Update on 3407

[Firebird2XC]

Pilot Overscheduling and other 'findings'

In my somewhat limited experience with accident investigation, it's my understanding that things that directly contributed, other 'findings' and other items of inaccuracy are usually brought to bear.

With the rift between the Colgan/Pinnacle operation as a whole and the FAA seems to be widening, I think it's good that other potential shortcomings of that company will be brought under scrutiny.

I've seen or heard of things done.. questionably.. at both my past and present employer. Many pilots, especially younger, less-savvy ones, might be lulled into thinking that their employer *always* acts in their best interests.

This is NOT the case, regardless of who you work for.

While some companies are certainly much more agreeable in their corporate climate when it comes to safeguarding the interests of their employees during day-to-day operations, many are not.

In the general span of airline history, it would seem that more rather than less of the companies fall into the category of those "not agreeable" towards their employees.

Did you know that a company scheduler or dispatcher could do something illegal, in violation of the FARs, or otherwise wrong, then self-report it, and leave you holding the bag? That they could do this without you even knowing it?

Know the law. As an aviator, the law is your bill of rights, especially if you don't have a more stringent employment agreement or contract.

'Bending the rules' for a business interest is a bad idea when you lose your license or your life. Ultimately, who takes the greatest risk per the measured gain? Certainly not your employer.

For aviators, the law is your shield, so stick to it. It exists for a reason. It's written in the blood of the aviators and their passengers who did not live because such a law did not previously exist.

 

[Polar742]

Okay, I'm short so I'm going to hop on this soapbox so ya'll can see me.

I think we can all agree that many times things we do as aviators can seem quite arcane, as a procedure or policy that was previously well served can seem a worthless training event.

Paradoxically, very few aviators sit around and think "Gee, it'd be great if they'd just tear up all that history we have and start a fresh approach on everything."

We like things that are tested in time and have been systemically shown to work, and work well.

This brings me to the stall series that is being maligned, and sometimes rightfully, in this thread.

I was thinking about this thread and what was being discussed. Maybe the following stuff might be just me talking for the exercise of me writing it all down to organize the random scraps of paper containing bits of notes floating around in the old grey matter.

The traditional part 121/type training stall series, the "Approach to Landing Stall", the "Takeoff Departure Stall" and the "Clean Stall" serve, again in my mind, 3 purposes.

First, they is a quantitative way to measure one's flying skills on the edge of the flight envelope in various aircraft configurations for checking purposes (We presently train for this, and this is pretty much only useful for evaluation purposes but not much use to the airman [note, I use airman since english lacks a term I feel acceptable to cover everyone, we all know gender is not an indicator at any level of airmanship]).

Second, stall maneuvers allows us identify when the aircraft is in a dangerous position and how to safely remove the aircraft from the condition. (We train for this, this is actually useful to the airman[I'll get there] and for the evaluation process)

Third, the maneuvers allow the airman what I like to call a "get to know you" phase in aircraft training. You get to actually fly the machine around a bit and learn how it handles.

Like so many things, the maneuvers were designed in the era of low automation aircraft, and there have been minimal changes in how the stall scenarios are encountered to better train the awarness of the pilots.

I'd like to pick at the stalls individually, noting every operator can approach the same maneuver from a different angle. Also note that each maneuver is designed to replicate a real world scenario, however in sim-land where time is a precious jewel, there just isn't time to get a real good stall scenario set up. I'll toss in my ideas on how to better things later.

First, we'll talk about the Takeoff stall. We all know the aircraft is set up in a departure configuration, and "the man" wants you to stop trimming at a certain airspeed. During takeoff, trim is set to approximate a setting to maintain V2 in case of an engine loss on takeoff. Usually the speed you stop trimming at will approximate a trim setting similar to the takeoff trim setting at the weight the aircraft is presently at (obviously a note such as that is best served in the simulator as the instructor usually has a weight profile that they are using for the maneuver). The thrust is usually set so the engines have a fairly normal response time. A practical maneuver that should keep you from descending into the obstacle clearance plane on departure.

The Clean Stall seems to be set up for an idle descent with an intermediate level off, and the workload precludes one from remembering to bring the power off the idle stops. Enough said.

