Rant

I wanted to wait until I had an actual keyboard to write a more detailed reply. I think that as we move into the future of flight training, we really need to explore the idea of using simulators and virtual reality to enhance our ability to expose students to things they won't actually experience in an airplane. Airplanes and technology have greatly increased safety, but a side effect is now there is an expectation developing that nothing will go wrong. When we have an abnormality, emergency, or irregular operations, it's hard to critically think your way through the situation if you've never been challenged. The freight dogs flying ratty-old Beech 18's in icing conditions developed skills and decision making through experience. Now, we have 1500-hour pilots flying high-performance jets coming straight from the CFI world.

I do blame the 1500-hour ATP rule partially for this. We need to find a way to get our sub-1500 pilots some actual decision-making challenges. In the college program I teach in, I have redeveloped our curriculum to focus a LOT on aerodynamics and flight controls at the very beginning. Before we even discuss aerodynamics, however, we discuss CRM/SRM/ADM/RM, and instill things like checklist discipline, evaluation of risk, etc., so they exit the gate with that in the forefront of their minds. I have been adamant that we use the checklists and learn how to actually fly the airplane, because when all else fails, we aviate, navigate, and communicate.

A few sim sessions into training I'll take the checklist away and say "start it up for me please." The students look there dumbfounded, and say "without the checklist?" Yes, without the checklist, using your knowledge of airplane systems and your experience doing the startup procedures multiple times. 100% of the students can't do it. Because they use the checklist as a crutch, and they don't truly understand what they are doing or why they are doing it. I use that as an awakening for why it's important to know our airplane in and out. I then walk through a series of failures and demonstrate troubleshooting problems based on a solid foundation of systems knowledge. I can't simulate an engine-driven fuel pump failure in an actual airplane, or fail the airspeed indicator before takeoff to drive home rejected takeoffs. Even something like deteriorating weather and inadvertent IMC is hard in a real airplane when you say "my controls, put on the hood, you just flew into the clouds."

The point of this dissertation is that if we want to affect change, we need to explore new ideas for basic flight training, so we are giving these primary students the best possible foundation to build upon for success in their careers. We can't just keep doing the same thing we did in 1997 and complain that the students suck. My students don't suck. They just learn differently in a completely different aviation environment. The years between the Colgan crash, the 1500-hour rule, and today are in my personal opinion a lost generation of pilots who was expected to just be better based on an arbitrary number of flight hours and not an adapted flight training model.

Edited to add: I re-read this and I know I say "I, I, I," but I'm not trying to boast my ideas as gospel, but just use some personal examples. I think this needs to be an open discussion amongst many to develop new ideas to effectively train pilots in a way that they don't just do things, but think their way through it critically.
 
Last edited:
I wanted to wait until I had an actual keyboard to write a more detailed reply. I think that as we move into the future of flight training, we really need to explore the idea of using simulators and virtual reality to enhance our ability to expose students to things they won't actually experience in an airplane. Airplanes and technology have greatly increased safety, but a side effect is now there is an expectation developing that nothing will go wrong. When we have an abnormality, emergency, or irregular operations, it's hard to critically think your way through the situation if you've never been challenged. The freight dogs flying ratty-old Beech 18's in icing conditions developed skills and decision making through experience. Now, we have 1500-hour pilots flying high-performance jets coming straight from the CFI world.

I do blame the 1500-hour ATP rule partially for this. We need to find a way to get our sub-1500 pilots some actual decision-making challenges. In the college program I teach in, I have redeveloped our curriculum to focus a LOT on aerodynamics and flight controls at the very beginning. Before we even discuss aerodynamics, however, we discuss CRM/SRM/ADM/RM, and instill things like checklist discipline, evaluation of risk, etc., so they exit the gate with that in the forefront of their minds. I have been adamant that we use the checklists and learn how to actually fly the airplane, because when all else fails, we aviate, navigate, and communicate.

A few sim sessions into training I'll take the checklist away and say "start it up for me please." The students look there dumbfounded, and say "without the checklist?" Yes, without the checklist, using your knowledge of airplane systems and your experience doing the startup procedures multiple times. 100% of the students can't do it. Because they use the checklist as a crutch, and they don't truly understand what they are doing or why they are doing it. I use that as an awakening for why it's important to know our airplane in and out. I then walk through a series of failures and demonstrate troubleshooting problems based on a solid foundation of systems knowledge. I can't simulate an engine-driven fuel pump failure in an actual airplane, or fail the airspeed indicator before takeoff to drive home rejected takeoffs. Even something like deteriorating weather and inadvertent IMC is hard in a real airplane when you say "my controls, put on the hood, you just flew into the clouds."

