Article: What really happened on Air France 447

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I don't blame the pilots. They tried to lower the pitch to recover and got stall warning for their efforts. Who among us could fight through such a fubar episode? If Airbus wanted to design a failsafe jet, design it to revert to "basic airplane law" in a stall or unusual attitude. At least then the pilots would know what they are dealing with and know the planes logic won't try to fool or confuse them.

And, yes, I'm a highly prejudiced Boeing driver that is glad his jet has one less level of engineering built into the flight controls.
 
This has got to be one of the most ridiculous posts I've seen in a long time...congrats.

Your arrogance really amazes me sometimes. I don't recall you ever saying you had any time in an automated jet (If you do, I stand corrected), so how do you know what Jtrain is saying is wrong?
 
Your arrogance really amazes me sometimes. I don't recall you ever saying you had any time in an automated jet (If you do, I stand corrected), so how do you know what Jtrain is saying is wrong?

50 people in Buffalo would agree with me. Revert to basics, and those people would be here today.
 
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Originally Posted by jhugz This has got to be one of the most ridiculous posts I've seen in a long time...congrats. Your arrogance really amazes me sometimes.

I don't recall you ever saying you had any time in an automated jet (If you do, I stand corrected), so how do you know what Jtrain is saying is wrong?


Let me just add this thought to that......
:)

[video=youtube;H9kpTvm6CYA]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H9kpTvm6CYA&feature=related[/video]

(just kidding)
 
50 people in Buffalo would agree with me. Revert to basics, and those people would be here today.

1) We are talking about AF 447 not Buffalo
2) Even if we were talking about Buffalo you would still be wrong and not have a clue.

Neither was about basics, both are about systems knowledge and how they work and CRM.
 
1) We are talking about AF 447 not Buffalo
2) Even if we were talking about Buffalo you would still be wrong and not have a clue.

Neither was about basics, both are about systems knowledge and how they work and CRM.

Recovering from a stall would be the basics.
 
Recovering from a stall would be the basics.

Ok mister real man of genious stall recovery man. Jump into a 330 over a dark ocean and try to recover from a stall that you are barely aware is happening then get back to me.
 
1) We are talking about AF 447 not Buffalo
2) Even if we were talking about Buffalo you would still be wrong and not have a clue.

Neither was about basics, both are about systems knowledge and how they work and CRM.


What am I missing here? . I realize 447 was a complicated situation. . Unlike Colgan, I don't think anybody is suggesting the pilots were incompetent. . But, just for fun, we're hypothesizing what they could have done, if anything, to get out of it alive. . Sullenberger has a theory. . Which part of what the FAA and Sullenberger say about going back to basic fundamental skills are you disputing?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKE5J9e4qW4&feature=player_detailpage#t=65s . Flight 447


"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, now a CBS News Aviation Safety Expert, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessable to me.
http://www.kval.com/news/local/128920623.html


(Are you concerned that Sullenberger just doesn't understand these new automated airplanes well enough to have an authoritative opinion on Colgan or 447? Not trying to be too sarcastic here, but what point are you trying to make that differs from Sullenberg on 447? . On Colgan? . 2 different situations.)
 
A part of airmanship is being one with the machine.

It's not basics (you can teach anyone to recover from a stall) that need to be revived...it's airmanship.

But still:

Ok mister real man of genious stall recovery man. Jump into a 330 over a dark ocean and try to recover from a stall that you are barely aware is happening then get back to me.
I said that already!
 
What am I missing here? . I realize 447 was a complicated situation. . Unlike Colgan, I don't think anybody is suggesting the pilots were incompetent. . But, just for fun, we're hypothesizing what they could have done, if anything, to get out of it alive. . Sullenberger has a theory. . Which part of what the FAA and Sullenberger say about going back to basic fundamental skills are you disputing?

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKE5J9e4qW4&feature=player_detailpage#t=65s . Flight 447


"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, now a CBS News Aviation Safety Expert, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessable to me.
http://www.kval.com/news/local/128920623.html


(Are you concerned that Sullenberger just doesn't understand these new automated airplanes well enough to have an authoritative opinion on Colgan or 447? Not trying to be too sarcastic here, but what point are you trying to make that differs from Sullenberg on 447? . On Colgan? . 2 different situations.)