The Arrival/Landing stall scenario, especially in a bank, is also patently obvious. Again the configuration and trim are set to reflect your approach profile and the engines are configured usually close to your target settings on final. The goal, in addition to meeting the criteria previously discussed, is to save your bacon should you find yourself in that predicament.

Now, I think the way the training is completed for training a crewmember for a PC/Type ride/ ATP ride are fine. Really, that ride is not much more than a test of one's organizational abilities and a test of basic handling skills of the aircraft in various normal and non-normal configurations (yet it still makes us all nervous).

The problem is in the training following the PC/Type/ATP check.

The most common manner that each maneuver is entered is maintaining altitude, the sim instructor cinfiguring or instructing one of the pilots the power and flap settings while the flying pilot is decelerating 1-2kts/sec until the first indication of the stall. At that point the stall is recovered, and the plane is headed back to the airport to do approaches.

However, thinking on the above stall scenarios, realistically, the clean stall would probably be the only one entered from straight and level flight. For Those of you that have aircraft without autothrottles, you would be busy doing something on the descent, the aircraft would level out and the speed would decay. Of course, being distracted you would neglect to put the power up and the aircraft's stall warning would be the first indication of the situation.

Those of us with AutoThrottle equipped aircraft would probably get the aircraft into a place where we don't manage the automation properly. Probably on a CAVOK day, you click off the AP and use your FLCH button to descend the jet. Being used to the autothrottles adding power when you need it, you shallow your descent rate to make a nice smooth level off at the approaching altitude. Unfortunately, you are looking at the airport 30 miles out for a bit too long and the speed rolls back into the impending stall regime. Again, at that point it'd be expected to recover from the situation.

How often have any of us seen this in training? The times I've seen it, the scenario wasn't written into any training module, I was just lucky enough to haven an instructor take the time to set up the scenario.

How many of you have done an approach to landing stall flying a 3 degree glide path? Or have been on a 3 degree glide path and the scenario gets set up by an intermediate level off?

Or on the departure stall a very quick low level leveloff, followed by a reason to pitch up with either an autothrottle failure or some other reason preventing you from getting enough power?

I submit if the stall series was introduced thoughout a training module, whether during a LOFT scenario or otherwise, in a manner in which one might be in such a position out on the line, the training will enhance the situational awareness of where the situation might happen on the timeline of an operational flight and expose the pilots to the dues and indications in a realistic situation.

The ability to see the nature of the beast in it's natural habitat would be far more effective imprinting the practical knowledge and practice of the maneuver in a situation in which the sim can "crash" than currently seen either annually, or semi-annually, by the vast majority of us.

Go out there, have fun and fly safe...

 

[Cruise]

That's exactly right, Polar! Nice illustration on how stalls are currently trained and how they could, and should, be better. We need to ask ourselves WHY we're doing these maneuvers. In the current format, I think the 'brain trust' would say it's to be proficient in stall recovery. However I, like you (so it sounds), contend they're used for sim response familiarization, and not much more. The scenarios should be much more 'realistic' if we are actually to be gaining stall recovery techniques. The stall series should be demonstrated in 'real life' situations.....and I think you will see become the norm in the future.

 

[Polar742]

That's exactly right, Polar! Nice illustration on how stalls are currently trained and how they could, and should, be better. We need to ask ourselves WHY we're doing these maneuvers. In the current format, I think the 'brain trust' would say it's to be proficient in stall recovery. However I, like you (so it sounds), contend they're used for sim response familiarization, and not much more. The scenarios should be much more 'realistic' if we are actually to be gaining stall recovery techniques. The stall series should be demonstrated in 'real life' situations.....and I think you will see become the norm in the future.

Pretty much. As I see it, there is only basic, yet necessary, training on the stall series.

Of course the act of recognizing the stall, maintaining aircraft control through out the stall, and as a side effect of an instrument scan, learning to see the trend cues leading to the condition, and successfully recovering the stall is of the utmost importance.

Of course when all these maneuvers were first developed for simulator training, it was for steam gauge aircraft, and the way the maneuvers are handflown for the most part reflect that.

However, I'm of the mindset that, again, learning to do the maneuvers as we currently do them is a great way for students to learn to handle the aircraft around the edge of the flight envelope. Learning the tactile feel and being introduced to that flight regime in a manner that allows a person to develop a "feel" for the airplane is very important in highly automated aircraft that we hand fly less and less.

