The novice pilot's enemy is experience, while the experienced pilot's enemy is complacency.....
13 June 1977
Glendale Municipal Airport (P37)
Peoria, Arizona
Cessna 172M, N1243U
4 Fatal
For those of you that fly out of the PHX area, there's a little-known bit of airport history in the valley amongst all the aviation history to be had here. The newest physically-built municipal airport in the valley is Glendale Municipal Airport, located on 107th Ave and Glendale Road. But prior to the mid-1980s, Glendale Municipal Airport was located on the corner of Grand Ave and Olive Ave in what was then the border of the cities of Glendale and Peoria. I spent many a time around the old Glendale airport, as dad had his C-182 based out there since he'd purchased it new in 1975. Glendale Muni at that time was a single runway 17-35, about 3000' x 75' runway length, 2400' of which was available on RW 17 due to a displaced threshold. Obstruction-wise, on the approach-end of RW 17 was the 4-lane Grand Ave, powerlines, and the parallel Santa Fe railroad, while the approach-end of RW 35 sported powerlines and Olive Ave. 17-35 had a single midfield turnoff, in addition to the runway end turnoffs. I still remember the challenge being able to land and make the midfield turnoff that dad would undertake. All in all, Glendale Municipal airport at that time was a field that you really had to have your proverbial "game-on", since there was little room for error during takeoff and landing.
On the late morning of 13 June 1977, a Cessna 172M, N1243U, departed Prescott, Arizona (KPRC) for the flight to Glendale (P37). Onboard was the pilot, a 35 year old female with a Private ASEL and 326TT and 17 hours in the 172, and two passengers. 1243U was an older 172 with the 150 HP Lycoming and the still-available 40 degree flap setting. Being a rather warm June day, the pilot of 1243U had insured that her 172 was within weight/balance and CG prior to her takeoff from PRC with it's high density altitude potential. Having little trouble departing PRC, she headed for Glendale, and the lower altitudes of the metro PHX valley. Arriving at around 1415L, 1243Us pilot called up Glendale UNICOM reporting 15 miles north and inbound, requesting airport advisories. The airport manager, located at the PrecisionAir FBO, advised her that winds were light and variable, with RW 17 in use, and only one other aircraft in the pattern. At that time, my dad had gotten the annual done on his 182, and was currently in the closed pattern at Glendale, practicing touch and goes, while simultaneously running some hours on the 182s engine. Hearing this, the pilot of 1243U advised that she would be making a straight-in to RW 17 and would advise when she was on 5 mile final.
Approaching 5 mile final, the pilot of 1243U made her final, full-stop radio call, and pressed inbound. Witnesses reported the 172 to appear to be fast and slightly high during the approach. At Glendale, when flying final to RW 17, Grand Ave and the railroad give the optical illusion of their being closer to your glidepath as you get near to them, than they really are; especially when there's a train or large truck passing by as you overfly. Consequently, the tendency for pilots unfamiliar, is to be slightly steep and high. Witnesses reported 1243U appearing this very way, but also slightly fast. As N1243U crossed the threshold for RW 17, the pilot chopped the power and drove down for the flare. But being high and fast to begin with, the 172 floated a good distance before finally touching down just past the midfield taxiway turnoff. Knowing the midfield turnoff I described, as well as the overall runway length, one can deduce that there wasn't much runway remaining. Realizing this too, the pilot of 1243U elected to perform a go-around vice trying to stop on the remaining runway, a prudent decision. She applied full power, rotated, and became airborne. Witnesses reported that the flaps remained at 40 degrees, and the 172 was moving slowly while remaining in ground effect during the go, seemingly unable to begin it's climb just yet. At the same time this was occurring, a cement mixer truck from a local rock company was driving eastbound down Olive Ave. As fate would have it, the Cessna 172 was still in ground effect unable to climb, just as the cement truck crossed the extended centerline of RW 17. The 172 appeared to make an attempt at a nose-up maneuver, but didn't have the performance to complete the maneuver. It impacted the drivers door of the cement truck, instantly killing the truck's driver, as well as the three persons aboard the 172. The now out-of-control cement truck, traveling at an estimated 35 mph, veered off the road and into the parking lot of PrecisionAir, impacting numerous vehicles before rolling over, still with the 172 attached, held in-place where it's engine impacted and penetrated the cab.
