Ameriflight PA-31 Accident - Arizona

The PA-31 was believed to have been the pilot ducking under on a night instrument approach or scud running; and the 208A, it's thought the pilot had the plane on autopilot and was reading the FAR/AIM; as he had been in straight and level flight for some time, and impacted a 14,221' mountain about 50' below the summit. Pages of the FAR/AIM were found in his grip on his body.

"What does an OROCA give you for clearance again? Let's see, glossary" But seriously, a really loud "CAUTION TERRAIN PULL UP!" May have saved his ass. As for the Navajo, bad decisions are bad decisions.
 
"What does an OROCA give you for clearance again? Let's see, glossary" But seriously, a really loud "CAUTION TERRAIN PULL UP!" May have saved his ass. As for the Navajo, bad decisions are bad decisions.

It's very possible, I agree.

A company here in AZ used to fly cancelled checks for BankOne. They operated Baron 58s out of KDVT. In the span of a year, they lost two; one for scud running into terrain, the other with the pilot falling asleep and the plane flying straight and level into a mountain.
 
Just off the top of my head, any Air Ambo company. .

Not just HEMS, but even fixed-wing EMS. Friend of mine was killed in a E-90 King Air after takeoff from FLG on a flight to PHX. Entering the WX, he got a gear unsafe light and requested vectors back to the field on the ILS. Managed to get the gear down safe while in some VMC, but couldn't continue, so he picked up IFR and went IMC for vectors. Cleared for the approach with a procedure turn and told to contact tower, he never made the procedure turn, continued west blowing through the LOC course, and went into Mt Humphreys on the NW side of Flagstaff. He and both flight nurses were killed. What sucks is that he handled the gear emergency just fine and solved it to a safe landable condition, all while single pilot and in/out of the WX. Yet, he boned up the procedure turn of the instrument approach for reasons unknown and flew level, then descended into the 12,600' mountain.
 
Just off the top of my head, any Air Ambo company. We crash like they're running out of places to crash. If that were the final arbiter of How Things Should Be, there wouldn't be any HEMS programs, anywhere.

If that's the direction you want to go, I can go there.

Do a Google search for "safety record of helicopter EMS." You'll find page after page talking about the poor safety record of HEMS and pondering what to do about it. The first link that pops up is a presentation from the NTSB. Here's the link:

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/speeches/sumwalt/sumwalt_050411.pdf

A direct quote from the first few pages of the presentation:

"The current Helicopter EMS (HEMS) accident record is unacceptable."

So while you might find the accident rate an acceptable side effect of the industry, many people don't--including the NTSB.

Yet when it comes to freight, there isn't even half as much chatter. Pilots die left and right, but that's just the way it is. No sense in drawing attention to it.

As for MikeD, I can't keep up with your avalanche of writing :)

I respect your point of view and agree you have valid points, but I don't think we'll come to the same conclusion any time soon. Let's agree to disagree.
 
If that's the direction you want to go, I can go there.

Do a Google search for "safety record of helicopter EMS." You'll find page after page talking about the poor safety record of HEMS and pondering what to do about it. The first link that pops up is a presentation from the NTSB. Here's the link:

http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/speeches/sumwalt/sumwalt_050411.pdf

A direct quote from the first few pages of the presentation:

"The current Helicopter EMS (HEMS) accident record is unacceptable."

So while you might find the accident rate an acceptable side effect of the industry, many people don't--including the NTSB.

Yet when it comes to freight, there isn't even half as much chatter. Pilots die left and right, but that's just the way it is. No sense in drawing attention to it.

As for MikeD, I can't keep up with your avalanche of writing :)

I respect your point of view and agree you have valid points, but I don't think we'll come to the same conclusion any time soon. Let's agree to disagree.

I don't know what there is to agree to disagree on. "One level of safety" you're looking for and harping on is fine, but it only applies to same operations types. Airline to airline, cargo to cargo, etc.

Since HEMS was brought up, that's a whole another bag of worms. Mainly due to the type of operation it is, and the fact that it's a service designed to help sick/injured people, yet when there's an accident, it ends up killing them along with the people who are supposed to be the helpers; more often than not due to pilot error. Thats the only reason it gets more press than single pilot cargo does, because of the fallout from an event like that.
 
I don't know what there is to agree to disagree on. "One level of safety" you're looking for and harping on is fine, but it only applies to same operations types. Airline to airline, cargo to cargo, etc.

