System knowledge
- Thread starter seagull
- Start date
Flyinthrew
Well-Known Member
Outstanding.
I fly a complicated airplane with one engine, little automation, and poor reliability on nearly every system and I absolutely get what you're saying. Next time I see someone (never on this site, but others for sure) immaturely wanking about not needing to learn aircraft systems and being level 10 recalcitrant about it, I'm going to send them to your link.
I fly a complicated airplane with one engine, little automation, and poor reliability on nearly every system and I absolutely get what you're saying. Next time I see someone (never on this site, but others for sure) immaturely wanking about not needing to learn aircraft systems and being level 10 recalcitrant about it, I'm going to send them to your link.
typhoonpilot
Well-Known Member
A reasonable article Shem and I don't disagree with a lot of what you say. The orals we had at my first "commuter" airline were pretty intense (edit - I wrote that not remembering you were at the same one). That aircraft had a 14 step procedure for electrical smoke of unknown origin that had to be memorized. Just one of many memory items on that airplane. My first type rating in a jet (DC-9) I had to draw the electrical and hydraulic systems from memory, among other things. Some airlines have no memory items now.
That all said, and because I have been on the training side of the equation for many years, the newer more modern aircraft systems are so complex that the previous level of systems knowledge is simply impossible within the finite requirements of an airline or other type rating course. Boeing is who I am most familiar with. On the 787 they have written only one page in the FCOM about the actual brains of the airplane, the Common Core System. No detailed description. I have access to more detailed data from the Boeing CSIDs ( Crew System Interface Documents). For the Common Core System it is closer to 40 pages of description and diagrams. Why did Boeing do this? The easy answer is there really is not much a pilot can do about how the system operates. There are 2 Common Computer Resource (CCR) reset switches on the overhead panel, which are not normally used. Pushing them basically reboots that specific CCR and is a QRH (electronic checklist) item only.
Similarly the electrical system is so complex that the FCOM does not even touch on certain areas of it. For instance there is a 270 Volt DC portion to the electrical system but no mention of it whatsoever in the FCOM. It is actually written as Large Motor Power Distribution System in the FCOM ( 3 paragraphs, no diagram). There is only a very simplified Power Flow and Distribution schematic in the FCOM, no more full electrical diagrams.
While systems like the above have become much more complex so too has FMS and Flight Guidance as compared to the early DC-9 and 727s that we flew. Those were easy airplanes to get in and start-up. I could get a DC-9 going in under 10 minutes( I think 5 was my record). The autopilot was basically just a wing leveler with some pitch and altitude holding capability. No FMS to program, not much to set-up really. Today that is certainly not the case. Anything under 30 minutes in a B777 or B787 would feel incredibly rushed.
Airlines tend to place much more emphasis on use of the automation, and they need to, because that is the normal way of flying the airplane. By comparison Flight Safety International is stuck in the dark ages of system ground school. They spent an inordinate amount of time on systems classes and not near enough on the FMS and autoflight. I had ground school instructors talking about the temperature of the fuel as it moved through the fuel pump ( Are you "blank" kidding me?) This while almost totally ignoring how to program the FMS and not adequately describing blue/green needles (really important stuff).
In today's information society there really does need to be a compromise on what we are required to know versus what is nice to know and what we really don't need to know. The human brain can only retain so much information (penguins on an iceberg anyone?). While it would be grand if I could draw a 787 electrical system from memory or remember the temperature of the fuel as it goes through the fuel pump it does almost no good whatsoever in operating the airplane.
That all said, and because I have been on the training side of the equation for many years, the newer more modern aircraft systems are so complex that the previous level of systems knowledge is simply impossible within the finite requirements of an airline or other type rating course. Boeing is who I am most familiar with. On the 787 they have written only one page in the FCOM about the actual brains of the airplane, the Common Core System. No detailed description. I have access to more detailed data from the Boeing CSIDs ( Crew System Interface Documents). For the Common Core System it is closer to 40 pages of description and diagrams. Why did Boeing do this? The easy answer is there really is not much a pilot can do about how the system operates. There are 2 Common Computer Resource (CCR) reset switches on the overhead panel, which are not normally used. Pushing them basically reboots that specific CCR and is a QRH (electronic checklist) item only.
Similarly the electrical system is so complex that the FCOM does not even touch on certain areas of it. For instance there is a 270 Volt DC portion to the electrical system but no mention of it whatsoever in the FCOM. It is actually written as Large Motor Power Distribution System in the FCOM ( 3 paragraphs, no diagram). There is only a very simplified Power Flow and Distribution schematic in the FCOM, no more full electrical diagrams.
