Again you might do them once or twice but after that the students are doing them.
That's sometimes true, but it doesn't mean that as the CFI you're just sitting there staring out the window. You are still offering advice and corrections to the student, and you are also experiencing and observing what happens when stalls are not done (or recovered) correctly.
I highly doubt you were demonstrating stalls to each of your students every day of their training.
I might not have been demonstrating stalls every day, but since I had a good mix of private/instrument/comm students and was often logging 6+ hrs 6 days/wk, I was seeing them pretty darn often!
The argument made for actually doing the stalls is "muscle memory". My point is you don't "log" much muscle memory as a CFI if you are doing it right.
It's not just muscle memory. A stall recovery is not a pure physical reaction... It is a mental recognition of a deteriorating situation in flight with appropriate recovery. Once again, you don't seem to "get it" that a CFI is not just sitting their along for the ride... As the CFI, I was very much in the loop during these kinds of maneuvers and was "logging" all kinds of experience while my students worked through them.
And again, European airlines aren't falling out of the skies because "low time" pilots are stalling, are they? And their system isn't 1) learn to fly 2) teach 3) go to airline.
No, it's because the European airlines have a VERY selective process for choosing pilot candidates. It's nothing like we have here in the US, where any numbnuts can plonk down a loan at ATP, hoping to fulfill their dream to fly a jet in 90 days.
ETA:
Getting further off topic. The simple fact remains that this regulation - had it been in effect - would not have prevented a Colgan 3407. Which is what spurred it's creation.
Irony? Or stupidity?
I disagree. Had the CA been forced to develop his basic airmanship skills in the beginning, he wouldn't have completely butchered a VERY basic piloting skill that ended up killing a bunch of people.
Although I've never worked in the 121 environment, I've worked in 135 and have been flying a jet part 91 for almost two years now. We never come close to approaching the edge of the performance envelope except during very specific training events, which are few and far between compared to what I experienced as a CFI. Further, it's pretty well known that prior to the 3407 accident, most 121 airlines taught recovery at the shaker and had standards for minimum altitude loss. The procedure was NOT to demonstrate a full stall recovery and/or a recovery by unloading the wing, which is necessary during a full, deep stall. Those of us that have spent hundreds or even thousands of times doing this in our formative years understand the need to unload the wing in a full stall recovery, but somebody that went from zero to hero at some PFT operator and then went straight to Colgan may have missed that important little bit of info.
