Ameriflight PA-31 Accident - Arizona

I'm a little confused as to why some of the same folks who have previously criticized their former employer for running busted ass ragged out equipment that needed to die ages ago (9DS anyone?) "VFR" operations that would make an Alaska pilot blush, and a training department characterized by arbitrary and illogical procedures are now rushing to defend the operation.
There is at least one of those places that has a "survivors" group on facebook. lol
 
I'm a little confused as to why some of the same folks who have previously criticized their former employer for running busted ass ragged out equipment that needed to die ages ago (9DS anyone?) "VFR" operations that would make an Alaska pilot blush, and a training department characterized by arbitrary and illogical procedures are now rushing to defend the operation.

Because there is a time to bash a company, and a time to defend it. David's crash is waaaay too new to even begin to know what exactly happened. But pulling NTSB reports and making claims without looking at the bigger picture is just not right. I am not defending pilot pushing, over working, under paying, mx oversight or anything else here.
 
The equipment isn't the issue. That is a bandaid for lackluster piloting. I would be shocked to see an NTSB report citing equipment or lack there of, being the contributing factor. I would be more willing to bet it would talk about the pilots inability, or the pilots failure to, or the pilots decision to.

Sure, would a moving map maybe helped the 99 pilot who forgot the course change in Montana? That is a definite yes, but do you think the NTSB said oh the plane wasn't /G? No it was the pilots failure change course at the FAF.

Everyone makes mistakes. I've made more than I care to think about, and I've been lucky enough to live through the airplane ones I've made. I don't think it's necessarily "lack luster piloting" to get distracted at station passage by something (anything really) and forget something simple that turns out to be a big deal. I can see myself getting the crap kicked out of me in crummy weather, and trying to re-level the wings (especially in a tailheavy 99) right over the fix then going, "Gotta start down now!" and forgetting to change the course. I remember one particular time where having a handheld GPS saved the day for me (this story is best told over a case or so of beer). There's a whole host of times where "great" pilots make stupid mistakes. You can try to have the "Right Stuff" and act like accidents only happen to bad pilots, and real aces don't make mistakes, but be realistic, • happens, and some times the good guys lose. One of the best pilots I ever knew, who has signoffs in my logbook, and was the sharpest most focused person I've had the privilege of meeting went down in the ocean off of Sand Point for undetermined reasons. Technology, automation, navigation equipment, and oxygen can be simple fixes to complex problems.

If we didn't acknowledge the safety increments that technology bring, we'd all be flying around on four-course ranges to fields with light beacons because it was cheaper and more convenient. I've cheated death enough to know that "There but for the grace of god go I." One mistake, at the wrong time will end you, and they're easier to make than most guys will admit.
 
David's crash is waaaay too new to even begin to know what exactly happened.

This seems 100% right to me, anyway. It was the notion that Amflight has some sort of exceptionally GOOD safety record that made me look twice. I don't think anyone can conceivably have any idea of what or who was "at fault" (insofar as that's a meaningful term) in this accident.
 
Not directly, but that's essentially what's being said when pilots talk about what a high risk job it is, needing to bend either the company or FAA's rules to stay out of trouble regarding ice, oxygen, mountainous terrain at night, and so on--all things said earlier in this thread. I also interpret quotes like, "It was only a matter of time" coupled with the fact pilots keep showing up to work in that environment as "We can handle a few fatalities." Sometimes actions speak louder than words.

There are risks that are real, such as things beyond a pilot's control, while there are things within the pilots control that he chooses to either deal with correctly, or not.

Yes, that's exactly what I'm saying. Why is that so outrageous?

Because it's utterly naive. That's why.

Plenty of other sectors of flying have figured out how to do it. Thirty or forty years ago fatal airline accidents were semi-commonplace. I bet if you'd talked to pilots in those days, they'd be making all the same arguments you are for why it can't be improved, yet look at us now. The airline industry is at an all time best regarding safety.

