Oh Alaska/Boeing

So the key takeaway from this incident is not that they were on two systems, but that they were using a second system as a workaround of the first - and that middle management had created a safety culture that normalized going “off-script” and violating their own processes, and working around the guard rails (like quality inspections and the manufacturing defect disposition process) that the original system specifically had in place to prevent things like this from happening. If news comment guy is to be believed - Manipulating the verbiage to “Opening” the door instead of “Removing” the door (when they are physically one and the same) was a case of working around that system. Drilling out and replacing the rivets on the second system instead of the first was a separate violation of the manufacturing defect process above.

The problem is that this will occur officially, semi-officially or unofficially whenever you set metrics or goals that are unrealistic and/or there is some kind of motivation, fiscal or otherwise, to show compliance.

The prime example of this was the VA Hospital got busted for having an "unofficial" list to get on the real list for treatment, because the word had come down that the list for treatment must not be longer than six months. So they tossed everyone on the unofficial list until they were six months out and then put them on the "real" list. Problem solved.
 
The problem is that this will occur officially, semi-officially or unofficially whenever you set metrics or goals that are unrealistic and/or there is some kind of motivation, fiscal or otherwise, to show compliance.
"When a measure becomes a target, it ceases to be a good measure."

Goodhart's law is a problem common in machine learning where the network optimizes in an undesirable way for a few possible reasons: the goal proxies (metrics) do not align with the desired outcome, or the training set lacks diversity, or inequality develops among the relative weighting among the proxies.

 


This guy has a vendetta against Boeing. He raised all sorts of attention after the 2 crashes. But then also openly admit his issues he had brought up had nothing to do with MCAS. He's just a troll. Only an idiot would refuse to fly on a 737 MAX because of safety.

And the reality is, the two MAX crashes should not have happened. It was unfortunate you had a 31 yr old and 29 yr old CAs who were button pushers - not aviators. Everyone conveniently ignores the MCAS went off on that same Lion Air the night before. The crew handled it, and idiotically continued to Jakarta, and wrote it up incorrectly and the issue was never addressed. The next day, it crashed first flight of day. Had it been the same crew as the night before, Lion Air wouldn't have happened.
 
He says he "flew navy planes" and then elsewhere he is described as a former P-3 NFO. So he sat back in the tube then too.
 
I will say, it is fascinating watching a tiger, try to be a koala. Boeing is so far gone, that it doesn't even know how to right the ship, it literally is doing the only thing it knows now, which is to stick corporate business types in key positions, and nobody else.

I also find the fact that the board voted down the idea of moving HQ back to Seattle very interesting. That would have been a very big move in having the corporate operation closer to the heart of manufacturing. But no, let's keep them separate both literally, and metaphorically....
 
Where do you have to finish in ranking in NFO school to end up in VP?

I mean, like anything else, timing has a big role in it. And some people actually want VP ("per diem", QOL, etc). But it is also the place where they have traditionally been able to dump the bottom performing end of the NFO pipeline. I'm sure there has probably been a unicorn week here or there where no P-3 (or now P-8) slots were available, but kinda like helicopters on the pilot side (a slight majority of our seats are in helos), there are just so many VP NFOs per plane.
 
I will say, it is fascinating watching a tiger, try to be a koala. Boeing is so far gone, that it doesn't even know how to right the ship, it literally is doing the only thing it knows now, which is to stick corporate business types in key positions, and nobody else.

I also find the fact that the board voted down the idea of moving HQ back to Seattle very interesting. That would have been a very big move in having the corporate operation closer to the heart of manufacturing. But no, let's keep them separate both literally, and metaphorically....
Late stage capitalism
 
Read that the other day.

Yes, Interesting indeed.

Not surprising, yet still interesting.

Boeing has been a hot mess since they started chasing the next quarter's numbers and moved HQ to Chicago. Now, they're colo'd in the belly of the beast.

As I've pointed out in other posts (mostly ignored) we have a serious problem in America right now. Most of our corporate masters no longer care one whit about producing a good product. Most are hellbent on producing NOTHING... but still selling that NOTHING for big PROFIT.

Our entire economic model had gone full VEM! (Vegas Economic Model)
 


I'm raising the horse-s*** flag, on things that never happened for $800, Alex..................



"Last year, I was flying from Seattle to New York, and I purposely scheduled myself on a non-MAX airplane. I went to the gate. I walked in, sat down and looked straight ahead, and lo and behold, there was a 737-8/737-9 safety card. So I got up and I walked off. The flight attendant didn’t want me to get off the plane. And I’m not trying to cause a scene. I just want to get off this plane, and I just don’t think it’s safe. I said I purposely scheduled myself not to fly [on a MAX]."



Let me get this straight.

SEA to NYC, the only MAX operating on that route would be by AS. And in SEA, literally every gate in use is by AS is CLEARLY visible from the waiting area (one of the things I love about SEA = so much glass, so many viewing windows).

You REALLY mean to tell me Mr. Genius Engineer from Boeing had no clue it was a Boeing MAX until AFTER he boarded, sat down, and pulled out the safety card and read it said MAX9?


REALLY?

1. You didn't see the plane through the windows in SEA? C gates, D gates, N gates, and even S gates. ALL have clear viewing opportunity for your plane. And the MAX9 is distinct compared to the NGs. The winglet, the engine fan blades, the engine shape, the vertical stabilizer, aft tail cone area. ANY Boeing engineer worth their salt would be able to tell in 2 seconds from one glance whether it's a NG or a MAX.


2. Once you boarded, you didn't immediately realize by the overall cabin design, the overhead PSUs, that this was a MAX?

REALLY?

Any Boeing engineer who worked on the MAX would know right away. But it took having to read from a safety card that you were on a MAX in order to get up and march your family out?


100% completely fabricated BS!
 
Seems the NTSB is getting frustrated with Boeing stonewalling

Just a reminder that some of us could easily end up in a morgue for not complying with instructions from an officer of the law. But if you’re high enough up the corporate ladder, it’s just a business tactic.
 
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