WSJ Article on UPS BHM Crash

TallFlyer

Well-Known Member
Copied and pasted from another board, and it's some interesting reading:

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By ANDY PASZTOR CONNECT
Oct. 10, 2013 8:02 p.m. ET

The cockpit recorder had captured the crew discussing fatigue.
The captain of a United Parcel Service Inc. cargo plane that crashed in August took an unusually long time getting promoted to captain and had complained he was fatigued before the fatal accident, according to people familiar with details of the probe.

Preliminary findings from the Birmingham, Ala., crash, which haven't been reported before, are expected to spark debate about the relative safety of cargo carriers versus passenger airlines. The last fatal crash of a U.S. passenger plane occurred almost five years ago, while six cargo pilots have died since then in three separate accidents involving scheduled U.S. jet freighters.

The National Transportation Safety Board's investigation of the Airbus A300 accident also is likely to prompt renewed attention to differences in federal oversight, including supervision of pilot-training programs and a FAA decision in 2011 exempting freighters from stringent new pilot-rest requirements slated to kick in at the end of this year.

The 58-year-old UPS captain, Cerea Beal , had more than 6,000 hours flying experience with UPS, about one-quarter of it as captain on the widebody A300. A former Marine Corps helicopter pilot who started working for the carrier in 1990, he had remained a co-pilot for about 19 years, an unusually long time, which people familiar with his training record attributed to difficulties during some simulator sessions.

He was promoted to captain four years ago, and a UPS spokesman said there is "no record of him failing" a test to be upgraded to captain. "He was fully qualified, held appropriate FAA operating and medical certificates, and was legal to fly," UPS said.

The cockpit-voice recorder on UPS Flight 1354, the people familiar with the probe said, captured Capt. Beal and his 37-year-old first officer, Shanda Fanning , discussing how tired they were—and how fatiguing they felt UPS overnight schedules could be—before their predawn approach to Birmingham.

The UPS spokesman said "we strongly object to any assertions that UPS crew scheduling was not compliant with FAA rules or was a factor in this accident."

With all of the plane's systems apparently working properly and Capt. Beal at the controls, the A300 arriving from Louisville slammed into a hill less than a mile short of the runway, killing both pilots. The NTSB hasn't officially determined the cause, but investigators previously said they uncovered no problems with engines or other onboard systems.

The crash raises broader issues related to what many safety experts describe as excessive reliance on automation by many jetliner pilots. The safety board, which is expected to hold a public hearing on the crash next year, has indicated it wants to determine whether UPS training and cockpit procedures may have contributed to complacency by the crew.

In August, safety board member Robert Sumwalt said investigators planned to examine UPS instructions to pilots about how to fly such approaches and "look to see if there are wider systemic issues that need to be addressed."

An NTSB spokeswoman wasn't available for comment.

The jet's autopilot and automated speed-control system were turned on and programmed to provide a steady descent during the non-precision approach. The runway wasn't equipped with a full-blown instrument landing system capable of bringing a plane in on a specific path, or glide slope, and the crew failed to recognize the plane's trajectory was taking it short of the strip, according to the NTSB.

The autopilot remained on until the last few seconds before the jet clipped a power line, hit some trees and erupted in a fireball. Safety experts said such non-precision approaches can be tricky, particularly at night when it may hard to spot terrain around the airport.

With the airport's system of landing lights illuminated to help the pilots stay on the correct descent path, "they should have had lots of visual warnings that the plane was way too low," according to Bill Waldock , a professor at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. "There was plenty of time to see" the problem and adjust the flight path, he added.

Investigators have said they want to determine if fatigue may have impeded cockpit reactions. The flight into Birmingham was the end of the second day of a four-day trip for the crew. The pilots were scheduled to report for duty at around 10 p.m. for a nearly nine-hour work period.

Safety experts have said such overnight hours, often referred to as backside-of-the-clock flying, pose particularly serious fatigue hazards. One issue is whether pilots are able to get adequate sleep when their rest periods are scheduled during the day.

The FAA's new pilot-rest regulations, among other things, require passenger carriers to adjust crew schedules to reflect the rigors of overnight flying, and mandate setting up formal fatigue-risk management systems. In announcing the tougher rules at the end of 2011, FAA officials unsuccessfully urged cargo operators to voluntarily adopt the same scheduling limits as passenger carriers.

