ASpilot2be
Qbicle seat warmer
Toughest thing I have ever done.Some of y'all have never had a V2 cut in a plane with a big ass critical engine, and it shows
AQP?
- Thread starter USMCmech
- Start date
BEEF SUPREME
Well-Known Member
I just got through this years CQ and I'm no longer wondering why a crew shut down an engine because they rushed through a checklist.
It's because they were trained by the training department to do exactly just that.
SurferLucas
Southern Gentleman
I was comparing my first CQ at SJI to a friend that doing her first AS CQ after upgrade…holy balls is that unnecessary and borderline cruel,
BEEF SUPREME
Well-Known Member
Apparently there is some 70 something year old retiree who makes up the scenarios. It makes a lot of sense because it's a fairly predictable theme every year. They come up with a convoluted reason to take away automation and dive deep into multi page checklists.
For the FO it wasn't really that bad. They just had to hand fly a lot. My FO was a 6th month guy and he did great. I asked him to slow down and he was very helpful catching my many mistakes not just on the last day but on all the days lol.
The captain's side was quite different:
The captain's side is all about compressed time decision making. That was my real ehem beef with the negative learning. We had more than one crew shut down an engine because of a suspected fuel leak, during the last couple of years. One of the incidents was apparently pretty bad and the checklist was rushed.
So it totally makes sense to rush me through a bunch of checklists to get a passenger in medical distress on the ground right?
I also don't understand how the training department views the pilot group as so stupid and isolated from the rest of the industry. They must realize we have friends at other airlines who don't have 4, 5, 6 or even 7 things go wrong on a LOE? My friends at United get a pretty simple scenario that generally involves not rushing, being thorough and making good decision making. Positive learning. An ANC-SEA that diverts to JNU for a medical emergency is pretty bad enough. Let's just run that and see what happens. Add in a failed airspeed and 2 MELs oh yeah and severe icing, route changes, hand built missed approaches this list goes on. I'm probably forgetting something else because it was so entirely stupid.
It is no wonder why we have so many issues with rushing on the line and things like skipped checklists and taking off unpressurized for example.
SurferLucas
Southern Gentleman
Fully agreed.
At QX, we built the “spot training” and LOE off of the FOQA/ASAP trends.
SJI…the LOE was SEA-PDX, MEL on the air con system, and return to field out of 12,000ft with a medical. However, we get a computer chosen scenario, so you could get a cargo fire/engine failure too.
BEEF SUPREME
Well-Known Member
They did an A) or B) style event a couple of years ago. That was fine. I find the check airmen get bored at the end of the year and change things up so I try not to get too gouged up anyway.
I can not wait for all the Mcchord Mafia to flock to the 787 or whatever happens in the future. Maybe the 737 training will actually be a learning event and not just a helmet fire that involves kissing the instructors ass.
I can not wait for all the Mcchord Mafia to flock to the 787 or whatever happens in the future. Maybe the 737 training will actually be a learning event and not just a helmet fire that involves kissing the instructors ass.
scooter2525
Very well Member
Source force course.
Probably because somebody, 15 or 20 years ago -when all the automated doop-dee-doops entered cockpits- had faith (strongly, but incorrectly suspected) that within about 2 years of the doop-dee-doop installations, the FAA would require that doop-dee-doop monitoring systems would be required to be installed to automatically monitor the automatic monitors. But, yeah, that didn't happen. Everything else built upon that faith -like reduced training standards- did happen. So, you know, 'Saul good, Man!
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ClearedForOption
Psychiatric Help 5¢
We do... but that's because in the 121 world it's chemical oxygen generators that supply the passenger needs in case of depressurization. So, instead of the "stump the chump" knowledge game, the focus in that situation would be "pilot stuff" - ensuring that you have an escape plan in high terrain to get down to a safe altitude and then get on the ground. That's the discussion to have in the schoolhouse.
What was this thread about again... AQP? So, here's the scenario... the ground portion of the training is focused on depressurization and associated regulatory material. Like that O2 number above... and what your plane does in that situation. Memory items, etc. etc. Also, high altitude ops, etc. etc. Then, you can have a training flight where you don the mask and practice an event - seeing in the real world that it's gonna be a real PITA to figure out stuff with the face-hugger doing it's thing... so, what do you take out of it... have a plan. Be prepared to execute it. And you've seen in the training environment some of the pitfalls of performing an rapid decompression over the Rockies for instance.