To be honest, basic stick and rudder manipulation of the controls while processing raw data inputs(mine included) after flying highly automated airplanes is significantly degraded.

It's not like we're taken out in the sim and go fly ILS's all the time. We get the basics down of all engine operations and our normal ILSs. Then we start to lose things (you know, engines, ILSs, hydraulics...the things that make you sweat through the back of your shirt), which is building on the training.

I would like to see the realistic stall scenarios introduced in LOFT training and other manner training (such as the PT/PC style of recurrent training). Then during actual PCs or PC warm ups, go to the basic air work. Those maneuvers still provide a large number of benefits.

In summation of all this junk I just wrote, I'm only solidly for adding training, not changing any of the basic maneuvers as stand alone items. Add the complex scenarios in appropriate situations.

 

[Cruise]

I would like to see the realistic stall scenarios introduced in LOFT training and other manner training (such as the PT/PC style of recurrent training). Then during actual PCs or PC warm ups, go to the basic air work. Those maneuvers still provide a large number of benefits.

In summation of all this junk I just wrote, I'm only solidly for adding training, not changing any of the basic maneuvers as stand alone items. Add the complex scenarios in appropriate situations.

I like it!

Unfortunately, the sim time is already jam packed w/ stuff to do. Andddd, the almighty dollar will rear it's ugly head once again. While I absolutely agree with your assessment, I don't think companies are willing to increase their cost by adding time to the sim schedule. If it's not 'required,' the likelihood of a company agreeing to spend more (even if it'll improve their pilot's skills) just isn't going to happen. Hell, nothing is stopping any company from being proactive now....but it's not happening unless some crew balls up an aircraft.

But, maybe that's just me being pessimistic.

 

[kellwolf]

I think he was talking simply about stall recovery, not dual flameout-core lock procedures.

:yeahthat:

If they had done a proper stall recovery (put the nose down instead of trying to recover as they would have at 10,000 ft), the core lock odds would have been reduced since the N2 blades would have still been turning.

 

[SteveC]

************************************************************
NTSB ADVISORY
************************************************************

National Transportation Safety Board
Washington, DC 20594

May 8, 2009
************************************************************

UPDATE ON NTSB PUBLIC HEARING ON THE COLGAN AIR ACCIDENT
NEAR BUFFALO, NEW YORK

************************************************************

The National Transportation Safety Board today released
additional information about the Board's scheduled public
hearing on the crash of the Colgan Air Dash-8 near Buffalo,
New York.

The three-day hearing will convene at 9:00 a.m. on May 12,
2009 at the NTSB's Board Room and Conference Center, 429
L'Enfant Plaza, S.W., Washington, D.C. The room is lighted
for television and a mult box is provided for sound.

On February 12, 2009, about 10:17 p.m. Eastern Standard Time
(EST), a Colgan Air Inc., Bombardier Dash 8-Q400, N200WQ,
d.b.a. Continental Connection flight 3407, crashed during an
instrument approach to runway 23 at the Buffalo-Niagara
International Airport (BUF), Buffalo, New York. All 49 persons on
board were fatally injured and the airplane was destroyed by
impact forces and post crash fire. There was one ground
fatality.

The Safety Board will also open the public docket at the
start of the hearing. The public may view and download the
docket contents on the web under the "FOIA Reading Room" at
http://www.ntsb.gov/Info/foia_fri-dockets.htm at that time.

The information being released is factual in nature and does
not provide analysis or the probable cause of the accident.
The docket will include investigative group factual reports,
interview transcripts, Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)
transcripts, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) data and other
documents from the investigation. In addition, docket items
that will be used as exhibits during the public hearing will
be available on the website under "Public Hearings"

The hearing, which is part of the Safety Board's efforts to
develop all appropriate facts for the investigation, will
cover a wide range of safety issues including:

* Icing effect on the airplane's performance
* Cold weather operations
* Sterile cockpit rules,
* Crew experience, fatigue management
* Stall recovery training

An agenda is posted on the Board's website,
http://www.ntsb.gov/events/2009/Buffalo-NY/Default.html. A
live webcast of the proceedings will be available on the
Board's website at www.ntsb.gov . Technical support details
are available under "Board Meetings."