That's great. We're not talking pax airlines here, where it doesn't matter if the pax get there today or tomorrow. Where there are crew aircraft. Where there are newer aircraft. Ive been in this game a long time on both the flying and flight safety side of things, probably twice as long as you've been flying planes; and what I've learned is that trying to paint all operations with the same paintbrush by expecting them all to have the same exact standards for operations, safety, etc, is completely and utterly naive. You can't do it with military aviation in comparison to airlines, you can't do it with aerial firefighting compared to a basic flight school, you can't do it with helo EMS compared to helo long-ling logging ops, and you can't do it with corporate as compared to 135 freight. Each has it's own challenges, risks, positives, and negatives; and each needs to be judged independantly.

a completely serious, non-hypothetical question: If every AMF plane were loaded up with the family of a management employee on every flight flown, would the operation be run the same way it is now? And I'm not talking about flying through turbulence or having beautiful interiors. I'm talking about the true core operation.

Would the avionics still be equipped the same?
Would the same types of airframes remain on their current routes?
Would inoperative equipment still be deferred as often?
Would the pilots be hired with the same qualifications, trained to the same standards, and paid the same?
Would dispatchers treat the pilots the same way?
Would pilots make the same go/no go decisions?
Would company policies regarding weather minimums, rest requirements, and so on remain the same?

If the answer is not "yes" to all of these questions, I think it begs the question of why one person's (management's) loved one is more important than another person's (pilot family's) loved one.

Again, you're trying to compare any kind of passenger ops.....whether revenue passenger or loved one, to a single-pilot operation of cargo. Human nature is to generally always be careful with any loved one.....whether in a car, plane, whatever. People tend to be more accepting of risk......whether legitimate, or in some cases unnecessary.........when they're by themselves. No one is more important than another in terms of a loved one; it's just a matter of the general nature of people.

To answer your questions above:

Avionics: Moot point. Not everything needs to be a G1000 or near to it. I flew cargo with an ADF and single VOR. And I lived. Would instrument upgrades be nice? Sure. Are they necessary for safety? No, they're not.

Airframes on routes: That depends on the load(s). That's pretty much it. Don't see where anything else would figure in, unless you're talking taking a Lance to Telluride in the summer or something.

Inop equipment defers: That's company dependant, and then further, that's pilot dependant in terms of comfort level, time of year, WX, etc.

Pilot hiring and training: Everyone at my two companies had to be trained and pass a 135 checkride, which wasn't a cakewalk. So no, I don't think there'd be a difference here. Unless there was an identified problem. If there's nothing broken here, then there's nothing to fix.

Dispatcher treatment: Also depends on the company and whether there's an existing problem or not.

Go/No Go decisions: People again are naturally going to be more risk averse when its someone other than them onboard. There are exceptions, of course, but thats generally how it goes.

Company policies: If they meet FAA regs, then there's no need to fix what isn't broken.In terms of how they're implemented on the line, that should be by the book in the first place. If that isn't already happening, then adding a pax might not make a difference, since the regs are given lip service already without any pax around.
 
I look at this stuff as "smarter not harder." If something seems "hard" in the airplane, if I feel that "man I can make this work if I just..." then I drop back, think about what I'm doing, and try to justify it to myself rationally. If I can't justify it through the lens of "is this reasonable, legal, and safe" then I go somewhere else and hangout until the weather gets better. That said, I'm more risk averse in the airplane than I was before.

Pilots get paid to make decisions on risk, that's no secret. The job needs to get done, but obviously not at the risk of crashing the plane. The balance point will be different for each pilot depending on any number of factors. That's what pilots are paid to do: make good decisions. Sometimes those decisions are black and white. Other times, there are various shades of grey.
 
The notion that "the most conservative decision wins every time, all the time", doesn't pay the bills. We get paid to move stuff, safely. Move Stuff. And Safely. Both matter.