The discussion, as I saw it, came down to me saying there ought to be one level of safety and you basically said it can't be done.

I'm saying, it can be done, but it *won't* be done in the freight world, because companies want their money and pilots want their flight time, so the system keeps churning along, albeit with some dead pilots along the way. I think it's a messed up system, whereas you seem to think it's ok.

That's what I'm agreeing to disagree on.
 
I'm tired of talking about this. I want to reply to a lot of your comments, but I'm going to stick to this point alone.

I'm fired up in this thread because it makes me really angry when I hear about pilots dying due to relatively preventable reasons. Apparently there's something in the water at AMF, because this is the ninth fatal accident in the past twenty years. I can't find any other companies that have averaged a fatal accident every two years and are still in business two decades later. If you can point one out to me, I'll gladly pick on them instead.

99% of accidents are preventable, what don't you understand about this? How have you gotten this far in your career not understanding the risks a pilot takes? I feel weird having to explain it to you. You can't find another company with 9 fatal accidents in twenty years because you aren't looking for it. Look up ANY crop dusting company, ANY firefighting company, ANY air ambulance company. Look up Key Lime, they have had 7 deaths since 2000 alone. You are on a witch hunt for AMF which is clear, but it is unfounded, you have never worked for the company, and you really don't have a clue how the company operates. The complaints I have about AMF are how every freight company operates, there are some things that are worse, some that are better.

What makes me even angrier is when pilots act like this kind of safety record is normal, acceptable, par for the course, the cost of doing business, not able to be improved, or whatever else they might want to call it. I'm not bashing AMF for low pay or a crappy QOL. I'm saying, pilots deserve to work for companies where death is not a primary concern.

Buddy you better get used to the fact that people die in this industry, its a fact. Again I will ask you to read the NTSB findings on these accidents at AMF. The trend you will see is pilot error. If death is not your primary concern all of the time when you are flying, then you aren't operating in the interest of safety. If you think for one second I don't think about possible reasons I might die when I fly you are nuts. Trust me when I say, if it got to the point where you literally thought you were going to die because of some situation whether its crappy aircraft, you're tired etc. would you stick around? Hell no, nobody would. There is always a risk flying period, the risk is a little higher flying older planes that have to stay right in the weather. There is risk of course, but no pilot at AMF was so scared, and so sure about certain death.

One of the big reasons for being involved at JetCareers is the idea of "paying it forward." I've learned a few lessons in my relatively short career, and I'm trying to pay it forward by getting prospective and current AMF pilots to think about what's going on there.

Paying it forward involves helping people further their career. Bashing a company, and making assumptions or accusations is not paying it forward to anyone. Trust me you aren't helping the situation.

When I applied to work at Cape Air, I saw they had an excellent safety record. I didn't know many specifics about the company, but I could reasonably assume if I got hired and made it through training, I probably wasn't going to get killed. They obviously have a proven system in place, as evidenced by their lack of accidents.

Cape Air had a fatal crash in 2008 with a vetaran pilot on board. Caused by spacial disorientation. Explain that one? One could easily bash Cape Air into the ground and I could make up random reasons all day that may or may not be true. But why do that?

Now look at AMF from the same perspective. They're losing a plane every few years. There's a whole bunch of possible causes behind those accidents, but the big question a pilot ought to be asking himself is, "What makes *me* so special? How do I know *I'm* not going to be the next guy to auger one in?" Because something's going on there, it's just nobody knows (or admits?) what.

That's why I blame AMF.

Blame AMF all day long, you don't know what you're talking about. Hell just looking at some of the accidents and incidents at Cape Air, I cannot believe you think you can sit on some sort of high horse and look down to bash other companies. Dual engine failures because of crappy mx, pilots not knowing where they are and being killed, the ENTIRE fleet being grounded because of engine failures.

No airline is perfect, but I bet if you work out accidents/incidents per flight hour or per cycle, AMF dwarfs Cape Air. Cape only has about 50 aircraft. AMF has almost 200.
 
"What does an OROCA give you for clearance again? Let's see, glossary" But seriously, a really loud "CAUTION TERRAIN PULL UP!" May have saved his ass. As for the Navajo, bad decisions are bad decisions.

Do you know how many pilots have been killed, as well as their passengers and cargo destroyed because they failed to follow a terrain alert? We were told about 3 different fatal accidents at Simuflite. I will say it again, there is NO amount of electronics or automation in the cockpit to fix stupid.
 
