Article: What really happened on Air France 447

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Qutch said:
So my question to those of you who say the rules are different in the newer automated aircraft is, what part of what Sullenberger and other trained experts are saying do you all disagree with? . I'm not saying you're wrong. . But I'd like to hear you argue this with Sullenberger. . Sullenberger says part the problem lies in the aircraft systems. . But it's also an issue of "basic pilot fundamentals"
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No one is saying the rules are different. What we are saying is AF447 was not about basic fundamentals. Watch the last 1:00 of the video you posted of Sully talking about AF447. It sure sounds like he agrees with us that AF447 was a very complex problem and basic fundamentals wouldn't have helped them a whole lot.

FYI: I have looked and can't find one video of Sully saying basic fundamentals would have made a difference in AF447.
 
Gonzo said:
No one is saying the rules are different. What we are saying is AF447 was not about basic fundamentals. Watch the last 1:00 of the video you posted of Sully talking about AF447. It sure sounds like he agrees with us that AF447 was a very complex problem and basic fundamentals wouldn't have helped them a whole lot.

FYI: I have looked and can't find one video of Sully saying basic fundamentals would have made a difference in AF447.
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Then you are only seeing the part you wish to see, only acknowledging the portion you wish to acknowledge.

I think I've discovered the problem here. . It doesn't matter to you what he says. . Like seagull, you're only going to selectively tune in to the portion that validates your fixed opinion. . Thanks for clarifying that.

Can't have an honest conversation that way. .
 
Qutch said:
Then you are only seeing the part you wish to see, only acknowledging the portion you wish to acknowledge.

I think I've discovered the problem here. . It doesn't matter to you what he says. . Like seagull, you're only going to selectively tune in to the portion that validates your fixed opinion. . Thanks for clarifying that.

Can't have an honest conversation that way. .
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Well said. It amazes me the lack of responsibility everyone takes in these things. It's never the aviator and it's always the training department, aka colgan crash. Sulley didn't have a profile to dead stick it in the river, why does everyone else?
 
Autothrust Blue said:
A part of airmanship is being one with the machine.

It's not basics (you can teach anyone to recover from a stall) that need to be revived...it's airmanship.

But still:


I said that already!
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Not the first part! I missed your post before posting mine though.
 
From my limited understanding, it is strange that they couldn't figure out wtf was going on. But here's the thing, my understanding is limited on what happened in that cockpit. I can advocate for stronger "stick and rudder" training without asserting that those guys "screwed up" and should be publically pilloried. What's maybe a more interesting sidenote, though, is that airbus told air france that the pitot system tends to freeze over and should be replaced. And they didn't. There's nothing particularly complex about that, is there? Except, of course, there probably is. My general sense is that I can take from it what I'm capable of taking from it (pay attention to what's going on around you, know how to "just fly the wing" in whatever I'm flying, etc.), but that I'm really not in a position to Point The Definitive Finger at who or what is At Fault (as though there's ever just one person or entity that's At Fault).

IMHO, our goal ought to be trying to figure out how to prevent it from happening again, rather than bumping chests spending a lot of time arguing about how Outraged everyone ought to be by (x,y,z, whatever). There's an awful lot of "WTF, I would NEVER do that!" on this thread (and every other thread/discussion I've ever read/heard on the subject). I learned a long time ago never to say what I'll never do. Oh, wait...
 
jhugz said:
Well said. It amazes me the lack of responsibility everyone takes in these things. It's never the aviator and it's always the training department, aka colgan crash. Sulley didn't have a profile to dead stick it in the river, why does everyone else?
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I'm still curious about your thoughts on AF, specifically the possibility that the information presented to them did not give a clear indication that they were in a stalled condition?

Possible scenario: Airspeed data invalid / aircraft attitude and power setting *should* be adequate for stable, positive rate of climb flight / unknown airspeed means the pilot does not know if he is at the bottom red arc or at the top, but he does know that when he lowers the nose he gets a warning that goes away when he brings the nose back up.