While systems like the above have become much more complex so too has FMS and Flight Guidance as compared to the early DC-9 and 727s that we flew. Those were easy airplanes to get in and start-up. I could get a DC-9 going in under 10 minutes( I think 5 was my record). The autopilot was basically just a wing leveler with some pitch and altitude holding capability. No FMS to program, not much to set-up really. Today that is certainly not the case. Anything under 30 minutes in a B777 or B787 would feel incredibly rushed.
Airlines tend to place much more emphasis on use of the automation, and they need to, because that is the normal way of flying the airplane. By comparison Flight Safety International is stuck in the dark ages of system ground school. They spent an inordinate amount of time on systems classes and not near enough on the FMS and autoflight. I had ground school instructors talking about the temperature of the fuel as it moved through the fuel pump ( Are you "blank" kidding me?) This while almost totally ignoring how to program the FMS and not adequately describing blue/green needles (really important stuff).
In today's information society there really does need to be a compromise on what we are required to know versus what is nice to know and what we really don't need to know. The human brain can only retain so much information (penguins on an iceberg anyone?). While it would be grand if I could draw a 787 electrical system from memory or remember the temperature of the fuel as it goes through the fuel pump it does almost no good whatsoever in operating the airplane.
Zapphod Beblebrox
Inventor of the Pan Galactic Gargle Blaster
This article, IMHO, is exactly on point. New aircraft checklist and ECAM philosophy has led to a "binary" form of non-normal procedure use. The checklist if full of If / Then statements. I have been on the bus for 10 years but there are some procedures in the QRH or ECAM that you just do because the page or box tells you to, but I am not sure why I am doing it. It's not for lack of trying.
Our company used to have a little "blue" computer reset booklet. It was a maintenance "field" pocket guide designed to help maintenance do computer resets and the like. It had the actual actions and a description of why you were doing it. It had all the bite test sequences and procedures for testing and correcting a problem. Once the company found out that some pilots were carrying the manual it became severely restricted and was not authorized. We now cannot even reset circuit breakers except on explicit direction from maintenance control. There are possibilities for far too many unintended consequences.
The problem with automated aircraft is getting at the system knowledge that is important,like keeping the yellow system powered via the APU and electrical system, USAir 1549, vs. inert knowledge that is so heavily computer related you will never use or need it. I would say that the carriers, particularly Airbus were being pressured by Airlines, to build simpler more automated aircraft, with simplified and common controls and systems so that common type ratings could be used. That requirement alone creates a lot of the impetus to "dumb down" system knowledge and training. Airlines want dumb, automated airplanes.
Aircraft are more reliable, but when systems fail, or a cascade failure occurs, the crew can be inundated with information that may or may not have any relevance. He is a segment of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau report on Quantas 32. When automated aircraft fail they can fail "big time", and current training deprives the crew of the knowledge they need to work a problem that is "not in the book." Think Apollo 13, as an example.
Completion of ECAM procedures - Quantas Flight 32
The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel
system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer
as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system. In addition, the
flight crew could not jettison fuel due to damage to the fuel management system.
The flight crew also received an aircraft communications addressing and reporting
system (ACARS) message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple
failure messages had been received from the aircraft by the operator.
At the time, the flight crew were busy managing the ECAM messages and procedures, and only
had time to acknowledge but not respond to that ACARS message.
It took about 50 minutes for the flight crew to complete all of the initial procedures
associated with the ECAM messages.
Here is a sample of the multi-page ECAMS the crew received:
Crew recollection of the initial ECAM messages The flight crew recalled the following sys tems warnings and inoperative system messages on ECAM after the failure of the No. 2 engine:
•
engines No. 1 and 4 were operating in a degraded mode
•
Green hydraulic system – low system pressure and low fluid level
•
Yellow hydraulic system – engine No. 4 pump errors
•
failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No. 1 and 2 bus systems
•
flight controls operating in alternate law
•
wing slats inoperative
•
flight controls – ailerons partial control only
•
flight controls – reduced spoiler control
•
landing gear con trol and indicator warnings
•
multiple brake system messages
•
engine anti
-ice and air data sensor messages
•
multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
•
centre of gravity messages
•
autothrust and autoland inoperative
•
No. 1 engine generator dr ive disconnected
•
left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
•
avionics system overheat.
