AAG to Transfer Envoy CRJ-700s to PSA

What's CCQ?

Don't know CCQ, but we have an 80s boombox affixed to the transmission wall of our UH-1H Hueys that plays CCR tapes during flight. 1965 model here with 5 Vietnam tours, parked on our ramp.

uh-1.jpg
 
Last edited:
The Republic pilot contract already had their payscale set up that way. It was not like it was different and then they voted to cap themselves at 12/4 yr pay like Endeavor did. Also, Eagle isn't shutting down - not yet anyway. And about the Chapter 7 comment, what liquidation? All they did is threaten you in the same manner Envoy got threatened. There was no Chapter 7. Technically wasn't Endeavor already de-listed at that point? It was a wholly-owned Delta entity. You don't need an economics degree. If you listened to their shutdown threat and voted yes, then you should have listened when they communicated on numerous occasions that a shutdown would take a year. Their words, not mine. But common sense dictates you cannot (not even Delta) take out 200+ regional jets in less than 12 months without ramping up some sort of replacement. The 717s weren't ready to come online until recently. No way could those planes have been removed in anything shorter than their-own admission of 12 months. Comair took a decade to dismantle and destroy. Endeavor would have lasted more than 12 months if the group had voted no. Only a naiive person would think a 200-airplane Endeavor would be gone in less than 12 months when that threat came out.



I see ATN Pilot has changed his tone. Before when he and I were arguing VX payrates when they came out in 2008, I compared it to rates being paid at that time at US Airways, Delta, Northwest, and of course his response was those were bankruptcy imposed rates and don't count towards pattern bargaining and therefore a NMB member doesn't look at those for comparison. Hence, according to him my comparison wasn't legit. Doh! Did he say that 2008-2010 was the worst recession and a money-losing VX and their pilots had no leverage for better pay? Of course not. Because it's non-union... apparently these VX pilots can't take what they get and live to fight another day as he so eloquently says.

Nothing to see here. Just an extreme pro-union leader out of touch with constituents who uses "facts" only when it fits him and his viewpoints.

ATN and I don't see eye to eye all the time, but on this we do. What leverage do the FFD guys have? Yes, they want and deserve more, but if your company is being undercut by another (or several others) there just isn't leverage. Maybe temporary leverage for the large FDD carriers exists. Delta may agree to a temporary increase for the largest FFD carriers, but only enough to appease them until they shrink them out of existence.

I'm not sure how else to see this situation, and ATN certainly isn't on the pro-company side of things, so he has no interest in making this up.

How would you suggest the FFD guys gain leverage?
 
My comment was airline-specific. Training and safety standards aren't the same at Majors vs Regionals. Usually safety costs money.

Well, while you're correct that the financial capabilities are different with regard to safety budgets, the standards are the same for all 121 carriers, with the caveat that different FSDOs have varying degrees of their special brand of crazy. Most, if not all, of the regionals share and compare data with the other 121 carriers, and the data just don't support your opinion.

I can't speak to the smaller regionals, as we didn't work with them much, but all of the DCI carriers were in line with each other metric-wise, and in comparison to legacies were comparable.

I'm sure some of the smaller guys don't have FOQA, but the big ones do. SkyWest even uses the most expensive FOQA software out there. E'rebody seems to have ASAP now, and SMS is being implemented 121-wide.

So I'm not sure where you're getting your data that says the regionals are less safe. Are you just saying that because of anecdotal evidence, such as Colgan?
 
They can't gain leverage, I agree. But on the same token that's also the reason I don't hold a grudge against GoJets back when it came out or Mesa in the 2000s. One way or another someone is going to do 70 seater RJ flying and it will go where management wants it to go (recently, cheaper options).
 
So I'm not sure where you're getting your data that says the regionals are less safe. Are you just saying that because of anecdotal evidence, such as Colgan?
At least from 2000s and onwards, there have been two mainline fatal crashes: Alaska MD80 series and an AA A300 [excluding 9/11 terrorists on purpose]. Since then, there have been 6 regional crashes, Air Midwest CLT, Corporate Air at Kirksville, Ocean Chalk near FLL, Comair at LEX, Colgan at BUF and one I can't think of at the moment. So at least since 2000, the regionals have suffered nearly 3 times worse in fatal crashes. Statistically speaking the regionals have been less safe compared to the mainline counterpart. There are a couple reasons and the biggest is that regionals simply do a lot more cycles per day than the mainline counterpart. I routinely did 4-7 legs at the regional and at current Co. I usually do just one (sometimes two) per day. Since most accidents happen in the takeoff/landing phase, the more cycles you do the more likely there will be an accident that much sooner.
 