This. And to quantify, this will also vary depending on the operation. I wouldn't expect (and rightfully so) a pax carrying airline pilot to make the same exact decisions on whether to launch into WX that a single pilot freight guy would [OpsSpecs aside and all]. The pax airliner pilot has pax to consider....comfort, ride, their safety, as well as his own. The freight guy just has his own safety. Both of course have to be mindful of the safety of people on the ground too. But the point is, that each type of operation will have its own set of risks it deems acceptable ones, and risks that are unacceptable. And that perfectly legit.
 
You are trying to find a reason to blame AMF for who knows why...

I'm tired of talking about this. I want to reply to a lot of your comments, but I'm going to stick to this point alone.

I'm fired up in this thread because it makes me really angry when I hear about pilots dying due to relatively preventable reasons. Apparently there's something in the water at AMF, because this is the ninth fatal accident in the past twenty years. I can't find any other companies that have averaged a fatal accident every two years and are still in business two decades later. If you can point one out to me, I'll gladly pick on them instead.

What makes me even angrier is when pilots act like this kind of safety record is normal, acceptable, par for the course, the cost of doing business, not able to be improved, or whatever else they might want to call it. I'm not bashing AMF for low pay or a crappy QOL. I'm saying, pilots deserve to work for companies where death is not a primary concern.

One of the big reasons for being involved at JetCareers is the idea of "paying it forward." I've learned a few lessons in my relatively short career, and I'm trying to pay it forward by getting prospective and current AMF pilots to think about what's going on there.

When I applied to work at Cape Air, I saw they had an excellent safety record. I didn't know many specifics about the company, but I could reasonably assume if I got hired and made it through training, I probably wasn't going to get killed. They obviously have a proven system in place, as evidenced by their lack of accidents.

Now look at AMF from the same perspective. They're losing a plane every few years. There's a whole bunch of possible causes behind those accidents, but the big question a pilot ought to be asking himself is, "What makes *me* so special? How do I know *I'm* not going to be the next guy to auger one in?" Because something's going on there, it's just nobody knows (or admits?) what.

That's why I blame AMF.
 
I think he's making the point that the company isn't doing enough to make sure the airplanes are capable enough for the kinds of things they're asking the pilots to do.

This is a valid point, but the argument could be made that having airplanes that are strictly /A (or even EGADS /U or /X) could be an easily correctable contributing factor in a lot of accidents over the years. Especially when the technology exists to put better equipment in at reasonable prices but the choice hasn't been made to do this.

And that would be a BS argument. I flew this way for years in cargo back when you were still playing with legos, and Im still alive. What has changed? The only thing I can think of, is the quality of basic training and use/comfort of basic instrumentation, a skill that has been wildly lacking with todays GPS-dependant population. Then again, for all I know, these planes could be upgraded already. If there is any issue, I'd hang it on the pilots before I'd hang it on the planes themselves, unless there can be a proven malfunction of said instrumentation or Navaids or the like.
 
And that would be a BS argument. I flew this way for years in cargo back when you were still playing with legos, and Im still alive. What has changed? The only thing I can think of, is the quality of basic training and use/comfort of basic instrumentation, a skill that has been wildly lacking with todays GPS-dependant population. Then again, for all I know, these planes could be upgraded already. If there is any issue, I'd hang it on the pilots before I'd hang it on the planes themselves, unless there can be a proven malfunction of said instrumentation or Navaids or the like.

It's more complicated than "who's to blame." A more valid response is, "how can we try to make it so this doesn't happen again."
 
I can't find any other companies that have averaged a fatal accident every two years and are still in business two decades later. .

Just off the top of my head, any Air Ambo company. We crash like they're running out of places to crash. If that were the final arbiter of How Things Should Be, there wouldn't be any HEMS programs, anywhere. I don't think I'll ever understand this belief that everything must be Safe, all the time. Safer? Of course. As safe as is possible? Naturally! But I'm positively shamed by how hardass the rotary-wing guys are in accepting the possibility that they might meet an untimely end in the course of "just doing some work". And is a freight company really all that different? Things need to go places, sometimes fast. We all like to believe that we're at the very center of the beating heart of the world, but the truth is we're just some dudes who have learned how to operate aviation-appliances. And some of us are going to die in unpleasant ways. Nature of the beast. If I'd wanted to be a Gardener, I would have studied Horticulture.
 