Upon investigation of the wreckage and interview with eyewitnesses, it was determined that the pilot of 1243U had executed a high/steep approach and was fast, resulting in the float and late touchdown. It was also discovered in the wreckage that the 172s 40 degree flap setting was still set, as well as the carb heat knob still pulled out; both items being clean-up items for any go around: the carb heat immediately, and the flaps incrementally. Having the carb heat taken care of would've allowed @ 200 more RPM available, and incrementing the flaps from the 40 degree setting to the 30 or 20 degree setting would have maintained the lift necessary for the go-around, while not being a drastic configuration change that would result in the loss of lift. Missing these items, the pilot of 1243U could conceivably have had the performance necessary to climb, and overfly the truck. Interestingly, had the cement truck not been where it was at the time 1243U was passing, 1243U would probably have been able to overfly regular passenger car-sized vehicles, underfly the departure-end powerlines, then have 2 blocks of (at that time) flat cotton field to build more speed and climb performance, while not having any obstructions to have to negotiate. Olive Ave had the standard "Caution: Low Flying Aircraft" signs installed on the shoulder of the road. As the cement truck had made no attempt to slow or stop, it's assumed that the driver didn't notice, or possibly noticed and blew-off, the sign. This will never be truly known. Had the pilot of 1243U not had the cement truck crossing her path, and had she had the SA to see this escape opportunity, and had the cement truck driver seen the warning sign or at least checked left/right due the sign; with all or any combination of these factors, it is believed that she could have pulled off a successful go-around utilizing the cotton-fields. Tragically, that opportunity wasn't available to her due to the cards fate had dealt, following the square-corner she'd backed herself into.
Probable Cause:
*Pilot In Command- Misjudged distance and airspeed
*Pilot In Command- Delayed go-around initiation
Secondary Factors:
*Pilot In Command- Improper operation of powerplant and controls
*Personnel--miscellaneous--Driver of Vehicle
Tertiary Factors:
None
MikeD says:
This accident highlights a number of concepts that need to be garnered from it. Namely, and in this order on purpose:
1. Situational Awareness
2. Not pressing a bad situation
3. Proper checklist/procedure discipline.
4. Proper preflight planning (add-on)
5. Operation of the cement truck / driver actions
Situational Awareness: In this accident, it is reasonable to assume that the pilot of 1243U may have not noticed her high/steep and slightly fast approach due to the optical illusions inherent to this airport. However, from the time she crossed the threshold to the time she actually touched down, there was ample time to gauge that the landing just wasn't going to happen on this pass, and a go-around, while still airborne and with more speed, would be prudent.
Not Pressing a Bad Situation: Tying into the SA concept, not pressing a bad situation into a worse situation is imperative. I deliberately put this concept after SA, since SA is a pre-requisite for being able to have this concept in the first place, and realizing/knowing when it's time to hold 'em and when it's time to fold 'em.
Proper Checklist/Procedure Discipline: Again, I deliberately put these concepts in the order they're in, since they tie-in in a building-block fashion in this accident....you need one in order to progress to the other. As close as the pilot of N1243U was to beginning a climb out from her late go-around decision, it's very possible that had she followed the procedure of closing the carb heat after application of full power, and had she managed her flaps to a more reasonable setting for go around, one that would maintain or slightly increase lift while reducing the drag, she may not have ended up in the square corner she found herself in. At most any other airport, missing these items on a go-around would've been a nuisance at worst, and no real problem at best. At Glendale Muni, the combination of short runway and runway-end obstructions, allowed for little error while properly excuting procedures for takeoff, landing, and go-around. If the proper procedures aren't used, that't just more of a corner that a pilot ends up backing himself into. Learning and maintaining the correct habit patterns for procedures, will help insure that they become rote actions when needed; performed out of reaction to a situation where almost no thought is required. In a word, they must be near to second-nature, if not already. Granted, the pilot of 1243U only had 17 hours in-type, but is reasonable to assume that after 326 TT, basic flying procedures as-such should've been learned already.