 

[tonyw]

We need to ask ourselves WHY we're doing these maneuvers. In the current format, I think the 'brain trust' would say it's to be proficient in stall recovery.

You know, during my private training, one of my instructors did exactly that. He said, okay, we want you to be able to recover from a stall. But what we really want is for you to be able to recognize when you're starting to get into that situation so you never have to recover from an unplanned one.

Yes, I know that's an entirely different kind of flying, altogether now.

But the reasoning is the same. If you know how to recognize when things are going to go bad, then you won't need to rely on the training you receive on how to get out of that bad situation.

BTW, in a 717 sim, I did a full stall, just for S&Gs. And I thought I just didn't know what I was doing, because I could not get the damn nose to come down. But from what you guys are telling me, that's not surprising. It took what seemed like an eternity to recover.

 

[BeechBoy]

BTW, in a 717 sim, I did a full stall, just for S&Gs. And I thought I just didn't know what I was doing, because I could not get the damn nose to come down. But from what you guys are telling me, that's not surprising. It took what seemed like an eternity to recover.

This is an excerpt from Handling The Big Jets by B.P. Davies:

"At the stall the rear-engined high tail aeroplane tends to suffer a marked nose up pitch (because the tips stall first moving the center of lift forward) and the wing wake, which has now become low energy turbulent air, passes aft and immerses the high set tail which is in just about the right position to catch it. This greatly reduces the tail effectiveness and makes it incapable of combating the nose up pitch and the aeroplane continues to pitch up. This pitch up just after the stall is worsened by greatly reduced lift and greatly increased drag which causes a rapidly increasing descent path."

 

[BeechBoy]

Question for you -- how much altitude does a transport category aircraft lose during a stall? I'm curious, because the Colgan crash involved a plane that was at a low altitude.

You can recover from a stall in a 172 in 100 feet. I'm sure it takes a lot more altitude to do it in a transport category aircraft.

Another excerpt from B.P. Davies book, Handling The Big Jets: (he's talking about recovery from a "super stall" in which the turbulent wash off the wings has severely reduced tail effectiveness. He states that some aircraft may not be recoverable from this).

"Persist in full forward elevator control ... and wait for the aeroplane to pitch down and recover from the stall. It is important once again to realise that pitch attitude is not enough guide to the recovery. Too early a recovery, from a gentle dive following assumed recovery from the super-stall, will again increase AOA and ensure that the aeroplane remains locked in. It is necessary to persist with full forward elevator control until the aeroplane is quite steeply nose down with a rapidly increasing airspeed which then indicates that stall recovery has been achieved."

"The effect of momentum in the stall recovery needs elaboration. If a very heavy aeroplane should be stalled, it is no good, the nose having dropped, simply pulling the nose up again and expecting an immediate return to unstalled flight. When the stall occurs the aeroplane begins to sink fast and the initial sink rate is almost independent of pitch attitude. Therefore, keep the nose down initially, apply power and 'fly' the aeroplane around the recovery path. It is much better to use a little extra height on the first attempt than to stall again."

Of course, the above info doesn't apply to the Q400 with it's straight-wing and props but it makes interesting reading nonetheless.

 

[BobDDuck]

Not much really scares me in the RJ, but somehow getting into an upset that causes a deep stall where the wings are blanking the airflow around the elevator is one thing that does.

I'm assuming this is what he means by a "super-stall".

I really need to get that book even if I never plan on shooting for the Cathay interview. The more I see/hear about it the more useful it gets.

 

[Seggy]

Another excerpt from B.P. Davies book, Handling The Big Jets: (he's talking about recovery from a "super stall" in which the turbulent wash off the wings has severely reduced tail effectiveness. He states that some aircraft may not be recoverable from this).

It has been told to me that in the certification of the 727, they had to super stall the thing. In order to get out of it, they put a parachute on the tail to actually stop the stall, then detached it, and then flew out of it.

 

[seagull]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html

Assuming the WSJ is doing their usual fairly decent job, the hits are on training, the ongoing (and previously identified issue) of airman who are marginally proficient, the tail ice thing that has been previously mentioned, fatigue due to the scheduling practices, the f/o possibly flying sick, and had apparently commuted to work from SEA on a redeye (leaving how much time to recover before flying the trip?).

