Ameriflight PA-31 Accident - Arizona

Then why does the freight sector, and in this case, AMF, have so many accidents?

I'm talking about a simple numbers game. It's a simple question, how do we run a large scale operation without killing people on a regular basis? Pretty much the entire passenger carrying airline world has figured it out. The vast majority of flight schools have figured it out. Most corporate operators have figured it out.

Yet freight pilots keep dropping out of the sky and it's business as usual.

You can't really compare an airline, or a flight school, or a weekend GA flyer, to a freight operation. The former flies good equipment, the latter doesn't bother flying if he doesn't really need to. Along with some other factors, freight flying of the 135 variety can be a far riskier endeavor than the other ops you mention. My airline, we lost a PA-31 and 3 C-208As in the span of 3 years, to various causes.

Accidents are not "just a matter of time" at solid companies. If my former airline were to have a fatal crash tomorrow, I would not be shrugging and saying, "it was just a matter of time." I'd be shocked and extremely curious as to what went wrong, because all of the day to day flying I was exposed to there wasn't even close to pushing the envelope. Excellent safety culture, excellent training, mostly excellent pilots..

While they may not be a matter of time at solid companies, that doesn't mean that accidents don't happen. Excellent safety culture, training, and pilots, don't always = 100% safety. There are a ton of things to throw a monkey wrench into the mix of any flight, including humans and their limitations or faults.
 
You can't really compare an airline, or a flight school, or a weekend GA flyer, to a freight operation. The former flies good equipment, the latter doesn't bother flying if he doesn't really need to. Along with some other factors, freight flying of the 135 variety can be a far riskier endeavor than the other ops you mention. My airline, we lost a PA-31 and 3 C-208As in the span of 3 years, to various causes.
The only reason it's riskier is because operators cut corners and do stupid • to move the freight. Going A to B in an Amflight Chieftain isn't inherently more dangerous than going A to B in a Cape 402 (well, unless said Chieftain is an unairworthy hunk of junk, which may or may not be an issue at Amflight, I can't comment). It's guys who say "it's just freight" and do dumb things, or management that says "it's just freight" and keeps pushing it along that make the difference. Is that acceptable? Well, it appears that that is the case, since pilots still keep showing up to do it.

I lost a co worker this summer in part, I believe, to that same type of attitude that we seem to be hearing about out of Amflight. Whether all of what we hear is true, I can't say, but it sure sounds familiar to me.

Shoot, I don't even know what kind of numbers Amflight runs, they might be big enough that this number of accidents is not out of line with other types of flying.
 
The only reason it's riskier is because operators cut corners and do stupid to move the freight. Going A to B in an Amflight Chieftain isn't inherently more dangerous than going A to B in a Cape 402 (well, unless said Chieftain is an unairworthy hunk of junk, which may or may not be an issue at Amflight, I can't comment). It's guys who say "it's just freight" and do dumb things, or management that says "it's just freight" and keeps pushing it along that make the difference. Is that acceptable? Well, it appears that that is the case, since pilots still keep showing up to do it.

I lost a co worker this summer in part, I believe, to that same type of attitude that we seem to be hearing about out of Amflight. Whether all of what we hear is true, I can't say, but it sure sounds familiar to me.

It's close in my experience. The "I'm a billy-bad-ass cuz' I fly boxes" is alive and well in the lower 48, just like the "I'm a billy badass cuz I fly in Alaska" exists up here. It took me a really long time to realize it, but getting the mail, or cans of soda, or UPS boxes from point A to point B isn't worth it if it pushes you unnecessarily.
 
You can't really compare an airline, or a flight school, or a weekend GA flyer, to a freight operation. The former flies good equipment, the latter doesn't bother flying if he doesn't really need to. Along with some other factors, freight flying of the 135 variety can be a far riskier endeavor than the other ops you mention. My airline, we lost a PA-31 and 3 C-208As in the span of 3 years, to various causes.



While they may not be a matter of time at solid companies, that doesn't mean that accidents don't happen. Excellent safety culture, training, and pilots, don't always = 100% safety. There are a ton of things to throw a monkey wrench into the mix of any flight, including humans and their limitations or faults.