And that would be a BS argument. I flew this way for years in cargo back when you were still playing with legos, and Im still alive. What has changed? The only thing I can think of, is the quality of basic training and use/comfort of basic instrumentation, a skill that has been wildly lacking with todays GPS-dependant population. Then again, for all I know, these planes could be upgraded already. If there is any issue, I'd hang it on the pilots before I'd hang it on the planes themselves, unless there can be a proven malfunction of said instrumentation or Navaids or the like.

If this is going to be a want-measuring contest, you win by default (vastly more experienced freightdawg/A-10 Driver/F117/Helicopter Pilot vs. Bush Rat Hack? no contest ;-) ). I don't necessarily disagree with anything you've said, it's not the airplane's fault. But...there are ways to make a given airframe safer, and these days it can be as cheap as some basic GPS unit (even a handheld would help). Also, if my understanding of stats is right, flying freight for a living was statistically more dangerous when I was playing with legos - flying is getting safer.

safetygraph.PNG



This is what's in the FAA's SRM handbook. Nobody is suggesting that we hang up our wings and not fly, but how much more is it to add decent avionics to Navajos and 99s?
 
I'm tired of talking about this. I want to reply to a lot of your comments, but I'm going to stick to this point alone.

I'm fired up in this thread because it makes me really angry when I hear about pilots dying due to relatively preventable reasons. Apparently there's something in the water at AMF, because this is the ninth fatal accident in the past twenty years. I can't find any other companies that have averaged a fatal accident every two years and are still in business two decades later. If you can point one out to me, I'll gladly pick on them instead.

What makes me even angrier is when pilots act like this kind of safety record is normal, acceptable, par for the course, the cost of doing business, not able to be improved, or whatever else they might want to call it. I'm not bashing AMF for low pay or a crappy QOL. I'm saying, pilots deserve to work for companies where death is not a primary concern.

One of the big reasons for being involved at JetCareers is the idea of "paying it forward." I've learned a few lessons in my relatively short career, and I'm trying to pay it forward by getting prospective and current AMF pilots to think about what's going on there.

When I applied to work at Cape Air, I saw they had an excellent safety record. I didn't know many specifics about the company, but I could reasonably assume if I got hired and made it through training, I probably wasn't going to get killed. They obviously have a proven system in place, as evidenced by their lack of accidents.

Now look at AMF from the same perspective. They're losing a plane every few years. There's a whole bunch of possible causes behind those accidents, but the big question a pilot ought to be asking himself is, "What makes *me* so special? How do I know *I'm* not going to be the next guy to auger one in?" Because something's going on there, it's just nobody knows (or admits?) what.

That's why I blame AMF.

Pay attention to what I'm saying. You're wildly tossing darts at an operation that you haven't experience in. That's apparent by how you're trying to paint it (and all flight operations) with the same broad brush of a safety standard, without recognizing that every major type of flight operation has different goals, objectives, styles, acceptance of risk, and mitigation of the same.

That said, does that mean that there are no problems here? Of course not. You could very well be onto something, but you're going about it and attempting to quantify it, in all the wrong ways. The thing is, we do not yet know what caused this crash. All of the crashes could've been bad decisions, failure to act, a pilot zigging when he should've zagged, or any number of factors. To try to tie this into a specific company culture that is either directive or supportive of pilot pushing of some kind requires some pretty specific and damning evidence, not just some shots in the dark. You know who the worst pilot pushers are? Pilots themselves.

There's an old saying that says "Inexperience is what gets a pilot into trouble. Pride is what keeps him there." And Ive seen that adage apply across the board in aircraft accidents.