This is going to be interesting. Those latter issues could lead to an ARAC to design limitations on commuters.

 

[seagull]

It has been told to me that in the certification of the 727, they had to super stall the thing. In order to get out of it, they put a parachute on the tail to actually stop the stall, then detached it, and then flew out of it.

They put those on many flight test aircraft, but don't often use them. The Lear is a good example. Does take some unusual techniques to recover, but they could do it in flight test. They added those fins on the aft body to make it more conventional.

 

[jtrain609]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html

Assuming the WSJ is doing their usual fairly decent job, the hits are on training, the ongoing (and previously identified issue) of airman who are marginally proficient, the tail ice thing that has been previously mentioned, fatigue due to the scheduling practices, the f/o possibly flying sick, and had apparently commuted to work from SEA on a redeye (leaving how much time to recover before flying the trip?).

This is going to be interesting. Those latter issues could lead to an ARAC to design limitations on commuters.

So who's gonna be the first person here to say, "Sounds like life at a regional?"

I know I've seen a few of those things when I was still working.

 

[zmiller4]

...the f/o possibly flying sick, and had apparently commuted to work from SEA on a redeye (leaving how much time to recover before flying the trip?)....Those latter issues could lead to an ARAC to design limitations on commuters.

That was my thought exactly reading the article.

So who's gonna be the first person here to say, "Sounds like life at a regional?"

I know I've seen a few of those things when I was still working.

I've seen a number of west-coast commuters using red-eyes to get to work. I'm not sure how good an idea it is for most people.

 

[C150J]

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html

the ongoing (and previously identified issue) of airman who are marginally proficient

Seagull -

I find this point interesting. How do we, as an industry, combat against this? Should the CA not have gained employment initially due to three failed check rides at the primary level? Should he have been pulled off the line for two failed PCs at his carrier?

I see my initial checkride history as more LUCK than performance, and would argue that there needs to be more uniformity in training/testing at the primary level. Some guys skate through with the same fair DE every time, while others only have a curmudgeon DE as an option who is predisposed to fail candidates. I guess my point is that primary checkride history does not tell us too much at this juncture.


However, that AND failing proficiency checks certainly start painting a picture. Do you agree? I have a hard time with this one, as I know some great guys with bad primary records, and also know some guys with "clean" records that ended up bending metal due to their overconfidence.

 

[drunkenbeagle]

Front page of today's WSJ, claims the stick pusher activated at 115 mph, but was overridden by the CA. Also notes the he "failed" 5 checkrides, 3 in GA A/C, the 1900, and the 340. 109 hours in the Dash 8.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html

I'd be looking at the CFI's that would sign someone off for THREE checkrides that they didn't pass. I can understand maybe not passing a CFI ride the first time - but how many light GA checkrides are there?

 

[jynxyjoe]

Front page of today's WSJ, claims the stick pusher activated at 115 mph, but was overridden by the CA. Also notes the he "failed" 5 checkrides, 3 in GA A/C, the 1900, and the 340. 109 hours in the Dash 8.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124200193256505099.html

I'd be looking at the CFI's that would sign someone off for THREE checkrides that they didn't pass. I can understand maybe not passing a CFI ride the first time - but how many light GA checkrides are there?

Is it possible they are talking about 141 rides? You get tossed up for your stage II instrument and fail, then your comm. stage 2 because you suck at complex and didn't work hard enough, then toss in a CFI rating you bone up because you screw something up under the hood. I think, if I understand the 141 world, that would be 3 failures but you'd never have to say you failed an FAA check ride right? I always taught part 61 but I went through 141. I'm curious what the final report is.

 

[C150J]

Regardless of 61 vs. 141, three primary busts doesn't tell us much. Were they multiple attempts at the same ride? In which knowledge area was he found to be deficient?

Again, I think it's the TOTALITY of the circumstance that matters. Looking at an airline pilot's primary record is like looking at a PhD candidate's 2nd grade science grades - kind of distant. However, combined with problems in college (initial training in the 1900) and problems at grad school (bad grades in an MA program), might mean something.

DrunkenBeagle - I took seven part 61 checkrides prior to the 121 world, and have been lucky. There are those that have and those that will fail rides. If only the public were to see how many high-profile attorneys and politicians failed their bar exam the first time.