Ameriflight PA-31 Accident - Arizona

[z987k]

So the assumption at this point is ice?

That's the rumor I've heard. Pireps for mod-severe. Also something about "go take a look".

 

[Cal Goat]

That's the rumor I've heard. Pireps for mod-severe. Also something about "go take a look".

That's infuriating, if true. The AMF company line was always officially cautious, but I felt that most of the pilot group ( and not necessarilly ACPs or the training dept. instructors ) created a culture of dick-measuring and who had the most manly freight dog story. In fact, it shows up in here too. Fortunately, that crap was always meaningless to me, but I saw a few young and seemingly insecure pilots try to get in on that BS.

I truly hope that was not the case in this accident.

 

[z987k]

That's infuriating, if true. The AMF company line was always officially cautious, but I felt that most of the pilot group ( and not necessarilly ACPs or the training dept. instructors ) created a culture of dick-measuring and who had the most manly freight dog story. In fact, it shows up in here too. Fortunately, that crap was always meaningless to me, but I saw a few young and seemingly insecure pilots try to get in on that BS.

I truly hope that was not the case in this accident.

Just a something I heard. You know how facts can be so misleading, but rumors!

 

[Maurus]

That's infuriating, if true. The AMF company line was always officially cautious, but I felt that most of the pilot group ( and not necessarilly ACPs or the training dept. instructors ) created a culture of dick-measuring and who had the most manly freight dog story. In fact, it shows up in here too. Fortunately, that crap was always meaningless to me, but I saw a few young and seemingly insecure pilots try to get in on that BS.

I truly hope that was not the case in this accident.

Funny, our stories around these parts are about how our schedules have recently been getting jacked around and we have to deny flights due to fatigue. The sad thing is that the reserves are still there with their thumbs up their butts .

 

[jrh]

Maybe this isn't the right thread to say this, but I'm going to say it anyway...

It bothers me how so many people seem to think this kind of accident is somehow "normal," particularly in the world of freight flying. Just part of the price of doing business. That's so effed up.

I have no idea what caused this accident. Maybe it was poor judgement on the pilot's part. Or maybe it had something to do with training. Or fatigue. Or corporate culture. Or maintenance. Or pilot pushing. Or management's decision to put an aircraft on the line with inadequate performance or equipment for the conditions. I don't know.

But what I do know, is if you go to the NTSB's aviation accident database and type in "Ameriflight" you'll see all kinds of incidents and accidents, both fatal and non-fatal. The fatal accidents seem to happen every 2-4 years like clockwork, with the exception of a recent string of six years involving only non-fatal incidents.

The causes of each accident are varied, but to me, this trend shows one point very clearly--there's a serious breakdown of risk management happening. Something is getting pushed way harder than it should. I spent a year flying piston twins for a similarly-sized company with only one fatal accident in their 20 year history. The job had its ups and downs, but literally dying at work was pretty low on my list of concerns.

I say all this because I think pilots ought to demand better. It's one thing to complain about low pay and long hours.

It's a whole 'nother level to get needlessly killed on the job.

Think about that next time you go to work.

 

[MikeD]

It bothers me how so many people seem to think this kind of accident is somehow "normal," particularly in the world of freight flying. Just part of the price of doing business. That's so effed up.
.

Don't do military flying then, as "price of doing business" is a big part of accidents. Price of being prepared and training like we fight and all that. Accidents are going to happen. That said, I do realize that we're not talking that kind of extreme here with something akin to 99% of civilian flight operations. I do get that. At the same time though, being paid to get cargo from point A to point B, where pax and comfort aren't an issue.....there's a certain amount of accepted risk that goes with that. There ARE things that are the price of doing business: flying in crappier WX than the average pax plane would, flying a junkier airplane than you'd see in the pax world, pushing the limits a little farther when necessary, without going over the line and having a mishap (as best as possible). Your job is to get the boxes safely from A to B, and sometimes in the course of doing that and taking the normally elevated risks that the job entails, one can find themselves in the proverbial square corner, not having seen themselves getting there in time to have reversed or changed that event from occurring. That kind of thing happens in aviation. It shouldn't, but it does; especially with all the variables out there that aren't under the pilot's control. The best thing is to be able to learn from these experiences and press on. It doesn't make the deceased pilot a bad person, but just someone who suffered the unfortunate result(s) of whatever combinations of factors were piled onto him that night.