Proper Preflight Planning: A factor in many accidents, and possibly one in this accident, yet not proven. The failure in this factor is rarely from over-planning; it's normally the other way around. Preflight planning, at least checking the Airport Facilities Directory or VFR or IFR Supp for any unfamiliar airport you may be flying into, is a must. Familiarizing oneself with airfield layout, obstructions, frequencies, etc is something to be accomplished prior to stepping to the aircraft, not while in the cockpit enroute generally speaking, with the exceptions being unplanned diverts. Again, not saying that this was a primary, secondary, or even tertiary factor in this accident; just another factor for pilots to consider. The pilot of 1243U had reportedly been into Glendale Muni a few times, so some basic familiarity was there.
Operation of the Cement Truck / driver actions
I considered carefully the actions or inactions of the cement truck driver. As a Class A CDL holder myself, I took into account my knowlege of large vehicle operations and regulations. My accounting of the accident in regards to the cement truck driver, was more of a factor of "should the sign posted by the road have reasonably cautioned the driver to at least have SA on what was going on in the area he was approaching?" Granted, those signs are not regulatory, and there is no requirement to slow down/stop as in the case of HAZMAT trucks and passenger buses approaching railroad crossings at all times. Of course, the driver is not at fault in this accident, and his presence there was one of fate versus fault. However, the reason I place him in the "Personnel- miscellaneous- driver of vehicle" as a secondary causal factor is simply due to his presence and the fact the the aircraft hit the truck, which wouldn't have happened had the truck not been there. I can only wonder, that the sign being there in the cautionary nature it was, that had the driver taken the caution and possibly looked towards the runway, there might have been a varied outcome. Again, not his fault, since the pilot is the one that's the primary causal factor of this accident, but again, these are side items that are still tied-into the accident, that must be considered in this accident, where decision whether To Land or Not to Land was a final one.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
13 June 1977
Glendale Municipal Airport (P37)
Peoria, Arizona
Cessna 172M, N1243U
4 Fatal
For those of you that fly out of the PHX area, there's a little-known bit of airport history in the valley amongst all the aviation history to be had here. The newest physically-built municipal airport in the valley is Glendale Municipal Airport, located on 107th Ave and Glendale Road. But prior to the mid-1980s, Glendale Municipal Airport was located on the corner of Grand Ave and Olive Ave in what was then the border of the cities of Glendale and Peoria. I spent many a time around the old Glendale airport, as dad had his C-182 based out there since he'd purchased it new in 1975. Glendale Muni at that time was a single runway 17-35, about 3000' x 75' runway length, 2400' of which was available on RW 17 due to a displaced threshold. Obstruction-wise, on the approach-end of RW 17 was the 4-lane Grand Ave, powerlines, and the parallel Santa Fe railroad, while the approach-end of RW 35 sported powerlines and Olive Ave. 17-35 had a single midfield turnoff, in addition to the runway end turnoffs. I still remember the challenge being able to land and make the midfield turnoff that dad would undertake. All in all, Glendale Municipal airport at that time was a field that you really had to have your proverbial "game-on", since there was little room for error during takeoff and landing.
On the late morning of 13 June 1977, a Cessna 172M, N1243U, departed Prescott, Arizona (KPRC) for the flight to Glendale (P37). Onboard was the pilot, a 35 year old female with a Private ASEL and 326TT and 17 hours in the 172, and two passengers. 1243U was an older 172 with the 150 HP Lycoming and the still-available 40 degree flap setting. Being a rather warm June day, the pilot of 1243U had insured that her 172 was within weight/balance and CG prior to her takeoff from PRC with it's high density altitude potential. Having little trouble departing PRC, she headed for Glendale, and the lower altitudes of the metro PHX valley. Arriving at around 1415L, 1243Us pilot called up Glendale UNICOM reporting 15 miles north and inbound, requesting airport advisories. The airport manager, located at the PrecisionAir FBO, advised her that winds were light and variable, with RW 17 in use, and only one other aircraft in the pattern. At that time, my dad had gotten the annual done on his 182, and was currently in the closed pattern at Glendale, practicing touch and goes, while simultaneously running some hours on the 182s engine. Hearing this, the pilot of 1243U advised that she would be making a straight-in to RW 17 and would advise when she was on 5 mile final.
