Interesting article from the late and highly respected and humble Capt Len Morgan from one of his "Vectors" columns in an early 1990s Flying magazine. Always loved reading what Morgan had to write and have always had a deep respect for him, especially since this guy had a very large amount of wisdom and experience to look up to.
"When Captain Dave Cronin landed at Honolulu in February 1989, his overweight 747 had a 10 foot by 20 foot hole in its side, both right engines shut down, and flaps that would only extend 10 degrees. He put it on the ground at 195 knots, touching down "just like a normal landing", according to one passenger. The Wall Street Journal headlined, "United's Flight 811 Showed How Vital Capable Pilots Can Be." Cronin, age 59, had one trip left to fly before retirement.
Five months later, UALs Capt Al Haynes somehow kept his DC-10 flying for 41 minutes with its controls set in concrete, having lost all hydraulic boosters. The chances of survival for anyone onboard was virtually nil, yet Haynes and his crew (he and Cronin would reject the inference that either pulled it off alone) managed and arival at Sioux City that say nearly two thirds of the the sould aboard survive. "What if a less skilled pilot had been at the controls?" asked TIME magazine. Haynes would retire in two years.
Why are pilots of such outstanding caliber grounded at age 60? It's the law. Specifically, it's Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 that states, in part, "No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has reached his 60th birthday." The background behind this is interesting.
President Eisenhower appointed his friend, ex-USAF General Elwood "Pete" Quesada to head the FAA in 1958. Airline pilots were not Pete's favorite people, in fact, he held them responsible for most safety problems and vowed to bring airline flying "up to military standards." Under Quesada, the FAA, which theretofore had shown no concern about pilot age, proposed two new restrictions, one prohibiting any pilot over 55 from qualifying on turbojet aircraft; the other grounding all pilots at age 60.
After a public hearing, the age 55 proposal was dropped. Despite a deluge of objections by industry and medical experts, the "age 60 rule" was implemented in 1960 - without a public hearing. Senior pilots with impeccable records found themselves on the street. (A suggestion that social security payments should commence immediately because employment had been terminated by federal edict fell on deaf ears in Congress). All remaining pilots faced the loss of their five most lucrative years.
Air Line Pilots Association president Charley Ruby protested, but received little membership support. The majority of younger members favored the rule; now they would move up to seniority faster. It was an unthinking, self-serving stance unworthy of them, but the egoistic "get mine while I can" syndrome was irresistable.
JJ O'Donnell, Ruby's successor at ALPA, halfheartedly continued the fight, but eventually ALPA bowed to the consensus and thereafter sided with the FAA. No one knew better but ALPAs leadership that the Age 60 rule was wrong, yet assurging the membership took precedence. Senior card holders who had built the union and who paid the highest dues, were summarily abandoned. It was not ALPAs finest hour.
A number of campaigns were mounted to overturn the rules, mainly financed by older pilots and retirees. All failed. At one point, Congress ordered the National Institute on Aging to conduct an in-depth study of the matter. After three years of deliberations and the expenditure of $250 milltion of taxpayer money, that August body found "no medical significance to age 60 as a mandatory age for retirement." However, it recommended that the rule be retained because "age related changes in medical conditions and performances" would have decremental effects on some individuals.
The report ignored certain facts and made a mockery of scientific research. At least the panel urged the FAA to allow selected volunteers to continue flying past age 60 under close surveillance in order to acquire the age/performance data it claimed were unavailable. This reasonable proposal was ignored. Six years later, several retirees instigated a courte ordered review of the rule. The FAAs response to this latest attempt: expemtion denied.
The FAA maintains that older pilots are more likely to be involved in accidents. It acknowledges that there would be individual exceptions, but points out that the "population as a whole" is subject to an increased rate of disability with increasing age. This is hardly news. Neither is it news that we don't all fit the norm; as we age at different rates. I knew pilots grounded in their 30s and 40s. A Mayo Clinic study in 1968 predicted that about 20 percent of all airline pilots would be medically disqualified before they reached retirement age.
Yet, as a senior copilot, I flew with Captains nearing 60 who were as sharp as men 20 years their junior. More than once we shared predicaments requiring heads-up piloting and they performed faultlessly in every instance. To judge such individuals by a general pattern of physical and mental deterioriation is unrealistic and grossly unfair.
