Seriously people, it isn't that hard

Oh, look: more pilots that it can't happen to.

For anyone who has this thought that (about this, or any other error in judgment or airmanship), ask yourself about the experience and professionalism of all of the people this is happened to in the past.

Then think of the incredible arrogance and lack of self-awareness to say that you are incapable of making the same mistake.

Fate is the hunter, fellas. Stay frosty.
All true, but it gets kind of annoying hearing people go completely the other direction and embrace an almost fatalistic view of it. Similar to discussions about landing gear up. In both cases yes, the error chains that lead to it CAN happen to anyone, but on the other hand if proper procedures are always followed both are absolutely 100% preventable. Thousands of pilots go entire careers without doing either, and not all of it (in fact a very very small part of it for most of them) is luck/fate/whatever. Resignation is a hazardous attitude too.
 
I've flown into RAP multiple times several years ago as an operator based there who ATC was obviously familiar with and still every morning was the same:
"Tiredassfreightpilot has the field in sight."
"Tiredassfreightpilot, verify you have both Rapid and Ellsworth in sight."
Only once you acknowledged both would they clear you for the visual. Did it with every aircraft I ever heard, including military airplanes going into Ellsworth.

I'm wondering if that's still common practice. If it wasn't, I'm guessing it is again.
 
Complacency. It is a FAR requirement for 121 ops to use a navigational aid as backup. Because it's a FAR, it's in every airlines SOP/FOM. It's also a FAR to be fit for duty. And with 117 it's not "am I fit now?" it's "will I be fit during flight?" So the fatigued and didn't know it is out the window.

(In no way am I saying the crew wasn't fatigued. I know absolutely zero, zilch, none, nada, nein about the circumstances here. More of a "what leg do you have to stand on?" with the company/FAA?)

Also, if this is the case, and you can point to a reg, how was everyone doing visuals into ABQ when 8 was closed?
 
I worked with a few folks that worked at SLC Tracon some years ago , they had some management problems and quite an unhappy work force due to it !!!!!!!!!!!!
 
Also, if this is the case, and you can point to a reg, how was everyone doing visuals into ABQ when 8 was closed?
Where I work all runways have a vis approach in the box. Just puts an automatic 5 mile fix from the end of the runway. The pilot can change that final to whatever they desire. But usually the 5 mile fix and putting an altitude 1,500' HAT works like a charm. And that satisfied backing it up.

And maybe you're right. Maybe it isn't required as @SpiceWeasel pointed out. Don't have my manual in front of me and I really don't care to go find it right now.

I know perfection is impossible. I've screwed up a few times in this career. I know I'm not infallible. It just gets annoying when someone asks "how does this happen, it's not that hard" then people jump on here saying "it's really easy. It can happen to you. It can happen to anyone. You think you're so great? What about the ones who have done it? Were they not great?"

It obviously isn't THAT easy to land at the wrong airport in 121 ops as we don't hear about it that much. Maybe a handful in the last year or two. Out of 10s of thousands of flights a day.
 
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Also, if this is the case, and you can point to a reg, how was everyone doing visuals into ABQ when 8 was closed?

There are 121 manuals that have it because of this situation, and 121 FOM's that will. With how much flying 121 pilots do, it's just a matter of time. About every 3-5months, we hear about it. I just hope and pray it's never me.

Edit: If no approach is available, you back it up with the FMS visual.
 
It obviously isn't THAT easy to land at the wrong airport in 121 ops as we don't hear about it that much. Maybe a handful in the last year or two. Out of 10s of thousands of flights a day.

Hell, it doesn't even happen that often in 91/135 or any other ops. While no one is infallible sure, it does take certain circumstances for this to occur....Wx, inattention, seeing what one expects to see, not cross checking, multiple runways, parallel airports, or any other host of or combo of issues.
 
All true, but it gets kind of annoying hearing people go completely the other direction and embrace an almost fatalistic view of it. Similar to discussions about landing gear up. In both cases yes, the error chains that lead to it CAN happen to anyone, but on the other hand if proper procedures are always followed both are absolutely 100% preventable. Thousands of pilots go entire careers without doing either, and not all of it (in fact a very very small part of it for most of them) is luck/fate/whatever. Resignation is a hazardous attitude too.

There is an enormous difference between saying "this could happen to me" and "this will happen to me."

Both statements are likely better than what I was criticizing, which is saying "this can't happen to me"
 
I've flown into RAP multiple times several years ago as an operator based there who ATC was obviously familiar with and still every morning was the same:
"Tiredassfreightpilot has the field in sight."
"Tiredassfreightpilot, verify you have both Rapid and Ellsworth in sight."
Only once you acknowledged both would they clear you for the visual. Did it with every aircraft I ever heard, including military airplanes going into Ellsworth.

I'm wondering if that's still common practice. If it wasn't, I'm guessing it is again.

Flown in there several times this year and they never asked me to report both.
 
It's required for ATC to point out both airports if there is likely to be confusion. There is no such requirement if the pilot takes the initiative to report the airport before ATC calls it out, but many will still clarify because they've seen how quickly it can go badly.

Of course, just because it's a rule doesn't mean it gets followed.
 
It's required for ATC to point out both airports if there is likely to be confusion. There is no such requirement if the pilot takes the initiative to report the airport before ATC calls it out, but many will still clarify because they've seen how quickly it can go badly.

Of course, just because it's a rule doesn't mean it gets followed.

U90 does the same with TUS/DMA, even though they're about 5 miles apart. Yet they still get mistaken. DMA will generally leave their runway lights off after nornal ops hours, only bringing them on, on request, or for a scramble.
 
It's required for ATC to point out both airports if there is likely to be confusion. There is no such requirement if the pilot takes the initiative to report the airport before ATC calls it out, but many will still clarify because they've seen how quickly it can go badly.

Of course, just because it's a rule doesn't mean it gets followed.

In this instance ATC did point out both airports. That one in Tampa/MacDill they didn't though
 
It's required for ATC to point out both airports if there is likely to be confusion. There is no such requirement if the pilot takes the initiative to report the airport before ATC calls it out, but many will still clarify because they've seen how quickly it can go badly.

Of course, just because it's a rule doesn't mean it gets followed.

It could be that by the second or third time I went in I was familiar enough that I was self-reporting.
 
Meh. I'd argue against that. It's really hard, in fact impossible, to land at the wrong airport following company and FAR requirements.

It becomes easy to do when one becomes complacent. And yes, it can be really easy to become complacent. Is that what you're referring to? The complacency?

What about when you aren't cognitively at 100%? (Long day, etc.) It isn't only complacency you have to guard against.
 
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