 

[jrh]

Don't do military flying then, as "price of doing business" is a big part of accidents. Price of being prepared and training like we fight and all that. Accidents are going to happen. That said, I do realize that we're not talking that kind of extreme here with something akin to 99% of civilian flight operations. I do get that.

Ok, let's leave military flying out of it, as I think you and I agree it's an apples to oranges comparison.

At the same time though, being paid to get cargo from point A to point B, where pax and comfort aren't an issue.....there's a certain amount of accepted risk that goes with that. There ARE things that are the price of doing business: flying in crappier WX than the average pax plane would, flying a junkier airplane than you'd see in the pax world, pushing the limits a little farther when necessary, without going over the line and having a mishap (as best as possible). Your job is to get the boxes safely from A to B, and sometimes in the course of doing that and taking the normally elevated risks that the job entails, one can find themselves in the proverbial square corner, not having seen themselves getting there in time to have reversed or changed that event from occurring. That kind of thing happens in aviation. It shouldn't, but it does...

This is exactly the line of logic I was writing against. You talk about not going over the line and having a mishap, yet clearly AMF has crossed that line in a fatal way nine times over their history. To me, that's a problem that ought to be addresed.

You yourself even admit a problem with the last line I quoted, saying, "It shouldn't, but it does."

Ok, if it shouldn't, then why does it? Because everybody in the system, pilots, dispatchers, management, the FAA, and everyone else agree the pilots' lives are worth less than the almighty dollar. A person can sugarcoat it in nicer terms if they want, but it still boils down to this basic agreement.

When the new 121 rest rules came out a while ago, there was a big uproar over the 121 cargo carriers being left out of it. "One level of safety!" everyone screamed.

Apparently one level of safety doesn't apply to smaller aircraft, lower down on the food chain of the aviation industry. Like I said in my first post, I used to fly piston twins for a passenger operation with literally NINE TIMES fewer accidents than AMF. And they were a long lasting, profitable company. Their operation put safety as a true priority at every level of the organization, not just some nice words to say during basic indoc training. Safety is not something that *can't* be done, it's something people choose *not* to do.

"Certain amounts of accepted risk" are what brought about things like child labor laws and labor unions at the turn of the century. People reached a point where they determined they didn't want to work in a sweatshop, factory owners realized it's pretty sleezy to operate a sweatshop, and legislators concluded they should outlaw sweatshop conditions.

I'm just some guy typing on the internet. I'm realistic. I don't expect anything miraculous to change based on what I write.

My hope is that if more people think through these issues of why things are the way they are, they'll be better informed for setting a career path. Maybe there'll even be fewer guys like Dave, still flying with us, rather than on the side of a hill in Arizona.

 

[z987k]

jrh, you make good points, and I'd really like to revisit all of this when we get the ntsb report. I'm genuinely curious as to what they're going to have to say overall.

 

[MikeD]

This is exactly the line of logic I was writing against. You talk about not going over the line and having a mishap, yet clearly AMF has crossed that line in a fatal way nine times over their history. To me, that's a problem that ought to be addresed.

You yourself even admit a problem with the last line I quoted, saying, "It shouldn't, but it does."

Ok, if it shouldn't, then why does it? Because everybody in the system, pilots, dispatchers, management, the FAA, and everyone else agree the pilots' lives are worth less than the almighty dollar. A person can sugarcoat it in nicer terms if they want, but it still boils down to this basic agreement.

When the new 121 rest rules came out a while ago, there was a big uproar over the 121 cargo carriers being left out of it. "One level of safety!" everyone screamed.

Apparently one level of safety doesn't apply to smaller aircraft, lower down on the food chain of the aviation industry. Like I said in my first post, I used to fly piston twins for a passenger operation with literally NINE TIMES fewer accidents than AMF. And they were a long lasting, profitable company. Their operation put safety as a true priority at every level of the organization, not just some nice words to say during basic indoc training. Safety is not something that *can't* be done, it's something people choose *not* to do.

