It isn't the automation, it is the Pilot Monitoring, CRM and Culture

[inigo88]

You are incorrect on how Boeings display the runway you're planning on landing on. Even the 90's philosophy, with limited processing capability, give very good SA.

Sorry Polar, I thought the ND generally looked similar to this with airports enabled? Do the runways show up at closer zoom settings?
http://www.pbase.com/flying_dutchman/image/95067727/original

Even so, I agree that is excellent SA so long as you have a procedure loaded in the FMC, since heading to one of the other circles will take you off the route line. (And for the record, I love the Boeing interface.)

 

[MercFE]

Sorry Polar, I thought the ND generally looked similar to this with airports enabled? Do the runways show up at closer zoom settings?
http://www.pbase.com/flying_dutchman/image/95067727/original

Even so, I agree that is excellent SA so long as you have a procedure loaded in the FMC, since heading to one of the other circles will take you off the route line. (And for the record, I love the Boeing interface.)

The picture you show is correct... This is very similar to the setup we have in the E-6B since updating to our 737 flight deck.

However, what I think @Polar742 was alluding to was the way the LANDING runway is depicted.

When you zoom in on the map a little more, the runway that you have selected in the FMS as the "approach" runway will be displayed with two parallel white lines in the runway heading direction.

I know that in our community, even if someone is shooting an ILS or other approach in the VOR or APP display mode, which removes the map display from their Nav Display, we normally keep the PM display on the MAP mode. The backup of the moving map with approach points, airfield layout, and TCAS information, is a great way to avoid winding up at the wrong place or hitting someone else out there.

 

[dasleben]

Sorry Polar, I thought the ND generally looked similar to this with airports enabled? Do the runways show up at closer zoom settings?
http://www.pbase.com/flying_dutchman/image/95067727/original

Even so, I agree that is excellent SA so long as you have a procedure loaded in the FMC, since heading to one of the other circles will take you off the route line. (And for the record, I love the Boeing interface.)

That's very zoomed out. 160nm range is what's shown, which is what you'd potentially use for enroute operations.

Here's what it looks like during normal approach/landing:

This is still zoomed out to the 40nm range (and cluttered up with a non-standard number of rings and lines...wasn't me!), but you can readily see the two white parallel lines that depict the runway. Zoomed in further makes it much clearer (we normally land at the 5nm range)

Sorry for the crappy example; best I could find.

 

[Stomp16]

At Colgan we used to have to fill out an irregularity report if we went around.......

Are you for or against that? We have that same requirement. It's there to identify trends and to capture if we need to re-analyze our operations and/or training. This has specifically led to two risk mitigation's where we decided to no longer base at the airports where we continued to experience go-arounds. Both were due to ATC (tower) issues.

Also, at the beginning of this thread you stated;

Proper CRM and threat and error training which emphasizes the role of the pilot monitoring and a commitment to a just safety culture. It actually is very easy to do.

What are you saying is easy to do? Give the training pertaining to CRM and a just safety culture or have a just safety culture with everyone on board? In the last 5 years I've developed and lead a successful safety culture at my place of employment and I can say without a doubt, the hardest part has been getting everyone to buy into the system (at first). Once the advantages are seen, every one usually quickly falls in line. However, maintaining that culture is a fine art in itself and requires constant attention and grooming.

 

[Seggy]

Fair enough. How would you feel about changing training so either pilot could call the abort? Support your answer. Just trying to wrap my head around it better.

I think, as it is probably one of the most dangerous maneuvers out there, that it should be a Captain only call. There obviously should be a set standard of go/no decision making and training to back it up, but I don't think First Officers should call the actual abort.

 

[Seggy]

Are you for or against that? We have that same requirement. It's there to identify trends and to capture if we need to re-analyze our operations and/or training. This has specifically led to two risk mitigation's where we decided to no longer base at the airports where we continued to experience go-arounds. Both were due to ATC (tower) issues.

I am against it. The ASAP and FOQA program identify any of these trends very nicely.

What are you saying is easy to do? Give the training pertaining to CRM and a just safety culture or have a just safety culture with everyone on board? In the last 5 years I've developed and lead a successful safety culture at my place of employment and I can say without a doubt, the hardest part has been getting everyone to buy into the system (at first). Once the advantages are seen, every one usually quickly falls in line. However, maintaining that culture is a fine art in itself and requires constant attention and grooming.

Thanks for making me clarify this.

Developing the tools to put in place a good CRM/TEM program is easy. At Colgan we had one in place a few weeks after the accident. Yes, getting everyone on board initially with a just safety culture is a whole different animal. You are right though, once it happens everyone does line up nicely.

