Very interesting. Would like to know more about this then..
Another MedEvac Helicopter Down
- Thread starter dustoff17
- Start date
Very interesting. Would like to know more about this then..
surreal1221
Well-Known Member
BobDDuck said:
Incorrect analysis.
It's a warning to those considering this segment, to be aware of all the risks associated with it.
surreal1221
Well-Known Member
Dugie8 said:
And again, an incorrect analysis. Too bad Im on my phone and can not merge the two.
MikeD understood exactly what I was trying to express.
In no way do I suggest operating in violation of any known regulation or industry best practice that increases the safety of crew and occupant.
Take care.
Dugie8
Well-Known Member
I think both MikeD and surreal1221 are missing my point.
If you take me and put me in a helo and say go do EMS flying, yes it is an apples to oranges comparison on the level of safety, etc. You take my counterpart of equal experience, training and background only theirs is in Helos then it becomes an apples to apples comparison. HEMS ops into scenes is much more difficult, has less margin for error but the folks doing it also have the training and experience to compensate for that. Just like I have the experience and training to handle the 20 kt crosswind landing to a narrow runway, to ILS mins, in a snowstorm. Flip flop our roles and the risk factor goes up.
The folks we carry around under "EMS" ops generally don't have a choice whom comes to get them. The choice is made for them and the price is usually a premium while the service (meaning equipment ability and type) is usually minimum, ie, one engine, one pilot, etc. To me, that creates and fosters and environment for abuse and corner cutting. Not all operators do it but I think we would be a bit naive to think it isn't going on and without the true customer, the patient, able to make the informed choice and ignorant (at best) social workers/mgmt/dispatchers selling 3 and 4 different operators as exactly the same level of "safety" and "performance" while not comparing equipment types, training done, etc. With that we are going to keep on seeing this rise in HEMS accidents.
So my point, flying EMS isn't anymore dangerous or incurs anymore acceptance of risk than chartering a flight or taking a helicopter tour. The folks who look at this job as some kind of "life saving" or "mission" centered practice are the ones causing most of the problems. Running a close second are the ones who keep track and post the number of flights a base or crew does in a given period.
If you take me and put me in a helo and say go do EMS flying, yes it is an apples to oranges comparison on the level of safety, etc. You take my counterpart of equal experience, training and background only theirs is in Helos then it becomes an apples to apples comparison. HEMS ops into scenes is much more difficult, has less margin for error but the folks doing it also have the training and experience to compensate for that. Just like I have the experience and training to handle the 20 kt crosswind landing to a narrow runway, to ILS mins, in a snowstorm. Flip flop our roles and the risk factor goes up.
The folks we carry around under "EMS" ops generally don't have a choice whom comes to get them. The choice is made for them and the price is usually a premium while the service (meaning equipment ability and type) is usually minimum, ie, one engine, one pilot, etc. To me, that creates and fosters and environment for abuse and corner cutting. Not all operators do it but I think we would be a bit naive to think it isn't going on and without the true customer, the patient, able to make the informed choice and ignorant (at best) social workers/mgmt/dispatchers selling 3 and 4 different operators as exactly the same level of "safety" and "performance" while not comparing equipment types, training done, etc. With that we are going to keep on seeing this rise in HEMS accidents.
So my point, flying EMS isn't anymore dangerous or incurs anymore acceptance of risk than chartering a flight or taking a helicopter tour. The folks who look at this job as some kind of "life saving" or "mission" centered practice are the ones causing most of the problems. Running a close second are the ones who keep track and post the number of flights a base or crew does in a given period.
deadstick
Well-Known Member
z987k
Well-Known Member
Well yes, kilos are grams. Just move the decimal.
Disagree with you some on this part. A helicopter tour flight and an EMS helicopter flight, can and often are very different. Thats where the risk difference is, simply the nature of the job itself. Helo tours aren't going into tight, unprepped LZs at night and the like. So there is a difference in basic risk. Now how that risk can and is mitigated, Ill agree with you, can and should be similar.
It is life saving and/or mission oriented, in the most basic sense, thats a fact. I think what you're referring to are those who don't or can't separate that ideal from their own risk analysis, or otherwise allow that mission or lifesaving sense to drive their decisions on go/no-go. And I agree with you on that, where those kind of people can easily create risk that wouldn't have otherwise have existed. Agree also on the second example of numbers crunchers, who do that or post stats like that as some kind of measure of productivity, rather than just basic stats; as some places will naturally be busier than others for any number of reasons.
Patrick
Well-Known Member
Same here. The risk avoidance for us is almost mind boggling.
z987k
Well-Known Member
The second I start talking about an alternate their red flags start waving.
deadstick
Well-Known Member
deadstick
Well-Known Member
Another point is that tours are over very specific, planned routes to well prepared LZ's. Although both can be over hostile terrain, the HEMS operators is flying from a base to a set of coordinates (scene flight) that are rarely the same. To a point, they rely on the police, fire, and ems crews to do an initial LZ evaluation.
