AF447 Vanity Fair article

Serious question, do you guys have pep rallies?

Serious question... what's your point?

It just happened to be that it was a DL flight that had the same situation and flew it well. If it were USair that had done it instead, I would have said the same thing.
 
How are you guys jumping from the visual approach being more difficult than an ILS to a visual being an emergency procedure? No one here has suggested that professional pilots shouldn't be able to fly visuals.

My last sentence was some sarcasm. The event really happened though, looked good.

Straight off the balcony, ATN_PILOT! Then we'll see if you REALLY know how to fly!

No balcony on the first floor, so you'll have to find another way to dispose of him. :)
 
Serious question... what's your point?

It just happened to be that it was a DL flight that had the same situation and flew it well. If it were USair that had done it instead, I would have said the same thing.
OK, so I know I said it was a serious question, but I lied. It was sarcasm, with a hint of rhetorical-ness. It's cool, broseph.
 
You know how many visual approaches (from a downwind) I've done in the plane that I just hit 1000 hours in? Two. That's it. I've done a whole bunch of "base to final" sorts, but keep in mind too, I'm in an operation that does way more visual flying than almost any other 121 airline out there. We (121) just don't ever practice (in the sim and nobody in 121 is doing in aircraft training now) visual approaches. That's why, when we get them for real, even if we have thousands of hours of 172 time in the pattern to fall back on, it's a much harder maneuver than a straight in ILS, for us.

Thanks, that's about the most cogent explanation that I've heard...but I'm still not buying it completely.

Every time you fly any approach at all, it is still the same basic glidepath from the visual descent point (the standard "300 feet at a mile position) to touchdown. With the seeming-demise of the "dive-and-drive" methodology of flying a nonprecision approach, I'd argue that (excepting an overhead pattern) every approach is even pretty much the same from the FAF (4-5 miles and 1200-1500 feet) all the way down to touchdown. Even if that point is maneuvered to from a downwind, from an extended base, or a straight-in, it is still the same point in space.

The airplane is doing the same thing, and requires the same flight control inputs, the same throttle settings/AOA/airspeed, and the same control/performance instrument readings. The pilot is seeing the same basic ballpark altitudes, at the same ballpark distances from the threshold, at the same speeds, in the same configurations. In essence, the instrument approaches are the same as a visual approach but simply with some additional training wheels.

So 121 pilots are getting that same repeated "practice" of flying the visual approach as they fly multiple instrument approaches as you observed with the military airplanes beating up the overhead and the radar pattern. Each experience is reinforcing in the pilots' minds the appropriate parameters, even if the specific crosscheck isn't the same (ergo, looking down to reference a flight director, or a LOC/GP needle instead of looking outside to reference the runway itself, PAPIs/VASIs, and other visual references in the runway environment). Now, obviously this different crosscheck is a significant difference when you are flying the approach to minimums and the pilot has absolutely nothing to look at outside, but obviously every approach isn't IMC. When the approach is flown with VMC outside, the pilots are seeing the same visual cues and references that they would if they were flying without any instrument reference.
 
imply saying "it was poor airmanship" is nothing but playing the blame game rather than trying to prevent future accidents.

So you missed the entire part about trying to identify and understand the causal human factors and using that to try and prevent future accidents?

Or is that just my ego talking....trying to show how superior I am, and my belief that those guys were just idiots and a good pilot would never make those mistakes?
 
You will when you get here.

Oh, I promise that I'll be right out here admitting I'm wrong and eating crow if that happens.

In other news, walking is one of the most difficult things to do because we as humans spend so much of our life either laying down in bed or sitting on our cans at work.
 
Thanks, that's about the most cogent explanation that I've heard...but I'm still not buying it completely.

Every time you fly any approach at all, it is still the same basic glidepath from the visual descent point (the standard "300 feet at a mile position) to touchdown. With the seeming-demise of the "dive-and-drive" methodology of flying a nonprecision approach, I'd argue that (excepting an overhead pattern) every approach is even pretty much the same from the FAF (4-5 miles and 1200-1500 feet) all the way down to touchdown. Even if that point is maneuvered to from a downwind, from an extended base, or a straight-in, it is still the same point in space.

The airplane is doing the same thing, and requires the same flight control inputs, the same throttle settings/AOA/airspeed, and the same control/performance instrument readings. The pilot is seeing the same basic ballpark altitudes, at the same ballpark distances from the threshold, at the same speeds, in the same configurations. In essence, the instrument approaches are the same as a visual approach but simply with some additional training wheels.