Why not? Or realistically, why shouldn't we? Shouldn't we all be going for the same level of safety? Shouldn't the goal be Zero accidents across the board? Even with that being unlikely, isn't it the zenith we should be aiming for?
 
The only reason it's riskier is because operators cut corners and do stupid to move the freight. Going A to B in an Amflight Chieftain isn't inherently more dangerous than going A to B in a Cape 402 (well, unless said Chieftain is an unairworthy hunk of junk, which may or may not be an issue at Amflight, I can't comment). It's guys who say "it's just freight" and do dumb things, or management that says "it's just freight" and keeps pushing it along that make the difference. Is that acceptable? Well, it appears that that is the case, since pilots still keep showing up to do it.

While the cutting corners and doing stupid is certainly part of it, there is an inherent risk in the fact that there's expectation to fly the boxes and get them there in WX that may not be severe VFR. The nature of the business is to get freight from A to B, and in conditions that won't always be sunny and a light breeze. While obviously no one wants to kill themselves, or lose the boxes in a crash, the mission objective is to get the boxes delivered. It could be easy, or it could be challenging. It could also be impossible. That is what the pilot is there to determine, and what he gets paid to do. Northern AZ in the winter is no joke come snow time. Ive had all sorts of crappy WX to get into and out of, to either be able to get to my destination, or to get there and figure out that I can't land because I cant get under the WX. At KSOW once, on touchdown, the plane bagan immediately sliding on the ice. Braking was ineffective, so it was pour the coals to it, rotate, turn the landing into a touch & go now, and try the other runway, which worked. Plane behind me from another company landed on the same first runway as me, and had no problem at all. Sometimes its the things we can't control......
 
Why not? Or realistically, why shouldn't we? Shouldn't we all be going for the same level of safety? Shouldn't the goal be Zero accidents across the board? Even with that being unlikely, isn't it the zenith we should be aiming for?

You flew freight, you already know the answer to this question. Its the nature of the operations being wildly different from one another in many ways. You could conceiveably fly freight in day VFR only, but mission degradation would ensue, and you wouldn't be flying the freight for long.

You can aim for a zenith all you like, but you have to figure in mission realities. The Air Force could park all its planes and have a 100% safety record, but no missions would get accomplished.
 
It's close in my experience. The "I'm a billy-bad-ass cuz' I fly boxes" is alive and well in the lower 48, just like the "I'm a billy badass cuz I fly in Alaska" exists up here. It took me a really long time to realize it, but getting the mail, or cans of soda, or UPS boxes from point A to point B isn't worth it if it pushes you unnecessarily.

Now, when it comes to the human aspect....the pilot; I agree that here is where we have the biggest problems. And what you cite above is one of the dangerous personality traits for a pilot is the ego problem, or inability to check it. This can manifest itself in all kinds of decision-making processes: get the boxes there at all costs, get-home-itis, duck-under syndrome, etc.

While I harp that getting the boxes there is the mission, I also harp not to kill oneself trying to do it.

Peer pressure is another big problem. Specifically, the guy or two who, on a bad WX day, decide to "sit it out and wait"; then the dumbo behind them decides to launch into icing and freezing rain, and avoids killing himself through sheer luck. Dumbo radios back that he made it through; and now the two guys who waited feel pressure to go, even though it's obvious that the guy who launched is only surviving on dumb luck. The two guys left behind waiting don't want to look bad or look like candyasses, so one of them launches, gets into the icing which is now worse, isn't able to climb, and descends into the terrain in IMC, killing himself.
 
It may or may not. But remember, where the PIC is the final authority, he is also the final responsibility. So barring some mechanical or some kind of severe WX that just couldn't be avoided, well, the investigation will go right back to the cockpit.

Yeah, but given that the poor bastard is already dead, I'm just hoping for something vaguely positive.
 
Then why does the freight sector, and in this case, AMF, have so many accidents?

I'm talking about a simple numbers

Dude look up FedEx, Airnet, look up these big operators. You think Cape Air is accident free? It is EXACTLY a numbers game. You're talking about the biggest part 135 operator in the country, by far. The amount of daily flights, and annual flights is a staggering number when compared to the competition. The fact this is the first death in 6 years is already pretty damn good. And we don't even know what went wrong. It could have been pure pilot error and bad judgement. And it could also not have anything to do with the company culture or training.
 