The "ECAM" overload received some recognition and discussion in the Government report.
Our company used to have a little "blue" computer reset booklet. It was a maintenance "field" pocket guide designed to help maintenance do computer resets and the like. It had the actual actions and a description of why you were doing it. It had all the bite test sequences and procedures for testing and correcting a problem. Once the company found out that some pilots were carrying the manual it became severely restricted and was not authorized. We now cannot even reset circuit breakers except on explicit direction from maintenance control. There are possibilities for far too many unintended consequences.
The problem with automated aircraft is getting at the system knowledge that is important,like keeping the yellow system powered via the APU and electrical system, USAir 1549, vs. inert knowledge that is so heavily computer related you will never use or need it. I would say that the carriers, particularly Airbus were being pressured by Airlines, to build simpler more automated aircraft, with simplified and common controls and systems so that common type ratings could be used. That requirement alone creates a lot of the impetus to "dumb down" system knowledge and training. Airlines want dumb, automated airplanes.
Aircraft are more reliable, but when systems fail, or a cascade failure occurs, the crew can be inundated with information that may or may not have any relevance. He is a segment of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau report on Quantas 32. When automated aircraft fail they can fail "big time", and current training deprives the crew of the knowledge they need to work a problem that is "not in the book." Think Apollo 13, as an example.
Completion of ECAM procedures - Quantas Flight 32
The flight crew reported that, during their assessment of subsequent multiple fuel
system ECAM messages, they elected not to initiate further fuel transfer
as they were unsure of the integrity of the fuel system. In addition, the
flight crew could not jettison fuel due to damage to the fuel management system.
The flight crew also received an aircraft communications addressing and reporting
system (ACARS) message from the aircraft operator that indicated that multiple
failure messages had been received from the aircraft by the operator.
At the time, the flight crew were busy managing the ECAM messages and procedures, and only
had time to acknowledge but not respond to that ACARS message.
It took about 50 minutes for the flight crew to complete all of the initial procedures
associated with the ECAM messages.
Here is a sample of the multi-page ECAMS the crew received:
Crew recollection of the initial ECAM messages The flight crew recalled the following sys tems warnings and inoperative system messages on ECAM after the failure of the No. 2 engine:
•
engines No. 1 and 4 were operating in a degraded mode
•
Green hydraulic system – low system pressure and low fluid level
•
Yellow hydraulic system – engine No. 4 pump errors
•
failure of the alternating current (AC) electrical No. 1 and 2 bus systems
•
flight controls operating in alternate law
•
wing slats inoperative
•
flight controls – ailerons partial control only
•
flight controls – reduced spoiler control
•
landing gear con trol and indicator warnings
•
multiple brake system messages
•
engine anti
-ice and air data sensor messages
•
multiple fuel system messages, including a fuel jettison fault
•
centre of gravity messages
•
autothrust and autoland inoperative
•
No. 1 engine generator dr ive disconnected
•
left wing pneumatic bleed leaks
•
avionics system overheat.
The "ECAM" overload received some recognition and discussion in the Government report.
ozziecat35
4 out of 5 great lakes prefer Michigan.
100% this. At 1100 hours, I did my first type rating at PIC on the XL. Lots of system knowledge etc, but come time to get in the box, because of time constraints, I can't even use both hands and feet to count how many times my sim instructor would lean forward, do something to the FMS to make it go, and get us moving...
Now that I'm flying, I'm not 100% sure I could build a hold on my own. I'm all for systems knowledge, but prepare pilots for what they can control in flight. If I can't fix it / etc... while we're airborne, not really sure I need to know the ins and outs (30,000 foot view maybe) until we're back on the ground and doing an AAR.
jtrain609
Antisocial Monster
Talking about how we used to do things was so much better, and about how the kids these days don't know what they're doing, but WE were SO much better trained makes us feel good.
But it's also wrong.
The systems manual in the E-Jet series won't even tell you how a lot of systems work because they don't want their competitors to steal the design. If you call down to brazil to ask a question, they'll tell you that you don't need to know and that they're not telling you in any event.
We're operators, not engineers. Focusing on how to fly the plane is what's important, and now that we've gotten past the bad old days, we focus on flying in training. That means understanding the FMS, auto flight system and how to run procedures correctly.
But it's also wrong.
