PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision

This is already how the system works. If the CA CA goes off, it is not just audible, both aircraft involved get a red CA (conflict alert) next to their data tag. The CA CA goes off all the time when visual separation is being applied. It is part of the aviation social contract, controller points out traffic, pilot says they have the traffic in sight, controller assumes the pilot does in fact have the traffic in sight. This controller did it twice. I could not say I would have done anything different, except maybe not using "no delay" and "immediate" in the same transmission to the AAL departure, but I digress. The gist of it is I would probably not have done anything different if I were the tower controller. I feel really bad for him and his family because the system failed him as well.

While I get that, I think it’s clear that the Blackhawk called out the wrong traffic in sight.

As for the controller:


“Do you have that CRJ in sight?”


Versus


“Pat 25, Traffic alert, danger close ;) , CRJ at half mile 10 o clock”


Kidding for danger close. But I think a traffic call - especially the second one which was controllers tingly spider feeling - SHOULD be distance and clock direction.

Had the Blackhawk heard one half mile and 10’o clock, that might have forced them to think wait a minute, the guy we are looking at is much further than 1/2 mile, so who is this guy really close to us?

Could have made all the difference.
 
It's unfortunate. The controller didn't do anything wrong, but he probably feels horrible for what happened. Probably second guessing every decision he made that led up to that point. I don't he doesn't feel like he's at fault - can't imagine living with that.


One guy on a break, one guy watching two screens. Hello DHL 757 and Bashkirian Airkines TU-154 Germany midair 2002.
 
The ADS-B In traffic information are on the ND even when the TCAS is turned off / standby with the engines are shutdown at the gate.
Seems like it wouldn't be that difficult to write a filter to present targets which are a threat and eliminate those which aren't.
 
This is already how the system works. If the CA CA goes off, it is not just audible, both aircraft involved get a red CA (conflict alert) next to their data tag. The CA CA goes off all the time when visual separation is being applied. It is part of the aviation social contract, controller points out traffic, pilot says they have the traffic in sight, controller assumes the pilot does in fact have the traffic in sight. This controller did it twice. I could not say I would have done anything different, except maybe not using "no delay" and "immediate" in the same transmission to the AAL departure, but I digress. The gist of it is I would probably not have done anything different if I were the tower controller. I feel really bad for him and his family because the system failed him as well.
One thing I'm used to hearing that I didn't hear here—"Regional 12345, traffic 2 o'clock, less than a mile, helicopter, has you in sight" or something to that effect. This seems more common in some places, less in others. I might have just missed it, and I don't know if it's required. I know that when I hear that it prompts me to double-check.

To be clear, I'm not saying or implying in any way that there was ANY ATC error here. It's hard to imagine one, from my point of view, but it does make me think of things that I've seen that mitigate that sort of interaction for me.
 
One thing I'm used to hearing that I didn't hear here—"Regional 12345, traffic 2 o'clock, less than a mile, helicopter, has you in sight" or something to that effect. This seems more common in some places, less in others. I might have just missed it, and I don't know if it's required. I know that when I hear that it prompts me to double-check.

To be clear, I'm not saying or implying in any way that there was ANY ATC error here. It's hard to imagine one, from my point of view, but it does make me think of things that I've seen that mitigate that sort of interaction for me.
I do agree with this. The saying you will hear around the office time and again is "traffic for one is traffic for the other," while there are exceptions like 1% of the time, it is a good mantra. On the other hand, as discussed on the first few pages of this thread, seeing traffic high to low at night is extremely difficult, and it is even harder to see traffic through your floor when you are wings up. I am quite sure the crew of JIA had no idea what happened.

Duty priority is separation of traffic and issuing of safety alerts. If you think the traffic is visually separated then there is no safety alert to give. Next comes safe, orderly and expeditious flow of traffic. the orderly and expeditious part are why those helicopter routes exist and why the circle to 33 off-load is used in the first place. The congestion at DCA is added institutional pressure. The guy working the traffic probably did not write the SOP
 
How is that tragedy relevant? I'm not familiar with it. At DCA, there was 1 controller working. He followed protocol, did nothing wrong.

The only similarity is that the probable cause was ruled to be institutional drift, which I suspect may be a causal factor here. Peter Nielson, the Swiss controller working the aircraft was murdered by the husband of some of the victims.
 
How is that tragedy relevant? I'm not familiar with it. At DCA, there was 1 controller working. He followed protocol, did nothing wrong.


That remains to be seen. You can’t conclude that.


Look up the Uberlingen collision of 2002.


Anyway, in this case, 2 people were working but one was sent home early. So now one guy has to do 2 screens. My understanding is before, 1 guy did the planes, the other guy had the capacity to do helicopters. If that had been the case, one could have alerted the heli AND the other could have alerted the CR7.

As it stands, no warning was issued to the CR7.

Lack of staffing, less manpower in the tower with one man down earlier than expected, and no warning issued to the CR7. All or some can be considered contributory factors.


Time will tell, we have to wait for the final NTSB report.
 