The nature of the business is to get freight from A to B, and in conditions that won't always be sunny and a light breeze. While obviously no one wants to kill themselves, or lose the boxes in a crash, the mission objective is to get the boxes delivered. It could be easy, or it could be challenging. It could also be impossible. That is what the pilot is there to determine, and what he gets paid to do.

Mike, I'm kinda surprised to hear you arguing this the way you are.

You could take your quote above and replace all instances of "freight" or "boxes" with "passengers" and you would describe a passenger airline.

So what's the deal? How can Cape Air fly 402s for twenty years with only one fatality, while Ameriflight can barely make it five?

Young pilot group? Check. Old, piston twin equipment? Check. Single pilot operations? Check. Ice, thunderstorms, terrain, and other hazards? Check.

The two operations stack up very similarly next to each other, with the exception of drastically different accident statistics. You can call it an inherent risk to the job if you want, but I'm saying there is no reason, outside of egos and money, why it has to be that way.

Let me know if I'm missing something.
 
That brings up another good point. Before you go to work for some company, look up all the ntsb reports on them. Always.
I did before going to AMF. A lot can change in 6 years. We had a guy in OAK not let us go into perfectly legal conditions (1sm vis) because an engine could fail and we would have to do an ILS approach single engine. This same guy was once a pilot pusher back in the day (and still is with broken airplanes unfortunately).

The last fatality before this was a 99 shooting a VOR approach. There was a turn at the VOR and they didn't turn. Mistakes like that you can't really blame the company for. Basic instrument flying shouldn't be something they have to teach. Obviously there could be other factors but the NTSB did not list them. Pretty much for 2 decades there haven't been any non-pilot error crashes that I know of. One is undetermined, but other than that, pilot error. Some for stupid stuff like scenic picture taking or selecting a bad altitude for VFR flight into mountains. at night.

  • The second pilot's failure to follow the published instrument approach procedure and the captain/PIC's inadequate supervision. Snow and mountain obscuration were factors.
  • failure of the pilot to maintain clearance with mountainous terrain for undetermined reasons.
  • The pilot-in-command's failure to maintain proper glidepath alignment during an ILS approach in poor weather resulting in collision with trees and terrain. Contributing factors were the unreliable status of the primary (NAV 1) ILS receiver (leaving the pilot with only the secondary (NAV 2) ILS receiver), the low ceilings and trees.
  • The failure of the pilot-in-command to maintain separation from terrain while operating under visual flight rules. Contributing factors were the improper issuance of a suggested heading by air traffic control personnel, inadequate flight progress monitoring by radar departure control personnel, and failure of the radar controller to identify a hazardous condition and issue a safety alert.
  • the pilot's failure to follow procedures and directives and his failure to maintain clearance from mountainous terrain.
  • The failure of the air traffic controller to comply with instructions contained in the Air Traffic Control Handbook, FAA Order 7110.65, which resulted in the flight being vectored at an altitude below the minimum vectoring altitude (MVA) and failure to issue a safety advisory. In addition, the controller's supervisor monitoring the controller's actions failed to detect and correct the vector below the MVA. A factor in the accident was the flightcrew's failure to maintain situational awareness of nearby terrain and failure to challenge the controller's instructions.
  • loss of aircraft control at night by the pilot for unknown reasons.
  • the pilot's failure to select a cruise altitude which would ensure adequate terrain clearance. Contributing factors related to the dark, nighttime condition and to the pilot's lack of attentiveness.
This is the list of probable causes to all the fatal accidents in the last two decades. Notice a pattern or two? I'm not exactly sure what AMF can do other than change some of their procedures (which they have). We now only fly IFR at night now. No VFR stuff any more. We are now required to have the approach on the second nav.

jrh Last I checked Cape Air doesn't fly around mountainous terrain like the rockies. They add an interesting risk factor to the mix. When you screw something up in the Caribbean or the NE you likely will not be running into a mountain. That doesn't mean there haven't been things that needed improving in the cargo biz, but there is extra risk that AMF has to deal with that Cape air does not based solely on location.
 
Mike, I'm kinda surprised to hear you arguing this the way you are.

You could take your quote above and replace all instances of "freight" or "boxes" with "passengers" and you would describe a passenger airline.

