Before we even discuss aerodynamics, however, we discuss CRM/SRM/ADM/RM, and instill things like checklist discipline, evaluation of risk, etc., so they exit the gate with that in the forefront of their minds. I have been adamant that we use the checklists and learn how to actually fly the airplane, because when all else fails, we aviate, navigate, and communicate.

A few sim sessions into training I'll take the checklist away and say "start it up for me please." The students look there dumbfounded, and say "without the checklist?" Yes, without the checklist, using your knowledge of airplane systems and your experience doing the startup procedures multiple times. 100% of the students can't do it. Because they use the checklist as a crutch, and they don't truly understand what they are doing or why they are doing it. I use that as an awakening for why it's important to know our airplane in and out. I then walk through a series of failures and demonstrate troubleshooting problems based on a solid foundation of systems knowledge. I can't simulate an engine-driven fuel pump failure in an actual airplane, or fail the airspeed indicator before takeoff to drive home rejected takeoffs. Even something like deteriorating weather and inadvertent IMC is hard in a real airplane when you say "my controls, put on the hood, you just flew into the clouds."

The point of this dissertation is that if we want to affect change, we need to explore new ideas for basic flight training, so we are giving these primary students the best possible foundation to build upon for success in their careers. We can't just keep doing the same thing we did in 1997 and complain that the students suck. My students don't suck. They just learn differently in a completely different aviation environment. The years between the Colgan crash, the 1500-hour rule, and today are in my personal opinion a lost generation of pilots who was expected to just be better based on an arbitrary number of flight hours and not an adapted flight training model.

Edited to add: I re-read this and I know I say "I, I, I," but I'm not trying to boast my ideas as gospel, but just use some personal examples. I think this needs to be an open discussion amongst many to develop new ideas to effectively train pilots in a way that they don't just do things, but think their way through it critically.
 
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FlyChicaga said:
I wanted to wait until I had an actual keyboard to write a more detailed reply. I think that as we move into the future of flight training, we really need to explore the idea of using simulators and virtual reality to enhance our ability to expose students to things they won't actually experience in an airplane. Airplanes and technology have greatly increased safety, but a side effect is now there is an expectation developing that nothing will go wrong. When we have an abnormality, emergency, or irregular operations, it's hard to critically think your way through the situation if you've never been challenged. The freight dogs flying ratty-old Beech 18's in icing conditions developed skills and decision making through experience. Now, we have 1500-hour pilots flying high-performance jets coming straight from the CFI world.

I do blame the 1500-hour ATP rule partially for this. We need to find a way to get our sub-1500 pilots some actual decision-making challenges. In the college program I teach in, I have redeveloped our curriculum to focus a LOT on aerodynamics and flight controls at the very beginning. Before we even discuss aerodynamics, however, we discuss CRM/SRM/ADM/RM, and instill things like checklist discipline, evaluation of risk, etc., so they exit the gate with that in the forefront of their minds. I have been adamant that we use the checklists and learn how to actually fly the airplane, because when all else fails, we aviate, navigate, and communicate.

A few sim sessions into training I'll take the checklist away and say "start it up for me please." The students look there dumbfounded, and say "without the checklist?" Yes, without the checklist, using your knowledge of airplane systems and your experience doing the startup procedures multiple times. 100% of the students can't do it. Because they use the checklist as a crutch, and they don't truly understand what they are doing or why they are doing it. I use that as an awakening for why it's important to know our airplane in and out. I then walk through a series of failures and demonstrate troubleshooting problems based on a solid foundation of systems knowledge. I can't simulate an engine-driven fuel pump failure in an actual airplane, or fail the airspeed indicator before takeoff to drive home rejected takeoffs. Even something like deteriorating weather and inadvertent IMC is hard in a real airplane when you say "my controls, put on the hood, you just flew into the clouds."