"Certain amounts of accepted risk" are what brought about things like child labor laws and labor unions at the turn of the century. People reached a point where they determined they didn't want to work in a sweatshop, factory owners realized it's pretty sleezy to operate a sweatshop, and legislators concluded they should outlaw sweatshop conditions.

I'm just some guy typing on the internet. I'm realistic. I don't expect anything miraculous to change based on what I write.

My hope is that if more people think through these issues of why things are the way they are, they'll be better informed for setting a career path. Maybe there'll even be fewer guys like Dave, still flying with us, rather than on the side of a hill in Arizona.

Im from Arizona, I flew cargo on the same exact run as him, in the same exact airplanes, flying out of the same exact base airport, and in some of the same exact WX, over 15 years ago. Im still here. I accepted the same risks that it appears he did, generally speaking. The only difference is the timeframe and the company: Him now, me back then. Other than that, there's little difference. Except he ran into a situation that either overtaxed his abilities, the airplane's abilities, or a combination of both. Does that speak to a cultural issue? I don't know. Has there been some large cultural change in flying cargo in the 16 or so years difference between me flying the same run and him doing it now? I don't know that either.

Flying is already a risky proposition, as you well know. It's not always clear, blue and 22. The accepted risk can be as low as going around the pattern VFR, or as high as having to use the icing protection systems on the plane. Those are the realities of life. Now.....what I can't speak to is the culture. I don't know AMFs culture of either it's pilots in how they see themselves, or in how AMF management sees the pilots or the mission. That could very well be the linchpin you're referring to. The problem is whether the issue is management, or the pilots themselves. It could be the former, the latter, or both. Until that is known, there might not be enough info in order to determine how either could've affected the deceased pilot in question.

 

[MikeD]

jrh, you make good points, and I'd really like to revisit all of this when we get the ntsb report. I'm genuinely curious as to what they're going to have to say overall.

Don't hold your breath. As it's very possible that many of the answers jrh and you likely seek, may have gone down with the PA-31 and it's pilot.

 

[z987k]

Flying is already a risky proposition, as you well know. It's not always clear, blue and 22. The accepted risk can be as low as going around the pattern VFR, or as high as having to use the icing protection systems on the plane. Those are the realities of life. Now.....what I can't speak to is the culture. I don't know AMFs culture of either it's pilots in how they see themselves, or in how AMF management sees the pilots or the mission. That could very well be the linchpin you're referring to. The problem is whether the issue is management, or the pilots themselves. It could be the former, the latter, or both. Until that is known, there might not be enough info in order to determine how either could've affected the deceased pilot in question.

It's both. No doubt there.

 

[jrh]

Exactly. I'm not trying to figure out what happened in this specific accident.

I'm saying, if you're currently working for, or interested in working for, a company that has numerous reports in the NTSB database, you should be raising an eyebrow and saying, "Whoa, WTF is going on here???" rather than, "Meh, it comes with the territory, I'll be ok."

NTSB reports don't show up randomly. There are very good reasons why things happen the way they do. There are reasons why some companies have page after page of reports, while others have virtually none.

 

[z987k]

That brings up another good point. Before you go to work for some company, look up all the ntsb reports on them. Always.

 

[ppragman]

Don't do military flying then, as "price of doing business" is a big part of accidents. Price of being prepared and training like we fight and all that. Accidents are going to happen.

Hah, the Airforce is one of the safest forms of flying that there is. Here's an article from 2010:
http://www.flyingmag.com/safety/training/safety-against-odds