From the video is sounds like me and Sully agree. It was more about problem solving (Knowing how to use the data they were getting) aka systems knowledge and how it works. In both cases better CRM and better systems knowledge might have kept everyone alive.
 
What if you didn't know you were stalled?

From listening to Sullenberger's talks, and based upon my own time in Aviation Human Factors, I think what he's saying is that, if your "basic fundamental" skills are deeply entrenched, the 447 pilot would ideally override what his automated systems were telling him, and realize that his attitude and thrust = STALL, regardless of his stall (or lack of stall) warnings.

It's similar to when a child complains to a teacher that he "had no way of knowing the math answers were wrong...it's not my fault, the calculator malfunctioned!!" . To those of us who were forced to learn math the manual way, we know that 2 + 2 can't = 42,004,362. . It doesn't matter what the calculator says. . We'll ignore the calculator and turn the damn thing off. . We can still figure out the answer manually. .

As AutoThrustBlue says: "A part of airmanship is knowing what the machine is telling you—and knowing when it's lying."

As Gonzo is suggesting, maybe we can agree on some of this. . "From the video is sounds like me and Sully agree."

So, what exactly are we arguing about?
 
So, what exactly are we arguing about?

There seems to be some people who think AF 447(and Colgan 3407) were only about stall recovery procedures. Both had more to do with systems knowledge and how it works then stall recovery. In fact the AF447 pilots did just about everything right if they were not in a full stall. They set max power and pitched up to max AOA like they are trained to do, power out of a stall.
 
Has anyone seen any info on what kind of a ride (turbulence wise) they were getting during this. I've had a couple experiences where it basically turned into "keep the blue side up and the airspeed out of the red bars." Toss in a blank airspeed indicator and stuff could get hairy in a hurry.
 
There seems to be some people who think AF 447(and Colgan 3407) were only about stall recovery procedures. Both had more to do with systems knowledge and how it works then stall recovery. In fact the AF447 pilots did just about everything right if they were not in a full stall. They set max power and pitched up to max AOA like they are trained to do, power out of a stall.


As far as powering out of a stall, I have a problem with that training. . Not with you, just with the training I see at flight schools. . As a 15 year old glider student, my former Air Force instructor drummed into me that you don't get a second chance to land in a glider, and there is no power to rely on, so you come in hot, and rely in attitude only for airspeed. . That instinct carried over in me to powered flight. . I look to attitude first, engines second (if I have them, but I don't rely on them except on take-offs.)

The minute I heard about a powerless US Airways jet setting down in the Hudson I thought "Glider Pilot!!!". . I'd always dreamed of doing that in an airliner, glider style, wondering where to start my flare. . As soon as I heard the name "Sullenberger", I googled Sullenberger + Glider. . Sure enough, there it was!! "Glider Pilot". The Air Force and Naval Academies have both started glider/sailplane programs for their aviation cadets. . The reason: in part to ingrain the "idea" that power is nice if you've got it, but the first place to turn for speed in a pinch is aircraft attitude. . Sullenberger would have instinctively lowered the nose without waiting to find out what was going on with his engines. . That was crucial. .

I'm not criticizing anyone here. . Just trying to explain why these old hands like Sullenberger are still preaching "basic fundamentals" even when discussing highly automated aircraft. . I used to hear the same thing from the old hands in the Air Force, and at first I didn't want to hear it. . They called it the "Control-Performance Concept". . Some nonsense about aircraft attitude and such. . Old out-dated stuff I thought. . Later I realized how useful it was. . Basic fundamentals. .

"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessable to me.
 
As far as powering out of a stall, I have a problem with that training. . Not with you, just with the training I see at flight schools. . As a 15 year old glider student, my former Air Force instructor drummed into me that you don't get a second chance to land in a glider, and there is no power to rely on, so you come in hot, and rely in attitude only for airspeed. . That instinct carried over in me to powered flight. . I look to attitude first, engines second (if I have them, but I don't rely on them except on take-offs.)

