How often do you...

How often do you brief your airframe's go around profile/procedures during your approach briefings?

  • Never

    Votes: 21 27.3%
  • Rarely

    Votes: 28 36.4%
  • Frequently

    Votes: 13 16.9%
  • Always

    Votes: 15 19.5%

  • Total voters
    77
It's right off a briefing card we were once issued but it's in one of our manuals is.

Do you have any insight as to why it is in the order it is in?

It seems mostly chronological in terms of how items will occur during the flight....except the runway considerations and taxi plan.

In the military, we had a briefing order that was largely patterned around the fact that the middle portion of the flight was the one that required the most discussion time. So, we'd do the "taxi/takeoff/departure" first, the "recovery/arrival/landing/taxiback" second, the "abnormals and emergencies" third, and then the rest was the tactical portion of the flight.
 
Different companies have different briefing philosophies so I'm not sure why we are jumping all over this one guy. Briefing a go around happens as many times as you do a takeoff so I don't feel the need to brief configurations and call outs. At my airline if we do cat2/3 ops we have special briefing items that are reviewed out of the qrh before the approach. A complex missed or EO missed would also be an additional briefing.
Brief all you want, but I don't think there's a direct correlation in "the more you brief the better things will go".
Finally, brief what your supposed to based on company procedures.
 
I very rarely brief the missed profile as part of the approach briefing. Interestingly enough, out of all the go arounds I've done in the actual plane (well, two different air frames now), only once had a go around been super sloppy and something I felt was a safety risk and that was due to an abnormal configuration (fully configured, full boards, power idle, descending 3000fpm)

What in the world were you guys doing close to the ground at -3000fpm??? Windshear?
 
Do you have any insight as to why it is in the order it is in?

Nope! I generally don't try to figure it out as there are people that are adamant it's the best thing one earth and those that feel the polar opposite. Not my jet! :)
 
You're welcome.

-PHL airways crew.

That was actually part of the brief long before that. When the PHL accident happened, I reached out to my US friends and couldn't believe it wasn't part of their standard brief.

Looking for that FMA to wake up is extremely critical on the bus...
 
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What in the world were you guys doing close to the ground at -3000fpm??? Windshear?

Really bad vectors, trying to get established prior to the FAF. Was about 800 feet above the glideslope inside the faf when I bailed on the approach. We were at about 2000 agl I think.
 
Do y'all brief it every leg?

First leg, new pilot, the big brief.

Thereafter it's just a basic "WARTS". Weather, abnormals (as "Abnormals, as discussed previously" 99% of the time unless there's something weird broken on the jet), runway, terrain and anything special every leg.
 
Brake temps? Window sliding open? Thrust not set? :)

Surely you jest. Unless you're trolling, then I gotta check that IP.


In the <sim> I killed many a hawker pilot with a simple hydraulic failure prior to V1 - just because it makes a really loud horn go off.

Usually ended up with us upside down in a ditch next to the runway.

The startle factor of the horn often causes use them to reject, even though the safe and prudent action is to take it flying and the. Deal with the problem. A No brake, no flap, no spoiler, no steering reject from 100kts usually doesn't work when there is less than a mile of runway remaining.

I'm not a fan of the "reject for anything below 80" usually tend to give it the pilot noticing state the problem, it will be my secession to abort. If I do abort the call out will be.... I'll stop the airplane, you will notify atc.
 
In the <sim> I killed many a hawker pilot with a simple hydraulic failure prior to V1 - just because it makes a really loud horn go off.

Usually ended up with us upside down in a ditch next to the runway.

The startle factor of the horn often causes use them to reject, even though the safe and prudent action is to take it flying and the. Deal with the problem. A No brake, no flap, no spoiler, no steering reject from 100kts usually doesn't work when there is less than a mile of runway remaining.

I'm not a fan of the "reject for anything below 80" usually tend to give it the pilot noticing state the problem, it will be my secession to abort. If I do abort the call out will be.... I'll stop the airplane, you will notify atc.

Sounds like the main issue is with the hawker.
 
Sounds like the main issue is with the hawker.
Nah, the bottom air take drops when hydraulic pressure is removed, so you get the take off config warning. The only reason that horn comes on is if the airbake has dropped, or the gears been selected up with flaps at 25...
If you know your systems it takes a Half second to ID, and then the correct action is to continue take off.

People always give the standard "abort for any lights below 80, after 80 engine failure fire of loss of directional control". A good percentage will then abort at V1 for a DC gen fail contrary to their brief. I use the hydraulic failure right after that to drive home the point. I found it funny how many people would say ,"but it was before V1". Well - that's great. I'm sure the NTSB will make note of the speed being less than V1 in the accident report.
 
Nah, the bottom air take drops when hydraulic pressure is removed, so you get the take off config warning. The only reason that horn comes on is if the airbake has dropped, or the gears been selected up with flaps at 25...
If you know your systems it takes a Half second to ID, and then the correct action is to continue take off.