The e-mail we received here at Flying from Col. Sid "Scroll" Mayeux, chief of aviation safety at the United States Air Force Safety Center, was a little hard to believe. "Last year (Fiscal Year 2009)," Mayeux's e-mail read, "was the USAF's safest year in aviation safety, with 17 Class A Aviation Flight Mishaps for a 0.8 rate per 100,000 flying hours."
One might think that the job of attaining a level of safety like that, given the Air Force's high-flying, high-tech fleet of aircraft, was an impossible task, and I would have been right there with you. Somehow, though, the Air Force seems to have hit upon a formula for safety that last year approached perfection.
Air Force Safety in Context Before you can fully appreciate just how remarkable an achievement the Air Force's safety record is, you have to understand just what it means.
For starters, it is important to define what constitutes a Class A Mishap. Just as the NTSB and FAA have their specific definitions of what constitutes an accident versus an incident, so does the Air Force. The bar for an event falling into the Class A category is surprisingly low: It's any accident in which there's a fatality, permanent disabling injury, destruction of an Air Force aircraft or property damage of $1 million or more. That repair-cost figure is going up soon to keep pace with the rising costs of repairs. You can hit that figure, one investigator commented to me, by putting a healthy gouge in the paint of an F-22 radome. So, while some of the accidents that get listed as a Class A Mishap are high-speed crashes resulting in loss of life, others aren't much more than glorified fender benders. By civilian standards, the rate might be even lower.

Just how good a rate is 0.8 per 100,000 flight hours? It's, in a word, remarkable. The rate compares favorably with the fatal accident rate for general aviation, which is around 1.17 per 100,000 hours. Remember, most of the Air Force's Class A Mishaps don't involve fatalities, and many of them don't involve injuries.
The more pertinent figure from GA, the overall accident rate, in 2008 was 7.1 per 100,000 hours, which is approximately nine times that of the Air Force's mark. In fact, the Air Force's safety record for 2009 compared favorably with every segment of civil aviation in the United States (based on 2008 figures) except for the scheduled airlines. Scheduled Part 121 flying, as one would hope, is considerably safer. Then again, the airlines aren't flying high-speed, low-level training missions through mountainous terrain.

Here's an older article from early 2001:
http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93854&page=1#.UODFObbuUco

That rate for 2001 so far is 1.28 Class A aviation accidents per 100,000 flight hours. In 2000 during the same time period, it was slightly less, 1.19. But this year's rate so far is not much higher than the rate for all of 2000, 1.25, and significantly less than what it was in 1999, 1.61. In 1990, the rate hit a high of around 2.1 Class A mishaps per 100,000 flight hours.

Bottom line, the military has a culture of safety and the desire to do better. That doesn't exist in a lot of the civilian world. Aircraft losses are seen as the "cost of doing business" in more of aviation than one would expect.

http://www.menatrisk.org/health/dangerousjobs.html

Another often owner-operated job -- commercial pilot -- comes in third on the list of the country's most dangerous jobs, with 70 fatalities per 100,000 workers.
Most pilot fatalities come from general aviation; bush pilots, air-taxi pilots, and crop-dusters die at a far higher rate than airline pilots. Again, Alaskan workers skew the profession's data; recent National Institute for Occupational Health and Safety (NIOSH) stats indicate that they have a fatality rate four times higher than those in the lower 48. "Alaskan pilots have a one in eight chance of dying during a 30-year career," says George Conway of NIOSH. "That's huge."
Conway reports that the most common scenario in fatal plane crashes in Alaska is, "controlled flight into terrain." A pilot starts out in good weather then runs into clouds, loses visibility, and flies into a mountainside.
Even though pilots flying small planes have a much higher fatality rate than pilots flying big airline jets, they're not financially compensated for the added danger; non-jet pilots average about $52,000 a year in pay while jetliner pilots make about $92,000.

I'd bet that a "career" in freight, or flying small piston twins would be equivalent everywhere.

For more information, take a gander here:
http://www.nbaa.org/ops/safety/stats/#stats7