The point of this dissertation is that if we want to affect change, we need to explore new ideas for basic flight training, so we are giving these primary students the best possible foundation to build upon for success in their careers. We can't just keep doing the same thing we did in 1997 and complain that the students suck. My students don't suck. They just learn differently in a completely different aviation environment. The years between the Colgan crash, the 1500-hour rule, and today are in my personal opinion a lost generation of pilots who was expected to just be better based on an arbitrary number of flight hours and not an adapted flight training model.

Edited to add: I re-read this and I know I say "I, I, I," but I'm not trying to boast my ideas as gospel, but just use some personal examples. I think this needs to be an open discussion amongst many to develop new ideas to effectively train pilots in a way that they don't just do things, but think their way through it critically.

Politely, the 1,500 hour rule has zero to do with this, and everything to do with the broken compensation model that existed at the time of Colgan until recently.

The sub-1,500 hour pilots should be getting their experience the way they have always done it, out flying in the real world. The FAA agreed with time limits even before the rule, because they thought having 1.200 hours to flying boxes in a 310 under 135 was a good idea, and they were, and are, right.

You learn your machine and environment slowly, with experiences that that no pre-scripted simulator can reproduce.. There will always be all stars, the mechanically inclined, the ace of the base that can do fine at 500 hours, but the rules aren’t for them, but for the average pilot.

People forget that the Feds didn’t pull that number out of their rear end. For decades, that was the accepted number not just by the FAA, but insurance carriers and operators. Even in the peak times of massive hiring, where some outfits were seeing 100% annual turnover, they kept the minimums to four digits. Why? Because experience showed them that this level of exposure to the real world prepared the pilot to move to the next level.

For most of time, the 1,500 rule would been completely superfluous, because everyone had experience requirements that exceeded that, and most of the time, far exceeded it.

You can’t force feed 5 years of experience into 3 months worth of simulator time.
 
IMG_2591.gif
 
I believe that there areca multitude of issues that affect that air space that NovemberEcho operates. It's just full of things that needs close attention paid to. For instance, TEB is one few operates that circling to land is a part of it's normal ops. It is also has one of the few approaches that you ever see a mandatory crossing altitude at fix. You just don't see it often.

The Ruudy departure is better. But it still is a pain. It's a noise abatament airport with a 500ft at or above crossing restriction at the end of a 6000ft runway followed by a 1500ft mandatory level all while flying the departure that has two quick turns. You also can't forget that you are underneath the bravo and cannot exceed 200kts. There is a fairly quick handoff to departure also....

It really is a lot going on and requires some a good briefing. Add going in and out of there with someone (whether that be a newbie or a retired airline guy) who isn't accustomed to it all and there's bound to be issues.
 
I believe that there areca multitude of issues that affect that air space that NovemberEcho operates. It's just full of things that needs close attention paid to. For instance, TEB is one few operates that circling to land is a part of it's normal ops. It is also has one of the few approaches that you ever see a mandatory crossing altitude at fix. You just don't see it often.

The Ruudy departure is better. But it still is a pain. It's a noise abatament airport with a 500ft at or above crossing restriction at the end of a 6000ft runway followed by a 1500ft mandatory level all while flying the departure that has two quick turns. You also can't forget that you are underneath the bravo and cannot exceed 200kts. There is a fairly quick handoff to departure also....

It really is a lot going on and requires some a good briefing. Add going in and out of there with someone (whether that be a newbie or a retired airline guy) who isn't accustomed to it all and there's bound to be issues.

Fwiw, my complaints in this rant are not related to any altitude busts (although for those of you who depart 24 and turn SOUTH, wtf is wrong with you?).

It’s much more about people not listening making me have to repeat myself often several times before getting a response when it’s busy (yes I know yall got stuff to do in the cockpit but when you’re 3 miles from the localizer is not the time to zone out and this has gotten really bad in the last few years), not being able to find fixes on the advertised approach, slowing down even AFTER being assigned a speed etc.

I had a session yesterday where it shouldn’t have been busy but literally every single transmission I had to make 2-3 times.
 
Politely, the 1,500 hour rule has zero to do with this, and everything to do with the broken compensation model that existed at the time of Colgan until recently.

The sub-1,500 hour pilots should be getting their experience the way they have always done it, out flying in the real world. The FAA agreed with time limits even before the rule, because they thought having 1.200 hours to flying boxes in a 310 under 135 was a good idea, and they were, and are, right.

You learn your machine and environment slowly, with experiences that that no pre-scripted simulator can reproduce.. There will always be all stars, the mechanically inclined, the ace of the base that can do fine at 500 hours, but the rules aren’t for them, but for the average pilot.

People forget that the Feds didn’t pull that number out of their rear end. For decades, that was the accepted number not just by the FAA, but insurance carriers and operators. Even in the peak times of massive hiring, where some outfits were seeing 100% annual turnover, they kept the minimums to four digits. Why? Because experience showed them that this level of exposure to the real world prepared the pilot to move to the next level.