Inverted: Ok, I think we've hashed this out about as much as we can. I doubt you'll change my mind nor will I change yours. Thanks for the good discussion.
 
The discussion, as I saw it, came down to me saying there ought to be one level of safety and you basically said it can't be done.

I'm saying, it can be done, but it *won't* be done in the freight world, because companies want their money and pilots want their flight time, so the system keeps churning along, albeit with some dead pilots along the way. I think it's a messed up system, whereas you seem to think it's ok.

That's what I'm agreeing to disagree on.

And Im telling you it can't be done when you try to compare dissimilar operations, such as airline to 135 cargo. Now, if you want to compare 135 cargo to 135 cargo, that can be done, since they mostly all operate under the same rules, doing similar ops, with similar equipment and in similar areas. That's the "can" part.

Agan jrh, you're not paying attention and not reading....or you're only seeing and believing what you want to; I never said it was ok, I said that based on the limitations I've outlined in previous posts regarding the balance of getting the job done with the balance of safety, that flying cargo out west (esp this time of year) is much higher risk then you flying straight and level on autopilot on a sunny day in your 402. Like it or not, thats a fact. It's like you live on easy street in your job, and think all "neighborhoods" should live the same way without understanding why they possibly can't. When you want to talk safety and analyze such, you HAVE to take the baselines and begin measuring from there. I can't remove facts like planes fly single pilot, fly IFR, fly in mountainous terrain at night, penetrate WX, move sometimes time-critical cargo; all those things required in order to get the job done. Those are general facts of the business. The measuring stick HAS to start with those things in mind, you can't just eliminate them because you don't happen to like them. Or nothing would ever move with cargo. It's a riskier type of flying at times, and the risk mitigator is the pilot. He is the go/no. And even his best go decision based on conditions known at the time, might turn out to bite him in the butt due to unknowns he will encounter.
 
Do you know how many pilots have been killed, as well as their passengers and cargo destroyed because they failed to follow a terrain alert? We were told about 3 different fatal accidents at Simuflite. I will say it again, there is NO amount of electronics or automation in the cockpit to fix stupid.

That's not so much a crew problem as a training problem. If you punch it off because the equipment is unreliable, or because you never learned to trust it, while it's your fault you augered in, there are factors that made your auger more likely.
 
I can't remove facts like planes fly single pilot, fly IFR, fly in mountainous terrain at night, penetrate WX, move sometimes time-critical cargo; all those things required in order to get the job done. Those are general facts of the business. The measuring stick HAS to start with those things in mind, you can't just eliminate them because you don't happen to like them. Or nothing would ever move with cargo. It's a riskier type of flying at times, and the risk mitigator is the pilot.

Mike, I know exactly what you're saying.

You and I are approaching the problem with two fundamentally different philosophies.

We're on the same spectrum, but you're falling more towards the "get the job done" side and I'm falling more towards the "protect the crew" side.

It's kinda like Democrats and Republicans. Not entirely right or wrong, just different ways to approach the situation. That's all.
 
And Im telling you it can't be done when you try to compare dissimilar operations, such as airline to 135 cargo. Now, if you want to compare 135 cargo to 135 cargo, that can be done, since they mostly all operate under the same rules, doing similar ops, with similar equipment and in similar areas. That's the "can" part.

Agan jrh, you're not paying attention and not reading....or you're only seeing and believing what you want to; I never said it was ok, I said that based on the limitations I've outlined in previous posts regarding the balance of getting the job done with the balance of safety, that flying cargo out west (esp this time of year) is much higher risk then you flying straight and level on autopilot on a sunny day in your 402. Like it or not, thats a fact. It's like you live on easy street in your job, and think all "neighborhoods" should live the same way without understanding why they possibly can't. When you want to talk safety and analyze such, you HAVE to take the baselines and begin measuring from there. I can't remove facts like planes fly single pilot, fly IFR, fly in mountainous terrain at night, penetrate WX, move sometimes time-critical cargo; all those things required in order to get the job done. Those are general facts of the business. The measuring stick HAS to start with those things in mind, you can't just eliminate them because you don't happen to like them. Or nothing would ever move with cargo. It's a riskier type of flying at times, and the risk mitigator is the pilot. He is the go/no. And even his best go decision based on conditions known at the time, might turn out to bite him in the butt due to unknowns he will encounter.

