AQP?

[Autothrust Blue]

I remember getting out of my last EMB-120 CQ LOE after good old [name removed to protect the guilty, but he's still at the Whiz] was named Captain of that particular fleet and thinking "just what in the (expletive) was all that," which sounds like LOE at the Eskimo as described above, and that's no way to run a railroad.

 

[roundout]

Caveat: If all of that crap is happening on a single line flight, well:

Ultra Low has entered the chat

 

[Autothrust Blue]

Ultra Low has entered the chat

I meaaaaaaaaaan that's when you get to the destination and there's going to be no intention for further aircraft movement, regardless of what your pairing says, too

though that was more an RJ thing in my experience shudder

 

[Richman]

We transitioned to AQP at my regional, and that was back in the 90s fer Pete’s sake. It seemed to be done right, but it was pretty clear they were doing it for the cost savings.

At Great White, various fleets were on it or transitioning to it. Old school 727 FE program was no joke, but my favorite part was the guys teaching it were lamenting that it had been dumbed down since the old days.

Haven’t really seen it done badly. All the programs I’ve been through are well done and you actually learn something…at least during the other-than-0600 sims, where the Xmas light nature of my brain puts me at a disadvantage.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

Eh, I don't think this is the dunk you think it is:

Our LOEs have scenarios that will involve declared emergencies on this Fleet (engine limit/surge/stall, engine failure, center or left as appropriate hydraulic system failure, medical emergency) but they don't "stack" into failures on top of your failures unless you do it to yourself. That stuff sounds like piling on and trying to cram too much into the scenario when other "boxes" should be ticked in other events, NOT all in an LOE. That doesn't sound like an event worth a darn as far as both training and checking.

Caveat: If all of that crap is happening on a single line flight, well:

That last sentence is a cultural problem, incidentally, and those are ridiculously difficult for management/training/standards groups to "fix" via edict, but I could fill a book with thoughts on that at this point.

I'll try and run through it from memory:

One Pack is MEL so the highest you can go is FL250
The FA's medlink comm system is down so you have to use the SATCOM
Apparently they made the scenario harder and you had to use DTMF but that changed by the time I saw it.

Flight is ANC - SEA
There are reports of severe icing between 190-220
Right around YAK someone in the back has a medical issue
I called medlink and this was easy for me since almost every flight out of ANC or FAI has some unhealthy person who tries to die
Medlink determines the PAX is fine, for now.
ATC calls for a route change
FAs call and PAX has gotten much, much worse. Medlink recommends a diversion to JNU as there is a state hospital there.
Divert to JNU, ask FO to slow the aircraft down. He was all gouged up and knew he had to do it anyway.
Program FMC for JNU, call dispatch, call FAs make PA
Set up the RNP for 08 weather and winds are good enough for this best option
Descend through severe icing
Captains PITOT caution light
Captains airspeed fails with associated lights/errors
Autopilot disengages
Memory items for unreliable airspeed
Run several page long checklist for unreliable airspeed/FMC is degraded
Switch to LDA 08 and hand build missed approach into FMC
Additional ATC reroute
Build entire approach again and missed
Approach needs to be flown as a VS/LNAV
Still not done with a checklist, can't remember which one
My FO did a great job but when we broke out at 3000' or so I had to talk him through the landing at JNU, since he's a 6 month guy he'd never seen it IRL. I was pretty busy pointing out the lights through the cut, the cut and giving very explicit instruction to not get too high in the turn to final.
I apologized for micromanaging but he didn't mind it's hard to see the lights for the runway in the sim and the flight through the cut is kind of not what you'd expect to see at a major airline...

At the 3/4 point of this monstrosity I just went into triage mode and I didn't build the approach perfectly the second time but I ran out of F's in my F's jar. So we had to identify one waypoint via DME. I got a bit of feedback about that.

I also skipped a waypoint on a J route. During one of the reroutes because it was just direct anyway. Also got feedback about that.

As always I just sat there and said oh yes mighty instructor I have so much to learn through the debrief. When in reality I probably would have just done what our director of safety did and just continue on to SEA. I actually experienced this out of FAI in real life and Medlink just kept us going to SEA. JNU was looking possible but awful and the captain agreed we probably should divert into there.

Lives of the many vs. the few and all.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

I'll try and run through it from memory:

One Pack is MEL so the highest you can go is FL250
The FA's medlink comm system is down so you have to use the SATCOM
Apparently they made the scenario harder and you had to use DTMF but that changed by the time I saw it.