Approaching 5 mile final, the pilot of 1243U made her final, full-stop radio call, and pressed inbound. Witnesses reported the 172 to appear to be fast and slightly high during the approach. At Glendale, when flying final to RW 17, Grand Ave and the railroad give the optical illusion of their being closer to your glidepath as you get near to them, than they really are; especially when there's a train or large truck passing by as you overfly. Consequently, the tendency for pilots unfamiliar, is to be slightly steep and high. Witnesses reported 1243U appearing this very way, but also slightly fast. As N1243U crossed the threshold for RW 17, the pilot chopped the power and drove down for the flare. But being high and fast to begin with, the 172 floated a good distance before finally touching down just past the midfield taxiway turnoff. Knowing the midfield turnoff I described, as well as the overall runway length, one can deduce that there wasn't much runway remaining. Realizing this too, the pilot of 1243U elected to perform a go-around vice trying to stop on the remaining runway, a prudent decision. She applied full power, rotated, and became airborne. Witnesses reported that the flaps remained at 40 degrees, and the 172 was moving slowly while remaining in ground effect during the go, seemingly unable to begin it's climb just yet. At the same time this was occurring, a cement mixer truck from a local rock company was driving eastbound down Olive Ave. As fate would have it, the Cessna 172 was still in ground effect unable to climb, just as the cement truck crossed the extended centerline of RW 17. The 172 appeared to make an attempt at a nose-up maneuver, but didn't have the performance to complete the maneuver. It impacted the drivers door of the cement truck, instantly killing the truck's driver, as well as the three persons aboard the 172. The now out-of-control cement truck, traveling at an estimated 35 mph, veered off the road and into the parking lot of PrecisionAir, impacting numerous vehicles before rolling over, still with the 172 attached, held in-place where it's engine impacted and penetrated the cab.
Upon investigation of the wreckage and interview with eyewitnesses, it was determined that the pilot of 1243U had executed a high/steep approach and was fast, resulting in the float and late touchdown. It was also discovered in the wreckage that the 172s 40 degree flap setting was still set, as well as the carb heat knob still pulled out; both items being clean-up items for any go around: the carb heat immediately, and the flaps incrementally. Having the carb heat taken care of would've allowed @ 200 more RPM available, and incrementing the flaps from the 40 degree setting to the 30 or 20 degree setting would have maintained the lift necessary for the go-around, while not being a drastic configuration change that would result in the loss of lift. Missing these items, the pilot of 1243U could conceivably have had the performance necessary to climb, and overfly the truck. Interestingly, had the cement truck not been where it was at the time 1243U was passing, 1243U would probably have been able to overfly regular passenger car-sized vehicles, underfly the departure-end powerlines, then have 2 blocks of (at that time) flat cotton field to build more speed and climb performance, while not having any obstructions to have to negotiate. Olive Ave had the standard "Caution: Low Flying Aircraft" signs installed on the shoulder of the road. As the cement truck had made no attempt to slow or stop, it's assumed that the driver didn't notice, or possibly noticed and blew-off, the sign. This will never be truly known. Had the pilot of 1243U not had the cement truck crossing her path, and had she had the SA to see this escape opportunity, and had the cement truck driver seen the warning sign or at least checked left/right due the sign; with all or any combination of these factors, it is believed that she could have pulled off a successful go-around utilizing the cotton-fields. Tragically, that opportunity wasn't available to her due to the cards fate had dealt, following the square-corner she'd backed herself into.