So what's the deal? How can Cape Air fly 402s for twenty years with only one fatality, while Ameriflight can barely make it five?

Young pilot group? Check. Old, piston twin equipment? Check. Single pilot operations? Check. Ice, thunderstorms, terrain, and other hazards? Check.

The two operations stack up very similarly next to each other, with the exception of drastically different accident statistics. You can call it an inherent risk to the job if you want, but I'm saying there is no reason, outside of egos and money, why it has to be that way.

Let me know if I'm missing something.

All Im arguing is a simple reality of the business. It's not unsafe, it's simply more challenging and somewhat more risky than the average pax flying, in a general sense. While that risk is mitigated as best as possible, it's never fully eliminated because there are indeed factors beyond one's control. As Maurus alluded to, the nature of AMFs operations, combined with the geography they operate in (and I operated in back in my day there); the pilot can only play the hand he's dealt, and it won't always be a royal flush. It's just the nature of the beast. It can be great, or it can suck; but it still is what it is. The skilled pilot does his best to marry mission effectivness with safety of the operation. That ultimately will determine whether he launches or not. Of course, as I mentioned before, all of this is out the window with unchecked egos, unchecked peer pressure, and other human factors issues.

Im with you in that I wish those risks weren't present, but they unfortunately are. And even a good decision now, can sometimes turn into a bad decision later.....all by no fault of the pilot.
 
Dude look up FedEx, Airnet, look up these big operators. You think Cape Air is accident free? It is EXACTLY a numbers game. You're talking about the biggest part 135 operator in the country, by far. The amount of daily flights, and annual flights is a staggering number when compared to the competition.

No, I know Cape Air is not accident free. No operator is perfect and I'm not claiming anyone should be.

But if you're trying to argue Ameriflight somehow has equivalent safety records to the rest of the industry, I don't think you want to go down that road because you won't like what you'll find.

The only reason I brought Cape Air up was because they're the most similar operation I know of that is not a freight operator. You're right, AMF is approximately three times bigger, on a fleet size basis, than 9K. On flight hours flown and number of takeoffs/landings performed, I *think* Cape does more per aircraft than AMF, but I don't know.

In any case, I'm not sure how this difference can account for nine times as many fatal accidents at AMF.

The fact this is the first death in 6 years is already pretty damn good. And we don't even know what went wrong. It could have been pure pilot error and bad judgement. And it could also not have anything to do with the company culture or training.

First death in six years is GOOD? Are you serious? By those standards, what would be considered a "bad" streak? The previous decade, when planes were going down every 2-4 years? Six years is not exactly something to brag about.

I'd be intrigued if you could find me an operator outside of the freight world that has fatal accidents every six years and everyone shrugs it off as normal.

As for the cause of this specific accident, I don't know. But any time a fatality is the result, again, I don't think anyone should be looking at it as par for the course. It means the pilot went deep, deep down the accident chain for one reason or another.
 
I'd be intrigued if you could find me an operator outside of the freight world that has fatal accidents every six years and everyone shrugs it off as normal.

As for the cause of this specific accident, I don't know. But any time a fatality is the result, again, I don't think anyone should be looking at it as par for the course. It means the pilot went deep, deep down the accident chain for one reason or another.

No one is shrugging anything off as normal, at least not me. What Im saying is that with the riskier flying, that there could be times where an emergency or something else would have one degree of risk or outcome in one area; and another degree of risk or outcome somewhere else or in a different type of operation. As I've written, not everything is under the direct control of the pilot. And a good decision now, could become a bad decision later....both with and without pilot intervention. Freight, by the nature of it's necessity, pushes the envelope more than other types of operations. Occasionally, these envelopes are taken too for for a variety of reasons. It's wise that people live and learn from those accidents and incidents, but the freight world doesn't come to an end. Business continues and pilots are expected to use their judgement and keep the mission going in a general sense. If changes need to be made, depending on their criticality, they will be.
 
This is the list of probable causes to all the fatal accidents in the last two decades. Notice a pattern or two? I'm not exactly sure what AMF can do other than change some of their procedures (which they have). We now only fly IFR at night now. No VFR stuff any more. We are now required to have the approach on the second nav.

A couple things come to mind.