So...yeah. That is making my argument for me. Since the regionals do more cycles, they are exposed to more risk. That doesn't mean the regionals are necessarily less safe.

Let's say the probability of an accident is 1 in 100, and it's equal risk at any carrier. (It's obviously not, but work with me). If one airline flies 10 flights per year, and another flies 100 flights per year, the chance of an accident is still the same on any given flight (1 in 100). The airline with more flights is exposed more, and will on average have more accidents, but they are not any less safe.

Follow me?
 
Last edited:
So...yeah. That is making my argument for me. Since the regionals do more cycles, they are exposed to more risk. That doesn't mean the regionals are necessarily less safe.

Let's say the probability of an accident is 1 in 100, and it's equal risk at any carrier. (It's obviously not, but work with me). If one airline flies 10 flights per year, and another flies 100 flights per year, the chance of an accident is still the same on any given flight (1 in 100). The airline with more flights is exposed more, and will on average have more accidents, but they are not any less safe.

Follow me?

More risk I'd say entails being less safe. The less risk typically being more safer. So it can be argued both ways. Plus, it's also the entry level job and usually (though not always) the lower experience when comparing resumes of regional versus major applicants. I do think that experience now at regionals is far greater than it's ever been, due mostly to industry-wide stagnation. Gone are the days people could just upgrade at 1,500 - 2,500 hrs total and have a new FO that could have 250-750 hrs. Today the typical RJ CA probably has 7-10k+ hrs and the FO 3k-7k+ hrs which are due largely to the Age 65 stagnation from Dec 2007-Dec 2012. There have been industry-wide changes for the regionals since the 2009 crash, and now we have better TEM models and FOQA/LOSAs to learn and fix from. The regionals today are safer than before, but we still need to acknowledge that every single regional airline that crashed with passenger fatalities since 2000 do not exist. Air Midwest - Corporate Air - Ocean Chalk - Colgan = all gone. So the pool of regionals themselves have dried up and some have consolidated into bigger regionals.

Another thing to keep in mind is tremendous growth. The legacies are all big enough that their growth usually comes at the expense of another fleet type being parked. For example, AA is getting new Airbuses and Boeings while parking older MD80s. Their net fleet growth slowly increases. Now compare that to a regional like PSA today, which literally stands to more than double in size in just a couple of years. Now how that growth is managed directly plays into the safety factor of that airline. Will they be able to find enough guys to upgrade? Street Captains? What if hire a street CA who only has turboprop experience right at the 1000 hr mark for 121 flying and a new FO as a CFI in the right seat, and now you have two guys with zero jet time. These are the kinds of scenarios that can come into play (and they certainly did for a while at 9E during their growing pains from 2000-2005. Arguably, the ATP rule (especially having to take sim/advanced training to obtain the ATP written) and the 1,500 rule should help in the experience pool. But this remains to be seen how the regional management handles this growth that more than doubles their fleet. There is a right way to do it and a wrong way. Typically, the more safer way requires more money and that's one area where regional managements do like to skimp (though of course not all).
 
@Cherokee_Cruiser I think '98 was the first year EVER in airline history that there wasn't a fatality. And moving on from 2000-2014 you can count six regional crashes....put that in perspective man.
The perspective is that we are enjoying an unprecedented safety record and it doesn't matter if you're black or white.
 
@Cherokee_Cruiser I think '98 was the first year EVER in airline history that there wasn't a fatality. And moving on from 2000-2014 you can count six regional crashes....put that in perspective man.
The perspective is that we are enjoying an unprecedented safety record and it doesn't matter if you're black or white.

I agree about putting it into perspective. In the United States we've had a good record for this century (all things considered). Unfortunately, in other parts of the world that's not true. And fate takes a real bad turn for one of the safest airlines in the world until 2014: Malaysian :( Up until the loss of the two 777s, Malaysian Airlines had an extremely safe record dating all the way back to their origins.

Also, '98 had the Swissair MD11 out of JFK that crashed near Halifax killing all 229 onboard.
 
Also, don't forget the non-fatal 121 accidents that were only non-fatal by luck. The Miracle on the Hudson, Continental 1404 in Denver, and the several over-runs by SouthWest and American. Any of those could've been fatal very easily, and don't forget that one of the SouthWest over runs was fatal to those two on the ground.

My point is that it's easy to look and see a few regionals have had accidents and say, "Regionals are less safe." But there's a lot more to it than anecdotal first impressions.
 