The systems manual in the E-Jet series won't even tell you how a lot of systems work because they don't want their competitors to steal the design. If you call down to brazil to ask a question, they'll tell you that you don't need to know and that they're not telling you in any event.
We're operators, not engineers. Focusing on how to fly the plane is what's important, and now that we've gotten past the bad old days, we focus on flying in training. That means understanding the FMS, auto flight system and how to run procedures correctly.
wheelsup
Well-Known Member
On my interview at my company I was asked about briefing and flying optimum profile descent RNAV arrivals. They were having a ton of deviations from guys not understanding how to fly it. I did them day in and day out in an airplane with no VNAV or A/T and hadn't busted one yet.
Systems knowledge is good to have but a lot of the "more experienced" folks have no clue how to think like a programmer and manage the Airbus.
Systems knowledge is good to have but a lot of the "more experienced" folks have no clue how to think like a programmer and manage the Airbus.
learhawkerbe400
Well-Known Member
The less systems knowledge the better. Obviously you need a general understanding on them but more than that starts to work against you in modern airplanes.
If something goes wrong follow the checklist. The more people know about systems the more they try and play mechanic/ do their own thing in flight.
Don’t crash, follow the checklist, land. Don’t over complicate it.
If something goes wrong follow the checklist. The more people know about systems the more they try and play mechanic/ do their own thing in flight.
Don’t crash, follow the checklist, land. Don’t over complicate it.
Roger Roger
Bottom of the list
Ahahaha, “no memory items”. I’m sure it’s different in big airplane land with 2 pilots, but my experience with learning a “no memory item airplane” was that that’s a ridiculous term when used for a single engine single pilot airplane. You can bet your butt if the engine goes “kaboom” after takeoff or the pressurization goes Fünke at FL250 I’m not digging the QRH out of the bait well before running some immediate action items.
When I started out, checkrides/evaluations still were "stump the dummy", where the evaluator was just needlessly digging and digging to try and find where the limit of your knowledge was on the aircraft or a particular system, or was trying to demonstrate why he is smart and you are not. Not a very effective eval technique, as it really doesn't test anythng constructive. However, that method of evaluation is still around in places.
From a previous thread, I'll share the following here that I wrote: There's a difference between knowing the principles and operation of a particular system, and knowing the mechanics of it. Is it interesting to know the detailed mechanics of it...to the level of an A&P? Sure. Is it always necessary? Depends. Normally, no IMO.
When I flew the A-10, one of the weapons we carried was the AGM-65 Maverick missle. Some IPs and evaluators with the electrical engineering degrees or similar got really into how all the thinking algorithms of the weapon worked, far beyond just understanding how to use those for employing the weapon.....to the point of darn near being engineer-like. How do all 14 of the algorithms the missie's seeker head uses, work, for it to come off the rail and hit the target? For me, I could care less how to build or work on the missile, I need to know how to best employ it. To do that, I needed to know it's strengths and limitations, not how the seeker head specifically, mathmatically computes it's launch transient assist, for example. If it's not something I can operate or fix from the cockpit, then I don't get too wrapped up about it....it either works as advertised, or doesn't. Nothing I can do to fix one that's broken from the cockpit, nor am I going to work on it on the ground. However, what I can do, is have enough of an understanding of said algorithms in order to "help" place the missile in an envelope that will minimize the number of mental-obstacles it's seeker head has to overcome or solve once coming off the rail and target-bound.
That's the example of working knowledge (operating it) vs intricate mechanical knowledge (building it); but you get the point.
From a previous thread, I'll share the following here that I wrote: There's a difference between knowing the principles and operation of a particular system, and knowing the mechanics of it. Is it interesting to know the detailed mechanics of it...to the level of an A&P? Sure. Is it always necessary? Depends. Normally, no IMO.
When I flew the A-10, one of the weapons we carried was the AGM-65 Maverick missle. Some IPs and evaluators with the electrical engineering degrees or similar got really into how all the thinking algorithms of the weapon worked, far beyond just understanding how to use those for employing the weapon.....to the point of darn near being engineer-like. How do all 14 of the algorithms the missie's seeker head uses, work, for it to come off the rail and hit the target? For me, I could care less how to build or work on the missile, I need to know how to best employ it. To do that, I needed to know it's strengths and limitations, not how the seeker head specifically, mathmatically computes it's launch transient assist, for example. If it's not something I can operate or fix from the cockpit, then I don't get too wrapped up about it....it either works as advertised, or doesn't. Nothing I can do to fix one that's broken from the cockpit, nor am I going to work on it on the ground. However, what I can do, is have enough of an understanding of said algorithms in order to "help" place the missile in an envelope that will minimize the number of mental-obstacles it's seeker head has to overcome or solve once coming off the rail and target-bound.
