It isn't the automation, it is the Pilot Monitoring, CRM and Culture

[Cruise]

I've also got to add, with regard to the thing that finally killed the 3407 crew: reducing power for the approach.

If you've never done this yourself before, you either have auto throttles that won't let you, or you didn't notice when you pulled the power back to slow and got distracted by something.

I've done it before, though I obviously only lost a few knots before realizing what was happening. I've seen captains do it, and a quick "check speed" gets us back on profile.

When you do idle descents for long periods of time, it'll happen eventually. When you do decelerating approaches for long enough, it'll happen eventually. Hell, right after 3407 we had a crew do the exact same thing, but recovered from the shaker properly.

Were they bad pilots? No, they were distracted by figuring out how to not run headlong into a thunderstorm. It's EASY to end up having both sets of eyes outside the aircraft trying to figure out how to fix something.

Instead of lambasting our pilots, we put this into our CRM program and learned how to try to prevent it from happening again, because it could have been any of us.

Yep, it's called Mixed Mode Automation. We fly these highly automated, fully RNAV/VNAV aircraft and they lack auto thrust/ auto throttles. It's a design flaw of major proportion.
It only takes a small distraction while on decent or approach to miss bringing the power back in and in no time, you've got a big problem on your hands. Definitely one of the factors in the Colgan accident.

 

[Cruise]

Completely disagree with you.

By the time the First Officer (if PF) reaches for the throttle levers to abort you are past V1 in the high speed regime. Captains should be 'following along' with the rudder pedals so it isn't a 'full transfer' of controls.

But, if the FO is the PF and has abort authority, their hands would still be on the thrust levers. So there would be no delay in reaching, since the appropriate hands (PF) are where they should be. None of this I'm flying, you're aborting, hands all over the place stuff.

 

[MikeD]

However, the big thing I see is people not addressing good management techniques and creating a situation where there is too much information on the displays for a quick analysis of the aircraft state. Either they tend to view the systems as a "crutch" and leave out information the system needs to generate an accurate depiction, or as the photo @dasleben posted, they put so much information, it's reverse of the steam airplane - one has so much information depicted that you actually have to desconstruct the clutter to decipher what is truly important information. In the first case, incomplete and incorrect information inputted tends to create distrust in the accuracy of the automation leading to it being ignored. In the second case, pilots either spend so much time deconstructing the clutter they get behind where they need to be, or they ignore it because they don't have time to decipher a quick change. Think about how much effort it would take to verify a runway swap would have been looking at @dasleben 's cluttered display. Which is just as challenging, ironically, as partial panel in a steam plane.

The key is teaching to present the right information at the right time and using your display controls to manage the overall depictions to a quick glance. Just like in various phases of flight in steam airplanes where you adjust your scan to get the most relevant information at the proper time, so should you manage your display to in order to maintain a quick scan for relevant information for that phase of flight.

So how does this apply to your question?

It is the beauty of Boeing's basic ND. As long as you are flying into an airport in the database, and have programmed in the runway and approach, you will have EXACTLY one runway depicted. The runway you're landing on. To scale. With an approximately 14 mile dashed extended centerline off both thresholds. So in this case, it's extremely difficult to mistake the runway for another, as none are displayed. Unlike as been suggested, in airline operations, both pilots fly the approaches with their MAP display.

The only time you wouldn't fly the MAP display is a non-database airport or a dual FMC failure.

Gotta run to get on a flight. Hope I presented a complete picture.

Cheers

Declutter your darn display.

Good points. Even in the glass cockpit Citation I occasionally fly, the normal PFD/ND combo display in its normal mode simply has too much crap on it. It's all useful info for various phases of flight, just not for all phases. I generally have to declutter twice in order to get something workable, useable, and not a challenge to process mentally.

 

[Polar742]

While, I admit, I completely understand the additional situational awareness afforded by both pilots flying with the MAP displayed... Don't you think this is a small part of the problem with the "lack" of pilot proficiency?

Flying the jet when it's perfectly healthy, with all of the information and systems provided, should be a benign affair. But, if you were to lose both FMS or lose electrical power and were down to your emergency power VOR/ILS, wouldn't familiarization with the VOR or APP mode be helpful?

I'm not saying that there is anything mystical about the two settings. However, there is a difference between shooting a raw data ILS and a moving map with flight director available. Both low threat when managed properly, but different scans and skill sets.

Just trying to figure out all the mindset differences between you crazy airliners and us crazy military guys...

We do a demonstration in New hire training, but I think it's a difference in philosophy. Do you train for the 99% probability or the 1% probability that most people will scratch their heads with cooking up a compound unrelated failure to train.

I guess the another point is, what are you cross checking if you have another mode besides the map? There is a localizer repeater on the PFD.

