That was Bill Kershner's thoughts. He ran a school that specialized in spin training, wrote flight training and spin books, yet was against further spin requirements. His logic was that requiring more spin training would force pilots to take spin training from instructors who were not qualified to teach spins which would probably result I more stall/spin accidents than would be prevented by the training. Not sure if this would be the case, but it is worth investigating before calling the government action. Often such calls appeal to emotions but the actions taken by the government do more harm overall than good.
If you're interested, you won't have to go very far in a search to find that the FAA investigated it
before removing the spin training requirement that existed years ago. The stated reason for the removal was the number of stall/spin accidents that occurred during training.
It's old enough that it's no longer available from the government publication website, but this is from the 1991 rule revision that re-introduced spin training as a CFI requirement:
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NPRM No. 89-14 included three proposals regarding stall/spin training for pilots and stall/spin training and testing for flight instructors of airplanes and gliders. The spin, a controlled or uncontrolled maneuver or performance in which the glider or airplane descends in a helical path while flying at an angle of attack greater than the angle of maximum lift, was a required training maneuver for pilot certification until 1949. It was deleted from the pilot certification requirements based on the high number of fatal stall and spin accidents, most of which occurred during training. The FAA has since placed greater emphasis on spin avoidance, particularly on training in the avoidance of unintentional stalls or unwanted unusual attitudes. This shift in training requirements resulted in a significant decrease in the number of stall/spin accidents since 1949. NTSB statistics indicate that stall/spin accidents fell from 48 percent of fatal general aviation accidents during the period 1945-48, to 22 percent during 1967-69, and to 12 or 13 percent in the 1970's. The stall/spin proposals in NPRM No. 89-14 constitute an effort to further reduce the already declining incidence of spin-related accidents in general aviation. The amendments contained in this rule will broaden stall and spin awareness training by emphasizing avoidance of unintentional stalls in addition to what is currently the more common procedure of practicing recovery from intentional stalls.
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Stall awareness training is effective. After the United States dropped the spin training requirement in June 1949 in favor of increased stall training, stall/spin accidents dropped dramatically. Although other factors such as improved stall warning devices undoubtedly contributed to this decrease, several studies indicate that the revised training approach was a main factor in reducing stall/spin accidents. In the 4 year period from 1945 to 1948, stall/spin accidents accounted for 48 percent of all fatal accidents. This proportion dropped to 27 percent from 1965 to 1968. The NTSB conducted a study of the period from 1967 to 1969, and found that stall/spin accidents caused 22 percent of all "fatal occurrences." That study, the Special Study General Aviation Stall/Spin Accidents, 1967 - 1969 (National Transportation Safety Board AAS-72-8, September 13, 1972), examined the 1,261 stall/spin accidents recorded for the period and noted that, while they accounted for only 8 percent of the total number of accidents, they caused 23 percent of the fatalities or serious injuries.
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