Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
An airplane is still an airplane.
Any airplane is an all-attitude vehicle. The physics involved are the same.
Article: What really happened on Air France 447
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chris
Well-Known Member
I think Jtrain made some good points.
The A330 (and for that matter, other Airbus family a/c) are quite different from others, but I can only speak for the A330 as thats what I fly. It doesn't always fly like a conventional plane, in the conventional sense. There's many features to the flight control system that make it different. I can release the side-stick after takeoff, and the plane will maintain the attitude it had at stick release; I can bank the airplane as hard as I want, but it wont let me exceed 67 degrees (in normal law), and if I release the stick, it will hold 33 degrees; I can bank the plane to 30 degrees, let go of the stick and the plane will hold 30 degrees bank, but once I exceed 33 degrees I need to hold pressure to maintain bank angle; likewise you dont need to hold back pressure on the stick during a bank for anything less than 33 degrees, but you do once you exceed 33,etc etc. Not so "conventional" compared to other planes that we've flown. Crosswind takeoff/landings are different too, and then there's "ground speed mini" which will confuse you unless you know why your IAS is automatically varying when on final.
It's quite a complex system and trying to understand all the protections and flight control laws takes time and practice. If you dont know which control law you're in, and if you dont know which protections are available to you, then things can get pretty dicey.
Boris Badenov
Fortis Leader
I don't think anyone disputes any of that. I certainly don't.
cmhumphr
Well-Known Member
I have a bone to pick with this video, but maybe that's only because I'm the only loser who hand flies it up to cruise altitude.
I'm not going to jump on the "OMG they can't recover from a stall" bandwagon" simply because I wasn't there with them. And because of what Autothrust Blue stated. Imagine being out there flying a complicated Airbus with 300 people behind you, a relatively foreign area, dicey weather. That article gets pretty dang intense towards the end.
z987k
Well-Known Member
See this is just plain ridiculous. If a pilot is going to be in the airplane at all, I see no reason for most of this. Why don't they just get to it and eliminate the pilot all together?
I think a significant contributing factor is the human-machine interface that sucks beyond belief. But all together I think you have a CRM problem, a significant training problem, and a massive human factors problem.
Qutch
Question everything
http://www.aviationbrief.com/?p=3597
Aviation Medicine - "C. B. “Sully” Sullenberger, the celebrated US Airways pilot, famous for his successful ditching of an Airbus 330 in Hudson river, observed that, “”The Air France 447 crash was a seminal accident. We need to look at it from a systems approach, a human/technology system that has to work together. This involves aircraft design and certification, training and human factors. If you look at the human factors alone, then you’re missing half or two-thirds of the total system failure”.
http://www.avmed.in/2011/08/loss-of-control-human-factors-in-air-france-flight-477/ (Human Factors - Some facts)
z987k
Well-Known Member
I would add to that... simply flying around in the alternate law mode as part of what they needed to be better trained on. Although to be honest, I see the vast majority of these unusual systems that the airbus has to be a fundamental human factors failure.
Qutch
Question everything
As I tried to explain in Post #15, there is more to this story. . In the Air Force I worked in a think tank assigned to work on these problems. . Believe it or not, politics sometimes got in the way of the best human factors designs. . I saw one major discovery shut down and filed in order to keep it under wraps. . Now I see it from the forensic investigation side. . Again, I see politics and money get in the way of issuing accurate final reports (see TWA Flight 800 crash) . . Good luck figuring out what What really happened on Air France 447. .
chris
Well-Known Member
At first I thought I wouldn't like the sidestick and that it would be difficult to get used to. But it wasn't at all. I really like it, and I think that all the protections are nice to have. Understanding the system and laws can be difficult, but engineers designed them that way for a reason. Best of all though is the tray table
bunk22
Well-Known Member
I see where you're going with that. Now I have no experience flying big jets, medium turbo props, small turboprops and jets yes. So my question is, even with past military or glider experience, depending on time away from that specific flying and depending on the years of experience, is the skill perishable?
For example, in my flight training to get my wings with the Navy, I flew T-34C's and T-2C Buckeye's. Did OCF, spins, many stalls etc. I then moved on to C-2A's, a twin-engine prop, for the next 8 years or so. An airliner to the boat essentially and though we practiced stalls, it was very basic. I then became a primary flight instructor in T-34C's and literally 1/3 of the training is OCF, spins, stalls, etc. What I learned is after only 8 years, I forgot a lot of stuff. Not how to recover from a stall but just small things that given the right situation...night, maybe OCF, etc, things could get out of control pretty fast because of the lack of a perishable skill set. I now fly jets, and we do dynamic flying but the T-34C flying helped and is a great lead in to this.
So my point is with the automation, even with experience, as time goes by, we can become less capable in certain area's. I know it seems obvious but it seemingly goes in line with the FOX blurb you posted. If I become an airline guy, I plan on continuing to fly aerobatics and what not so that I don't lose that seat of the pants flying that I think is really beneficial to aviators. Flying for 10,000 housr, most of it automated straight and level, is experience but not always the best experience. From what I've seen in my Navy flying, the more capable pilots are those who have flown different platforms bringing different experience to the table. Just my thoughts.
Soul Brotha'
Off to go do Black guy stuff
Some might not agree, but he is right. Example, there was a guy from Southern Air during training who had over 12K hours. Flunked out because he couldn't understand the automation. Yes he is the not the norm but if you can't get the systems what good are you?