Flight is ANC - SEA
There are reports of severe icing between 190-220
Right around YAK someone in the back has a medical issue
I called medlink and this was easy for me since almost every flight out of ANC or FAI has some unhealthy person who tries to die
Medlink determines the PAX is fine, for now.
ATC calls for a route change
FAs call and PAX has gotten much, much worse. Medlink recommends a diversion to JNU as there is a state hospital there.
Divert to JNU, ask FO to slow the aircraft down. He was all gouged up and knew he had to do it anyway.
Program FMC for JNU, call dispatch, call FAs make PA
Set up the RNP for 08 weather and winds are good enough for this best option
Descend through severe icing
Captains PITOT caution light
Captains airspeed fails with associated lights/errors
Autopilot disengages
Memory items for unreliable airspeed
Run several page long checklist for unreliable airspeed/FMC is degraded
Switch to LDA 08 and hand build missed approach into FMC
Additional ATC reroute
Build entire approach again and missed
Approach needs to be flown as a VS/LNAV
Still not done with a checklist, can't remember which one
My FO did a great job but when we broke out at 3000' or so I had to talk him through the landing at JNU, since he's a 6 month guy he'd never seen it IRL. I was pretty busy pointing out the lights through the cut, the cut and giving very explicit instruction to not get too high in the turn to final.
I apologized for micromanaging but he didn't mind it's hard to see the lights for the runway in the sim and the flight through the cut is kind of not what you'd expect to see at a major airline...

At the 3/4 point of this monstrosity I just went into triage mode and I didn't build the approach perfectly the second time but I ran out of F's in my F's jar. So we had to identify one waypoint via DME. I got a bit of feedback about that.

I also skipped a waypoint on a J route. During one of the reroutes because it was just direct anyway. Also got feedback about that.

As always I just sat there and said oh yes mighty instructor I have so much to learn through the debrief. When in reality I probably would have just done what our director of safety did and just continue on to SEA. I actually experienced this out of FAI in real life and Medlink just kept us going to SEA. JNU was looking possible but awful and the captain agreed we probably should divert into there.

Lives of the many vs. the few and all.

That actually sounds far worse than the Craig Campbell Special.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

I'll try and run through it from memory:

One Pack is MEL so the highest you can go is FL250
The FA's medlink comm system is down so you have to use the SATCOM
Apparently they made the scenario harder and you had to use DTMF but that changed by the time I saw it.

Flight is ANC - SEA
There are reports of severe icing between 190-220
Right around YAK someone in the back has a medical issue
I called medlink and this was easy for me since almost every flight out of ANC or FAI has some unhealthy person who tries to die
Medlink determines the PAX is fine, for now.
ATC calls for a route change
FAs call and PAX has gotten much, much worse. Medlink recommends a diversion to JNU as there is a state hospital there.
Divert to JNU, ask FO to slow the aircraft down. He was all gouged up and knew he had to do it anyway.
Program FMC for JNU, call dispatch, call FAs make PA
Set up the RNP for 08 weather and winds are good enough for this best option
Descend through severe icing
Captains PITOT caution light
Captains airspeed fails with associated lights/errors
Autopilot disengages
Memory items for unreliable airspeed
Run several page long checklist for unreliable airspeed/FMC is degraded
Switch to LDA 08 and hand build missed approach into FMC
Additional ATC reroute
Build entire approach again and missed
Approach needs to be flown as a VS/LNAV
Still not done with a checklist, can't remember which one
My FO did a great job but when we broke out at 3000' or so I had to talk him through the landing at JNU, since he's a 6 month guy he'd never seen it IRL. I was pretty busy pointing out the lights through the cut, the cut and giving very explicit instruction to not get too high in the turn to final.
I apologized for micromanaging but he didn't mind it's hard to see the lights for the runway in the sim and the flight through the cut is kind of not what you'd expect to see at a major airline...

At the 3/4 point of this monstrosity I just went into triage mode and I didn't build the approach perfectly the second time but I ran out of F's in my F's jar. So we had to identify one waypoint via DME. I got a bit of feedback about that.

I also skipped a waypoint on a J route. During one of the reroutes because it was just direct anyway. Also got feedback about that.

As always I just sat there and said oh yes mighty instructor I have so much to learn through the debrief. When in reality I probably would have just done what our director of safety did and just continue on to SEA. I actually experienced this out of FAI in real life and Medlink just kept us going to SEA. JNU was looking possible but awful and the captain agreed we probably should divert into there.

Lives of the many vs. the few and all.

Already too late to edit but the captain agreed we shouldn't divert into scary JNU when the JAWS was going bonkers.