As far as your last paragraph, your biggest problem I detect here is your inability to accept that there are things in aviation that you, the PIC, do not and cannot control. You want control over everything, 100% guarantees on everything; and you're just not going to get it. I don't care where you are or what you're flying. You could die at Cape Air from something outside your control, that would never have occurred to a pilot at AMF. And an AMF guy could get killed by a situation or circumstance that you would never have experienced or come across at Cape. They're two different operations, doing two different things, in two completely different geographic places. The only similarities is that they have twin engine planes. No one has said deaths are acceptable. Let me repeat, NO one has said that. What HAS been said is that risks are different at different operations. Thats a simple fact, and Boris described it well. I would love to have 100% safety by grounding all planes, but I also know that nothing would get done. Different ops balance those two in different ways for different reasons, and rightfully so.

Insofar as "Paying it forward" goes, my advice would be to be sure that you're paying it forward in an accurate way. As I said, there may very well be something wrong at AMF....you might be onto something, but proving it is going to be a challenge. And like Denzel Washington said, "it's not what you know, it's what you can prove." Let the NTSB peel back the onion in their investigation and see what they come up with. Until then, everything is hearsay in that regard. Im not defending AMF, as I have zero tie to them; Im trying to get you to understand how to analyze things the right way when it comes to things like this, and how to do it by the numbers, not haphazardly. And this would apply to any operation.
 
If this is going to be a want-measuring contest, you win by default (vastly more experienced freightdawg/A-10 Driver/F117/Helicopter Pilot vs. Bush Rat Hack? no contest ;-) ). I don't necessarily disagree with anything you've said, it's not the airplane's fault. But...there are ways to make a given airframe safer, and these days it can be as cheap as some basic GPS unit (even a handheld would help). Also, if my understanding of stats is right, flying freight for a living was statistically more dangerous when I was playing with legos - flying is getting safer.

This is what's in the FAA's SRM handbook. Nobody is suggesting that we hang up our wings and not fly, but how much more is it to add decent avionics to Navajos and 99s?

To set the record straight here, I do not disagree with you. Im with you on the "nice to have's" regarding equipment. Now, are there many factors that go into the decision of what kind of upgrades come out and get installed? Of course there are.

Back in my day, we had accidents like we had today. Like I said before, 5 in my company, 4 within a 3 year timespan. All of them pilot error. One guy in a UPS cargo PA-31 descended into terrain on a night arrival into FLG; a Fedex 208A while landing in icing at Stapleton spun into a neighborhood; another Fedex 208A of ours flew into a mountain in Colorado, another Fedex 208A of ours crashed during a missed approach; and 208B crashed after getting into a spin at night after takeoff from Montrose, CO, killing a buddy of mine and the pax onboard. Following that last one, Fedex dropped us from their contract, and gave it to Empire for the AZ area.

Instrument upgrades wouldn't have changed the outcomes of these accidents. They would've definitely been nice, don't get me wrong, but the accidents were from factors unrelated to instrument types. I would love if there was the money to put more advanced instruments into freight planes (maybe it's already there, i don't know). My only contention is that while /G would be nice, or /R or whatever. /A is adequate with the right training, as is /U even. Somewhat limited nowdays, but doable. Where I see the lacking is in training. We don't train basics anymore, seemingly. We train to advanced standards, but at a number of schools Ive seen, the basics is given lip service, if given any attention at all.
 
Just off the top of my head, any Air Ambo company. We crash like they're running out of places to crash. If that were the final arbiter of How Things Should Be, there wouldn't be any HEMS programs, anywhere. I don't think I'll ever understand this belief that everything must be Safe, all the time. Safer? Of course. As safe as is possible? Naturally! But I'm positively shamed by how hardass the rotary-wing guys are in accepting the possibility that they might meet an untimely end in the course of "just doing some work". And is a freight company really all that different? Things need to go places, sometimes fast. We all like to believe that we're at the very center of the beating heart of the world, but the truth is we're just some dudes who have learned how to operate aviation-appliances. And some of us are going to die in unpleasant ways. Nature of the beast. If I'd wanted to be a Gardener, I would have studied Horticulture.