I believe this is a false dichotomy. There's nothing that says that night cargo has to be riskier, we just all assume it must be riskier because of the environment and the costs. Do you think Cape Air stays on the ground when the weather is bad? No, I've seen those airplanes out plodding around in all sorts of crummy weather, especially in North East icing. Amflight and Cape Air probably even have most of the same OpSpecs, and are governed by mostly the same rules - so why does one company put one every couple years and why doesn't the other? And, this isn't my Amflight bashing, Amflight is what it is, but they face the realities of UPS more than they face the realities of their own business model. It's my opinion that on time performance pressure to fly in less than acceptable conditions is a result of the UPS system in freight most of the time, rather than what the company wants. That said, the reality of the job is that Amflight puts airplanes into the ground at a higher rate than CapeAir. Why is flying at Ameriflight "less safe" than flying at Cape Air? Let's use the PAVE model, and do some thinking about risk.

Pilots: Ameriflight can hire pilots as low as 1200hrs, Cape Air needs 1500hrs and an ATP to hire pilots. I doubt this is a contributing difference, but it could be (seems unlikely to me). Pilots for Ameriflight often fly weirdly disjointed schedules (created to please UPS) this is almost certainly a cause of fatigue. Regardless, both places higher younger, less experienced pilots. The only difference is that I'd bet more Amflight guys fly fatigued than Cape Air guys because of the type of flying. I'd also posit that everything I've heard about Cape Air leads me to believe that the training there is a little bit more rigorous than Amflight - again, not a bash, just a reality from my experience.

Aircraft: This is what we've been discussing. TAWS, or GPS equipment, or better equipment in some way shape or form - obviously, Cape Air has the jump on Amflight.

enVironment: The terrain Ameriflight commonly operates in is obviously more difficult than Cape Air's. Exposure to bad weather is probably about the same.

External Pressures: UPS creates a stupid amount of pressure. More than it should. Also, I'd suspect that just generally freight companies tend to push their pilots more than people-flying, but that's anecdotal on my part. Regardless, I bet that flying at both places has it's external pressures and headaches - realistically, Amflight may have more due to UPS, but I can't prove it.

Well, we're not going to change the external pressures (as late freight is unacceptable!), and we can't change the environment we operate in (1800RVR and VV001! Freight's gotta move, go give it a shot!) so what are things we can EASILY change to reduce risk? I posit that you can reduce risk quite easily at Amflight by adding more equipment, and training the pilots better. Equipment like GPS and TAWS are probably the most reliable way to make things safer, with revisions to training coming next. Either way, the flying is more challenging than Cape Air in terms of terrain, and the external pressures are probably greater at Amflight, but there are ways to help mitigate other risks in the job. You don't have to have everything stacked against you all the time! No, you don't need moving map GPS and TAWS to fly around in the mountains, and yes these don't do any good if pilots ignore them - but saying "F-it, this job is dangerous," misses the point. How do we fix the problem that guys keep hitting mountains in the middle of the night? How do we stop guys from making the same mistakes that countless pilots have made over the years.? How do we mitigate the risk in a way that keeps the airplanes moving just as much? The answer: better equipment and training will help, those are the only two things we can easily change, so why the hell hasn't Amflight changed them? Is it money? UPS is stingy, so any company that flies for them generally has to be stingy too, sure, but I don't think that's it. Is it the culture? Probably, every Amflight guy I know talked about how cool it was that this was the "most challenging flying they'll ever do." That doesn't help that the pilots create their own pressure to fly minimalist in the worst weather they can, that probably rubs off on management and the training department. Regardless, equipment which could make that kind of flying safer is available, reasonably priced, and easy to use. Why isn't it installed? We're not talking about a Mom & Pop 135, we're talking about the largest 135 operator in the country, with airframes and operations in almost every state, Canada, and Mexico. It's not like the money isn't there - rather the will isn't.
 
ppragman: Thank for you taking the time to write out many of the things I didn't have the time or patience to.

Commence Inverted accusing you of AMF-bashing in 3...2...1...
 
We're on the same spectrum, but you're falling more towards the "get the job done" side and I'm falling more towards the "protect the crew" side.

Which is fine, but I would ask you "protect the crew (pilot) from what?" And the answer to that is, protect him from himself, in many respects. Be it training, experience, whatever. But the pilot is the risk mitigator. The final authority. And even then, he may find himself in situations that he thought he had mitigated well enough.
 
I believe this is a false dichotomy. There's nothing that says that night cargo has to be riskier, we just all assume it must be riskier because of the environment and the costs.