Do you really think it fair to say "Recovering from a stall would be the basics." if they didn't understand that they were in a fully stalled condition? Or am I reading that post incorrectly???
 
I'm not an airbus captain, and have never played on on TV, so i cant really say what was going through these guy's heads. Its easy to say that it all pilot error, and at first glance, it seems like they made some very simple, yet very serious mistakes. Most of the people commenting have exactly zero time in a 330, and even less time going through severe wx at 370.

From what i saw there wasnt too much mentioned about the type of turbulence the pilots were encountering. I think anyone whose gone through any type of severe wx can attest that 90% of your attention goes towards the airspeed, lest you want the wings to fall off. Where they trying to slow the plane down, or trying to climb out of the wx? I dont know. They had already discussed the warm temps and the inability to climb. Also, maybe the pilot flying didnt realize which law they were in.

I think for the most part its easy to say that yes, the pilots screwed the pooch. Theres no reason that plane should have crash from the information we have. For those who are trying to draw comparisons to landing in the hudson, you cant. Dead-sticking on a clear day is a different ball game than trying to interpret anomalous readings over the middle of the ocean in a tropical storm. Until you walk a mile in someone's moccasins...
 
Stupid question here. I can't tell from reading the transcripts. At what point do you think the passengers knew there was a problem?
 
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My area of Air Force Human Factors research was instrument flying. . My particular focus was in the development of techniques that permitted the pilot to forego use of computers (and math based calculations) and rely on other senses. . Instincts (something called "temporal perception" - See "Dave Pullman - fix to fix navigation") . . We were able to fly acrobatic, high-G type navigation maneuvers in the clouds using casual glances at the instruments. . No math, no computers. . There were test subjects recruited or assigned to our Lab projects who rejected from the outset the idea that such a thing was possible. . If they were not openminded enough to be receptive, we let them go. . Their loss. . We found that very experienced instructor pilots were often the most resistant, their students were never resistant. . It was common to see students outperform their IPs who just could not grasp an idea outside their conceptual boundaries (That discovery in itself was one of our findings. . AF wide implementation would face hurdles.). .

It doesn't matter if everyone on this thread can grasp what Sullenberger and other experts are trying to say. . If you're convinced that there is no 447 relevance to Sullenberger's perfect dead-stick into the Hudson, and that invalidates Sullenberger's "basic fundamentals" speech regarding AF 447, that's fine. . But for those who want to explore something new to them, the information is available, and well documented. . For those who are not interested, a link to seagull is provided below. .


seagull said:
Hmm. I'd argue with him [Sullenberger] on this topic -- and I would win. His credentials you posted are not particularly unusual..... we do have some on JC that can match his credentials. .......By the way, Sully was lucky.
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For those who'd like to learn more ........

bunk22 said:
I see where you're going with that.....From what I've seen in my Navy flying, the more capable pilots are those who have flown different platforms bringing different experience to the table.....
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[video=youtube;QbEHxYgegZw]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QbEHxYgegZw&feature=related[/video]

before automation "pilots were more mentally engaged"
[video=youtube;j4MGAUxHp3I]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j4MGAUxHp3I[/video]
 
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Aviation Medicine - "C. B. “Sully” Sullenberger, the celebrated US Airways pilot, famous for his successful ditching of an Airbus 330 in Hudson river, observed that, “”The Air France 447 crash was a seminal accident. We need to look at it from a systems approach, a human/technology system that has to work together. This involves aircraft design and certification, training and human factors. If you look at the human factors alone, then you’re missing half or two-thirds of the total system failure”.

http://www.avmed.in/2011/08/loss-of-...ce-flight-477/ (Human Factors - Some 447 facts)


(Sullenberger theorizes that 1/3 to 1/2 of the 447 accident may be attributable to human factors.)
 
