PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision

This accident eerily reminds me of the AZ Air National Guard KC-135A and Grumman AA-1 midair collision on final to Luke AFB on 13 March 1982, except it being two fixed wing.

Hey @derg can we have a "Mike's accident series" sub-forum or something? That would be cool. I love these. Like Peter Garrison Aftermaths and such.
 
In the LEX accident, I don’t think the tower was even open yet for business that morning, when the RJ taxiied for takeoff.
The episode I watched about incident said the controller wasn't required to monitor the airfield visually?
 
This is getting off track… going to delete the irrelevant posts. There’s a definite communication misunderstanding going on - we can’t effectively referee it so I’m removing it. Let’s stay on topic and keep the drama in the lav.
 
The episode I watched about incident said the controller wasn't required to monitor the airfield visually?

I believe the controller was getting morning duties completed. No requirement to monitor once departure clearance was given, if there were no other ground aircraft movements or landing traffic. Comair lined up with the wrong runway, which was also unlit at the time, and commenced takeoff.

I read every damn post. I did not glean from the thread why a controller looking at a radar failed to see 2 aircraft on a collision course.

It’s possible the tower controller was visually managing traffic at the time. Many radars in ATC towers are for reference only, not necessarily for vectoring purposes, and a tower controller’s primary duties are usually visual. Now, this will remain to be seen with the accident investigation what the exact details are.
 
I believe the controller was getting morning duties completed. No requirement to monitor once departure clearance was given, if there were no other ground aircraft movements or landing traffic. Comair lined up with the wrong runway, which was also unlit at the time, and commenced takeoff.



It’s possible the tower controller was visually managing traffic at the time. Many radars in ATC towers are for reference only, not necessarily for vectoring purposes, and a tower controller’s primary duties are usually visual. Now, this will remain to be seen with the accident investigation what the exact details are.
Thank you for the detailed explanation.
 
It’s possible the tower controller was visually managing traffic at the time. Many radars in ATC towers are for reference only, not necessarily for vectoring purposes, and a tower controller’s primary duties are usually visual.
Can’t quote the deleted post Mike’s responding to, but to expand upon his answer - ATC did see and respond to two merging aircraft. That’s exactly why visual separation was issued, with the instruction to pass behind.

Besides, radar displays in tower cabs are to be used for situational awareness only. As a standalone tower (as opposed to a tower-TRACON), DCA controllers are not certified to use radar for anything other than correlating the visual position of aircraft.

The application of visual separation may be up for discussion, but the assumption that ATC didn’t react appropriately to merging radar targets is wrong (and not a duty appropriate for that environment anyway).
 
Can’t quote the deleted post Mike’s responding to, but to expand upon his answer - ATC did see and respond to two merging aircraft. That’s exactly why visual separation was issued, with the instruction to pass behind.

Besides, radar displays in tower cabs are to be used for situational awareness only. As a standalone tower (as opposed to a tower-TRACON), DCA controllers are not certified to use radar for anything other than correlating the visual position of aircraft.

The application of visual separation may be up for discussion, but the assumption that ATC didn’t react appropriately to merging radar targets is wrong (and not a duty appropriate for that environment anyway).

Agreed. Once the traffic was issued, acknowledged as seen, visual separation issued, and accepted, then the separation responsibility shifted to the helicopter.
 
Can’t quote the deleted post Mike’s responding to, but to expand upon his answer - ATC did see and respond to two merging aircraft. That’s exactly why visual separation was issued, with the instruction to pass behind.

Besides, radar displays in tower cabs are to be used for situational awareness only. As a standalone tower (as opposed to a tower-TRACON), DCA controllers are not certified to use radar for anything other than correlating the visual position of aircraft.

The application of visual separation may be up for discussion, but the assumption that ATC didn’t react appropriately to merging radar targets is wrong (and not a duty appropriate for that environment anyway).
There are some towers that do have radar separation responsibilities and DCA is one of them. They call it Helicopter Control at DCA, in the NY metro we call it CBA (class b airspace)
 
Can’t quote the deleted post Mike’s responding to, but to expand upon his answer - ATC did see and respond to two merging aircraft. That’s exactly why visual separation was issued, with the instruction to pass behind.

Besides, radar displays in tower cabs are to be used for situational awareness only. As a standalone tower (as opposed to a tower-TRACON), DCA controllers are not certified to use radar for anything other than correlating the visual position of aircraft.

The application of visual separation may be up for discussion, but the assumption that ATC didn’t react appropriately to merging radar targets is wrong (and not a duty appropriate for that environment anyway).
The scenario makes more sense to me with your explanation. A couple of thoughts... Should tower controllers be trained to use radar in the same manner as TRACON controllers? Should the FAA revisit see and avoid at night in busy environments?
 
This is getting off track… going to delete the irrelevant posts. There’s a definite communication misunderstanding going on - we can’t effectively referee it so I’m removing it. Let’s stay on topic and keep the drama in the lav.
I'm over it now. 😃
 
The scenario makes more sense to me with your explanation. A couple of thoughts... Should tower controllers be trained to use radar in the same manner as TRACON controllers? Should the FAA revisit see and avoid at night in busy environments?
If tower controllers needed to abide by the same rules and restrictions as tracon controllers, no one would go anywhere.
 
I agree that IAD could handle more traffic from DCA. DCA should never have been a hub, but when I fly to the east coast, I often am offered connections through DCA. I prefer Charlotte if I'm flying American. And cross-country flights from DCA to tiny ass cities like Wichita is nuts.
The scenario makes more sense to me with your explanation. A couple of thoughts... Should tower controllers be trained to use radar in the same manner as TRACON controllers? Should the FAA revisit see and avoid at night in busy environments?
I mean, IDK. Full disclosure: I haven't flown an airplane in decades and have never been a commercial pilot.

Still, there are clear requirements and restrictions around DCA which have worked - until that horrible night - successfully. They have done so because they were adhered to; in this case (possibly) not.

It may sound callous (and for that I apologize) but after 41 years in emergency services I'm not sure how you get rid of the human element, unless you get rid of the humans. If the altitude restriction is 200 feet, one needs to stay at or below 200 feet (or whatever). If one doesn't, bad things can happen and others pay the price.
 
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