Oh, Boeing

this aged poorly...but that's par for the course for CC




Avoiding a criminal trial does not mean they are guilty.

You do realize, this is lawyer talk and millions spent in this case they advised Boeing, “take this deal.”
 
But yet it is meaningless.

A fundamental system flaw cannot and should not (and spoiler alert, it isn't) be ignored under the lens of better crews who would have not crashed it when the evidence of this claim is already wrong with the Ethiopian crash.

Crews are trained for system failures and issues, to which these crews were. To assume they should fix a manufacturing defect because all pilots can is ridiculous.



The 250 hr FO was worthless when things go wrong. I know, cause I was one too.


The Ethiopian took off with the CA as PF, had a AOA disagree alert and a stick shaker, and the CAs response to that was:

Autopilot on.

Didn’t take (of course)

He asked for it on 2 more times. With an AOA disagree and his stick shaker going off the entire time.

3 times for AP on.

Once I read this alone, I knew this crew (and pax) were already dead.
 
The 250 hr FO was worthless when things go wrong. I know, cause I was one too.


The Ethiopian took off with the CA as PF, had a AOA disagree alert and a stick shaker, and the CAs response to that was:

Autopilot on.

Didn’t take (of course)

He asked for it on 2 more times. With an AOA disagree and his stick shaker going off the entire time.

3 times for AP on.

Once I read this alone, I knew this crew (and pax) were already dead.
That's not really relevant to Boeing being criminal. To develop a product with a systemic flaw, hide it from the government body responsible for certifying the aircraft, and downplay the importance of the system to customers, is criminal. They plead guilty to a crime, so whether they did it or not, they admitted guilt. One wonders why you are so quick defend Boeing. Boeing has a systemic problem. The other issies that have plagued Boeing lately may not be criminal, but are a symptom of a larger issue. When there's rot in the wood, you cut it out. Boeing has a culture problem. I hope they can fix it.
 
That's not really relevant to Boeing being criminal. To develop a product with a systemic flaw, hide it from the government body responsible for certifying the aircraft, and downplay the importance of the system to customers, is criminal. They plead guilty to a crime, so whether they did it or not, they admitted guilt. One wonders why you are so quick defend Boeing. Boeing has a systemic problem. The other issies that have plagued Boeing lately may not be criminal, but are a symptom of a larger issue. When there's rot in the wood, you cut it out. Boeing has a culture problem. I hope they can fix it.
Related (maybe) observation: based on other topics, @Cherokee_Cruiser doesn’t appear to believe in “systemic problems”. Maybe that thought process carries over to Boeing?
 
The 250 hr FO was worthless when things go wrong. I know, cause I was one too.


The Ethiopian took off with the CA as PF, had a AOA disagree alert and a stick shaker, and the CAs response to that was:

Autopilot on.

Didn’t take (of course)

He asked for it on 2 more times. With an AOA disagree and his stick shaker going off the entire time.

3 times for AP on.

Once I read this alone, I knew this crew (and pax) were already dead.

Again, you have the luxury of hindsight and reading about a problem at airspeed zero in the comfort of your home. I am not excusing their decisions but they should have never seen an AOA disagree because that airplane should not have had a faulty sensor and a single point of failure to trigger MCAS. If this was easily dismissed as simply pilot error (which it is quite obvious to most, isn't) then Boeing wouldn't be in the mess it it is in. The MAX would be delivered without delay, it would have never been grounded (which was the first time that has EVER happened to any airplane ever, and it kinda happened twice) and Boeing wouldn't have just pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government.
 
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What was the mx effort done, after said flight the night before, involved the crew throwing the stab cutout switches? Not trying to re-assign blame, but holy hell, that is not a normal write up. At all. If I saw that on a white page, with a "could not duplicate" or random "ran BIT test XYZ" I'd have serious reservations about flying it.......even if I'm not the guy who signs for it in this world.

Sooooooooooooo about that…

December 19th I was called out for a SEA-HNL. Walk down to “the jet” to find a very nice FO and 4 great FAs. I do my “captain spectacular” briefing put my bags away. Let the FO know “you pick the legs and the meals” and offer to do the walk around. Hat, blazer and all.

On the walk around I see a mechanic with the logbook. “Oh hey. What’s going on?” “Not much just reset the light on the pressurization panel.”

“We good for ETOPS?”

“Yep”

“Cool see ya in a bit.”

Mechanic eventually comes back to the flight deck, hands me the logbook when I’m about 1/2 way through the ETOPS briefing card. I look though about 10 yellow pages of the logbook to see if there is anything troubling. Nothing repeating. Nothing weird. I’ve got zero hesitations about taking one of our newest airplanes across the Pacific Ocean.

Two weeks later the door popped off that same tail. Because it was missing the bolts meant to hold the door in place.

I still lie awake at night sometimes, going down very dark places. I’d rather be lucky than good for sure. However, all the horrific things that could have happened on that flight keep me up at night.

Also, I’m not saying I wouldn’t refuse a tail number here and ask for a replacement but it wouldn’t be my favorite thing to do. I would expect to be questioned about it and likely not supported as well. I’ve yet to do it.

No APU on a Sacramento turn during the summer. I wasn’t the captain but I’ve had to do it as an FO. You gonna grind the operation to a halt for that? As a captain? As an FO?

I probably wouldn’t do it again. Then again I might not even make it to the airport before boarding and if I get the short term call out parking I probably won’t be reading the briefing packet until I’ve sat down in “the jet.”