Seconds before the Birmingham accident, according to investigators, the pilots received an automated alert from an onboard collision-avoidance system, warning them the plane was sinking dangerously quickly.

On Thursday, UPS said it trains pilots "how to manage automation and provides opportunities and training to demonstrate proficiency in a non-automated environment." The carrier declined to discuss whether it has changed training procedures.

Write to Andy Pasztor at andy.pasztor@wsj.com
 
There was one of the guys investigating this on the jumpseat the other day. He unofficially said this was more a CRM trainwreck than anything else. Basically they get left a few hundred feet high to start the approach. VNAV doesn't capture and he comes unglued. Hits vertical speed mode and flys it into the ground all while yelling about how the plane isn't doing what he wants it to. FO never said anything. If this is true, what a shame. UPS evidently sets missed approach altitude instead of minimums for VNAV approaches. If they would have set minimums then the plane would have leveled off instead of going into the ground.
 
There was one of the guys investigating this on the jumpseat the other day. He unofficially said this was more a CRM trainwreck than anything else. Basically they get left a few hundred feet high to start the approach. VNAV doesn't capture and he comes unglued. Hits vertical speed mode and flys it into the ground all while yelling about how the plane isn't doing what he wants it to. FO never said anything. If this is true, what a shame. UPS evidently sets missed approach altitude instead of minimums for VNAV approaches. If they would have set minimums then the plane would have leveled off instead of going into the ground.

We set missed approach altitude also, for a few reasons (and the A300 may have some similar reasons):

First, we have no VNAV, so, well, we have no VNAV. We're in VS mode when doing non-precision approaches.

Second, and because of the vertical mode that we fly our non-precision approaches in, we don't want the thing to capture the DDA on a non-precision because we fly CANPA's now, and if we get to the DDA, we're going missed. If you're doing dive and drive it makes sense.

Third, with all this being said, if you're not Johnny on the spot with a missed approach at DDA, there's nothing to save you from hitting the ground except being a pilot and not hitting the ground.

Did this guy say if the captain was a known quantity as far as CRM goes?
 
There was one of the guys investigating this on the jumpseat the other day. He unofficially said this was more a CRM trainwreck than anything else. Basically they get left a few hundred feet high to start the approach. VNAV doesn't capture and he comes unglued. Hits vertical speed mode and flys it into the ground all while yelling about how the plane isn't doing what he wants it to. FO never said anything. If this is true, what a shame. UPS evidently sets missed approach altitude instead of minimums for VNAV approaches. If they would have set minimums then the plane would have leveled off instead of going into the ground.
Maybe it would have, and maybe it wouldn't have.

I have yet to see an autopilot that performs as designed 100% of the time.
 
Do we have a matter of pilot fatigue or a matter of over reliance on automation? Or both? If the captains training record shows deficiencies, does that imply he failed upgrade training numerous times?

@Pilotdude3407 a CRM trainwreck because an FO did not speak up?
 
It sounds from me like the author of the article is trying to place the blame on the pilot by inferring that a long upgrade to CA meant he was a lackluster pilot... Just my .02 but I would take these kind of articles with a grain of salt until the official report is released.
 
Also... And this is just my observation from my limited experience with night flying ops... My current trip has had me on a midnight to 6am schedule for about 2 weeks straight. I couldn't imagine doing this kind of a thing for a career. That kind of flying can leave someone chronically fatigued which I think might have played a bigger part in this than UPS wants to admit. Bottom line, UPS will try everything in its power to put this on the pilots and not the operation for the sake of saving money. They don't want to have to hire more pilots if the FAA decides they are no longer exempt from the new rest rules affecting 121 ops.
 
It sounds from me like the author of the article is trying to place the blame on the pilot by inferring that a long upgrade to CA meant he was a lackluster pilot... Just my .02 but I would take these kind of articles with a grain of salt until the official report is released.

We all know there are about as many reasons for not bidding Captain as there are FOs eligible for upgrade. The least common of which is probably lack of skill.

But, you know, have to find something, somewhere....

Sent from my DROID X2 using Tapatalk 2
 
How does UPS run their night rotations? ie, do pilots switch between day/night schedules every trip, or do they get a month of night then a month of day, etc?

We had a LOT of issues with this at my deployed squadron- consistently flipping between day/night missions (like...every 24 hours you'd flip) and the crews were swearing that nothing would change until someone drove one in. Eventually we got the squadron to do 1 month day/night rotations, and it made everyone's life easier.
 
