What's CCQ?
Don't know CCQ, but we have an 80s boombox affixed to the transmission wall of our UH-1H Hueys that plays CCR tapes during flight. 1965 model here with 5 Vietnam tours, parked on our ramp.
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What's CCQ?
The Republic pilot contract already had their payscale set up that way. It was not like it was different and then they voted to cap themselves at 12/4 yr pay like Endeavor did. Also, Eagle isn't shutting down - not yet anyway. And about the Chapter 7 comment, what liquidation? All they did is threaten you in the same manner Envoy got threatened. There was no Chapter 7. Technically wasn't Endeavor already de-listed at that point? It was a wholly-owned Delta entity. You don't need an economics degree. If you listened to their shutdown threat and voted yes, then you should have listened when they communicated on numerous occasions that a shutdown would take a year. Their words, not mine. But common sense dictates you cannot (not even Delta) take out 200+ regional jets in less than 12 months without ramping up some sort of replacement. The 717s weren't ready to come online until recently. No way could those planes have been removed in anything shorter than their-own admission of 12 months. Comair took a decade to dismantle and destroy. Endeavor would have lasted more than 12 months if the group had voted no. Only a naiive person would think a 200-airplane Endeavor would be gone in less than 12 months when that threat came out.
I see ATN Pilot has changed his tone. Before when he and I were arguing VX payrates when they came out in 2008, I compared it to rates being paid at that time at US Airways, Delta, Northwest, and of course his response was those were bankruptcy imposed rates and don't count towards pattern bargaining and therefore a NMB member doesn't look at those for comparison. Hence, according to him my comparison wasn't legit. Doh! Did he say that 2008-2010 was the worst recession and a money-losing VX and their pilots had no leverage for better pay? Of course not. Because it's non-union... apparently these VX pilots can't take what they get and live to fight another day as he so eloquently says.
Nothing to see here. Just an extreme pro-union leader out of touch with constituents who uses "facts" only when it fits him and his viewpoints.
My comment was airline-specific. Training and safety standards aren't the same at Majors vs Regionals. Usually safety costs money.
At least from 2000s and onwards, there have been two mainline fatal crashes: Alaska MD80 series and an AA A300 [excluding 9/11 terrorists on purpose]. Since then, there have been 6 regional crashes, Air Midwest CLT, Corporate Air at Kirksville, Ocean Chalk near FLL, Comair at LEX, Colgan at BUF and one I can't think of at the moment. So at least since 2000, the regionals have suffered nearly 3 times worse in fatal crashes. Statistically speaking the regionals have been less safe compared to the mainline counterpart. There are a couple reasons and the biggest is that regionals simply do a lot more cycles per day than the mainline counterpart. I routinely did 4-7 legs at the regional and at current Co. I usually do just one (sometimes two) per day. Since most accidents happen in the takeoff/landing phase, the more cycles you do the more likely there will be an accident that much sooner.So I'm not sure where you're getting your data that says the regionals are less safe. Are you just saying that because of anecdotal evidence, such as Colgan?
So...yeah. That is making my argument for me. Since the regionals do more cycles, they are exposed to more risk. That doesn't mean the regionals are necessarily less safe.
Let's say the probability of an accident is 1 in 100, and it's equal risk at any carrier. (It's obviously not, but work with me). If one airline flies 10 flights per year, and another flies 100 flights per year, the chance of an accident is still the same on any given flight (1 in 100). The airline with more flights is exposed more, and will on average have more accidents, but they are not any less safe.
Follow me?
@Cherokee_Cruiser I think '98 was the first year EVER in airline history that there wasn't a fatality. And moving on from 2000-2014 you can count six regional crashes....put that in perspective man.
The perspective is that we are enjoying an unprecedented safety record and it doesn't matter if you're black or white.
More risk I'd say entails being less safe. The less risk typically being more safer. So it can be argued both ways. Plus, it's also the entry level job and usually (though not always) the lower experience when comparing resumes of regional versus major applicants. I do think that experience now at regionals is far greater than it's ever been, due mostly to industry-wide stagnation. Gone are the days people could just upgrade at 1,500 - 2,500 hrs total and have a new FO that could have 250-750 hrs. Today the typical RJ CA probably has 7-10k+ hrs and the FO 3k-7k+ hrs which are due largely to the Age 65 stagnation from Dec 2007-Dec 2012. There have been industry-wide changes for the regionals since the 2009 crash, and now we have better TEM models and FOQA/LOSAs to learn and fix from. The regionals today are safer than before, but we still need to acknowledge that every single regional airline that crashed with passenger fatalities since 2000 do not exist. Air Midwest - Corporate Air - Ocean Chalk - Colgan = all gone. So the pool of regionals themselves have dried up and some have consolidated into bigger regionals.
Another thing to keep in mind is tremendous growth. The legacies are all big enough that their growth usually comes at the expense of another fleet type being parked. For example, AA is getting new Airbuses and Boeings while parking older MD80s. Their net fleet growth slowly increases. Now compare that to a regional like PSA today, which literally stands to more than double in size in just a couple of years. Now how that growth is managed directly plays into the safety factor of that airline. Will they be able to find enough guys to upgrade? Street Captains? What if hire a street CA who only has turboprop experience right at the 1000 hr mark for 121 flying and a new FO as a CFI in the right seat, and now you have two guys with zero jet time. These are the kinds of scenarios that can come into play (and they certainly did for a while at 9E during their growing pains from 2000-2005. Arguably, the ATP rule (especially having to take sim/advanced training to obtain the ATP written) and the 1,500 rule should help in the experience pool. But this remains to be seen how the regional management handles this growth that more than doubles their fleet. There is a right way to do it and a wrong way. Typically, the more safer way requires more money and that's one area where regional managements do like to skimp (though of course not all).
Don't know CCQ, but we have an 80s boombox affixed to the transmission wall of our UH-1H Hueys that plays CCR tapes during flight. 1965 model here with 5 Vietnam tours, parked on our ramp.
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Also, don't forget the non-fatal 121 accidents that were only non-fatal by luck. The Miracle on the Hudson, Continental 1404 in Denver, and the several over-runs by SouthWest and American. Any of those could've been fatal very easily, and don't forget that one of the SouthWest over runs was fatal to those two on the ground.\
The last act has not played out in the Envoy drama yet...There is still almost 2.5 years before the first 175 theoretically shows up at EN. Don't be surprised to see Envoy and AAG going back to the table and this time a deal WILL be crafted that the pilots WILL sign this time. The caveat, is this deal will be cheaper than the one the pilots rejected twice previously. AAG does not want to retain the ERJ-140/145 fleet, and I maintain they still want the remaining E-175s, plus any options on Envoys certificate. Isn't it obvious to those of you that can stop playing internet games that AAG wants TWO fleet-types and TWO certificates...ONLY. The end result is a streamlined, consolidated operation with cheaper labor.
I have seen this "movie" before at "Pinnacolaba" where DAL very, very shrewdly manipulated our pilot groups into a "wham-bam" contract negotiation ( FIVE years PNCL Corp. had the pilots twisting in the wind with an amenable contract, and inside 6 weeks we had a TA with an integrated seniority list and a no-holds-barred open bidding process that created a ridiculous training bubble that cost MILLIONS ). The resulting bankruptcy through a debtor in possession process gave Delta equity, control and cheap lift with 81 CRJ-900s and got rid of the Colgan certificate to boot.