Not necessarily. Night cargo is inherently riskier for the reasons I outlined above. Single pilot ops, night in mountainous terrain, etc. All of these are factors which would influence and add points to any risk assessment sheet.

The "pressure to get the boxes there" in many cargo operations is self-imposed by pilots themselves often, whether by ego or by pride. Remember, while UPS might want the boxes there, they definitely don't want the boxes destroyed. That was the reason I often cited when I had to delay or even cancel for WX and tell them to truck the items that day......do you want them to get there, or don't you? Those boxes do no good burned up on the side of some mountain someplace.......and I noticed some high $$$ customers on the address labels of some of those Next Day Air items there. And of course, it does me no good to be dead. Nor does it do my contract company any good to have a hull loss.

Remember, the worst pilot pushers are pilots themselves. Pride is an insidious killer.

I can't speak to AMFs training....JTrain would be better for that or some other AMF pilot, so comparing Cape to AMF in that way is moot right now because all we have are guesses on how they stack up.

Insofar as toys installed in the planes, you can put all the toys you want in there, but those toys won't necessarily help for situations like icing, unforseen WX with bad terrain below, and other accidents where it was either bad luck, bad timing, or an unforseen situation that was thought to have been mitigated.
 
The PIC is the final authority, but doesn't have to be the only authority. Indeed acting like its the PIC versus the world misses the point. It doesn't have to be that way. Making life easier for crewmembes makes things safer. I'm not saying don't fly /A cuz it's dangerOUS!!!!1. I'm saying making things safer for crews isn't anathema to reliability in service.
 
The PIC is the final authority, but doesn't have to be the only authority. Indeed acting like its the PIC versus the world misses the point. It doesn't have to be that way. Making life easier for crewmembes makes things safer. I'm not saying don't fly /A cuz it's dangerOUS!!!!1. I'm saying making things safer for crews isn't anathema to reliability in service.

Not acting like its the PIC versus everybody, but the PIC is where I see many of the problems occurring. Are there things that can be influenced by the company or management, positive or negative? Of course there is. And that's a separate though equal issue. But on the PIC front, the problem I see is twofold: guys who are far too conservative, as well as guys who are far too cowboy. There's got to be a middle ground. The too conservative guys dont get the job done, while the too cowboy guys take unnecessary risks, which also can easily result in not getting the job done. Influencing both of these groups are things like ego (self pressure) and peer pressure, as well as pride.

Making things safer for crews can only do so much IF the guy in the seat makes the right decisions. Its sometimes a crapshoot. I know full well that pilots hate to think they're not in control of something, but thats a fact of life. As I've said many times here, even the best planning and risk mitigation can fall prey to unforseen circumstances. Did that mean the operation was unsafe? No. Did that mean the pilot was bad or at fault in the big picture? No. Even with a company making things safer for crews and even with pilots who are the "middle ground" I speak of, unfortunately, accidents are still going to happen in the business. But they're probably not going to happen for the "stupid" reasons mentioned in previous posts.
 
Not just HEMS, but even fixed-wing EMS. Friend of mine was killed in a E-90 King Air after takeoff from FLG on a flight to PHX. Entering the WX, he got a gear unsafe light and requested vectors back to the field on the ILS. Managed to get the gear down safe while in some VMC, but couldn't continue, so he picked up IFR and went IMC for vectors. Cleared for the approach with a procedure turn and told to contact tower, he never made the procedure turn, continued west blowing through the LOC course, and went into Mt Humphreys on the NW side of Flagstaff. He and both flight nurses were killed. What sucks is that he handled the gear emergency just fine and solved it to a safe landable condition, all while single pilot and in/out of the WX. Yet, he boned up the procedure turn of the instrument approach for reasons unknown and flew level, then descended into the 12,600' mountain.
Just went over that accident during SSDD. Really unfortunate.
 
That's not so much a crew problem as a training problem. If you punch it off because the equipment is unreliable, or because you never learned to trust it, while it's your fault you augered in, there are factors that made your auger more likely.

It isn't a training problem always. It is more a complacency or laziness issue. This is why pilots choose to hit the autopilot and read while the airplane "flies its self" or why pilots tune an ATIS frequency in, fall asleep and wake up once they get close enough for the ATIS to come in. Or don't believe that the aircraft is telling them. Telling somebody to not be complacent is about all you can do to "train" against complacency. Hearing PULL UP! and saying ehhhh its probably incorrect is absolutely a crew problem, and has been the EXACT cause of several fatal accidents.
 
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