According to the FAA, there is no way to discriminate between those over-60 pilots who could still safely fly, and those who could not. The excuse that such dat is unavailable, is weak. The age-60 rule did not ground every pilot. After 1960, a number of retirees continued flying airline equipment in charter work or with overseas carriers. How have they fared? And, had NIAs suggestion been followed, by now the FAA would have years of firsthand data to support, or refute, its conclusions. Apparently there is reluctance to refute new data that might upset preconceived notions.
Petitioners for modification of the age-60 rule argued that experience more than offsets the risks of sudden incapacitation brought on by aging. ALPA countered that after 5000 hours of flying, "additional flight time does not significantly improve pilot performance from a safety standpoint." The FAA agreed. It also accepted ALPAs claim that "experience does not prepare a pilot for technological change," an utterly absurd contention. I have friends who began flying in 90 mph Fords, and ended their careers in 600 mph Boeings.
The incredible flying of Cronin and Haynes, and the expert handling of many other emergency situations by older pilots do not unduly impress the FAA. "What the pilot of UAL Flight 811 did would be expected of any Captain," it said of Cronin, adding that it "cannot base its decision on isolated commendable acts."
The FAAs refusal to grant an exemption to the age-60 rule or allow a closely monitored trial, is inconsistent with its willingness to recertify under-60 pilots with known serious problems. Pilots with histories of alcoholism, myocardial infarction, bypass surgery, monocular vision, personality disorders, strokes, and dysrhythmias, have been returned to flight status. During a nine-year period, more than 400 pilots rehabilitated from alcoholism were returned to airline flying even though the relapse rate was known to be 20 percent.
Statistically, the pilot who has had a heart attack or stroke, bypass surgery, a drinking problem, or lost an eye, has a 35 percent chance of regaining his first-class medical certificate That means flying, providing of course that he is under age-60. "The Feds say I became a poor risk at age 60. How could they be sure I was safe at age 59?" said a friend who flew for 35 years without taking a day of sick leave. He's still hale and hearty 14 years later, by the way. Did the physical examinations and proficiency checks that kept tabs on fitness and performance throughout his career become less revealing on his 60th birthday?
The age-60 rule will ground 5000 pilots over the next five years. That it remains on the books nearly three decades later shames all younger pilots who support it and the bureaucrats who stubbornly refuse to admit a mistake. It should be abolished. In the meantime, the flying public would be better served if the FAA worried less about the pilots it certifies, and more about the airliners it approves. The recent rash of safety problems was caused by older airplanes bearing the FAAs stamp of approval, not by older pilots."
"When Captain Dave Cronin landed at Honolulu in February 1989, his overweight 747 had a 10 foot by 20 foot hole in its side, both right engines shut down, and flaps that would only extend 10 degrees. He put it on the ground at 195 knots, touching down "just like a normal landing", according to one passenger. The Wall Street Journal headlined, "United's Flight 811 Showed How Vital Capable Pilots Can Be." Cronin, age 59, had one trip left to fly before retirement.
Five months later, UALs Capt Al Haynes somehow kept his DC-10 flying for 41 minutes with its controls set in concrete, having lost all hydraulic boosters. The chances of survival for anyone onboard was virtually nil, yet Haynes and his crew (he and Cronin would reject the inference that either pulled it off alone) managed and arival at Sioux City that say nearly two thirds of the the sould aboard survive. "What if a less skilled pilot had been at the controls?" asked TIME magazine. Haynes would retire in two years.
Why are pilots of such outstanding caliber grounded at age 60? It's the law. Specifically, it's Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 that states, in part, "No person may serve as a pilot on an airplane engaged in operations under this part if that person has reached his 60th birthday." The background behind this is interesting.
President Eisenhower appointed his friend, ex-USAF General Elwood "Pete" Quesada to head the FAA in 1958. Airline pilots were not Pete's favorite people, in fact, he held them responsible for most safety problems and vowed to bring airline flying "up to military standards." Under Quesada, the FAA, which theretofore had shown no concern about pilot age, proposed two new restrictions, one prohibiting any pilot over 55 from qualifying on turbojet aircraft; the other grounding all pilots at age 60.
After a public hearing, the age 55 proposal was dropped. Despite a deluge of objections by industry and medical experts, the "age 60 rule" was implemented in 1960 - without a public hearing. Senior pilots with impeccable records found themselves on the street. (A suggestion that social security payments should commence immediately because employment had been terminated by federal edict fell on deaf ears in Congress). All remaining pilots faced the loss of their five most lucrative years.
Air Line Pilots Association president Charley Ruby protested, but received little membership support. The majority of younger members favored the rule; now they would move up to seniority faster. It was an unthinking, self-serving stance unworthy of them, but the egoistic "get mine while I can" syndrome was irresistable.