Why is AQP great? Because it can take the jeopardy out of these scenarios. The "checkride" (i.e. LOFT) can be a normal flight with a non-normal situation driven by safety-based ASAP/LOSA or whatever data. Then, knowing that you aren't playing 'You Bet Your Certificate' - you do some actual training. And everyone benefits. We all get to be better and safer airmen. You get to do things in a time-compressed environment that aren't just about checking boxes, you can actually learn something.
Richman
JC’s Resident Curmudgeon
And always lots of them.
Screaming_Emu
Joe Conventional
Uh…I think the point of the training is for you to learn NOT to rush and prioritize tasks. Sounds like you need to do it again.
BEEF SUPREME
Well-Known Member
Yeah not shocked you made it about me. I could break down the scenario for you and break down how it is negative training. But you have a history of just being a jerk about it and making it about me. Why bother?
Everyone I have discussed this with on the line agrees. Also the airlines issues on the line are reflective of it.
But yeah I need to take the training I passed again, because you know some guy on the internet who constantly makes things about me.
Sounds good.
Yeah no, our LOEs are a train wreck.
Screaming_Emu
Joe Conventional
Don’t flatter yourself, princess.
BEEF SUPREME
Well-Known Member
Oh no it's clearly all me. According to someone who has absolutely *zero post history* claiming I'm the problem during situations when I'm clearly not the problem. The laughable part about it is that he says this when he has zero knowledge on the actual issues at hand. He's by far the smartest man in the room.
Cherokee_Cruiser
Bronteroc
That's a crew error. Can't *read* how to properly do the checklist.
Virtual airline comments below, not any real airline................
Imagine a pressurization controller issue. Reading virtual ASAP reports, it is clear the CA ran the QRH in a numerical order, like #1 through #15. For example: Why did you go to step 8 when it tells you to go to step 12? You don't do #9-11 if the step 8 answer if no. That's one of the common screw ups. This also "aided" in shutting down the engine for a suspected fuel leak. Quite a few people don't know how to run decision trees in the QRH. And SKIP the steps that don't apply. And when you get to bold squares, that means END OF THE QRH PROCEDURE. You don't go right below that and continue reading.
As for fuel itself, there is one simple common sense way to observe TOTAL fuel burn.
Observe fuel burn rate. Lets say it's 2.9 on both sides. Per hour that's 5.8 or 5800 lbs.
6 minutes is 1/10th of an hour. 6 / 60 = .1
So 10% of 5800 is 580 lbs of fuel.
Run the clock for 6 minutes. Look at TOTAL fuel only before then. Then look at TOTAL fuel after 6 minutes. Your burn should have been 580 (600 rounded) lbs.
Do this technique and you will not misdiagnose a fuel condition.
Too many people (including those who shut down the engine) looked only at one fuel tank and saw an imbalance increasing and thought that meant a leak. They ignored - or didn't look at - total fuel. Newsflash, if you have the crossfeed open, ANY one pump that has a higher output pressure will suck more fuel than the others and result in an imbalance of right tank vs left tank.
Cherokee_Cruiser
Bronteroc
Well be honest too.
Again, my comments are about a virtual airline on Microsoft Flight Simulator. No matter how hard a LOE is in Flight Simulator 2002, lets not pretend that you don't get some gouge of how the checkride will be in Flight Simulator 2002. There's enough flight simmers in the online community who have gone through it, and there are documents available that spread like wildfire, that tells you about checkrides in Flight Simulator 2002. So no one playing Flight Sim 2002 can ever be surprised at what they face in Microsoft Flight Simulator.
Autothrust Blue
"Well, on the Brasilia..."
"CHECK FEATHER" (but you already know as PF)Some of y'all have never had a V2 cut in a plane with a big ass critical engine, and it shows
Autothrust Blue
"Well, on the Brasilia..."
Eh, I don't think this is the dunk you think it is:
Our LOEs have scenarios that will involve declared emergencies on this Fleet (engine limit/surge/stall, engine failure, center or left as appropriate hydraulic system failure, medical emergency) but they don't "stack" into failures on top of your failures unless you do it to yourself. That stuff sounds like piling on and trying to cram too much into the scenario when other "boxes" should be ticked in other events, NOT all in an LOE. That doesn't sound like an event worth a darn as far as both training and checking.
Caveat: If all of that crap is happening on a single line flight, well:
That last sentence is a cultural problem, incidentally, and those are ridiculously difficult for management/training/standards groups to "fix" via edict, but I could fill a book with thoughts on that at this point.