My bad

 

[word302]

That actually sounds far worse than the Craig Campbell Special.

It was a complete •show. My poor CA had to rebuild that missed 4 times I think due to mis programming the approach and such. I have asked several people in the training department if anyone has read the AQP manual, to which I receive blank stares of enthusiasm.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

I have asked several people in the training department if anyone has read the AQP manual, to which I receive blank stares of enthusiasm.

Sounds…yup…

 

[Roger Roger]

Already too late to edit but the captain agreed we shouldn't divert into scary JNU when the JAWS was going bonkers.

My bad

jeebus Ketchikan has a hospital too and an ILS, and there’s a medevac jet sitting in a hangar down the way.


But what do I know I’m just tryna cooperate and graduate

 

[SurferLucas]

At the red headed stepchild of AAG, in our scenarios you couldn’t get more than one failure of something/no multiple cascading failures like that Eskimo built one.

Hardest CQ scenario we had was ANC-FAI, divert back to ANC…cargo fire on downwind to a CATIII landing, evac on runway. It was incredibly built/planned and felt “real”. I had a LCA as my capt partner, and even he said after “my adrenaline is up there like in the real plane”.

My last year in the Q, we had a choose your own adventure type LOE that was actually really fun.

 

[///AMG]

I'd say our CQ is pretty reminiscent of some of the annual military check rides I've done. Present statistically improbable series of cascading failures, and see if you make a choice within the unrealistic constraints you are placed within. I still remember my last NATOPS check in the legacy Hornet. I don't remember the specific details, but it was like some massive uncontrolled keel bay fire (between the engines) that burned through hyd circuits/actuators, and eventually led to the loss of the flight control computers. At which point my only recourse was to pull the handle. Guy just laughed as only an old guy sim instructor can laugh, and said "I bet I'm starting to piss you off, huh?". Something something about how the fleet was starting to fail in compound ways that there is no procedure written for. Good job not delaying ejection. Real fun hour in the sim

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

It was a complete •show. My poor CA had to rebuild that missed 4 times I think due to mis programming the approach and such. I have asked several people in the training department if anyone has read the AQP manual, to which I receive blank stares of enthusiasm.

I feel like there was another checklist in there or they added another thing for me with a checklist and that's the one I didn't quite finish but I don't remember what it was.

I learned that I should disregard what was forced on me during LOE this year and to stick with slowing down and not getting pushed into a situation where I felt rushed.

It is my opinion that this kind of event during AQP is negative learning and why we are having issues with checklists being read incorrectly or not at all.

 

[Dacuj]

We transitioned to AQP at my regional, and that was back in the 90s fer Pete’s sake. It seemed to be done right, but it was pretty clear they were doing it for the cost savings.

At Great White, various fleets were on it or transitioning to it. Old school 727 FE program was no joke, but my favorite part was the guys teaching it were lamenting that it had been dumbed down since the old days.

Haven’t really seen it done badly. All the programs I’ve been through are well done and you actually learn something…at least during the other-than-0600 sims, where the Xmas light nature of my brain puts me at a disadvantage.

Envoy transitioned to AQP from the standard checkride format and it was nothing short of eye opening. Instead of going the the motions on a checkride, now you actually get one of a myriad of scenarios available to the check airman and get to actually learn something.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

I'd say our CQ is pretty reminiscent of some of the annual military check rides I've done. Present statistically improbable series of cascading failures, and see if you make a choice within the unrealistic constraints you are placed within. I still remember my last NATOPS check in the legacy Hornet. I don't remember the specific details, but it was like some massive uncontrolled keel bay fire (between the engines) that burned through hyd circuits/actuators, and eventually led to the loss of the flight control computers. At which point my only recourse was to pull the handle. Guy just laughed as only an old guy sim instructor can laugh, and said "I bet I'm starting to piss you off, huh?". Something something about how the fleet was starting to fail in compound ways that there is no procedure written for. Good job not delaying ejection. Real fun hour in the sim

Our training department is nearly all McChord mafia. The instructor conducting the LOE was wearing one of those GI Joe lanyards. Retired Navy I'm pretty sure, because of course he brought it up. I mean thank you for your service and all but FFS can I learn something other than how amazing our instructors are when I go to training?

Honestly I wish they would take any financial or schedule incentive away so those guys find some other way to puff their chests out. Hopefully when the 787 fences come down they will all go there and create international incidents I can read about on the news. I'd happily go work at the training center and try to teach my FOs how to do a go around on 16R when the altitude selector is set to 2000 we are at 3000 and we get a go around due to traffic with instructions to turn right heading 250 and maintain 4000. Because that's the biggest issue I notice on the line.