Soul Brotha'
Off to go do Black guy stuff
Soul Brotha'
Off to go do Black guy stuff
Pretty much that is it. I am very new to the plane but it is very logical.
Autothrust Blue
Welcome aboard the Washington State Ferries
I'd love to work there, actually. Although I prefer my airplanes built by Embraer, the 'bus is a particular source of fascination.
Qutch
Question everything
Is an acquired skill like stall and spin training perishable? . One earlier post stated "It's ridiculous to even think that someone who gets that far in this career would "not know how to recover from a stall." Thus, I don't believe that any of the people involved actually did not know..." .
Agreed, but the real question is, even though the pilot might "know" the procedure for test purposes, will a pilot "remember" to do what is correct under conditions of high stress? .
Tested under high stress - Your Navy training was designed and conducted under conditions of very high stress. . High G loads, a program looking for an excuse to wash you out, friends around you being sent home, military discipline, all adding to the stress. . Any free time at the O Club or off base was spent with fellow students, usually talking flying. . A total emersion program that most people would find "abusive" and would quit or break down under. . On top of that, you knew if you succeeded, your destination could be combat. . In contrast, the civilian pilot working to meet minimum rating qualifications knows no such stress. . He won't get sent home by his school unless he runs out of money, and even then he is welcome to return when he has more money. . He will not face combat. . Instead, he learns the right answer for the test, he/she then demonstrates the maneuver a few times under low stress conditions, gets a do-over if he fails, and then he's certified. .
The result - Both the military pilot and the civilian trained pilot "know how to recover from a stall." . But the military trained pilot (or someone who received their initial training in a glider or flying bush) is more likely to instinctively respond like Sullenberger did. . An automatic return to early fundamental flying skills. . For you, its like riding a bicycle or remembering how to swim, i.e. not a test question to remember, but a survival instinct. . It's more ingrained. . For glider and former fighter pilot Sullenberger, it was ingrained. . But for the pilots of the Colgan Air commuter crash, it was "perishable," for them, and for everyone on board the aircraft. . (I don't want to directly comment on Flight 447 or the AirBus, because in that case, I can't find the information I want and I'm not satisfied that politics didn't get in the way of that investigation.)
Sullenberger on a "A return to early fundemental flying skills."
[video=youtube;LKE5J9e4qW4]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LKE5J9e4qW4[/video]
Note: I'm not saying that only military trained pilots or glider/bush pilots can be competent pilots. . My point is limited to the effect that high intensity training and experience, and early fundamental training has on "retained knowledge". . We simply remember things better, recall them faster, and act more instinctively when we receive training under optimal circumstances. . Military training is designed to optimize retention. . Early glider training may have a lasting impact. . Civilian powered-flight schools don't always maximize retention of basic flight skills.
Firebird2XC
Well-Known Member
If there's a common theme in any of these situations, it's that stress can induce irrational reactions from a flight crew, no matter how experienced.
More experience would certainly help mitigate unawareness of this, but that's assuming that better training is received as one gains experience.
Human factors and CRM training might have prevented this crash. Had the more senior FO taken command sooner and exerted authority, the junior FO might not have continued to act as an individual. Furthermore, establishing and maintaining clear CRM practices of transfer of flight controls might've helped, too. Since there's no mechanical feedback between the two control sticks, awareness of who is actually flying the aircraft and *maintaining a clear definition* that one pilot flies the airplane at a time would seem absolutely essential.
The failure of the airspeed indicators because of the ice set them up for failure. It was their inability due to inexperience flying *together as a crew* that killed them.
cstewart6
Just smart enough to operate the machines
You're missing the point. This is a crash that looking in from the outside should have had a simple solution. There is a disconnect here between airline flying and the type of flying I understand, as well as what the general public is going to take from this crash. I wasn't blaming only the pilots, but the training and the airline and the culture of airline flying. I am an outsider to that culture, but for me and other people looking in, this is a scenario that seems preventable, and something that looks like it should be simple. I was trying to allude that there is something broken with this system of training.
Your quip about not learning anything seems a little ironic. What do you propose we learn from this? That automation is confusing and it's never the pilot's fault?
cstewart6
Just smart enough to operate the machines
Sounds great! Throw me in a sim and let's practice what happens outside of normal conditions. Or is that not what you were talking about?
It's been a while since I visited the current data on this accident, but as I recall reading a synopsis, the pilot was looking at an attitude indicator that showed a typical nose-slightly-high attitude, high power setting, and non-existent airspeed information. As I understand it, both from my small jet training and from earlier reading, those could be considered "typical" of what we see during a successful stall recovery. I.E.: first indications of stall, relax back pressure, add power, pitch back up to +5 or +10 and the aircraft powers itself out of the impending stall ("old" version of stall recovery). There were a couple of problems; first they were actually already fully stalled, so it would take much more nose down attitude to break the stall; second, when he did try dropping the nose further the airspeed started to come alive and he would get a stall warning (at the very low indicated airspeed while fully stalled that system silenced the warning, assuming that the data was erroneous - when airspeed came alive the system would allow the stall warning to activate). The final result is that the pilot was looking at panel indications that should have, according to past training, have him flying out of the "impending" stall, and when he tried to do the thing that would actually save them he was rewarded with a warning horn that told him to quit doing that, so he'd raise the nose again and the stall warning would GO AWAY because the system thought the input data (exceedlingly low airspeed) was invalid.
Is that still the general scenario presented?
Is that still the general scenario presented?
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