The minute I heard about a powerless US Airways jet setting down in the Hudson I thought "Glider Pilot!!!". . I'd always dreamed of doing that in an airliner, glider style, wondering where to start my flare. . As soon as I heard the name "Sullenberger", I googled Sullenberger + Glider. . Sure enough, there it was!! "Glider Pilot". The Air Force and Naval Academies have both started glider/sailplane programs for their aviation cadets. . The reason: in part to ingrain the "idea" that power is nice if you've got it, but the first place to turn for speed in a pinch is aircraft attitude. . Sullenberger would have instinctively lowered the nose without waiting to find out what was going on with his engines. . That was crucial. .

I'm not criticizing anyone here. . Just trying to explain why these old hands like Sullenberger are still preaching "basic fundamentals" even when discussing highly automated aircraft. . I used to hear the same thing from the old hands in the Air Force, and at first I didn't want to hear it. . They called it the "Control-Performance Concept". . Some nonsense about aircraft attitude and such. . Old out-dated stuff I thought. . Later I realized how useful it was. . Basic fundamentals. .

"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessable to me.

You make some great points but I don't think any of them have anything to do with AF447 or Colgan 3407. Now reading your post I can help but to think of Birgenair Flight 301 and the AAMP videos we watch at the airline I work for. The problem is in a 330 you can't just turn everything off and get back to basic fundamentals or level 1 for you AAMP fans.
 
You make some great points but I don't think any of them have anything to do with AF447 or Colgan 3407. Now reading your post I can help but to think of Birgenair Flight 301 and the AAMP videos we watch at the airline I work for. The problem is in a 330 you can't just turn everything off and get back to basic fundamentals or level 1 for you AAMP fans.


I still don't feel comfortable with the details of the 447 investigation, but I thought the FAA and NTSB were pretty clear on blaming the pilots for Colgan . .

In any event, who cares what my opinion is? . Its just an opinion. . What I find persuasive is that the recognized experts, like Sullenberger, say that it's still about "basic fundamentals," even on Colgan and 447. . The FAA says they are re-evaluating their position on stall training in light of a growing number of accidents. .

So my question to those of you who say the rules are different in the newer automated aircraft is, what part of what Sullenberger and other trained experts are saying do you all disagree with? . I'm not saying you're wrong. . But I'd like to hear you argue this with Sullenberger. . Sullenberger says part the problem lies in the aircraft systems. . But it's also an issue of "basic pilot fundamentals" he claims.


From Wikipedia:

"In addition to his Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Sullenberger also holds a Master's degree in Industrial Psychology from Purdue University and a Master's degree in Public Administration from the University of Northern Colorado. Sullenberger is a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley's Center for Catastrophic Risk Management. He was a speaker for two panels at the High Reliability Organizations (HRO) 2007 International Conference in Deauville, France, from May 29 to 31, 2007...Sullenberger [has also served] as chairman of a safety committee within the Airline Pilots Association."


Do we have anybody on JC with credentials better than those, or a demonstrated piloting history more impressive than Sullenberger's to convince him that "basic fundamentals" couldn't have "anything to do with 447"?
 
Hmm. I'd argue with him on this topic -- and I would win. His credentials you posted are not particularly unusual, by the way, so don't bother going there. That said, I think that he would come around fairly easily, as I know him to be a thoughtful person. The fact (?) that NTSB (FAA does not have an official opinion) faulted a crew does not make them correct. Blaming the crew has been an ongoing problem for many years, and pilots are often the worst culprits.

In answer to your last line, we do have some on JC that can match his credentials. The problem with the line of reasoning is that it makes a good sound bite, but really is not a solution. It is a very simplistic thing to say. While I could say that it is true, it leaves a lot out, as just having basic fundamentals would not have saved that crew. The situation is far more complex and has many facets. You say that he would instantly have lowered the nose in the AF situation, but you are wrong. What if it was an overspeed situation as a result of the thunderstorms they were in? Would "instantly lowering the nose" been the right decision then? If that were the case, you'd be telling us about how bad that decision was. The problem is that IMC with unreliable instruments, in turbulence (more than you've probably ever experienced), and complex control laws, the decision is not so simple. Not so simple at all. Your solution sounds good, but could kill you if you guessed wrong.

By the way, Sully was lucky. He would be the first to tell you that.


I still don't feel comfortable with the details of the 447 investigation, but I thought the FAA and NTSB were pretty clear on blaming the pilots for Colgan . .

