Seggy
Well-Known Member
I noticed that a few folks in the Southwest thread were talking about how the FAA is now going to require us to only shoot instrument approaches in wake of the Southwest (and Atlas) aircraft landing at the wrong airport over the last few months. I know that this was 'just' talk, but I want to point out a few things.
Before these aircraft landed at the wrong airport, we saw Colgan, Air France, and Asiana, get their aircraft into different stalls. It is interesting that we are seeing a 'grouping' of extremely similar causes of accidents/incidents in a relatively short period of time. Is that a coincidence? I don't think so.
Out of the Colgan and Air France accidents a big push was made to be less reliant on the automation and 'just fly' the airplane. Now we saw two incidents were aircraft landed at the wrong airport, in visual conditions, conditions that may lead us to 'just fly' the aircraft. I am not sure how the automation was set up in the Atlas and Southwest cockpits, but if the FAA wants to 'push' us to only do instrument approaches, that is in direct contradiction to what they just put out concerning the Colgan and Air France lessons learned. Of course you back up the visual approaches with your automation, but your eyes need to be more outside of the cockpit if you are 'just flying' the aircraft. You cross check with what you have inside, but in the last month even that cross check has failed twice....in a big way.
So do we need more or less automation? Does the FAA need to micromanage how we operate the airplane? If so how do they do it? Or is it something else?
Looking at the Colgan and Air France accident reports it is clear that if there was a lack of a strong pilot monitoring (PM) and a breakdown in CRM. I am not familiar with the culture at Air France or Atlas, but look at the culture of Southwest, Asiana, and Colgan at the time of their accidents/incidents. It doesn't paint a very favorable picture. Southwest has a culture of rushing, Asiana a culture of not speaking up, and Colgan a vindictive culture if one made any type of mistake.
See the similarities here? It has very little to do with the actual mechanics of operating the airplane. It has everything to do with how the crew interacted with themselves and the situation they were in.
The human factors folks at the NTSB and FAA need to focus on the roles of the PM, CRM, and actual culture of the companies when they investigate these incidents/accidents. They can't get caught up in micromanaging how we get the aircraft on the ground. Whether it be a visual or instrument approach, honestly, that really isn't that important. If you have strong pilot monitors, great CRM, and great cultures, getting the aircraft on the ground safely will happen VERY well.
Before these aircraft landed at the wrong airport, we saw Colgan, Air France, and Asiana, get their aircraft into different stalls. It is interesting that we are seeing a 'grouping' of extremely similar causes of accidents/incidents in a relatively short period of time. Is that a coincidence? I don't think so.
Out of the Colgan and Air France accidents a big push was made to be less reliant on the automation and 'just fly' the airplane. Now we saw two incidents were aircraft landed at the wrong airport, in visual conditions, conditions that may lead us to 'just fly' the aircraft. I am not sure how the automation was set up in the Atlas and Southwest cockpits, but if the FAA wants to 'push' us to only do instrument approaches, that is in direct contradiction to what they just put out concerning the Colgan and Air France lessons learned. Of course you back up the visual approaches with your automation, but your eyes need to be more outside of the cockpit if you are 'just flying' the aircraft. You cross check with what you have inside, but in the last month even that cross check has failed twice....in a big way.
So do we need more or less automation? Does the FAA need to micromanage how we operate the airplane? If so how do they do it? Or is it something else?
Looking at the Colgan and Air France accident reports it is clear that if there was a lack of a strong pilot monitoring (PM) and a breakdown in CRM. I am not familiar with the culture at Air France or Atlas, but look at the culture of Southwest, Asiana, and Colgan at the time of their accidents/incidents. It doesn't paint a very favorable picture. Southwest has a culture of rushing, Asiana a culture of not speaking up, and Colgan a vindictive culture if one made any type of mistake.
See the similarities here? It has very little to do with the actual mechanics of operating the airplane. It has everything to do with how the crew interacted with themselves and the situation they were in.
The human factors folks at the NTSB and FAA need to focus on the roles of the PM, CRM, and actual culture of the companies when they investigate these incidents/accidents. They can't get caught up in micromanaging how we get the aircraft on the ground. Whether it be a visual or instrument approach, honestly, that really isn't that important. If you have strong pilot monitors, great CRM, and great cultures, getting the aircraft on the ground safely will happen VERY well.