 

[jtrain609]

I don't find it strange at all the more you break down the threats of a high speed abort. Having one person make the decision is probably the safest course of action.

Let's take this a few steps further then: why let FO's call for go arounds? It's a no fault call, right?

Why do we takeoff differently?

Further, there are some things that can happen just before V1 that the captain may be unable to respond to fast enough. What if the FO was the one doing the takeoff, and had a rudder hardover with no EICAS indication? The FO will know that the aircraft is unlikely to fly because they're the ones operating the aircraft, and by the time they tell the captain what's happening, you're either already airborne with an aircraft that isn't interested in flying, or you're still on the ground WAY over V1.

What if you get a nosewheel steering runaway near V1, and the FO is the one performing the takeoff, and disconnects the nosewheel steering with the trigger on their yoke before they can say anything to the captain, an EICAS message pops up, and the captain performs an abort at or above V1 because they saw the initial swerve and then the EICAS message. Now you're doing an abort with a free castering nosewheel.

• and elbows.

 

[Joshwa]

Another separate but interesting aspect is flight deck gradient. The NTSB suggest unless the numbers have been transposed that the captain had about 16,000tt and the FO 21,000.

That kind of experience split is very unusual in Europe - how do you design your CRM program to deal with it?

 

[Dugie8]

Another separate but interesting aspect is flight deck gradient. The NTSB suggest unless the numbers have been transposed that the captain had about 16,000tt and the FO 21,000.

That kind of experience split is very unusual in Europe - how do you design your CRM program to deal with it?

Hire people who's ego isn't so delicate that an arbitrary number in a funny looking book is a point of contention between two "professionals".

 

[🦈💜]

Captain isn't ever capitalized unless it's the first word in a sentence, or you are calling someone by their name as a title.
"I am a captain."
vs
"Have you seen Captain Smith?"

Or when the title is used in lieu of the person's proper name...

-Fox

 

[Joshwa]

@Dugie8 - more thinking about the dynamics of a very high experience cockpit, little gradient.

From the SW example - captain hasn't been to the airport before, FO has and calls the field in sight. If the skipper isn't sure, hes less likely to question a very high experience FO. People are people, and it's another factor you need to think about in your training program if your pilot group has those demographics.

 

[BobDDuck]

Another separate but interesting aspect is flight deck gradient. The NTSB suggest unless the numbers have been transposed that the captain had about 16,000tt and the FO 21,000.

That kind of experience split is very unusual in Europe - how do you design your CRM program to deal with it?

That is far more common in the States. Because people take very different paths to get to the airlines (and also, often times have to start their careers over again at the bottom if the horse they chose to ride dies underneath them), total time is often not a reflection of longevity at a specific company. Training and a general understanding of that fact pretty much negate those issues. I actually flew with a guy the other day who despite have 9 years at the current company (and me only having 7 month) had only 100 more hours of flight time than I did.

 

[Maurus]

That is far more common in the States. Because people take very different paths to get to the airlines (and also, often times have to start their careers over again at the bottom if the horse they chose to ride dies underneath them), total time is often not a reflection of longevity at a specific company. Training and a general understanding of that fact pretty much negate those issues. I actually flew with a guy the other day who despite have 9 years at the current company (and me only having 7 month) had only 100 more hours of flight time than I did.

Total time isn't necessarily the best indicator of experience either. There are guys out there that have been qualified in multiple airframes for air carriers and have low TT while others have tons of TT but have been flying the same aluminum can for the last 10+ years. There are many factors when summing up someone's experience.

 

[MikeD]

Let's take this a few steps further then: why let FO's call for go arounds? It's a no fault call, right?

Why do we takeoff differently?

Agree completely.

you're either already airborne with an aircraft that isn't interested in flying, or you're still on the ground WAY over V1.

In the F-117, there were critical items we would abort past V1 for where it was known that the jet will not keep flying once airborne....it will end up somewhere far off the end of the runway and into a neighborhood, etc. So the responsible thing is to keep that plane which you know will not keep flying, on the ground. Granted, we had the luxury of a drag chute, a tailhook if arresting gear was available, and in some places a departure end barrier we could take. For civil use, some airports have EMAS.

The point is, as a pilot, you need to know your aircraft well enough to know which critical emergencies these may be which may or may not be covered by critical action procedures, and act accordingly. Since there are times where judgement may dictate that a particular procedure won't necessarily work, and the pilot needs to make a call based on his experience. Some look at this as cowboy, but it's really not, because it's only used in exceptionally rare circumstances, never as standard procedure or contrary to established procedure when not specifically called for by the situation.