People always give the standard "abort for any lights below 80, after 80 engine failure fire of loss of directional control". A good percentage will then abort at V1 for a DC gen fail contrary to their brief. I use the hydraulic failure right after that to drive home the point. I found it funny how many people would say ,"but it was before V1". Well - that's great. I'm sure the NTSB will make note of the speed being less than V1 in the accident report.

That doesn't make it sound any better.
Any "TO inhibit" items on the hawker?
 
At my place we are to brief the entire go around profile the first flight of each day. Missed approach procedures, every leg.


What's most interesting to me is how the multi-crew environment takes many relatively simple tasks and turns them into much more complicated ones.

Care to expand on the 'many'? I see it more as work load management to prevent task saturation.

In nearly two decades of flying pointy-nosed, single pilot jets, I can't think of a single task during a go-around that I would have even considered having to mentally review prior to an approach.

I hope you aren't falling into the trap that 'at XYZ airline we did it this way'....

Just because you think that way in a fighter jet, doesn't mean it is the right thinking in a transport category aircraft.

It was as simple as posted earlier; advance throttles, climb away from the ground, clean up, and execute the missed approach. All of the switch and control movements were mine alone to execute, and remembering what to do wasn't ever really a challenge. The toughest thing I had to do was remember to not accelerate out to 300 knots, but instead stay at 250 because I'd be staying in the radar pattern to eventually return to the field.

Ok....how does that pertain to the airplane you are flying now or will be in the future?

In the airline world, with two pilots and intentionally-divided duties, you have now taken a simple task and transplanted a CRM exercise right in the middle of it.

I hope you aren't serious with this. First, in the airline world the planes simply aren't designed to be flown single pilot. Secondly, CRM/TEM has made flying safer, not harder or more dangerous. You have someone backing you up, checking to make sure the tasks are being done so you don't forget something and something bad happens.

The simple control and switch movements now don't just require one person's brain to remember the correct order, but now it requires two people to both recall appropriate callout verbiage in order to share the control and switch movements. This takes a task that is very simple single-person and makes it 2-3 times more complicated. More complicated to the extent where in an actual challenging/time-critical situation, it is easier to simply default back to just doing it yourself (e.g. what @jtrain609 posted).

From my understanding, the 'doing it yourself' mentality creates HUGE problems for military fighter guys who go through airline training programs.

Furthermore, I vehemently disagree that doing it your self is simpler. Having another set of eyes and ears is critical when you are told to go around at 200 feet and tasks are needed to be done. Look at the accident rates of military fighter aircraft vs. military cargo aircraft vs. 121 Operations that are in a CRM/TEM environment. I am sure that those military cargo and 121 operations are much safer than you see form the military fighter community. Part of that reason is the CRM/TEM environment.

What I find interesting from a human factors perspective is that, in a high-mental-demand situation, speaking is the first mental task to fall off the cognitive capabilities plate. I saw this all the time when I was training guys to either fly or fight in the T-38; when they were working really, really hard to accomplish an "aviate" task, they didn't even have the mental capacity to speak, and sometimes when they did, it was nonsense that came out of their mouths. This is a human factors problem that the military fighter community goes to great lengths to combat, since verbal communication in a crucial information link between single-seat aircraft working together as a team. Lots and lots of time in spent both making the task itself rote (so as to free up the brain bytes for other tasks), as well as rehearsing the radio commentary phraseology to make it easier to use under stress.

It isn't a human factors mystery. Brief what you are going to say in regard to call outs helps prevent this freeze up.

To answer @surreal1221, I'm a neophyte to the airline world, but I will brief the callouts and mechanics for a go-around whenever I am executing an actual instrument approach (and not just the west-coast visual-approach-backed-up-by-the-instrument-because-it-is-so-rarely-IMC-out-here approaches). Some Captains I've flown with have commented that other FOs don't include that as part of their approach briefing, and I'm not all together certain weather they are subtly telling me to stop doing it, or weather they appreciate the review.


If you come to my place you will brief the call outs the first leg of every day.

Doing what you are doing is good, although expect to do it more. Nothing wrong with that and it certainly doesn't add complexity, it makes it safer.

Tell the Captains that if they end up at my place, they will be doing it more than they are now...:)
 
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Actually it's different. Every time you go to fly, you take off. But you don't do a go around on every landing. That's why you brief it. In a 21 year career so far, I've only had a rejected landing/ go around maybe 5-6 times on the line.

Besides, if you're tier 1 material, that's what you do.
The ONLY thing that gets omitted from my takeoff briefing is the reject criteria after we've flown at least 1 leg together, because at my shop, it doesn't change, for anything, ever, and we rely heavily upon the inhibit logic in the airplane to take some of the "magic" out of it (but please do not get me started on ENG TLA NOT TOGA or A/T NOT IN HOLD tonight).

If you fail to carry out the full WANT briefing the way that my employer wants it done, you are not doing your job; I believe United's safety department recently said "if you have ever used the words 'standard briefing' then you are not following SOP."
 
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