Article: What really happened on Air France 447

Status
Not open for further replies.
All your skills are belong to us!


Have you us'd the skill U had at Mavericks? . Never tried it.

I've been ising mine at Steamer Lane when i can figure out how to us them, that is the ones I have and hav figured out. Thay're my skills. I should know how to use them, but my board didn't come with an instuction manual.
 
Have you us'd the skill U had at Mavericks? . Never tried it.

I've been ising mine at Steamer Lane when i can figure out how to us them, that is the ones I have and hav figured out. Thay're my skills. I should know how to use them, but my board didn't come with an instuction manual.

I've been out there on a kayak and that place is truly frightening. It's the only spot where I could say if I were given the opportunity, I wouldn't paddle out.
 
I've been out there on a kayak and that place is truly frightening. It's the only spot where I could say if I were given the opportunity, I wouldn't paddle out.


Yea. . Scares me too. . I grew up with the O'Neills in Santa Cruz. . Thought we were BIG TIME doing Steamers. .

I'm lucky nobody knew about Mavericks back then, when I was 17. . We'd have dared each other to try it, and never come back. . About that time I got the aviation bug (sailplanes in Fremont) and got some safety discipline. . Probably saved me.
 
I've been out there on a kayak and that place is truly frightening. It's the only spot where I could say if I were given the opportunity, I wouldn't paddle out.


My latest project. . Filmed on the Oregon/Washington border. . It's aviation related so I'll post this here, its a rush. . I'll PM you the back-story and a private video I took myself while in the water entering the caves. . This should scare you. . The scene was based on a real rescue in an Oregon sea cave. . One died. . One made it out alive. . The Helo saved the swimmer by flying part way into the cave, dropping the basket with all the line out so it could wash further back into the cave, then backing out of the cave dragging the swimmer with him. . No bull. . (google Tristan Heaton +coast guard)


Part 1
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mxN0Ampa1A8&feature=player_detailpage#t=477s
. . (The Guardian - this scene filmed in Oregon)

Part 2
[video=youtube;YYSkzri7WG4]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YYSkzri7WG4&feature=related[/video]
 

.

Originally Posted by seagull

"
I'd argue with him on this topic -- and I would win."



(I don't make the news, I just report it.)

No, more like a sound bite. I wrote that based on the premise that your representations of what Sully said were accurate. As has been pointed out, Sully said the same thing I have been saying.
 
.

quote_icon.png
Originally Posted by seagull

......Unfortunately, a large percentage of pilots, (yes,even those with a background similar to Sully's), could easily have been led down the wrong path in the AF scenario.....


(I'm just reading what the man said.)

It is, unfortunately, true. I am sure Sully would agree, by the way.
 
Just thought I'd post this to add to the knowledge base.

In May, 1997, an American Airlines A300 stalled while holding over Florida in the vicinity of thunderstorms.

What is interesting about this is that the very highly experienced crew thought they'd encountered windshear and so
were attempting the windshear escape maneuver (despite the fact that they were at 16,000'. While that was obviously
the incorrect response, it is not a surprising startle response given the repetitive training pilots get in windshear recovery, the thunderstorms in the area and the lack of stall training in the actual aircraft. They got into the stall without first getting a
stick shaker, then reacted to the perceived windshear encounter with their training. In actual fact, due to the A/T being
off without their knowledge, the aircraft had just slowed and stalled in the holding pattern.

They were approaching a line of thunderstorms and they both stated that they started encountering turbulence.
It turns out that the "turbulence" was stall buffet, but their preconception prevented them from realizing that
at the time.

It is interesting, also, in that, as a result of their actions, almost did not recover from the stall, and it was
really just luck along with max power that they happened to reduce the AoA long enough to recover, and that was partly due to other things going on at the time.

Again, this just goes to the point that it was about a lot more than stick and rudder skills. Those that say that need to do some research on human cognition and response mechanisms.

I think the implications on AF 447 are very clear here, and I would hope that the investigating authorities capture these issues.
 
Just thought I'd post this to add to the knowledge base.

In May, 1997, an American Airlines A300 stalled while holding over Florida in the vicinity of thunderstorms.

