PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision

So is the informed consensus that route 4 is incompatible with a RWY 1 circle to 33 FW aircraft? It seems the margins are very small, even with a helo maintaining max altitude on the route
What if the plane got a little low on approach, hypothetically? That would reduce the margins too.
 
I’ll buy that but the impact was on the right side which would mean a right wing stall rolling the aircraft right. But it rolls left.

Hit someone hard enough from underneath the right wing, and you will cause a left roll. I don't really think "stalling" was a significant contributor to the post impact gyrations seen. They lost a wing, and inertia took over.
 
And I can’t see any reaction for the helicopter prior to impact. I can’t imagine what they were looking at.

I'd imagine they were either incapacitated or deceased by this point, post impact. Their CVR (is that a thing in mil helos?) would likely tell that story if such a thing exists.
 
I'd imagine they were either incapacitated or deceased by this point, post impact. Their CVR (is that a thing in mil helos?) would likely tell that story if such a thing exists.
If ABC World News Tonight is accurate, they stated the helicopter CVR was recovered.
 
If ABC World News Tonight is accurate, they stated the helicopter CVR was recovered.

What I saw was "black box". Don't know what that means for a military airplane. For mine, we have what is called a DFIRS that is ejected from between the vertical stabs if a certain deceleration metric is met or an ejection takes place. It is basically a poor mans FDR. The "CVR" would be burned up in the aircraft wreckage, as it is a solid state recorder located in the cockpit, that is not hardened in any way, and would only have been recording in the first place, if the pilot (or in a 2 seat jet, the crew) turned it on......which is not all the time, generally only the tactical phase of a given flight, then turned off for all other phases of flight. I'm not sure that the civilian idea of a "black box" translates to the same thing in a Blackhawk
 
Post crash, comfort PAs?

Would be interested in opinions. New thread:

 
Post crash, comfort PAs?

Would be interested in opinions. New thread:

No, don’t acknowledge it at all.
 
After the CRJ crew was cleared from RWY 01 to 33, were they basically hand-flying it, or was there any kind of vertical guidance from a NAV system? I ask because I don’t know (I’m just a recip GA guy). I’m not trying to imply anything - just that both pilots would have their eyes out looking left-ish, watching the threshold, runway environment, lining up with the extended centerline, etc,
 
After the CRJ crew was cleared from RWY 01 to 33, were they basically hand-flying it, or was there any kind of vertical guidance from a NAV system? I ask because I don’t know (I’m just a recip GA guy). I’m not trying to imply anything - just that both pilots would have their eyes out looking left-ish, watching the threshold, runway environment, lining up with the extended centerline, etc,
There is an RNaV to 33 now that kind of follows the typical mount vernon to 33 path. Whether they were using that at all I don’t know but I’m sure someone could overlay they points with the track and get a good idea.
 
I’ve seen it suggested that the CRJ was in a slight left bank and that the helicopter came below it and struck the left wing that was dipped down. That might explain why the right wing is intact despite the helicopter coming from the right side.
 
I’ve seen it suggested that the CRJ was in a slight left bank and that the helicopter came below it and struck the left wing that was dipped down. That might explain why the right wing is intact despite the helicopter coming from the right side.
That seems kinda self evident from the flight path
 
If tower controllers needed to abide by the same rules and restrictions as tracon controllers, no one would go anywhere.
I wasn't suggesting they abide by the same rules, more so that they have the training to understand a radar screen so that at night or in limited visibility conditions they could spot a potential conflict on radar. I don't know if that's practical in a control tower environment but that's a thought.

Or maybe radar could be programed to make an audible noise if there is an identified conflict and visually highlight on the screen to 2 airplanes in conflict. Since TCAS is disabled, the controller could attempt to issue orders for maneuvers in a way that would keep the aircraft from going into the ground. AI could be incorporated into the radar system to identify a conflict.

Or could a landing mode be added to TCAS, will logic to identity and alert the aircraft to change course if it could be done without one of the aircraft going into the ground? If a course of action can not be identified without crashing one of the planes, the no alert issued? Just some thoughts.
 
I wasn't suggesting they abide by the same rules, more so that they have the training to understand a radar screen so that at night or in limited visibility conditions they could spot a potential conflict on radar. I don't know if that's practical in a control tower environment but that's a thought.

Or maybe radar could be programed to make an audible noise if there is an identified conflict and visually highlight on the screen to 2 airplanes in conflict. Since TCAS is disabled, the controller could attempt to issue orders for maneuvers in a way that would keep the aircraft from going into the ground. AI could be incorporated into the radar system to identify a conflict.
This is already how the system works. If the CA CA goes off, it is not just audible, both aircraft involved get a red CA (conflict alert) next to their data tag. The CA CA goes off all the time when visual separation is being applied. It is part of the aviation social contract, controller points out traffic, pilot says they have the traffic in sight, controller assumes the pilot does in fact have the traffic in sight. This controller did it twice. I could not say I would have done anything different, except maybe not using "no delay" and "immediate" in the same transmission to the AAL departure, but I digress. The gist of it is I would probably not have done anything different if I were the tower controller. I feel really bad for him and his family because the system failed him as well.
 
This is already how the system works. If the CA CA goes off, it is not just audible, both aircraft involved get a red CA (conflict alert) next to their data tag. The CA CA goes off all the time when visual separation is being applied. It is part of the aviation social contract, controller points out traffic, pilot says they have the traffic in sight, controller assumes the pilot does in fact have the traffic in sight. This controller did it twice. I could not say I would have done anything different, except maybe not using "no delay" and "immediate" in the same transmission to the AAL departure, but I digress. The gist of it is I would probably not have done anything different if I were the tower controller. I feel really bad for him and his family because the system failed him as well.
It's unfortunate. The controller didn't do anything wrong, but he probably feels horrible for what happened. Probably second guessing every decision he made that led up to that point. I don't he doesn't feel like he's at fault - can't imagine living with that.
 
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