The point of this dissertation is that if we want to affect change, we need to explore new ideas for basic flight training, so we are giving these primary students the best possible foundation to build upon for success in their careers. We can't just keep doing the same thing we did in 1997 and complain that the students suck. My students don't suck. They just learn differently in a completely different aviation environment. The years between the Colgan crash, the 1500-hour rule, and today are in my personal opinion a lost generation of pilots who was expected to just be better based on an arbitrary number of flight hours and not an adapted flight training model.

Edited to add: I re-read this and I know I say "I, I, I," but I'm not trying to boast my ideas as gospel, but just use some personal examples. I think this needs to be an open discussion amongst many to develop new ideas to effectively train pilots in a way that they don't just do things, but think their way through it critically.
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Politely, the 1,500 hour rule has zero to do with this, and everything to do with the broken compensation model that existed at the time of Colgan until recently.

The sub-1,500 hour pilots should be getting their experience the way they have always done it, out flying in the real world. The FAA agreed with time limits even before the rule, because they thought having 1.200 hours to flying boxes in a 310 under 135 was a good idea, and they were, and are, right.

You learn your machine and environment slowly, with experiences that that no pre-scripted simulator can reproduce.. There will always be all stars, the mechanically inclined, the ace of the base that can do fine at 500 hours, but the rules aren’t for them, but for the average pilot.

People forget that the Feds didn’t pull that number out of their rear end. For decades, that was the accepted number not just by the FAA, but insurance carriers and operators. Even in the peak times of massive hiring, where some outfits were seeing 100% annual turnover, they kept the minimums to four digits. Why? Because experience showed them that this level of exposure to the real world prepared the pilot to move to the next level.

For most of time, the 1,500 rule would been completely superfluous, because everyone had experience requirements that exceeded that, and most of the time, far exceeded it.

You can’t force feed 5 years of experience into 3 months worth of simulator time.
 
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I believe that there areca multitude of issues that affect that air space that NovemberEcho operates. It's just full of things that needs close attention paid to. For instance, TEB is one few operates that circling to land is a part of it's normal ops. It is also has one of the few approaches that you ever see a mandatory crossing altitude at fix. You just don't see it often.

The Ruudy departure is better. But it still is a pain. It's a noise abatament airport with a 500ft at or above crossing restriction at the end of a 6000ft runway followed by a 1500ft mandatory level all while flying the departure that has two quick turns. You also can't forget that you are underneath the bravo and cannot exceed 200kts. There is a fairly quick handoff to departure also....

It really is a lot going on and requires some a good briefing. Add going in and out of there with someone (whether that be a newbie or a retired airline guy) who isn't accustomed to it all and there's bound to be issues.
 
KLB said:
I believe that there areca multitude of issues that affect that air space that NovemberEcho operates. It's just full of things that needs close attention paid to. For instance, TEB is one few operates that circling to land is a part of it's normal ops. It is also has one of the few approaches that you ever see a mandatory crossing altitude at fix. You just don't see it often.

The Ruudy departure is better. But it still is a pain. It's a noise abatament airport with a 500ft at or above crossing restriction at the end of a 6000ft runway followed by a 1500ft mandatory level all while flying the departure that has two quick turns. You also can't forget that you are underneath the bravo and cannot exceed 200kts. There is a fairly quick handoff to departure also....

It really is a lot going on and requires some a good briefing. Add going in and out of there with someone (whether that be a newbie or a retired airline guy) who isn't accustomed to it all and there's bound to be issues.
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Fwiw, my complaints in this rant are not related to any altitude busts (although for those of you who depart 24 and turn SOUTH, wtf is wrong with you?).

It’s much more about people not listening making me have to repeat myself often several times before getting a response when it’s busy (yes I know yall got stuff to do in the cockpit but when you’re 3 miles from the localizer is not the time to zone out and this has gotten really bad in the last few years), not being able to find fixes on the advertised approach, slowing down even AFTER being assigned a speed etc.

I had a session yesterday where it shouldn’t have been busy but literally every single transmission I had to make 2-3 times.
 
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