What is interesting about this is that the very highly experienced crew thought they'd encountered windshear and so
were attempting the windshear escape maneuver (despite the fact that they were at 16,000'. While that was obviously
the incorrect response, it is not a surprising startle response given the repetitive training pilots get in windshear recovery, the thunderstorms in the area and the lack of stall training in the actual aircraft. They got into the stall without first getting a
stick shaker, then reacted to the perceived windshear encounter with their training. In actual fact, due to the A/T being
off without their knowledge, the aircraft had just slowed and stalled in the holding pattern.

They were approaching a line of thunderstorms and they both stated that they started encountering turbulence.
It turns out that the "turbulence" was stall buffet, but their preconception prevented them from realizing that
at the time.

It is interesting, also, in that, as a result of their actions, almost did not recover from the stall, and it was
really just luck along with max power that they happened to reduce the AoA long enough to recover, and that was partly due to other things going on at the time.

Again, this just goes to the point that it was about a lot more than stick and rudder skills. Those that say that need to do some research on human cognition and response mechanisms.

I think the implications on AF 447 are very clear here, and I would hope that the investigating authorities capture these issues.

That's a very interesting read. I find it frustrating that everyone is looking for the "golden arrow" to fix accidents when there really isn't one. There is no one thing we can do to stop accidents from happening. If anyone thinks that experience is going to keep them from messing something up, they're going to be in for a surprise some day. Really the only thing we can do is try to become the best well rounded pilot we can be. Study the books and get experience in EVERY aspect of our jobs.
 
Just thought I'd post this to add to the knowledge base.

What is interesting about this is that .................................................................... .. ... I think the implications on AF 447 are very clear here, and I would hope that the investigating authorities capture these issues.

o_O First, I wish you would link to your source material so readers can check your facts. . I'm not suggesting that there is anything wrong with your American Airlines A300 story. . However, you've been less than meticulous on previous fact checking in this thread. . It's hard to tell here where your "facts" stop and your "opinions" begin, in this "knowledge base" you are adding to. . You don't differentiate in the above post between your copy-and-paste material and your own opinions. . We all make mistakes, and linking to our source material on a serious thread like this lets everyone (everyone inclined to take the time) evaluate the source, credibility and consistency of our major underlying claims. . Is this another Popular Mechanics article, or did your material come from a credible aviation journal? . Was it written from your memory? . Below is a valuable contribution Chris made, with what we who have actually done this type of work call, an "authoritative source". . We cite sources to weed out all the WAG practitioners.

These long serious threads are hard to follow, but I've tracked your posts here and you've taken conflicting positions on all ends of the spectrum to cover your bases, first picking a fight with the Sullenberger quotes that were posted, then later siding with his quotes as the thread winds changed. . As you cherry pick your way through your various conflicting position statements, I'm getting dizzy and I'm just wondering where you are getting all your revolving opinions from. . Or, if you're just writing to please the crowd as the mood changes. .

Sources please. . Links if you have them. . If not that's OK. . Just please give them to us if you have them. . Thanks. .
 
Well said. It amazes me the lack of responsibility everyone takes in these things. It's never the aviator and it's always the training department, aka colgan crash. Sulley didn't have a profile to dead stick it in the river, why does everyone else?

That isn't what anyone is saying. In fact most of the time the pilots make up the last few links in the accident chain. We must also look at the whole accident chain. Did Marvin and Rebecca make some mistakes, Yes. But without looking at how the accident chain got to that point would be a disservice.
 
Qutch, the information comes from the NTSB report. There is not a link to all of the pilot interviews, but they are publically available from NTSB. I got the report when I was working with the IIC running the 547 accident. The rest (relating it to AF) is my thoughts based on 35 years of safety work. As for your insinuations, I never changed my position. I said I disagreed with what you wrote, which you (apparently incorrectly) attributed to Sully, as he NEVER said the things you did, unless you take his statements incredibly out of context. From the responses, it is clear that all of the others following here agree with me and have told you that I have NOT been inconsistent. However, if Sully WERE to have said what you inferred (and he did not!), then I would argue with him, as his credentials do not intimidate me in the slightest! However, he did NOT say those things, and, it turns out, he and I are in agreement (which only became apparent after his full comments were posted). You, meanwhile, apparently, spent some time doing a college research project and now have it "all figured out". BTDT. You have yet to show any sorts of credentials here, and have evaded the questions when asked.
 
As for my previous post on AA903, with the exception of the last couple lines, it all comes from the NTSB report. AA 903, May, 1997.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top