🤷‍♂️
 
Sooooooooooooo about that…

December 19th I was called out for a SEA-HNL. Walk down to “the jet” to find a very nice FO and 4 great FAs. I do my “captain spectacular” briefing put my bags away. Let the FO know “you pick the legs and the meals” and offer to do the walk around. Hat, blazer and all.

On the walk around I see a mechanic with the logbook. “Oh hey. What’s going on?” “Not much just reset the light on the pressurization panel.”

“We good for ETOPS?”

“Yep”

“Cool see ya in a bit.”

Mechanic eventually comes back to the flight deck, hands me the logbook when I’m about 1/2 way through the ETOPS briefing card. I look though about 10 yellow pages of the logbook to see if there is anything troubling. Nothing repeating. Nothing weird. I’ve got zero hesitations about taking one of our newest airplanes across the Pacific Ocean.

Two weeks later the door popped off that same tail. Because it was missing the bolts meant to hold the door in place.

I still lie awake at night sometimes, going down very dark places. I’d rather be lucky than good for sure. However, all the horrific things that could have happened on that flight keep me up at night.

Also, I’m not saying I wouldn’t refuse a tail number here and ask for a replacement but it wouldn’t be my favorite thing to do. I would expect to be questioned about it and likely not supported as well. I’ve yet to do it.

No APU on a Sacramento turn during the summer. I wasn’t the captain but I’ve had to do it as an FO. You gonna grind the operation to a halt for that? As a captain? As an FO?

I probably wouldn’t do it again. Then again I might not even make it to the airport before boarding and if I get the short term call out parking I probably won’t be reading the briefing packet until I’ve sat down in “the jet.”

🤷‍♂️
That is legit scary man. It would haunt me too.

Only tail I have refused so far as a CA was on a 700 in SEA. We park, bridge pulls up, people get off. Jet bridge alarm goes off and when they try to move it, it’s stuck. Well the jet bridge driver had wedged the bridge to L1 so bad that they couldn’t move the bridge. It causes a mess with the port authority who come out and actually have to move the plane off of the bridge. Maintenance closes and opens L1 a few times and let’s just say it sounded a little funny, but MX said it was good. I turn around to see a white faced FA who is now terrified that this door isn’t going to seal, is going to fly off or at the very least, cause a pressurization issue. MX was conflicted on whether or not anything needed to be tested on the ground before we could take it. Finally I refused it as we couldn’t come to a consensus on doing a ground pressurization test before putting passengers on board, and that was 2 months after the MAX incident.
 
What on earth do you thing a “guilty plea” signifies?

Avoiding a who knows how long trial and associated coverage. Saying yeah we’ll take guilty, in exchange for this slight slap on the wrist it’s just the words necessary for the slight punishment. Make no mistake, Boeing isn’t sorry for anything. If they were, they wouldn’t have have let things go this far to get to the level we are at now.
 
To me, this is a no-brainer. Is it really that much more expensive to have designed the aircraft to have 2 pitot tubes? Don't most airlines have 2 incase one fails? Is there any major system on modern airliners thay doesn't have some level of redundancy?
Again, you have the luxury of hindsight and reading about a problem at airspeed zero in the comfort of your home. I am not excusing their decisions but they should have never seen an AOA disagree because that airplane should not have had a faulty sensor and a single point of failure to trigger MCAS. If this was easily dismissed as simply pilot error (which it is quite obvious to most, isn't) then Boeing wouldn't be in the mess it it is in. The MAX would be delivered without delay, it would have never been grounded (which was the first time that has EVER happened to any airplane ever, and it kinda happened twice) and Boeing wouldn't have just pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the governme
 
Wellllllll, it's a little more complex when it comes to ADCs and whatnot.
 
Again, you have the luxury of hindsight and reading about a problem at airspeed zero in the comfort of your home. I am not excusing their decisions but they should have never seen an AOA disagree because that airplane should not have had a faulty sensor and a single point of failure to trigger MCAS. If this was easily dismissed as simply pilot error (which it is quite obvious to most, isn't) then Boeing wouldn't be in the mess it it is in. The MAX would be delivered without delay, it would have never been grounded (which was the first time that has EVER happened to any airplane ever, and it kinda happened twice) and Boeing wouldn't have just pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government.
And Ethiopian isn't on the same level as your Indonesian airliners. Historically, Ethiopian has had a solid safety record. If it could happen there, it could happen with a US airline.
 
Again, you have the luxury of hindsight and reading about a problem at airspeed zero in the comfort of your home. I am not excusing their decisions but they should have never seen an AOA disagree because that airplane should not have had a faulty sensor and a single point of failure to trigger MCAS. If this was easily dismissed as simply pilot error (which it is quite obvious to most, isn't) then Boeing wouldn't be in the mess it it is in. The MAX would be delivered without delay, it would have never been grounded (which was the first time that has EVER happened to any airplane ever, and it kinda happened twice) and Boeing wouldn't have just pled guilty to conspiracy to defraud the government.




“Never been grounded” isn’t a good look talking point.


After the AA DC10 cargo door blew out and it emergency landed at DTW, the fleet should have been grounded. The locking mechanism was faulty, and the NTSB knew it. McDonnell Douglas was too powerful, and used pressure to not ground the DC10 platform. Not 2 yrs later, the same problem on a Turkish DC10 cargo door blew. This time, a fatal hull loss, 300+ people dead. Then the door was fixed.

That’s one good example. One might argue the rudder hard over was another issue. After the UA and the US, maybe it should have been grounded. Never was.

If this was the USA, FAA, and NTSB of the 70s and 80s, the MAX wouldn’t have been grounded.
 
Share with us, without googling, what you know about the doors on the DC-10 and specifically what the problem was.
 
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