So 121 pilots are getting that same repeated "practice" of flying the visual approach as they fly multiple instrument approaches as you observed with the military airplanes beating up the overhead and the radar pattern. Each experience is reinforcing in the pilots' minds the appropriate parameters, even if the specific crosscheck isn't the same (ergo, looking down to reference a flight director, or a LOC/GP needle instead of looking outside to reference the runway itself, PAPIs/VASIs, and other visual references in the runway environment). Now, obviously this different crosscheck is a significant difference when you are flying the approach to minimums and the pilot has absolutely nothing to look at outside, but obviously every approach isn't IMC. When the approach is flown with VMC outside, the pilots are seeing the same visual cues and references that they would if they were flying without any instrument reference.
You assume people look outside for their cues. A lot of people just keep using the FD and GS in VMC with little reference to the runway until 200ft or so.
 
I think some of us here are arguing over an inability or ability to fly a visual approach because of the Asiana crash- but in my opinion, the cause wasn't related to if they could/couldn't fly a visual; it was a much simpler failure. They did not look at their airspeed, and if the PM did, he certainly didn't have the confidence to speak up. 30 knots slow on final? I'm taking the facking airplane from you. All either one had to do was say "slow", and the other make the corrective action. [So questions should be directed at PM/PF duties, culture, and scan rather than "stick and rudder".]

While we're talking Airbus/Boeing automations, I think you could also include Air Florida as an automation related crash. They had power available if they just pushed up the throttles (like any hand-flying aviator would do when slow in the climb, apparently). They trusted the EPR setting on the gauge over what the airplane was actually doing.
 
You know how many visual approaches (from a downwind) I've done in the plane that I just hit 1000 hours in? Two. That's it. I've done a whole bunch of "base to final" sorts, but keep in mind too, I'm in an operation that does way more visual flying than almost any other 121 airline out there. We (121) just don't ever practice (in the sim and nobody in 121 is doing in aircraft training now) visual approaches. That's why, when we get them for real, even if we have thousands of hours of 172 time in the pattern to fall back on, it's a much harder maneuver than a straight in ILS, for us.
Hmph! :def:

;)
 
Thanks, that's about the most cogent explanation that I've heard...but I'm still not buying it completely.

Every time you fly any approach at all, it is still the same basic glidepath from the visual descent point (the standard "300 feet at a mile position) to touchdown. With the seeming-demise of the "dive-and-drive" methodology of flying a nonprecision approach, I'd argue that (excepting an overhead pattern) every approach is even pretty much the same from the FAF (4-5 miles and 1200-1500 feet) all the way down to touchdown. Even if that point is maneuvered to from a downwind, from an extended base, or a straight-in, it is still the same point in space.

The airplane is doing the same thing, and requires the same flight control inputs, the same throttle settings/AOA/airspeed, and the same control/performance instrument readings. The pilot is seeing the same basic ballpark altitudes, at the same ballpark distances from the threshold, at the same speeds, in the same configurations. In essence, the instrument approaches are the same as a visual approach but simply with some additional training wheels.

So 121 pilots are getting that same repeated "practice" of flying the visual approach as they fly multiple instrument approaches as you observed with the military airplanes beating up the overhead and the radar pattern. Each experience is reinforcing in the pilots' minds the appropriate parameters, even if the specific crosscheck isn't the same (ergo, looking down to reference a flight director, or a LOC/GP needle instead of looking outside to reference the runway itself, PAPIs/VASIs, and other visual references in the runway environment). Now, obviously this different crosscheck is a significant difference when you are flying the approach to minimums and the pilot has absolutely nothing to look at outside, but obviously every approach isn't IMC. When the approach is flown with VMC outside, the pilots are seeing the same visual cues and references that they would if they were flying without any instrument reference.

I think the confusion may be that when guys are talking about "visual approaches" what they mostly mean are 10,000 feet on the downwind and cleared to land. Every approach (except a 0-0 autoland I guess) is a visual approach at some point but the issues arise when a new guy has to get otuside the profiles that are drilled in to them in the sim (180 downwind, 170 base, 160 and gear after joining up with the final approach course, ref and full flaps at final approach fix) and make their own decisions as far as configuring, airspeed, descent rate (until they get to the straight in part and can use 3-1 or a vasi) and roll rates to get aligned. That is where the issues generally are.
 
How many times have you had to shoot an approach recently? And you are always posting on FB about how the plane couldn't get in or you got CNX because of weather.
(1) I've actually had to do quite a few in the last 2 weeks. I did one today as a matter of fact. It was easier for me to disconnect the autopilot than fingerbang the FGC too on the non-precision we shot.
(2) That was a statistical anomaly the last two-three weeks or so. The FAA issued an FDC NOTAM for Arcata raising the DA 50' and requiring RVR 40 or better due to, I'm told, some new obstacle in the approach area. The sequence went something like "divert, go back, hold, divert again, people on bus and airplane NRFOing to the overnight," followed by "five hour delay, fly up, divert, go back, land" the next day. You know. The #hardproplife.
 
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