JJ O'Donnell, Ruby's successor at ALPA, halfheartedly continued the fight, but eventually ALPA bowed to the consensus and thereafter sided with the FAA. No one knew better but ALPAs leadership that the Age 60 rule was wrong, yet assurging the membership took precedence. Senior card holders who had built the union and who paid the highest dues, were summarily abandoned. It was not ALPAs finest hour.
A number of campaigns were mounted to overturn the rules, mainly financed by older pilots and retirees. All failed. At one point, Congress ordered the National Institute on Aging to conduct an in-depth study of the matter. After three years of deliberations and the expenditure of $250 milltion of taxpayer money, that August body found "no medical significance to age 60 as a mandatory age for retirement." However, it recommended that the rule be retained because "age related changes in medical conditions and performances" would have decremental effects on some individuals.
The report ignored certain facts and made a mockery of scientific research. At least the panel urged the FAA to allow selected volunteers to continue flying past age 60 under close surveillance in order to acquire the age/performance data it claimed were unavailable. This reasonable proposal was ignored. Six years later, several retirees instigated a courte ordered review of the rule. The FAAs response to this latest attempt: expemtion denied.
The FAA maintains that older pilots are more likely to be involved in accidents. It acknowledges that there would be individual exceptions, but points out that the "population as a whole" is subject to an increased rate of disability with increasing age. This is hardly news. Neither is it news that we don't all fit the norm; as we age at different rates. I knew pilots grounded in their 30s and 40s. A Mayo Clinic study in 1968 predicted that about 20 percent of all airline pilots would be medically disqualified before they reached retirement age.
Yet, as a senior copilot, I flew with Captains nearing 60 who were as sharp as men 20 years their junior. More than once we shared predicaments requiring heads-up piloting and they performed faultlessly in every instance. To judge such individuals by a general pattern of physical and mental deterioriation is unrealistic and grossly unfair.
According to the FAA, there is no way to discriminate between those over-60 pilots who could still safely fly, and those who could not. The excuse that such dat is unavailable, is weak. The age-60 rule did not ground every pilot. After 1960, a number of retirees continued flying airline equipment in charter work or with overseas carriers. How have they fared? And, had NIAs suggestion been followed, by now the FAA would have years of firsthand data to support, or refute, its conclusions. Apparently there is reluctance to refute new data that might upset preconceived notions.
Petitioners for modification of the age-60 rule argued that experience more than offsets the risks of sudden incapacitation brought on by aging. ALPA countered that after 5000 hours of flying, "additional flight time does not significantly improve pilot performance from a safety standpoint." The FAA agreed. It also accepted ALPAs claim that "experience does not prepare a pilot for technological change," an utterly absurd contention. I have friends who began flying in 90 mph Fords, and ended their careers in 600 mph Boeings.
The incredible flying of Cronin and Haynes, and the expert handling of many other emergency situations by older pilots do not unduly impress the FAA. "What the pilot of UAL Flight 811 did would be expected of any Captain," it said of Cronin, adding that it "cannot base its decision on isolated commendable acts."
The FAAs refusal to grant an exemption to the age-60 rule or allow a closely monitored trial, is inconsistent with its willingness to recertify under-60 pilots with known serious problems. Pilots with histories of alcoholism, myocardial infarction, bypass surgery, monocular vision, personality disorders, strokes, and dysrhythmias, have been returned to flight status. During a nine-year period, more than 400 pilots rehabilitated from alcoholism were returned to airline flying even though the relapse rate was known to be 20 percent.
Statistically, the pilot who has had a heart attack or stroke, bypass surgery, a drinking problem, or lost an eye, has a 35 percent chance of regaining his first-class medical certificate That means flying, providing of course that he is under age-60. "The Feds say I became a poor risk at age 60. How could they be sure I was safe at age 59?" said a friend who flew for 35 years without taking a day of sick leave. He's still hale and hearty 14 years later, by the way. Did the physical examinations and proficiency checks that kept tabs on fitness and performance throughout his career become less revealing on his 60th birthday?
The age-60 rule will ground 5000 pilots over the next five years. That it remains on the books nearly three decades later shames all younger pilots who support it and the bureaucrats who stubbornly refuse to admit a mistake. It should be abolished. In the meantime, the flying public would be better served if the FAA worried less about the pilots it certifies, and more about the airliners it approves. The recent rash of safety problems was caused by older airplanes bearing the FAAs stamp of approval, not by older pilots."