As unpleasant as it is to think about, one could do everything right; and still as I've said it before: Sometimes, when your number is up, your number is up. Could happen anywhere, doing anything; and there's really nothing you can do about it. The grim reaper of aviation WILL come and take you away at a time and place of his choosing, and he does so with neither prejudice, nor favoritism. The only thing you can do is go about your day-to-day, making the best and smartest decisions you can, and excuting them, whatever they may be. I know pilots want to feel like they have control over everything....its in our nature, me included. And alot of guys have a tough time accepting that they can indeed do everything right, and still have bad things happen to them.
 
Everyone makes mistakes. I've made more than I care to think about, and I've been lucky enough to live through the airplane ones I've made. I don't think it's necessarily "lack luster piloting" to get distracted at station passage by something (anything really) and forget something simple that turns out to be a big deal. I can see myself getting the crap kicked out of me in crummy weather, and trying to re-level the wings (especially in a tailheavy 99) right over the fix then going, "Gotta start down now!" and forgetting to change the course. I remember one particular time where having a handheld GPS saved the day for me (this story is best told over a case or so of beer). There's a whole host of times where "great" pilots make stupid mistakes. You can try to have the "Right Stuff" and act like accidents only happen to bad pilots, and real aces don't make mistakes, but be realistic, happens, and some times the good guys lose. One of the best pilots I ever knew, who has signoffs in my logbook, and was the sharpest most focused person I've had the privilege of meeting went down in the ocean off of Sand Point for undetermined reasons. Technology, automation, navigation equipment, and oxygen can be simple fixes to complex problems.

Truth here.

Ive made tons of mistakes in my flying career, some honest, some stupid. None have been too serious in terms of injury, but there has been bent metal; and all have been learning points. Any and all of us are susceptible, at any given time, with or without prior notice. The day any of us thinks otherwise, is the day we should hang up our wings.
 
To set the record straight here, I do not disagree with you. Im with you on the "nice to have's" regarding equipment. Now, are there many factors that go into the decision of what kind of upgrades come out and get installed? Of course there are.

Back in my day, we had accidents like we had today. Like I said before, 5 in my company, 4 within a 3 year timespan. All of them pilot error. One guy in a UPS cargo PA-31 descended into terrain on a night arrival into FLG; a Fedex 208A while landing in icing at Stapleton spun into a neighborhood; another Fedex 208A of ours flew into a mountain in Colorado, another Fedex 208A of ours crashed during a missed approach; and 208B crashed after getting into a spin at night after takeoff from Montrose, CO, killing a buddy of mine and the pax onboard. Following that last one, Fedex dropped us from their contract, and gave it to Empire for the AZ area.

Instrument upgrades wouldn't have changed the outcomes of these accidents. They would've definitely been nice, don't get me wrong, but the accidents were from factors unrelated to instrument types. I would love if there was the money to put more advanced instruments into freight planes (maybe it's already there, i don't know). My only contention is that while /G would be nice, or /R or whatever. /A is adequate with the right training, as is /U even. Somewhat limited nowdays, but doable. Where I see the lacking is in training. We don't train basics anymore, seemingly. We train to advanced standards, but at a number of schools Ive seen, the basics is given lip service, if given any attention at all.

Just to play devils advocate here, but TAWS or even the flashy garmin warning screen on a 430 could have prevented two of those today.
 
Just to play devils advocate here, but TAWS or even the flashy garmin warning screen on a 430 could have prevented two of those today.

To add more detail, the PA-31 was believed to have been the pilot ducking under on a night instrument approach or scud running; and the 208A, it's thought the pilot had the plane on autopilot and was reading the FAR/AIM; as he had been in straight and level flight for some time, and impacted a 14,221' mountain about 50' below the summit. Pages of the FAR/AIM were found in clutched in his grip on his body in the cockpit. While a Garmin wouldn't have hurt, if these pilots weren't paying attention or otherwise heeding them, well, the box can only do so much to tell you good info.
 
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