For most of time, the 1,500 rule would been completely superfluous, because everyone had experience requirements that exceeded that, and most of the time, far exceeded it.

You can’t force feed 5 years of experience into 3 months worth of simulator time.


While I’m not disagreeing, the accident history due to pilot error was worse back in those days.
 
Politely, the 1,500 hour rule has zero to do with this, and everything to do with the broken compensation model that existed at the time of Colgan until recently.

The sub-1,500 hour pilots should be getting their experience the way they have always done it, out flying in the real world. The FAA agreed with time limits even before the rule, because they thought having 1.200 hours to flying boxes in a 310 under 135 was a good idea, and they were, and are, right.

You learn your machine and environment slowly, with experiences that that no pre-scripted simulator can reproduce.. There will always be all stars, the mechanically inclined, the ace of the base that can do fine at 500 hours, but the rules aren’t for them, but for the average pilot.

People forget that the Feds didn’t pull that number out of their rear end. For decades, that was the accepted number not just by the FAA, but insurance carriers and operators. Even in the peak times of massive hiring, where some outfits were seeing 100% annual turnover, they kept the minimums to four digits. Why? Because experience showed them that this level of exposure to the real world prepared the pilot to move to the next level.

For most of time, the 1,500 rule would been completely superfluous, because everyone had experience requirements that exceeded that, and most of the time, far exceeded it.

You can’t force feed 5 years of experience into 3 months worth of simulator time.

A police officer can qualify with their firearm four times a year, shooting at paper targets, and perform quite well. Throw that same police officer in a VR or theater-type simulator with use of force scenarios and their performance level will be quite different. I equate that to a CFI who is doing day-VFR maneuvers with a student, simply observing and not manipulating the controls, versus repeated decision-making scenarios in various weather conditions with mechanical abnormalities. The student who is exposed to abnormal events and repeatedly is required to apply solid decision-making skills to successfully navigate a scenario will be much better prepared for real-life than someone who does the same basic thing over and over again. Same goes for a police officer who is exposed to simulated use-of-force scenarios to hopefully better prepare them to make appropriate decisions during high-stress events.

It seems that we've entered this downward cycle where a student is taught by a CFI who doesn't want to be there... doesn't put in much effort... so the student doesn't learn much. That student then goes and gets their CFI, teaching the minimal stuff they learned... soon getting burned out waiting for that magical 1500 number to get to the regionals. The cycle we are in is not producing quality applicants. I hear it from DPEs, airline pilots, corporate pilots, and now from air traffic controllers.

If we could make the training more intense, providing "experience" through simulation to develop good decision-making skills and stress inoculation, wouldn't that be a more desirable pilot than one who didn't manipulate the controls but lazily watched someone perform steep turns and stalls over and over all day? I think people are against this idea because it's not the way we've always done it. This way doesn't make a pilot "pay their dues" to gain experience. I am not against instructing by the way. I think it's extremely valuable, but not as much for decision-making as much as for communication skills.
 
It seems that we've entered this downward cycle where a student is taught by a CFI who doesn't want to be there... doesn't put in much effort... so the student doesn't learn much.

Until this is fixed none of the rest matters. You can have the greatest sims/VR and the best scenarios based scripts to teach from, but if the CFI isn’t putting in any effort it’s no better than just plowing maneuvers in the practice area.
 
A police officer can qualify with their firearm four times a year, shooting at paper targets, and perform quite well. Throw that same police officer in a VR or theater-type simulator with use of force scenarios and their performance level will be quite different.


Oo oo ohhh…. Do that for FFDO recurrent please.
 
Until this is fixed none of the rest matters. You can have the greatest sims/VR and the best scenarios based scripts to teach from, but if the CFI isn’t putting in any effort it’s no better than just plowing maneuvers in the practice area.

Not only that, this isn’t anything new.

Anyone who thinks that slack/tired/burned out/underpaid CFIs is some kind of new phenomenon doesn’t know their history.

Any CFI that is just droning along isn’t doing their job.

It takes a proactive school management structure that actively monitors the results of their instructors to produce well rounded pilots.

As I said, none of this is new. At. All. There are people who seem to think that it is. To what end? Unknown.

If we were talking about an academic institution, I’d say someone was fluffing up a grant proposal.
 
Not only that, this isn’t anything new.

Anyone who thinks that slack/tired/burned out/underpaid CFIs is some kind of new phenomenon doesn’t know their history.

Any CFI that is just droning along isn’t doing their job.

It takes a proactive school management structure that actively monitors the results of their instructors to produce well rounded pilots.

As I said, none of this is new. At. All. There are people who seem to think that it is. To what end? Unknown.

If we were talking about an academic institution, I’d say someone was fluffing up a grant proposal.