 

[Polar742]

Sorry Polar, I thought the ND generally looked similar to this with airports enabled? Do the runways show up at closer zoom settings?
http://www.pbase.com/flying_dutchman/image/95067727/original

Even so, I agree that is excellent SA so long as you have a procedure loaded in the FMC, since heading to one of the other circles will take you off the route line. (And for the record, I love the Boeing interface.)

At enroute scales, the airports are circles. In terminal area scales, the runways, along with extended centerlines are displayed.

The airports in the database are assigned by operator. For example, Jabara isn't in the 747 database as the runway doesn't meet the criteria. So it's not necessarily pilots heading to the wrong circle on the screen, eh?

 

[Polar742]

That's very zoomed out. 160nm range is what's shown, which is what you'd potentially use for enroute operations.

Here's what it looks like during normal approach/landing:

This is still zoomed out to the 40nm range (and cluttered up with a non-standard number of rings and lines...wasn't me!), but you can readily see the two white parallel lines that depict the runway. Zoomed in further makes it much clearer (we normally land at the 5nm range)

Sorry for the crappy example; best I could find.

Looks like astronaut work...

 

[jtrain609]

I think, as it is probably one of the most dangerous maneuvers out there, that it should be a Captain only call. There obviously should be a set standard of go/no decision making and training to back it up, but I don't think First Officers should call the actual abort.

I've gotta tell you man, idea of having a transfer of controls at 140 knots sounds like a TERRIBLE idea to me. Of course having a transfer of controls at 100' while doing a monitored Cat II approach seems like a terrible also, but we do that pretty often.

Sorry Polar, I thought the ND generally looked similar to this with airports enabled? Do the runways show up at closer zoom settings?
http://www.pbase.com/flying_dutchman/image/95067727/original

Even so, I agree that is excellent SA so long as you have a procedure loaded in the FMC, since heading to one of the other circles will take you off the route line. (And for the record, I love the Boeing interface.)

We build up the approach so you've got the fixes going to the runway. The display isn't as good as what was posted above, but it's pretty clear of where the approach course is.

Additionally, the best indication we have that there are other airports out there with the same configuration that are a threat when it comes to landing at the wrong airport is our 10-7 pages.

 

[inigo88]

At enroute scales, the airports are circles. In terminal area scales, the runways, along with extended centerlines are displayed.

The airports in the database are assigned by operator. For example, Jabara isn't in the 747 database as the runway doesn't meet the criteria. So it's not necessarily pilots heading to the wrong circle on the screen, eh?

Sorry if I gave the impression that I thought that, of course it's not. I actually brought up the ND for the opposite reason: That it would be a good SA tool to alert crews to expect an intermediate airport between them and their destination within the last 10-15 miles, before the pressure is on to call the field and both heads (potentially) go outside the cockpit. But I see why it makes sense to only include airports that meet the requirements of your aircraft/company on the display.

Obviously you have a good insight into what happened in at least one out of these three incidents, and if that can ever be released I look forward to learning from it.

 

[Seggy]

I've gotta tell you man, idea of having a transfer of controls at 140 knots sounds like a TERRIBLE idea to me. Of course having a transfer of controls at 100' while doing a monitored Cat II approach seems like a terrible also, but we do that pretty often.

Are you saying FOs shouldn't abort or call for the abort of the aircraft?

 

[jtrain609]

Are you saying FOs shouldn't abort or call for the abort of the aircraft?

I'm saying the PF should continue to be the PF during an abort. I don't really care who calls for the abort, but I think having the FO performing the takeoff, with the captain performing the abort is a recipe for disaster.

 

[inigo88]

We build up the approach so you've got the fixes going to the runway. The display isn't as good as what was posted above, but it's pretty clear of where the approach course is.

Additionally, the best indication we have that there are other airports out there with the same configuration that are a threat when it comes to landing at the wrong airport is our 10-7 pages.

Thanks a lot train! Do you happen to know if any of the 10-7 pages for the three affected airports pointed that out? Since two out of the three were Air Force Bases, do they even make Jepps for them? (I know military pilots are stuck using NACO.)

 

[Stomp16]

I am against it. The ASAP and FOQA program identify any of these trends very nicely.

Understood. 121 ops have the personnel to just data mine the FOQA data all day and night. We don't have the benefit of FOQA and therefore our entire program is based on pilot involvement. We have to have a positive, just culture our or program falls apart as we have no way to otherwise acquire the data.

 

[jtrain609]

Thanks a lot train! Do you happen to know if any of the 10-7 pages for the three affected airports pointed that out? Since two out of the three were Air Force Bases, do they even make Jepps for them? (I know military pilots are stuck using NACO.)