True, and the quality of that eval can vary widely. As can even something you and I would take for granted oftentimes: the LZ brief from these same police/fire/EMS entities. What's second nature information to us, is something we oftentimes have to pull from these people over the radio bit by bit (size, shape, obstructions, winds, etc), as many of them are simply not used to or haven't worked with an aircraft before.
surreal1221
Well-Known Member
Well Dougie, perhaps when you realize I wasn't making any comparison of two types of operations you'll realize there is nothing for you to disagree with me on...lol
Prelim: http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/brief.aspx?ev_id=20130612X12326&key=1
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA344
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Tuesday, June 11, 2013 in Talihina, OK
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS350B2, registration: N935EM
Injuries: 1 Fatal,1 Serious,2 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On June 11, 2013, at 1830 central daylight time, N935EM, a Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter, operating as EagleMed 35, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain during takeoff at Choctaw Indian Hospital Heliport (OK35), Talihina, Oklahoma. A small postimpact fire ensued. The passenger was fatally injured, the flight nurse was seriously injured, and the pilot and flight paramedic sustained minor injuries. The helicopter was registered to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Columbus, Ohio, and was operated by EagleMed, LLC, Wichita, Kansas. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 emergency medical service flight. The helicopter was destined for St. Francis Hospital Heliport (4OK3), Tulsa, Oklahoma.
When EagleMed 35 landed at OK35 another helicopter had just landed and was occupying the single space helipad surface. EagleMed 35 landed and shut down on the asphalt surface of a road adjacent to the helipad. The first helicopter departed at 1728 and EagleMed 35 remained parked on the road for the next hour.
According to the pilot, after the passenger and medical crew were loaded into the helicopter, he began a normal takeoff from a hover, and intended to follow the center of the road in a westbound direction. When the helicopter was 175 feet west from the takeoff location, the left side of the rotor blade disk impacted a 41 foot tall metal light pole which was located on the left side of the road. Control of the helicopter was lost and the helicopter came to rest on its right side about 230 feet from the takeoff position.
NTSB Identification: CEN13FA344
Nonscheduled 14 CFR Part 135: Air Taxi & Commuter
Accident occurred Tuesday, June 11, 2013 in Talihina, OK
Aircraft: EUROCOPTER AS350B2, registration: N935EM
Injuries: 1 Fatal,1 Serious,2 Minor.
This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed. NTSB investigators either traveled in support of this investigation or conducted a significant amount of investigative work without any travel, and used data obtained from various sources to prepare this aircraft accident report.
On June 11, 2013, at 1830 central daylight time, N935EM, a Eurocopter AS350B2 helicopter, operating as EagleMed 35, was substantially damaged after impacting terrain during takeoff at Choctaw Indian Hospital Heliport (OK35), Talihina, Oklahoma. A small postimpact fire ensued. The passenger was fatally injured, the flight nurse was seriously injured, and the pilot and flight paramedic sustained minor injuries. The helicopter was registered to JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., Columbus, Ohio, and was operated by EagleMed, LLC, Wichita, Kansas. Day visual meteorological conditions (VMC) prevailed at the time of the accident and a company visual flight rules (VFR) flight plan had been filed for the 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 emergency medical service flight. The helicopter was destined for St. Francis Hospital Heliport (4OK3), Tulsa, Oklahoma.
When EagleMed 35 landed at OK35 another helicopter had just landed and was occupying the single space helipad surface. EagleMed 35 landed and shut down on the asphalt surface of a road adjacent to the helipad. The first helicopter departed at 1728 and EagleMed 35 remained parked on the road for the next hour.
According to the pilot, after the passenger and medical crew were loaded into the helicopter, he began a normal takeoff from a hover, and intended to follow the center of the road in a westbound direction. When the helicopter was 175 feet west from the takeoff location, the left side of the rotor blade disk impacted a 41 foot tall metal light pole which was located on the left side of the road. Control of the helicopter was lost and the helicopter came to rest on its right side about 230 feet from the takeoff position.
Boris Badenov
This is no laughing matter.
Re: Risk Avoidance, etc. If they put anything else on the rotor "risk assesment", those things are going to turn in to paperweights. I'd say about half the time the rotor guys have a "medium" risk at night in great VFR. On the other hand, I totalled up what it would take to put me in "high", and the airplane would basically have to be on fire in a thunderstorm.
z987k
Well-Known Member
Pretty much this.
My risk assessments are normally always medium, unless it's day VFR and Im taking the bird ferry point to point. Just nature of the mission, even in day, is risky for what I do.
Boris Badenov
This is no laughing matter.
It's not even so much that I don't think that the rotor-wing stuff is highER risk...it pretty obviously is. But not one of the guys I work with is a "glory-chaser"...they've all got thousands of hours in EMS and if there's a t-shirt, they've got it. And to a man they are irritated by the risk assessment stuff. It's as though the solution to crashes is further intrusion in to the PIC's authority...as though the problem is that pilots, by their very nature, are reckless cowboys who shouldn't be allowed to cross the street without someone looking over their shoulder.