On the other hand, as discussed on the first few pages of this thread, seeing traffic high to low at night is extremely difficult, and it is even harder to see traffic through your floor when you are wings up. I am quite sure the crew of JIA had no idea what happened.

You might be surprised how much we can see, especially if we know where to look. And night, even with low traffic and a lot of lights, is often even easier. Sometimes I can't pick up traffic 4 miles away on a clear day and I'm just like "dude, am I blind?" ... but other times, at night or dusk, I see everything within thirty miles.

In short? it doesn't hurt.

I actually think the CRJ may have seen the helo a second or two before impact, but it's just a hunch. The investigation will tell, assuming it proceeds unobstructed.
 
That remains to be seen. You can’t conclude that.


Look up the Uberlingen collision of 2002.


Anyway, in this case, 2 people were working but one was sent home early. So now one guy has to do 2 screens. My understanding is before, 1 guy did the planes, the other guy had the capacity to do helicopters. If that had been the case, one could have alerted the heli AND the other could have alerted the CR7.

As it stands, no warning was issued to the CR7.

Lack of staffing, less manpower in the tower with one man down earlier than expected, and no warning issued to the CR7. All or some can be considered contributory factors.


Time will tell, we have to wait for the final NTSB report.
Is it normal for the tower to use more than 1 frequency? The CR7 crew didn't hear the conversation with the helicopter. If they were aware of each other, maybe the outcome would be different, maybe not.

I have a though regarding 1 controller on duty. What happens if he has a medical event that is incipacitating? What if he gets a call that is wife is in an accident and in critical condition? He won't be able to focus. That's one of the reasons airplanes have 2 pilots on board, no? 1 controller seems unwise from a medical standpoint.
 
Is it normal for the tower to use more than 1 frequency? The CR7 crew didn't hear the conversation with the helicopter. If they were aware of each other, maybe the outcome would be different, maybe not.

I have a though regarding 1 controller on duty. What happens if he has a medical event that is incipacitating? What if he gets a call that is wife is in an accident and in critical condition? He won't be able to focus. That's one of the reasons airplanes have 2 pilots on board, no? 1 controller seems unwise from a medical standpoint.
I personally prefer to put everyone on the same frequency when I am working multiple, but not everyone does that.

However, in this case the Helo is reported to be on UHF which is military only. Larger military aircraft usually have both UHF and VHF radios, but smaller ones often only have UHF radios, so putting both on the same frequency would be impossible.

At the time of the incident, there were 3 controllers on duty, not one. It is not uncommon for the Local Controller to be working what they call the helicopter control at times when there is not a lot of traffic at one or both positions.
 
I personally prefer to put everyone on the same frequency when I am working multiple, but not everyone does that.

However, in this case the Helo is reported to be on UHF which is military only. Larger military aircraft usually have both UHF and VHF radios, but smaller ones often only have UHF radios, so putting both on the same frequency would be impossible.

At the time of the incident, there were 3 controllers on duty, not one. It is not uncommon for the Local Controller to be working what they call the helicopter control at times when there is not a lot of traffic at one or both positions.

Generally though, with the same controller working two frequencies: wouldn’t that controller be simulcasting, where the transmissions would be on both freqs, but the responses would be on the individual freqs? Even hearing just the ATC side of the comms is good situational awareness.
 
Generally though, with the same controller working two frequencies: wouldn’t that controller be simulcasting, where the transmissions would be on both freqs, but the responses would be on the individual freqs? Even hearing just the ATC side of the comms is good situational awareness.
That is correct. At the center our routinely combined sectors were so large geographically that we had something called cross coupling that was supposed to relay the aircraft transmissions on the other frequency, but it never worked properly so we didn't use it.

I know when I am piloting I am always listening to and trying to visualize everything else that is going on, but I do not know how common that is, in fact I suspect it is the exception. If PAT was conducting some sort of unrelated training on board the helicopter they may not have been paying as close attention.
If they were indeed conducting training in that vicinity, the only training they should be doing there is familiarization and certification of flying in that vicinity.
 
That is correct. At the center our routinely combined sectors were so large geographically that we had something called cross coupling that was supposed to relay the aircraft transmissions on the other frequency, but it never worked properly so we didn't use it.

I know when I am piloting I am always listening to and trying to visualize everything else that is going on, but I do not know how common that is, in fact I suspect it is the exception. If PAT was conducting some sort of unrelated training on board the helicopter they may not have been paying as close attention.
If they were indeed conducting training in that vicinity, the only training they should be doing there is familiarization and certification of flying in that vicinity.
This, among many other things, is why I've written multiple letters to congress critters trying to get them to push the FAA to reinstate fam flights, ideally on a space-available basis just like our jumpseat agreements.

I, for one, WANT controllers to jumpseat around a few times a year to have an idea what it looks like from our side. I think we could smooth things out and improve safety.

But then staffing was a bigger priority, something I also touched on.

Not that I ever even got a single response on any of those letters.

And not that anything governmental matters at this point.
 
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