 

[word302]

I feel like there was another checklist in there or they added another thing for me with a checklist and that's the one I didn't quite finish but I don't remember what it was.

I learned that I should disregard what was forced on me during LOE this year and to stick with slowing down and not getting pushed into a situation where I felt rushed.

It is my opinion that this kind of event during AQP is negative learning and why we are having issues with checklists being read incorrectly or not at all.

Don't get me started on driving you to divert to specific airport to perform a specific approach. And here I thought LOEs were supposed to be about decision-making. Silly me.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

Don't get me started on driving you to divert to specific airport to perform a specific approach. And here I thought LOEs were supposed to be about decision-making. Silly me.

I think that's why the 250 MEL was added. Someone just said nope and continued to SEA.

A few years ago there was an equally stupid LOFT where we diverted to SBA lol. Absolutely not in real life. But yeah ok I'll play along if you let me go home and keep getting paid.

 

[word302]

Our training department is nearly all McChord mafia. The instructor conducting the LOE was wearing one of those GI Joe lanyards. Retired Navy I'm pretty sure, because of course he brought it up. I mean thank you for your service and all but FFS can I learn something other than how amazing our instructors are when I go to training?

Honestly I wish they would take any financial or schedule incentive away so those guys find some other way to puff their chests out. Hopefully when the 787 fences come down they will all go there and create international incidents I can read about on the news. I'd happily go work at the training center and try to teach my FOs how to do a go around on 16R when the altitude selector is set to 2000 we are at 3000 and we get a go around due to traffic with instructions to turn right heading 250 and maintain 4000. Because that's the biggest issue I notice on the line.

Eh, I think that used to be the case. There's a ton of new blood in there but the system is definitely broken. The problem is most of these guys have never seen a properly run AQP program so they have no idea how silly our scenarios are.

 

[BEEF SUPREME]

Eh, I think that used to be the case. There's a ton of new blood in there but the system is definitely broken. The problem is most of these guys have never seen a properly run AQP program so they have no idea how silly our scenarios are.

Pretty sure I've never taken an LOE from someone who wasn't former military.

 

[roundout]

I'll try and run through it from memory:

One Pack is MEL so the highest you can go is FL250
The FA's medlink comm system is down so you have to use the SATCOM
Apparently they made the scenario harder and you had to use DTMF but that changed by the time I saw it.

Flight is ANC - SEA
There are reports of severe icing between 190-220
Right around YAK someone in the back has a medical issue
I called medlink and this was easy for me since almost every flight out of ANC or FAI has some unhealthy person who tries to die
Medlink determines the PAX is fine, for now.
ATC calls for a route change
FAs call and PAX has gotten much, much worse. Medlink recommends a diversion to JNU as there is a state hospital there.
Divert to JNU, ask FO to slow the aircraft down. He was all gouged up and knew he had to do it anyway.
Program FMC for JNU, call dispatch, call FAs make PA
Set up the RNP for 08 weather and winds are good enough for this best option
Descend through severe icing
Captains PITOT caution light
Captains airspeed fails with associated lights/errors
Autopilot disengages
Memory items for unreliable airspeed
Run several page long checklist for unreliable airspeed/FMC is degraded
Switch to LDA 08 and hand build missed approach into FMC
Additional ATC reroute
Build entire approach again and missed
Approach needs to be flown as a VS/LNAV
Still not done with a checklist, can't remember which one
My FO did a great job but when we broke out at 3000' or so I had to talk him through the landing at JNU, since he's a 6 month guy he'd never seen it IRL. I was pretty busy pointing out the lights through the cut, the cut and giving very explicit instruction to not get too high in the turn to final.
I apologized for micromanaging but he didn't mind it's hard to see the lights for the runway in the sim and the flight through the cut is kind of not what you'd expect to see at a major airline...

At the 3/4 point of this monstrosity I just went into triage mode and I didn't build the approach perfectly the second time but I ran out of F's in my F's jar. So we had to identify one waypoint via DME. I got a bit of feedback about that.

I also skipped a waypoint on a J route. During one of the reroutes because it was just direct anyway. Also got feedback about that.

As always I just sat there and said oh yes mighty instructor I have so much to learn through the debrief. When in reality I probably would have just done what our director of safety did and just continue on to SEA. I actually experienced this out of FAI in real life and Medlink just kept us going to SEA. JNU was looking possible but awful and the captain agreed we probably should divert into there.

Lives of the many vs. the few and all.

That's just dumb.