First, it's extremely rare for the NTSB to come right out and cite a company for causing an accident. The accident report always faults the pilot, because...well...it WAS the pilot's fault. Thing is, there could have been factors behind the scenes, such as pressure from the company, pressure from coworkers, fatigue, etc.

Second, it seems as though you're talking out of two sides of your mouth. On one side you say AMF has no control over these accidents, then out of the other side you say things have improved because of new policies.

There's a novel idea...improve safety through better systemic processes. Kinda like how airlines have been doing it for years.

jrh Last I checked Cape Air doesn't fly around mountainous terrain like the rockies. They add an interesting risk factor to the mix. When you screw something up in the Caribbean or the NE you likely will not be running into a mountain. That doesn't mean there haven't been things that needed improving in the cargo biz, there is extra risk that AMF has to deal with that Cape air does not based solely on location.

I see what you're saying, but my point all along is that this is a question of risk management. Every operation has certain risks involved and manages those risks to get as much productivity as possible while killing as few people as possible.

AMF very well might operate in a higher risk environment, but that means they need to take steps in other areas to mitigate the risks. The policies you stated above are examples of ways they're doing this. Saying, "Eh, we can handle a few fatalities," is not acceptable risk management, in my opinion.
 
First, it's extremely rare for the NTSB to come right out and cite a company for causing an accident. The accident report always faults the pilot, because...well...it WAS the pilot's fault. Thing is, there could have been factors behind the scenes, such as pressure from the company, pressure from coworkers, fatigue, etc.

It can't be done. The pilot is in ultimate control, or a mechanical event or act of God occurs. At best, company policy is a secondary, and often a tertiary, factor to an aircraft accident; as the company isn't/wasn't in physical control of anything with regards to the accident aircraft itself.

I see what you're saying, but my point all along is that this is a question of risk management. Every operation has certain risks involved and manages those risks to get as much productivity as possible while killing as few people as possible.

AMF very well might operate in a higher risk environment, but that means they need to take steps in other areas to mitigate the risks. The policies you stated above are examples of ways they're doing this. Saying, "Eh, we can handle a few fatalities," is not acceptable risk management, in my opinion.

Again, no one is saying "we can handle a few fatalities". On one hand, you're saying to get most productivity as possible, while mitigating risks; then on the other hand you appear to be expecting near-100% safety. It simply isn't going to happen. Even with the best risk mitigation techniques, if you want to fly planes, accidents are going to happen. Now throw in an operation where there are already inherent risks out the gate that can't be controlled, only worked with or worked around, and the exposure to the probability of an accident increases. You still do your best to mitigate it, but there are things that can't be changed. Human failings such as ego, peer pressure, and simply just mistakes, etc, being a big part of that.
 
What I saw in my year and a half there was about 50/50: Half of the pilots seemed to be true professionals with very little ego and a high level of integrity. The other half were pathetic, wannabe cowboys. There were a couple of real gems in the training department there. You were in their elite circle or you weren't.

Of course, the company's official policy was one of prudent professionalism. But that didn't affect the guys who apparently had something to prove. I heard more than my share of those idiots bragging about scud running or disconnecting the broken stall warning system on their airplane. I promise you that AMF pay didn't come anywhere near compensating that type of risky behavior.

All of that said, I did not know the deceased pilot and I am not making any assumptions on his personality as a freight pilot. I sincerely hope that the investigation is able to find enough evidence to vindicate his decisions and actions.

I have known Dave for almost 6 years, he was not a "cowboy". AMF does have a lot of them, especially in PHX, but he was one of the more conservative pilots.
 
I have known Dave for almost 6 years, he was not a "cowboy". AMF does have a lot of them, especially in PHX, but he was one of the more coservitave pilots.

Like I said before, sometimes even the most conservative pilots find themselves in a pickle; while some of the most cowboy ones never do; and vice versa. Mistakes happen on both ends of that spectrum, as well as best laid plans going to heck by factors outside one's control. It will be interesting what is found.
 
I have known Dave for almost 6 years, he was not a "cowboy". AMF does have a lot of them, especially in PHX, but he was one of the more coservitave pilots.
Sorry for your loss. That is another interesting piece of the puzzle. The guy we put into a hill in weather was also known as a guy who didn't push it.
 
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