Qutch said:
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Aviation Medicine - "C. B. “Sully” Sullenberger, the celebrated US Airways pilot, famous for his successful ditching of an Airbus 330 in Hudson river, observed that, “”The Air France 447 crash was a seminal accident. We need to look at it from a systems approach, a human/technology system that has to work together. This involves aircraft design and certification, training and human factors. If you look at the human factors alone, then you’re missing half or two-thirds of the total system failure”.

http://www.avmed.in/2011/08/loss-of-...ce-flight-477/ (Human Factors - Some 447 facts)


(Sullenberger theorizes that 1/3 to 1/2 of the 447 accident may be attributable to human factors.)
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So, the guy lands in a river and he's aviation's jesus trumpet?
 
cmill said:
I think for the most part its easy to say that yes, the pilots screwed the pooch. Theres no reason that plane should have crash from the information we have. For those who are trying to draw comparisons to landing in the hudson, you cant. Dead-sticking on a clear day is a different ball game than trying to interpret anomalous readings over the middle of the ocean in a tropical storm. Until you walk a mile in someone's moccasins...
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The whole Monday morning QB'ing thing. Fact is, nobody knows what they would have done in that situation as they haven't been in that situation. Night, bad weather, confusion in the cockpit, emergencies, etc, make for a tough time. Unfortunately this is not a clear case of just a stall and recovery so it's not easily explained or defined.
 
Hardly selectively tuning anything out. On the contrary. I have fully considered what you are saying. There is always room for more skill, but that was not really the primary issue in this accident that is being discussed here. It is like arguing that DL 191 would not have happened if they only had more skill in windshear recovery. It misses the fundamental issues that led to the accident (you are excused for that, by the way, because the entire industry often does the same, sadly). The assessment is based on years of experience working on examining accidents and incidents, coupled with human factors and technical background to support it.

What I meant by luck was not that he had a skill set, but that the location of where he was, no traffic on the river, etc.


Qutch said:
Then you are only seeing the part you wish to see, only acknowledging the portion you wish to acknowledge.

I think I've discovered the problem here. . It doesn't matter to you what he says. . Like seagull, you're only going to selectively tune in to the portion that validates your fixed opinion. . Thanks for clarifying that.

Can't have an honest conversation that way. .
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seagull said:
Hardly selectively tuning anything out. On the contrary. I have fully considered what you are saying. There is always room for more skill, but that was not really the primary issue in this accident that is being discussed here. It is like arguing that DL 191 would not have happened if they only had more skill in windshear recovery. It misses the fundamental issues that led to the accident (you are excused for that, by the way, because the entire industry often does the same, sadly). The assessment is based on years of experience working on examining accidents and incidents, coupled with human factors and technical background to support it.

What I meant by luck was not that he had a skill set, but that the location of where he was, no traffic on the river, etc.
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I'd rather be lucky than good any day.
 
seagull said:
Hardly selectively tuning anything out. On the contrary. I have fully considered what you are saying. There is always room for more skill, but that was not really the primary issue in this accident that is being discussed here. It is like arguing that DL 191 would not have happened if they only had more skill in windshear recovery. It misses the fundamental issues that led to the accident (you are excused for that, by the way, because the entire industry often does the same, sadly). The assessment is based on years of experience working on examining accidents and incidents, coupled with human factors and technical background to support it........
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Well, it was an interesting discussion anyway. . It's a difficult topic, bound to raise some passions. . I was trained in a time and place where, for philosophical reasons, they assumed that " all aircraft incidents were caused by some degree of "pilot error.". There was always a better way to train than the way we were doing it. . And, there must be a better way to design an aircraft and its instrumentation". . I admired the aviators who were never satisfied that we'd done our best, and who kept on digging after others were satisfied that there was nothing more to be done. . However, since that messy process, by design, always implies that "the last guy must have screwed something up," people who do what I do get used to seeing passions flare. .

In this thread you all started digging up bodies, sorting through incomplete records of what happened, and the painful realities of aviation's dangers. . It's a dirty job, but someone had to do it. . It could have been worse. .

[video=youtube;9AFf0ysgNiM]http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=9AFf0ysgNiM[/video]
 
Sounds good, but you miss a very fundamental theme here.