Aircraft Accident Rates, 1990–2011 (per 100,000 flight hours) 1
Year General
Aviation 2
Total/Fatal Air Taxi 3
Total/Fatal Commuter
Air Carriers 4
Total/Fatal Airlines 5
Total/Fatal Corporate/
Executive 6
Total/Fatal Business 7
Total/Fatal
1990 7.77/1.56 4.76/1.29 0.641/0.171 0.198/0.171 0.210/0.090 3.71/0.96
1991 7.91/1.57 3.93/1.25 1.004/0.349 0.221/0.034 0.230/0.080 3.08/0.82
1992 8.51/1.81 2.67/0.84 0.942/0.300 0.146/0.032 0.210/0.080 2.17/0.68
1993 9.03/1.74 2.97/0.82 0.606/0.152 0.181/0.008 0.230/0.070 2.02/0.52
1994 9.08/1.81 3.45/1.05 0.359/0.108 0.168/0.030 0.180/0.070 1.81/0.51
1995 8.21/1.63 3.02/0.97 0.457/0.076 0.267/0.022 0.250/0.110 2.04/0.67
1996 7.65/1.45 2.80/0.90 0.399/0.036 0.269/0.036 0.140/0.060 1.68/0.34
1997 7.17/1.36 2.65/0.48 1.628 / 0.509 8 0.309/0.025 0.230/0.060 1.41/0.39
1998 7.43/1.41 2.03/0.45 2.262/0.000 0.297/0.006 0.091/0.000 1.14/0.30
1999 6.50/1.16 2.31/0.37 3.793/1.459 0.291/0.011 0.182/0.099 1.41/0.40
2000 6.57/1.21 2.04/0.56 3.247/0.271 0.306/0.016 0.125/0.060 1.28/0.37
2001 6.78/1.27 2.40/0.60 2.330/0.666 0.236/0.011 0.108/0.031 1.06/0.23
2002 6.69/1.33 2.06/0.62 2.559/0.000 0.237/0.000 0.116/0.029 1.08/0.36
2003 6.68/1.34 2.49/0.61 0.627/0.313 0.309/0.011 0.028/0.014 0.95/0.26
2004 6.49/1.26 2.04/0.71 1.324/0.000 0.159/0.011 0.093/0.013 0.91/0.23
2005 7.20/1.38 1.70/0.29 2.002/0.000 0.206/0.015 0.076/0.013 0.73/0.14
2006 6.35/1.28 1.39/0.27 0.995/0.332 0.171/0.010 0.141/0.011 0.80/0.29
2007 6.93/1.20 1.54/0.35 1.028/0.000 0.143/0.005 0.103/0.034 0.72/0.16
2008 6.86/1.21 1.81/0.62 2.385/0.000 0.147/0.010 0.075/0.000 9 1.27 /0.16
2009 7.08/1.32 1.63/0.07 0.685/0.000 0.170/0.011 0.070/0.014 0.56/0.21
2010 6.63/1.23 1.00/0.19 1.947/0.000 0.163/0.006 0.067/0.000 0.79/0.25
2011 6.51/1.17 1.50/0.48 1.303/0.000 0.175/0.000 0.061/0.000 0.73/0.22

The only place the military does worse than is Airlines, Corporate, and Business flying, anything in GA is a crap shoot comparatively.


This isn't something that the military shouldn't be proud of. Those kinds of accident statistics are impressive, but realistically, it's not the most "dangerous" flying there is to do in the world, because the military spends a lot of money on aircraft and pilots, and has a vested interest in keeping them alive. The civilian sector - especially at the lower end of the echelon tends to view these sorts of things as a "cost of doing business" at some outfits (not all).

 

[Cal Goat]

... I don't know AMFs culture of either it's pilots in how they see themselves, or in how AMF management sees the pilots or the mission. That could very well be the linchpin you're referring to. The problem is whether the issue is management, or the pilots themselves. It could be the former, the latter, or both. Until that is known, there might not be enough info in order to determine how either could've affected the deceased pilot in question.

What I saw in my year and a half there was about 50/50: Half of the pilots seemed to be true professionals with very little ego and a high level of integrity. The other half were pathetic, wannabe cowboys. There were a couple of real gems in the training department there. You were in their elite circle or you weren't.

Of course, the company's official policy was one of prudent professionalism. But that didn't affect the guys who apparently had something to prove. I heard more than my share of those idiots bragging about scud running or disconnecting the broken stall warning system on their airplane. I promise you that AMF pay didn't come anywhere near compensating that type of risky behavior.

All of that said, I did not know the deceased pilot and I am not making any assumptions on his personality as a freight pilot. I sincerely hope that the investigation is able to find enough evidence to vindicate his decisions and actions.

 

[Inverted]

Jrh while I don't disagree with you, but you can argue those points with every single accident to have ever happened. At some point there was an oversight, or bad decision by somebody along the way.