In the 117, a dual generator failure with a departure into IMC/Night was a must abort. Mainly because you'll get airborne with next to nothing instrumentation-wise, and then you'll only be on battery which will last 15 mins or so....maybe; not nearly enough time to recover the jet in the radar pattern, to which you could only do a ASR/PAR anyway because no navaids work. Then, when the battery dies, no FBW works. So your now out-of-control dart will go where it feels like going down through the WX. Only thing left working will be the ACESII seat.....

 

[Seggy]

Let's take this a few steps further then: why let FO's call for go arounds? It's a no fault call, right?

Why do we takeoff differently?

Because a reject is far more of a dangerous maneuver than a go around.

Further, there are some things that can happen just before V1 that the captain may be unable to respond to fast enough. What if the FO was the one doing the takeoff, and had a rudder hardover with no EICAS indication? The FO will know that the aircraft is unlikely to fly because they're the ones operating the aircraft, and by the time they tell the captain what's happening, you're either already airborne with an aircraft that isn't interested in flying, or you're still on the ground WAY over V1.

What if you get a nosewheel steering runaway near V1, and the FO is the one performing the takeoff, and disconnects the nosewheel steering with the trigger on their yoke before they can say anything to the captain, an EICAS message pops up, and the captain performs an abort at or above V1 because they saw the initial swerve and then the EICAS message. Now you're doing an abort with a free castering nosewheel.

and elbows.

What happens in all of those scenarios if the FO doesn't respond and you go flying anyway? Or the FO is indecisive? Or you do a high speed abort because it's a faulty message? Or the FO does a high speed abort for a minor issue because they haven't seen it in the airplane and 'wasn't sure' what happened?

You can't look at EVERY specific situation that can possibly occur. There are just to many to make procedures for.

Look at this in a general big picture way. It's probably safer to have the Captain make the decision. Is it perfect? No.

Look at it this way as well. If you put it on one person you can emphasize training that one seat a lot more proficient than both seats.

 

[Seggy]

Total time isn't necessarily the best indicator of experience either. There are guys out there that have been qualified in multiple airframes for air carriers and have low TT while others have tons of TT but have been flying the same aluminum can for the last 10+ years. There are many factors when summing up someone's experience.

But if they have more experience in the aircraft, which in 99% of the cases at your company is the Captain, they should probably handle the reject.

 

[Maurus]

But if they have more experience in the aircraft, which in 99% of the cases at your company is the Captain, they should probably handle the reject.

This is true.

My quote was part of a different discussion however. Just kind of adding to what "experience" can mean. It really depends on the situation.

 

[Seggy]

This is true.

My quote was part of a different discussion however. Just kind of adding to what "experience" can mean. It really depends on the situation.

Very true, I was just trying to illustrate the point to the @jtrain609!

 

[Dugie8]

ATI trained for the PIC performing the abort. Trained it very well too. I actually got to do one out of PHL. Granted we were relatively light, 20k of cargo and fuel to go to TOL. At about 100 knots the FE leaned up and calmly said the oil pressure on #1 had gone to zero. I was the PF and said abort and the Captain took the controls and brought the airplane to a quick but easy stop. All was good until he set the parking brake while waiting for the ground crew to come back out.

 

[Seggy]

Here's another issue with 'switching' off rejected take offs. It has to do more than being able to handle the maneuver.

At my place First Officers have VERY specific duties with a rejected takeoff in respect due to ATC, FA Communication and running the checklist. We have to have our duties memorized. It could lead to confusion if we went back and forth.

 

[Maurus]

Very true, I was just trying to illustrate the point to the @jtrain609!

Take every opportunity you get to do that.

 

[BobDDuck]

ATI trained for the PIC performing the abort. Trained it very well too. I actually got to do one out of PHL. Granted we were relatively light, 20k of cargo and fuel to go to TOL. At about 100 knots the FE leaned up and calmly said the oil pressure on #1 had gone to zero. I was the PF and said abort and the Captain took the controls and brought the airplane to a quick but easy stop. All was good until he set the parking brake while waiting for the ground crew to come back out.

PSA allowed either crewmember to call for the abort, although the CA was the one who performed it. Current shop, only the captain can call for it.

I did one highspeed RTO (at about 120) in the RJ based off of the FO calling for an abort due to a reverser deploying. Fortunately it was a pretty long runway so it was a non event. In the debrief afterwards we talked about if it had been a much shorter runway and agreed that we probably would have taken the plane into the air at that point as the CRJ will fly (kind of) with one engine in idle reverse, at least according to the sim. After that I have become a fan of the captain being the only one that can call for the reject as there is a lot of trust and thought that goes into a go/no go decision like that. Not that the FO can't make a decision of that type but it would be difficult to convey the whole thought process of "something broke but I'm not calling for a reject because there is only a little bit of runway left and the plane will still fly". Where as how most places do it, it's simply the FO saying "reverse deployed" and the captain thinking through the whole thing and then saying "continuing" or "rejecting".