More risk I'd say entails being less safe. The less risk typically being more safer. So it can be argued both ways. Plus, it's also the entry level job and usually (though not always) the lower experience when comparing resumes of regional versus major applicants. I do think that experience now at regionals is far greater than it's ever been, due mostly to industry-wide stagnation. Gone are the days people could just upgrade at 1,500 - 2,500 hrs total and have a new FO that could have 250-750 hrs. Today the typical RJ CA probably has 7-10k+ hrs and the FO 3k-7k+ hrs which are due largely to the Age 65 stagnation from Dec 2007-Dec 2012. There have been industry-wide changes for the regionals since the 2009 crash, and now we have better TEM models and FOQA/LOSAs to learn and fix from. The regionals today are safer than before, but we still need to acknowledge that every single regional airline that crashed with passenger fatalities since 2000 do not exist. Air Midwest - Corporate Air - Ocean Chalk - Colgan = all gone. So the pool of regionals themselves have dried up and some have consolidated into bigger regionals.

Another thing to keep in mind is tremendous growth. The legacies are all big enough that their growth usually comes at the expense of another fleet type being parked. For example, AA is getting new Airbuses and Boeings while parking older MD80s. Their net fleet growth slowly increases. Now compare that to a regional like PSA today, which literally stands to more than double in size in just a couple of years. Now how that growth is managed directly plays into the safety factor of that airline. Will they be able to find enough guys to upgrade? Street Captains? What if hire a street CA who only has turboprop experience right at the 1000 hr mark for 121 flying and a new FO as a CFI in the right seat, and now you have two guys with zero jet time. These are the kinds of scenarios that can come into play (and they certainly did for a while at 9E during their growing pains from 2000-2005. Arguably, the ATP rule (especially having to take sim/advanced training to obtain the ATP written) and the 1,500 rule should help in the experience pool. But this remains to be seen how the regional management handles this growth that more than doubles their fleet. There is a right way to do it and a wrong way. Typically, the more safer way requires more money and that's one area where regional managements do like to skimp (though of course not all).


I misspoke. I meant more risk as in, "more opportunity to have an accident", not more risk as in "a given flight at a regional has a higher probability of accident in comparison to a major." You are confusing those two.

I assume it's possible to gather the number of regional and major flights over a period, and compare the accident rates on a per flight basis. If you do that and prove the rate is significantly higher per X flights (or flight hours), I'll concede the point. Unfortunately the data is combined for all 121 carriers by the NTSB.
 
Last edited:
Also, don't forget the non-fatal 121 accidents that were only non-fatal by luck. The Miracle on the Hudson, Continental 1404 in Denver, and the several over-runs by SouthWest and American. Any of those could've been fatal very easily, and don't forget that one of the SouthWest over runs was fatal to those two on the ground.\

I want to highlight this. There have been a bunch of non fatal, but only because they were lucky, accidents on the major side. Not to mention FedEx and UPS have each lost a few that were fatal (but because it didn't involve passengers, nobody cares).

Yes, regionals have had accidents in that time period as well that could very easily have been fatal but thankfully weren't (PSA in CRW, AWAC in PVD etc), but the point remains that many major accidents have been VERY close to being fatal.
 
icon1.gif

The last act has not played out in the Envoy drama yet...There is still almost 2.5 years before the first 175 theoretically shows up at EN. Don't be surprised to see Envoy and AAG going back to the table and this time a deal WILL be crafted that the pilots WILL sign this time. The caveat, is this deal will be cheaper than the one the pilots rejected twice previously. AAG does not want to retain the ERJ-140/145 fleet, and I maintain they still want the remaining E-175s, plus any options on Envoys certificate. Isn't it obvious to those of you that can stop playing internet games that AAG wants TWO fleet-types and TWO certificates...ONLY. The end result is a streamlined, consolidated operation with cheaper labor. I have seen this "movie" before at "Pinnacolaba" where DAL very, very shrewdly manipulated our pilot groups into a "wham-bam" contract negotiation ( FIVE years PNCL Corp. had the pilots twisting in the wind with an amenable contract, and inside 6 weeks we had a TA with an integrated seniority list and a no-holds-barred open bidding process that created a ridiculous training bubble that cost MILLIONS ). The resulting bankruptcy through a debtor in possession process gave Delta equity, control and cheap lift with 81 CRJ-900s and got rid of the Colgan certificate to boot.
So, all of you at Envoy that are firing broadsides at STW on FB and other forums need to stop, think and re-evaluate exactly what the airline's strategic business goals are and how they will work to reach these goals.
 
Wow. This post has SO many misrepresentations of the facts and stuff taken out of thin air it warrants a response.

The last act has not played out in the Envoy drama yet...There is still almost 2.5 years before the first 175 theoretically shows up at EN. Don't be surprised to see Envoy and AAG going back to the table and this time a deal WILL be crafted that the pilots WILL sign this time. The caveat, is this deal will be cheaper than the one the pilots rejected twice previously. AAG does not want to retain the ERJ-140/145 fleet, and I maintain they still want the remaining E-175s, plus any options on Envoys certificate. Isn't it obvious to those of you that can stop playing internet games that AAG wants TWO fleet-types and TWO certificates...ONLY. The end result is a streamlined, consolidated operation with cheaper labor.