I was going to say....he pretty much described every CFI I had in college. I didn't get quality instruction until I went to Texas for my CFII, multi-engine, and MEI. Everything before that was trash. I didn't even know how bad it was until I went somewhere different and when I started instructing because I had no other form of reference.
 
I'd just like to add to this thread by saying that this 91 pilot took a Lear in to and out of EWR today without making @NovemberEcho or any of his coworkers repeat a single transmission. No phone numbers to copy or anything.

The only mistake of note for the day was the United crew at my homebase who read back my clearance, twice, despite the controller telling them it was for a different aircraft. Oh and they weren't even on the correct frequency.
 
I was going to say....he pretty much described every CFI I had in college. I didn't get quality instruction until I went to Texas for my CFII, multi-engine, and MEI. Everything before that was trash. I didn't even know how bad it was until I went somewhere different and when I started instructing because I had no other form of reference.

This is exactly my point. Our current system of training and gaining “experience” is broken. If we could hire well-experienced 66 year old retired pilots to be simulator instructors to teach primary students, why would that not be a great alternative? Share decades of experience to young pilots who can then find employment at 400, 500 hours, rather than that young pilot doing something they don’t want to do.

Flight schools could gobble up these experienced pilots to impart wisdom for $60 an hour at an operating cost of maybe $10 an hour (the sim cost). That’s $70 an hour or so cost to the student compared to $250 an hour of garbage instruction. This could also be a good job for pilots who are out on extended leave due to medical issues. Why lose that experience to a job outside aviation?

Edited to add: Another benefit of cheaper flight training using VR/sim could be opening doors to a larger applicant pool, especially those in low-income communities.
 
I instructed for years. Don’t know how many hours. I had one engine failure with a student. And a student who had an engine failure while flying solo. Both were really big learning experiences. Not sure how to replace those kinds of things.

I also really enjoyed teaching and being an instructor. I noticed not everyone did. Not sure what to do about that later. Instructors being in it for the wrong reasons are terrible for everyone. Even at the major airline level.
 
Edited to add: Another benefit of cheaper flight training using VR/sim could be opening doors to a larger applicant pool, especially those in low-income communities.

Our training center has a brand new Airbus sim which is VR based. I haven’t had a chance to try it out yet, but it looks interesting from what I’ve seen of it.
 
I had a multi-engine student today in the simulator. We were practicing instrument approaches with the expectation that an engine failure could occur at any time. I was vectoring him for an ILS approach and noticed that he had not changed the CDI needle from GPS to VLOC. I didn't say anything, and decided to see how things played out. Well he descended on a course that was not the localizer. I set a 300-foot ceiling and 1/8 mile visibility, since my plan was to have him get to minimums, do a go-around, and give him an engine failure as he went full power on the miss. Instead my plans changed when I saw the error. At one point he was maybe 20 feet above the ground and we passed between two pine trees. He yelled "holy crap" and went full power.

How do you simulate that under a hood? I'm sure that seeing two trees go by on each wingtip drove home the importance of ensuring the CDI needle was properly set when I explained that if this was a real airplane we'd be dead and in a NTSB report.

Another thing I do with students is use my engine failure switch on the iPad to simulate a broken engine-driven fuel pump. They go through the checklist perfectly but the engine won't start. Some try flipping random switches. They stare at the checklist wondering what is going on. So I ask, "did you do everything correctly?" Most say, "I think I did?" So I press, "are you confident that you followed the procedures correctly?" Some say yes, but most say no. I then tell them "turn on the alternate fuel pump and try starting that way." When the engine starts, they look back at the checklist like they did something wrong. So I ask again, "are you confident you followed procedures?" We discuss some more, and I finally get to my point: If you know the procedures, and you follow the procedures, and you double-check yourself, then be confident and know it's not you. It's the airplane that is broken." It is an exercise that hopefully builds confidence and stresses the importance of procedural compliance. We then discuss the fuel system, and I always say, "so if the engine ever quietly just quits, we have to remember to check fuel, fuel, fuel. Mixture, fuel pumps, fuel selectors. Give it all the fuel, fly the airplane, and go to the emergency checklist." The next sim session we'll be flying along and I'll fail the engine. Most students pitch for L/Dmax and find a field or whatever and land. Then I ask them, "did you try the alternate fuel pump?" No, of course not... and I tell them if they did, the engine would have immediately restarted and we'd be on our way. Instead we crashed into trees at the end of this cornfield. Again, there's no way to simulate this stuff in a real airplane, but I feel it really drives home some important points.

It's the benefit of being able to die, learn why you died, then don't die that way again.
 
Our training center has a brand new Airbus sim which is VR based. I haven’t had a chance to try it out yet, but it looks interesting from what I’ve seen of it.

Loft Dynamics? I flew their H-125 sim at a conference in Texas. It is incredibly impressive.
 
Back
Top