Broadly speaking, I'd say they want three things. First and most importantly, they want some actual IMC training. As you said earlier, if you do it day in and out, popping in to the clouds is an absolute non-event (one hopes!), but most of these guys, for all of their vast experience, haven't flown actual in years (if ever). Second, they want a second engine. I believe you've given a closely reasoned explication of why you think that's unncecessary, and obviously you have a lot of knowledge I don't on the subject, but it seems undeniable that a number of autorotative accidents wouldn't have occurred (or at the very least would have been a lot more survivable) with a second engine. Third, they want an autopilot.
Now, let's throw out the second engine, since the aerodynamics of it are above my paygrade/experience. How much would it cost to get these guys in to an IFR certified aircraft every six (or even 12) months, even if just for a few hours? And how expensive is a basic three axis autopilot, really? I mean, consider what a transport costs...it couldn't be more than the tiniest FRACTION to put a basic A/P in the aircraft, right? Versus how many "consultants" are being paid six figures to come up with more damned paperwork to do to make sure these highly skilled pros know how to make the most basic decisions?
Essentially, it seems to me that pilots don't need more and better oversight, they need more and better capabilities. I stand by for correction!
Broadly speaking, I'd say they want three things. First and most importantly, they want some actual IMC training. As you said earlier, if you do it day in and out, popping in to the clouds is an absolute non-event (one hopes!), but most of these guys, for all of their vast experience, haven't flown actual in years (if ever). Second, they want a second engine. I believe you've given a closely reasoned explication of why you think that's unncecessary, and obviously you have a lot of knowledge I don't on the subject, but it seems undeniable that a number of autorotative accidents wouldn't have occurred (or at the very least would have been a lot more survivable) with a second engine. Third, they want an autopilot.
Now, let's throw out the second engine, since the aerodynamics of it are above my paygrade/experience. How much would it cost to get these guys in to an IFR certified aircraft every six (or even 12) months, even if just for a few hours? And how expensive is a basic three axis autopilot, really? I mean, consider what a transport costs...it couldn't be more than the tiniest FRACTION to put a basic A/P in the aircraft, right? Versus how many "consultants" are being paid six figures to come up with more damned paperwork to do to make sure these highly skilled pros know how to make the most basic decisions?
Essentially, it seems to me that pilots don't need more and better oversight, they need more and better capabilities. I stand by for correction!
Broadly speaking, I'd say they want three things. First and most importantly, they want some actual IMC training. As you said earlier, if you do it day in and out, popping in to the clouds is an absolute non-event (one hopes!), but most of these guys, for all of their vast experience, haven't flown actual in years (if ever). Second, they want a second engine. I believe you've given a closely reasoned explication of why you think that's unncecessary, and obviously you have a lot of knowledge I don't on the subject, but it seems undeniable that a number of autorotative accidents wouldn't have occurred (or at the very least would have been a lot more survivable) with a second engine. Third, they want an autopilot.
Now, let's throw out the second engine, since the aerodynamics of it are above my paygrade/experience. How much would it cost to get these guys in to an IFR certified aircraft every six (or even 12) months, even if just for a few hours? And how expensive is a basic three axis autopilot, really? I mean, consider what a transport costs...it couldn't be more than the tiniest FRACTION to put a basic A/P in the aircraft, right? Versus how many "consultants" are being paid six figures to come up with more damned paperwork to do to make sure these highly skilled pros know how to make the most basic decisions?
Essentially, it seems to me that pilots don't need more and better oversight, they need more and better capabilities. I stand by for correction!
As you well know, it all comes down to $$. An IFR bird would be nice, but like you say, for single pilot it'll require an autopilot. Since all the AStar contracts are listed as "VFR" contracts, the company will likely just say "its your responsiblity to maintain VFR/VMC. Which shouldn't be a problem since none of you are glory chasers. Don't take the mission if you're at all in doubt, then find yourself in a square corner that you yourself put yourself into when you could've made a precautionary landing in that cornfield 5 minutes ago, but instead ran into the powerlines because you were creeping along trying to stay visual at 25 AGL and 25 knots..." Thats how I see that going down. Would be great to have, but it'd never pass the logic test of $$$ expenditure, for that very reason: "you guys are a VFR operation with the AStars, stay VFR then."
Agree that the second engine thing is just out of the equation, as it doesn't really do much for you, except in an emergency.
Danger-wise, for me, is not necessarily the helicopter itself, it's the extreme low-level work out in the desert in enforcement operations where not only dodging the ground is challenging, but dodging things that are attached to the ground is far more a challenge: powerlines, rocks, cacti, towers large and small; you name it, it's out there.
Boris Badenov
This is no laughing matter.
Also, back in my comfort zone re: FW. No, it's certainly not anything like doing scene flights in a helo, or even doing rotor-wing transfers. But "just like any other air taxi"? Eh, I mean maybe there's some passenger air taxi operator somewhere that does 80% of their flying in to short, rural strips, with no TAF, at short notice, at all hours, down in the weather, but I haven't seen them yet. It's a LOT more similar to flying freight than to flying people from Teterboro to Boca in a JEEEETTTTTT, IMHO.
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