I HIGHLY suggest that any Envoy Pilots engage their LEC Reps on the fleet plan at AAG in the Fee For Departure sector as......


I have seen this "movie" before at "Pinnacolaba" where DAL very, very shrewdly manipulated our pilot groups into a "wham-bam" contract negotiation ( FIVE years PNCL Corp. had the pilots twisting in the wind with an amenable contract, and inside 6 weeks we had a TA with an integrated seniority list and a no-holds-barred open bidding process that created a ridiculous training bubble that cost MILLIONS ). The resulting bankruptcy through a debtor in possession process gave Delta equity, control and cheap lift with 81 CRJ-900s and got rid of the Colgan certificate to boot.

....you haven't seen this movie before. What happened with Pinnacolaba Bankruptcy is completely different than your characterization of it.

What caused the merger was the language in the Mesaba Scope Language. That is the simple answer. No one knew, including Delta, that the transaction of Delta selling Mesaba to Pinnacle would force a single seniority list. Initially, Pinnacle Corporation didn't want to merge the three certificates, they wanted to keep them separate. Is that where your rage comes from towards ALPA @BE19Pilot? Did you want things to remain separate and Colgan to continue forever? Anyway, after it was brought to the attention that keeping the three pilot groups separate was against the scope language of the Mesaba contract and Delta didn't want to have that fight with ALPA, they told Pinnacle to merge the SLI into one. Also, I would love to know where you got the 6 weeks to a TA with integrated seniority list? We started in September, got the TA in December, and then got the SLI in July. Anyway, shortly after that, Delta realized that the contract negotiated by the idiots from Colgan management (that is the first folks you should place the blame with @BE19Pilot, MANAGEMENT AT COLGAN for negotiating a crappy agreement with the mainline partner) with Continental and United for the Q400s had huge holes in it, such as not having year over year increases. That, coupled with the fact that Delta was paying for the 3407 Accident (Colgan was insured through Pinnacle Corp which was insured through Northwest and then Delta when that merger occurred), and of course wanting to poke an eye in their competition saw these huge holes in the contract to exploit. I am not even bringing up the other mismanagement Delta was seeing with Pinnacle Corp.. Anyway, initially, Delta told Pinnacle, specifically Sean Menke, to get rid of that contract with the Q400s with United. He said, no, and then Delta didn't make a single, $20,000,000 payment to Pinnacle Corporation. That alone, an amount less than a crappy POS Q400 airplane, put Pinnacle Corp into Chapter 11.

Now, comes the second person you need to blame for what happened to Pinnacle Corporation. Ronald Reagan. In the 1980s, when Bankruptcy laws were changed to make it anti-labor to fulfill Reagan's economic policies that nearly destroyed America, no matter what carrier you are in ALPA, the laws are against you. So, Delta took advantage of those laws and was able to reset the industry.

You love to rag on ALPA. However, even though what happened to Pinnacle Corp sucks, the pilots at Colgan, the ones *I*, along with others on here represented through the ALPA structure, are a lot better off today than if we kept the Q400s. They are getting paid more, even under a Bankruptcy contract (yes Colgan was that bad beforehand with pay) and are having both internal and external career progression opportunities. So, in the end, the Pilots at Colgan are better off.

Finally, for the folks at Envoy, best of luck to you guys. Any help I can be, let me know.
 
The joint CBA and integration was a complete fiasco that you seem to be unable to share even the slightest bit of responsibility. All I hear is equivocation and excuses. So much for leaving it better than you found it...Seems I recall reading that in one of your letters to the pilot group in your capacity as MEC. I am not ragging on ALPA for the hell of it.
 
Yes, it is entirely one-sided and only from your perspective as the "events" unfolded. You failed to address the fact that every last one of you guys in the initial CJC ALPA cadre were led right down a primrose path exactly where Delta wanted you to go. And, the PT Barnum Circus clowns are counting their money. And, I submit to you that things were, and still are not so great for a lot of people...And, you know what? That's life, that's business and neither are fair...One day you're in the high cotton and the next your wondering what the heck happened. One last word of advice...Sometimes it's not about who is right, but trying to do the right thing. I never said that wasn't the case...
 
Once again, Delta had no clue what they were doing when they sold Mesaba. They just wanted to get Mesaba 'off the books'. Also, I am pretty sure others share my perspective. Even outside of the CJC ALPA structure.

I would have loved to hear what the other options were? Refuse to merge? It was a pretty clear choice what needed to be done.
 
Last edited:
Back
Top