Probable Cause:
*Pilot In Command- Misjudged distance and airspeed
*Pilot In Command- Delayed go-around initiation
Secondary Factors:
*Pilot In Command- Improper operation of powerplant and controls
*Personnel--miscellaneous--Driver of Vehicle
Tertiary Factors:
None
MikeD says:
This accident highlights a number of concepts that need to be garnered from it. Namely, and in this order on purpose:
1. Situational Awareness
2. Not pressing a bad situation
3. Proper checklist/procedure discipline.
4. Proper preflight planning (add-on)
5. Operation of the cement truck / driver actions
Situational Awareness: In this accident, it is reasonable to assume that the pilot of 1243U may have not noticed her high/steep and slightly fast approach due to the optical illusions inherent to this airport. However, from the time she crossed the threshold to the time she actually touched down, there was ample time to gauge that the landing just wasn't going to happen on this pass, and a go-around, while still airborne and with more speed, would be prudent.
Not Pressing a Bad Situation: Tying into the SA concept, not pressing a bad situation into a worse situation is imperative. I deliberately put this concept after SA, since SA is a pre-requisite for being able to have this concept in the first place, and realizing/knowing when it's time to hold 'em and when it's time to fold 'em.
Proper Checklist/Procedure Discipline: Again, I deliberately put these concepts in the order they're in, since they tie-in in a building-block fashion in this accident....you need one in order to progress to the other. As close as the pilot of N1243U was to beginning a climb out from her late go-around decision, it's very possible that had she followed the procedure of closing the carb heat after application of full power, and had she managed her flaps to a more reasonable setting for go around, one that would maintain or slightly increase lift while reducing the drag, she may not have ended up in the square corner she found herself in. At most any other airport, missing these items on a go-around would've been a nuisance at worst, and no real problem at best. At Glendale Muni, the combination of short runway and runway-end obstructions, allowed for little error while properly excuting procedures for takeoff, landing, and go-around. If the proper procedures aren't used, that't just more of a corner that a pilot ends up backing himself into. Learning and maintaining the correct habit patterns for procedures, will help insure that they become rote actions when needed; performed out of reaction to a situation where almost no thought is required. In a word, they must be near to second-nature, if not already. Granted, the pilot of 1243U only had 17 hours in-type, but is reasonable to assume that after 326 TT, basic flying procedures as-such should've been learned already.
Proper Preflight Planning: A factor in many accidents, and possibly one in this accident, yet not proven. The failure in this factor is rarely from over-planning; it's normally the other way around. Preflight planning, at least checking the Airport Facilities Directory or VFR or IFR Supp for any unfamiliar airport you may be flying into, is a must. Familiarizing oneself with airfield layout, obstructions, frequencies, etc is something to be accomplished prior to stepping to the aircraft, not while in the cockpit enroute generally speaking, with the exceptions being unplanned diverts. Again, not saying that this was a primary, secondary, or even tertiary factor in this accident; just another factor for pilots to consider. The pilot of 1243U had reportedly been into Glendale Muni a few times, so some basic familiarity was there.
Operation of the Cement Truck / driver actions
I considered carefully the actions or inactions of the cement truck driver. As a Class A CDL holder myself, I took into account my knowlege of large vehicle operations and regulations. My accounting of the accident in regards to the cement truck driver, was more of a factor of "should the sign posted by the road have reasonably cautioned the driver to at least have SA on what was going on in the area he was approaching?" Granted, those signs are not regulatory, and there is no requirement to slow down/stop as in the case of HAZMAT trucks and passenger buses approaching railroad crossings at all times. Of course, the driver is not at fault in this accident, and his presence there was one of fate versus fault. However, the reason I place him in the "Personnel- miscellaneous- driver of vehicle" as a secondary causal factor is simply due to his presence and the fact the the aircraft hit the truck, which wouldn't have happened had the truck not been there. I can only wonder, that the sign being there in the cautionary nature it was, that had the driver taken the caution and possibly looked towards the runway, there might have been a varied outcome. Again, not his fault, since the pilot is the one that's the primary causal factor of this accident, but again, these are side items that are still tied-into the accident, that must be considered in this accident, where decision whether To Land or Not to Land was a final one.
MikeD
The above is not intended to be an undue criticism of the person or persons involved in the incident described. Instead, the analysis presented is intended to further the cause of flight safety and help to reduce accidents and incidents by educating pilots through the sacrifices of others in our profession.