I get really agitated about this fatigue topic. How on earth could the FAA possibly sign off on the fact that the current fatigue rules aren't good enough for 121 pax, but just fine for cargo, the segment of the industry that has the toughest flying sked by far. It's a level of corruption and backscratching that seriously rivals some third world countries.
 
I get really agitated about this fatigue topic. How on earth could the FAA possibly sign off on the fact that the current fatigue rules aren't good enough for 121 pax, but just fine for cargo, the segment of the industry that has the toughest flying sked by far. It's a level of corruption and backscratching that seriously rivals some third world countries.
Politics in action. UPS PAC is very powerful, having contributed over $4.2 million to campaigns in 2012.

That said, I have little doubt that UPS was in compliance with the FAA and union contract.
 
We have some 24 hour layovers, especially the international stuff. It can be day flying or night flying, but a 24 hour layover is terrible and fatigue inducing for many. People that can fall asleep easy whenever they want to can deal with those best. The problem is you sleep right when you hit the hotel. Get up. Screw around for 12 hours, and right when your body is ready to sleep again you are out to do a full nights flying. Sometimes a shorter layover is better.

What I have a hard time with, and there is a lot of this in the ONT domicle, is an early morning show to go to SDF, 12 hours off, and then an early morning show back to the west coast. You show in ONT at like 445 am, which means I gotta get up at 330am. Then you get to the SDF hotel about 2pm eastern time. You are expected to drop and get good sleep during the afternoon when you body doesn't want to sleep. Then you show at 2am to fly a two legger back to the west coast. I find those brutal.

There is some domestic day flying but it goes very senior. I'd guess maybe 25% of the flying is like that. They try not to mix day/night but you find some of it on the junior lines.

With our domestic flying, part 117 isn't a big player as our contract is more restrictive. It may have an impact on reserve staffing, I don't know that much about it. There was more part 117 impact on the international flying, especially with the multi-leg intra Europe and intra Asia stuff.

Personally, I really like that idea that transportation to the hotel won't count as rest and the ability to string out a duty period due to contingencies would be limited under the new rules....which don't apply to us....
 
We have some 24 hour layovers, especially the international stuff. It can be day flying or night flying, but a 24 hour layover is terrible and fatigue inducing for many. People that can fall asleep easy whenever they want to can deal with those best. The problem is you sleep right when you hit the hotel. Get up. Screw around for 12 hours, and right when your body is ready to sleep again you are out to do a full nights flying. Sometimes a shorter layover is better.

I agree, 18 or 36 hour layovers are much, much better than a 24. I recently did a 24 hour SYD, getting in at 2200L, departing the next night at 2200L for an 11 hour leg back to NRT. Tough to stay up all night, and even if you do manage to do it, your body wants to wake up on a day schedule. No real good way to do a 24.
 
Maybe it would have, and maybe it wouldn't have.

I have yet to see an autopilot that performs as designed 100% of the time.

Never seen one not do exactly what it's told to do, even if it is sloppy. Most of the time, when it does something funny, it's user error, and I make a lot.of those. It usually turns into "*bleep bleep bleep* That's me. Set *x* in the AP and re-connect it please."
 
Never seen one not do exactly what it's told to do, even if it is sloppy. Most of the time, when it does something funny, it's user error, and I make a lot.of those. It usually turns into "*bleep bleep bleep* That's me. Set *x* in the AP and re-connect it please."
Lucky you!

And yes, we tend to do it to ourselves plenty as well.
 
Lucky you!

And yes, we tend to do it to ourselves plenty as well.

You missed my point. It will always do what's it's told. Unless it's broken, then, it shouldn't be told to do anything. If it's not doing what it's told, write it up. If it's doing something funny, write it up.
 
It sounds from me like the author of the article is trying to place the blame on the pilot by inferring that a long upgrade to CA meant he was a lackluster pilot... Just my .02 but I would take these kind of articles with a grain of salt until the official report is released.
The second I read that, I just rolled my eyes and skimmed through quickly. I don't know how these editors allow "facts" like that to be published. All it does is create confusion to those who know nothing about flying and the various QOL reasons one may choose not to upgrade and make them look unreliable to those who know the statements are foolish. Honestly, one of the biggest reasons I don't trust most US news media is because I assume all their articles about stuff I don't understand must be dumb as the avation ones.
 
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