10-7 pages are designed by each carrier for use in their specific operations. They're reprinted by Jeppesen, but everything in them is provided by the specific air carrier.

They include things like what gates an airport uses, what the ops frequency for that airport is, etc. As such, it isn't general data, but instead it's tailored to each carriers operation, by that carrier.

 

[Seggy]

I'm saying the PF should continue to be the PF during an abort. I don't really care who calls for the abort, but I think having the FO performing the takeoff, with the captain performing the abort is a recipe for disaster.

Completely disagree with you.

By the time the First Officer (if PF) reaches for the throttle levers to abort you are past V1 in the high speed regime. Captains should be 'following along' with the rudder pedals so it isn't a 'full transfer' of controls.

 

[BobDDuck]

For some really strange reason, we can't put circles around a fix on the 717. I keep meaning to ask a MD11 guy if they are able to as apparently we have the same avionics package. When we select a navpoint on the FIX page it circles it in green, but the radius of the circle isn't controllable, which is something I could do even with the terrible display on the CRJ.

That it would be a good SA tool to alert crews to expect an intermediate airport between them and their destination within the last 10-15 miles, before the pressure is on to call the field and both heads (potentially) go outside the cockpit. But I see why it makes sense to only include airports that meet the requirements of your aircraft/company on the display.

For a smaller plane, there are a ton of airports that might meet the landing requirements. On the CRJ it would show every airport with at least 4000 feet of runway. I'm not sure what the cut off is on the 717 but I know we can get it down and stopped in less than 4500 feet.

I'm really a fan of forcing guys to get their head out of the cockpit MORE on final approach and feel like adding another reason to keep checking inside ("are we going to the correct circle") isn't very good. Using something like that while briefing and when deciding if what you are about to call visually is in fact the airport/runway that you want to land on is fine, but once you are hand flying the only thing you should be checking inside is your airspeed and maybe your altitude if you are restricted still.

I was having a conversation about this with the captain I flew with yesterday. HNL was landing west (so an LDA 26L) and at the last minute we got a sidestep to 26R which involves a pretty tight turn at about 300 feet to get aligned correctly. The runway is damn near impossible to find at night, but during daylight hours once you break off the LDA it's pretty easy to see where you are going. As soon as they gave us the sidestep the captain went heads down to try to reprogram the box for that runway. There is no instrument approach for it, and even if there was, rolling out at 300 feet doesn't really give you any time to use the vnav anyways. After we landed he apologized that he hadn't been able to get the box setup for the new runway in time and that I had to deal with flight director command bars that were pointing in a direction I wasn't going. The fact of the matter is that I wasn't even looking inside, other than to keep an eye on my airspeed.

 

[jtrain609]

Completely disagree with you.

By the time the First Officer reaches for the throttle levers to abort you are past V1 in the high speed regime.

Not true if the FO is the one that keeps their hand on the thrust levers.

In any event, disagree all you want. I just find it strange that we harp on how a transfer of controls at low altitudes and high speeds is a great way to kill yourself, but we train to do exactly that with high speed aborts.

 

[inigo88]

10-7 pages are designed by each carrier for use in their specific operations. They're reprinted by Jeppesen, but everything in them is provided by the specific air carrier.

They include things like what gates an airport uses, what the ops frequency for that airport is, etc. As such, it isn't general data, but instead it's tailored to each carriers operation, by that carrier.

I thought I remembered seeing stuff like gate diagrams, ramp tower freqs, etc on 10-7s. Thanks.

 

[inigo88]

I'm really a fan of forcing guys to get their head out of the cockpit MORE on final approach and feel like adding another reason to keep checking inside ("are we going to the correct circle") isn't very good. Using something like that while briefing and when deciding if what you are about to call visually is in fact the airport/runway that you want to land on is fine, but once you are hand flying the only thing you should be checking inside is your airspeed and maybe your altitude if you are restricted still.

I completely agree with you, and I think my OP was too long so people got sidetracked by my airports on the ND mistake.

What I was really trying to ask is are there better ways in which to brief the threat of landing at the wrong airport well before you start looking out the window for it in the terminal area? For example, I think almost all the airports in Europe have some sort of charted visual flight procedure regardless of their size, like this one for Innsbruck (I always thought these were overkill FWIW).

Would something like that, or even just a sectional/TAC excerpt of the destination airport area, improve situational awareness? So that when heads do go outside and the PF is flying reference to the airspeed indicator only, they have a better idea of what to expect (like seeing the wrong airport before they see the right one)? Or are the existing company-specific 10-7 pages enough to warn pilots what to watch out for?