Oh, Boeing

Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Then there was a bulletin that clearly explained MCAS, what it does, and what to do if it ever happens again.
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That would be great if it was actually true, but it really just is not the case; the repeated line of Boeing was existing procedures were adequate to prevent this calamity and the emergency AD merely reinforced the importance of the Runaway Stabilizer memory item while mentioning that all manner of flight deck effects (“FEEL DIFF PRESS?!”) could indicate that the single-string alpha input to the FCC was garbage and firing the stab nose down intermittently (important, for fault recognition) but vigorously.

It ignored that:
1) this specific malfunction was an intermittently but rapidly moving stabilizer that
2) not a single crew in the world had seen in training which
3) is how you run to the limits of expertise and that’s not a good place to put an airline pilot and
4) did I mention they did this on single-input alpha with no comparing and
5) failed to tell ANYONE flying these things about it before the first time it hurt people?

Put more shortly, basic knowledge about pilot performance was ignored, among the other engineering problems.

God it pisses me off every time I write it out.
 
Autothrust Blue said:
That would be great if it was actually true, but it really just is not the case; the repeated line of Boeing was existing procedures were adequate to prevent this calamity and the emergency AD merely reinforced the importance of the Runaway Stabilizer memory item while mentioning that all manner of flight deck effects (“FEEL DIFF PRESS?!”) could indicate that the single-string alpha input to the FCC was garbage and firing the stab nose down intermittently (important, for fault recognition) but vigorously.

It ignored that:
1) this specific malfunction was an intermittently but rapidly moving stabilizer that
2) not a single crew in the world had seen in training which
3) is how you run to the limits of expertise and that’s not a good place to put an airline pilot and
4) did I mention they did this on single-input alpha with no comparing and
5) failed to tell ANYONE flying these things about it before the first time it hurt people?

Put more shortly, basic knowledge about pilot performance was ignored, among the other engineering problems.

God it pisses me off every time I write it out.
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The good news is that my entire career is dependent on this abomination.

Yay!
 
What’s hilarious is that CC read a book that thought the salient problem was the cargo doors. Something corrected with largely training and some minor component modifi…

Wait…

…I hear some notification on an old IRC channel…

…what… OH!

>>>Captain_Al_Haynes ENTERS THE CHAT
 
derg said:
What’s hilarious is that CC read a book that thought the salient problem was the cargo doors. Something corrected with largely training and some minor component modifi…

Wait…

…I hear some notification on an old IRC channel…

…what… OH!

>>>Captain_Al_Haynes ENTERS THE CHAT
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That was 1989.



Try 1972 and 1974


The DC10 had many problems. AA191 and UA232 are well known cases.

Turkish would never have happened if the proper actions were taken after AA 96.
 
derg said:
What’s hilarious is that CC read a book that thought the salient problem was the cargo doors. Something corrected with largely training and some minor component modifi…

Wait…

…I hear some notification on an old IRC channel…

…what… OH!

>>>Captain_Al_Haynes ENTERS THE CHAT
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May the reluctant hero Rest In Peace!

Hope he and Denny are "sure as •" having that beer now.
 
Inverted said:
*Checks DC10 safety record…*

Interesting sentence.
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The 737 had 2 fatal losses too related to flight controls, in the United States. UA at COS and US at PIT. Thanks to an Eastwind Airlines StingerBee, the real problem was finally discovered.

Not once was it grounded back then, and I think you’d agree that was a serious flight control-related issue.

Frankly, I’d rather deal with a runaway stab that can be cutout for 5 seconds with the yoke trim switch, and then permanently cutout with the trim cutout switches, than being at 190 knot approach speed at flaps 5, having a full rudder hardover, and finding out how bad crossover AOA is.
 
Someone’s “when you’re lost, keep digging” entrenching tool is about to wear out.

Might need to sharpen that thing! LOL
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
Yes.

That, or accept it.

No one likes a complainer.


I’m done with the whiney ones at my shop. Now my standard answer is, oh you don’t like it here, so when are you leaving for Delta/United?
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So saying out loud that my employer putting all of its eggs in Boeings basket maybe wasn’t the best idea isn’t OK?
 
BEEF SUPREME said:
So saying out loud that my employer putting all of its eggs in Boeings basket maybe wasn’t the best idea isn’t OK?
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No offense, but what part of “Proudly all Boeing” did you not understand when you applied? The Busses were on their way out.

AS is all Boeing, all the way. Nothing that happened is going to change that. And if this merger goes through, don’t listen to those who believe the 321NEO has a chance. It didn’t before, it won’t now.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
No offense, but what part of “Proudly all Boeing” did you not understand when you applied? The Busses were on their way out.

AS is all Boeing, all the way. Nothing that happened is going to change that. And if this merger goes through, don’t listen to those who believe the 321NEO has a chance. It didn’t before, it won’t now.
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I was hired onto the bus because I applied to that side for one specific reason:

I owned a home in the Bay Area.

I was never once told than the SFO base or the bus was going away. In fact I was led to believe that the bus was my best opportunity to remain in the Bay with friends and family when I asked this specific question during the interview.
 
Anonymous user said:
I still lie awake at night sometimes, going down very dark places. I’d rather be lucky than good for sure. However, all the horrific things that could have happened on that flight keep me up at night.
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Hijacking the thread for a moment.

I know you may have just been adding to the conversation. But just in case:

May 18 of last year, the engine on my 172 died and I ditched. I swam out, the rescue I planned on was waiting on the shore, and I was, generally speaking, fine.

May 15, I took a friend and his daughter on her first XC, across the Cascades. Against my better judgment, we returned at night, following the interstate.

May 19, I was planning on taking two of my kids to the coast. We would’ve been over uninhabited mountains for an hour.

Dark places? I know them. I could’ve lost so, so much. Shoot, five minutes one way or the other on the 18th, and I probably would’ve been in a memorial.

If you’re mentally going to these places, step one, stop. Don’t entertain the thoughts. There’s a million what ifs. Consider what you’d do, if you want. But not what you might’ve suffered. It can’t help. It won’t help.

And step two: if you can’t stop the thoughts, please find someone to speak to. You don’t need to have been in the incident to be affected. The resources are there. ALPA, friends, the carrier… I can even help; I have family ties to nationwide mental health organizations and can set you up with an anonymous referral. PM me. Even set up an alt to talk about it here if you want. But don’t carry this around.
 
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