In any event, who cares what my opinion is? . Its just an opinion. . What I find persuasive is that the recognized experts, like Sullenberger, say that it's still about "basic fundamentals," even on Colgan and 447. . The FAA says they are re-evaluating their position on stall training in light of a growing number of accidents. .

So my question to those of you who say the rules are different in the newer automated aircraft is, what part of what Sullenberger and other trained experts are saying do you all disagree with? . I'm not saying you're wrong. . But I'd like to hear you argue this with Sullenberger. . Sullenberger says part the problem lies in the aircraft systems. . But its also an issue of "pilot fundamentals" he claims.


From Wikipedia:

"In addition to his Bachelor of Science degree from the U.S. Air Force Academy, Sullenberger also holds a Master's degree in Industrial Psychology from Purdue University and a Master's degree in Public Administration from the University of Northern Colorado. Sullenberger is a visiting scholar at the University of California, Berkeley's Center for Catastrophic Risk Management. He was a speaker for two panels at the High Reliability Organizations (HRO) 2007 International Conference in Deauville, France, from May 29 to 31, 2007...Sullenberger [has also served] as chairman of a safety committee within the Airline Pilots Association."


Do we have anybody on JC with credentials better than those, or a demonstrated piloting history more impressive than Sullenberger's to convince him that "basic fundamentals" couldn't have "anything to do with 447"?
 
Hmm. I'd argue with him on this topic -- and I would win. His credentials you posted are not particularly unusual, by the way, so don't bother going there. That said, I think that he would come around fairly easily, as I know him to be a thoughtful person. The fact (?) that NTSB (FAA does not have an official opinion) faulted a crew does not make them correct. Blaming the crew has been an ongoing problem for many years, and pilots are often the worst culprits.

In answer to your last line, we do have some on JC that can match his credentials. The problem with the line of reasoning is that it makes a good sound bite, but really is not a solution. It is a very simplistic thing to say. While I could say that it is true, it leaves a lot out, as just having basic fundamentals would not have saved that crew. The situation is far more complex and has many facets. You say that he would instantly have lowered the nose in the AF situation, but you are wrong. What if it was an overspeed situation as a result of the thunderstorms they were in? Would "instantly lowering the nose" been the right decision then? If that were the case, you'd be telling us about how bad that decision was. The problem is that IMC with unreliable instruments, in turbulence (more than you've probably ever experienced), and complex control laws, the decision is not so simple. Not so simple at all. Your solution sounds good, but could kill you if you guessed wrong.

By the way, Sully was lucky. He would be the first to tell you that.


1) "You say that he would instantly have lowered the nose in the AF situation, but you are wrong." Yes, I did say something similar to that in post #75, but not that. . It was in a paragraph discussing his glider applications to the Hudson River ditching only, and that is what I was referring to. . The ditching. . I made no reference to "the AF situation" that I can find there. . Sorry if I did not make that clear enough. . You might have assumed I was switching subjects, but I wasn't. . No harm done. . Please take another look at post #75.


2) "By the way, Sully was lucky." He seems to be a classy guy, so I can imagine he would say that. . But he's also considered an "expert", and in that role he's been asked many times for his analysis of how he managed such a perfect water landing. . I think you'll actually find that what he said was

"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessible to me.

That does not sound to me like he's attributing it all to "luck", and you're the only person I've ever heard say something like that. . But if that's what you hear there, O.K. . It was all luck. . I posted some links to his various statements on that. . Guess you missed them. . That's O.K. . No harm done. .



3) "I'd argue with him on this topic -- and I would win. His credentials you posted are not particularly unusual, by the way, so don't bother going there......we do have some on JC that can match his credentials." . . Well, first I can see that you're a humble and modest fellow. . Since I have no way to verify any of your last set of claims though, I'll just have to take your word for it that you carefully checked your facts this time. .


Thanks. . You were very entertaining.


Note: I've said repeatedly throughout my posts that I don't want get into specifics about the 447 investigation. . You must have missed that. . I don't trust it, and I don't trust Popular Mechanics which recently discredited itself on another aircraft investigation (didn't check their facts before speaking). . My comments are limited primarily to the generic issue of concern now to the FAA and safety experts, that pilots are being taught to rely too much on automation, and have "forgotten how to fly" using basic fundamentals. . I posted some videos on that, you might want to take a look at them.
 
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