You see, I have been, as have several others participating in this thread, strong advocates for basic airmanship, and have been calling on the industry to make changes in the approach to this for the last 25 years in working groups advertised to be comprised of "experts". Nobody had said that pilots do not make errors, however, you are behind the times as to how errors are classified and how they need to be addressed. An error is, by definition, an unintentional act, not a result of carelessness or trying to shortcut. It is not a result of not trying to be the best pilot you can be. Those "philosophical reasons" you cite are very old school. We (as those working on these issues at a policy level) have moved past that not because we want to avoid implicating pilots, but because the approach was fundamentally wrong, and if we continued on that path we would have little chance of reducing the rate of fatal accidents to meet the goals set by the White House in 1997.

There is no question that automation has led to a degradation and that has led to serious issues. And, in many circumstances, such as Sully's, those basic skills came in handy. However, as others have pointed out to you, Sully also believes 447 was more complex. Skills are nice. Be as good as you can be. Do not ever stop improving your basic stick and rudder skills, as well as your skills and knowledge base. That is essential. Along with getting more rest, hydration, nutrition, all of that can reduce errors. Great. However, given the right set of circumstances, a pilot who has done all of that can still make errors that, for you sitting in your chair at home, are easy to identify and we can throw stones at them for doing so, but it entirely misses the cognitive processes, the impact of startle effect, the problems of confusing indications. Sully was VMC at low altitude, his instruments all worked (how would it have gone if he had lost all his airspeed in the birdstrike encounter?), the F/O was not trying to override his flight controls, there was no turbulence. The decisions are much more clear in those circumstances than they are at night, IMC, in turbulence strong enough to make it hard to see flight instruments at times, icing, with loss of various indications.

You see, it is you Sir who have made your mind up and are not open to other alternatives.

Qutch said:
Well, it was an interesting discussion anyway. . It's a difficult topic, bound to raise some passions. . I was trained in a time and place where, for philosophical reasons, they assumed that " all aircraft incidents were caused by some degree of "pilot error.". There was always a better way to train than the way we were doing it. . And, there must be a better way to design an aircraft and its instrumentation". . I admired the aviators who were never satisfied that we'd done our best, and who kept on digging after others were satisfied that there was nothing more to be done. . However, since that messy process, by design, always implies that "the last guy must have screwed something up," people who do what I do get used to seeing passions flare. .

In this thread you all started digging up bodies, sorting through incomplete records of what happened, and the painful realities of aviation's dangers. . It's a dirty job, but someone had to do it. . It could have been worse. .

[video=youtube;9AFf0ysgNiM]http://www.youtube.com/watch?NR=1&feature=endscreen&v=9AFf0ysgNiM[/video]
Click to expand...
 
seagull said:
.....Those "philosophical reasons" you cite are very old school. We (as those working on these issues at a policy level) have moved past that not because we want to avoid implicating pilots, but because the approach was fundamentally wrong.........
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And that was the point of our Human Factors research. . Pilots returning to long forgotten instinctive (old school) abilities. . Abilities stomped out of them in the stampede of the avionics manufacturing/defense lobby, a lobby throwing money at the Congress, the White House, and other "policy makers". . We've been waiting to see how far the pendulum would have to swing in this direction before high profile accidents like Colgan and AF 447 forced the culture to consider swinging the pendulum back in the opposite direction. . It seems we have arrived at that point. . I expect the special interests and policy makers to resist and vigorously defend their turf. . In the mean time, for new open-minded pilots who would like to learn some of those "old school" seat-of-the-pants survival instincts, the opportunity is there for them if they wish to learn. .

"I learned these fundamental skills very well," said Sullenberger, now a CBS News Aviation Safety Expert, "they were so deeply internalized that even after 40 years they were very accessible to me.

(Sounds very "old school." Hopefully you can set him straight.)


seagull said:
Hmm. I'd argue with him [Sullenberger] on this topic -- and I would win. His credentials you posted are not particularly unusual, by the way, so don't bother going there.......
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You really are quite the entertainer. . Let me know when you plan to straighten Sullenberger out. . I want to watch. . You can contact him at http://safetyreliability.com/about-us.html
 
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