It's no secret how AMF operates, and every current and ex employee has several things running through his head after an accident like this, one of which is, "it was only a matter of time."

Cal Goat is right on. I bought into the cowboy mentality for a bit, then something clicked and I completely changed the way I operated. No canceled check or Amazon Kindle is worth it...I also unfortunately have to agree with his assessment of the training department. Lets just say its a lot easier to armchair quarterback from the right seat thing is to fly the left seat when it comes to training.

What I will say though, is there was never a captain there I didn't feel really comfortable flying with. They pump out good pilots. With that said, there is still a constant trade between luck and skill. For a lot of those guys it's the first time flying in any kind of real weather.

 

[z987k]

It's no secret how AMF operates, and every current and ex employee has several things running through his head after an accident like this, one of which is, "it was only a matter of time."

Cal Goat is right on. I bought into the cowboy mentality for a bit, then something clicked and I completely changed the way I operated. No canceled check or Amazon Kindle is worth it...I also unfortunately have to agree with his assessment of the training department. Lets just say its a lot easier to armchair quarterback from the right seat thing is to fly the left seat when it comes to training.

What I will say though, is there was never a captain there I didn't feel really comfortable flying with. They pump out good pilots. With that said, there is still a constant trade between luck and skill. For a lot of those guys it's the first time flying in any kind of real weather.

I agree with this entire statement.

 

[jrh]

Jrh while I don't disagree with you, but you can argue those points with every single accident to have ever happened.

Then why does the freight sector, and in this case, AMF, have so many accidents?

I'm talking about a simple numbers game. It's a simple question, how do we run a large scale operation without killing people on a regular basis? Pretty much the entire passenger carrying airline world has figured it out. The vast majority of flight schools have figured it out. Most corporate operators have figured it out.

Yet freight pilots keep dropping out of the sky and it's business as usual.

It's no secret how AMF operates, and every current and ex employee has several things running through his head after an accident like this, one of which is, "it was only a matter of time."

Right. Exactly. Which is why this is so messed up.

Accidents are not "just a matter of time" at solid companies. If my former airline were to have a fatal crash tomorrow, I would not be shrugging and saying, "it was just a matter of time." I'd be shocked and extremely curious as to what went wrong, because all of the day to day flying I was exposed to there wasn't even close to pushing the envelope. Excellent safety culture, excellent training, mostly excellent pilots.

You say it's no secret how AMF operates, and I'm just pointing out, dead bodies are the result of operating in this manner. A lot of pilots either don't fully comprehend this connection, or do, but don't care. They got away with it for the past six years. Now it's staring everyone in the face. I hope somebody learns from it.

 

[MikeD]

This isn't something that the military shouldn't be proud of. Those kinds of accident statistics are impressive, but realistically, it's not the most "dangerous" flying there is to do in the world, because the military spends a lot of money on aircraft and pilots, and has a vested interest in keeping them alive. The civilian sector - especially at the lower end of the echelon tends to view these sorts of things as a "cost of doing business" at some outfits (not all).

Don't mistake the money spent on aircraft and pilots, as being related somehow to there being low danger in military flying. Much of the "cost of doing business" in military flying stems from having to accept that to accomplish a given mission, there are going to be some high risks, many of which can't be mitigated without severe mission degradation. So yes, "cost of doing business" is accepted in many ways, even as risk-averse as the U.S. military is. Many foreign air arms even moreso believe in the "cost of doing business" philosophy. Now, just because that philosophy is present, doesn't mean caution and safety should be thrown to the wind; but it's simply an acknowledgement that there are many things beyond control of the aircrew that can severely affect safety, and in order to accomplish the mission, dealing with many of those outside factors is simply an accepted concept.

 

[MikeD]

What
All of that said, I did not know the deceased pilot and I am not making any assumptions on his personality as a freight pilot. I sincerely hope that the investigation is able to find enough evidence to vindicate his decisions and actions.

It may or may not. But remember, where the PIC is the final authority, he is also the final responsibility. So barring some mechanical or some kind of severe WX that just couldn't be avoided, well, the investigation will go right back to the cockpit.