That's the example of working knowledge (operating it) vs intricate mechanical knowledge (building it); but you get the point.
trafficinsight
Well-Known Member
I'm the type that wants to know every little thing eventually. So while I really don't care if they teach it in class and I definitely don't want to face it on a checkride... it makes me mad that the manuals are so vague about things.
I'm not even sure you *could* teach the newer crop airplanes that way anyway.
I'm not even sure you *could* teach the newer crop airplanes that way anyway.
Roger Roger
Bottom of the list
I don’t know nothin bout missiles, but for a lot o automated systems knowing the logic behind the automation makes it a lot easier to steer clear of the pitfalls involved in the automation.
ppragman
No pasa nada.
I sincerely hate the mentality of “meh no need to know that,” maybe not, but you never know what could come back and save your bacon.
Why wouldn’t you want to know literally everything you can about a piece of machinery that you trust your life to? Do I need to be able to build it? Probably not, no, but actually going through maintenance manuals and schematics has sincerely helped my systems knowledge and given me some useful information that has once or twice saved my bacon.
Outside of the realm of day to day 121 flying this knowledge above and beyond is critical. Being able to start the airplane in the bush in -34C because I understood the system so me and my passengers wouldn’t freeze to death is a really good thing. Similarly knowing how to reset the flap computer in the field so you can retract them after an undervolt condition knocks the computer offline when you’re 900NM from home in the aleutians is probably a good thing.
Even outside the bush in 135, knowing the systems well enough to actually diagnose and troubleshoot a problem so that the $15/hr contract A&P who’s never worked on your airplane before can fix it before your boss gets back from his trip is a really good thing. Knowing to keep a strong rubber band in your flight bag so you don’t have to listen to out of sync props with a governor failure is a good thing. Understanding the electrical system well enough to be able to prioritize what things to load shed is a good thing.
Maybe it’s different under 121,but I feel strongly that the best pilots I know are always trying to better themselves, which includes knowing as much as you can about your job, the systems, the rules, and anything else you feel that you could put into your bag of tricks to save your ass. I don’t always succeed at this pilot arete stuff, but I feel like trying to do better than just “meet the minimums required for training,” is kind of important if you are a professional.
Why wouldn’t you want to know literally everything you can about a piece of machinery that you trust your life to? Do I need to be able to build it? Probably not, no, but actually going through maintenance manuals and schematics has sincerely helped my systems knowledge and given me some useful information that has once or twice saved my bacon.
Outside of the realm of day to day 121 flying this knowledge above and beyond is critical. Being able to start the airplane in the bush in -34C because I understood the system so me and my passengers wouldn’t freeze to death is a really good thing. Similarly knowing how to reset the flap computer in the field so you can retract them after an undervolt condition knocks the computer offline when you’re 900NM from home in the aleutians is probably a good thing.
Even outside the bush in 135, knowing the systems well enough to actually diagnose and troubleshoot a problem so that the $15/hr contract A&P who’s never worked on your airplane before can fix it before your boss gets back from his trip is a really good thing. Knowing to keep a strong rubber band in your flight bag so you don’t have to listen to out of sync props with a governor failure is a good thing. Understanding the electrical system well enough to be able to prioritize what things to load shed is a good thing.
Maybe it’s different under 121,but I feel strongly that the best pilots I know are always trying to better themselves, which includes knowing as much as you can about your job, the systems, the rules, and anything else you feel that you could put into your bag of tricks to save your ass. I don’t always succeed at this pilot arete stuff, but I feel like trying to do better than just “meet the minimums required for training,” is kind of important if you are a professional.
Agreed. And if there was a way to separate out the need to know from the nice to know, with regards to that kind of information......ie- what info actually is a pitfall the pilot can fall into vs what is something the computer only knows or is something outside the pilot's control; that would be pretty helpful in my opinion as it comes to learning what's truly important to know.
Roger Roger
Bottom of the list
Brace yourself for incoming.
ppragman
No pasa nada.
When I gave checkrides I gave everyone a list of all the “need to know” items, all the “nice to know” items, and all the trivia I could think of. I gave out flash cards for everything and published a study guide. Weekly if I had time I’d send out some brain teasers.
If you knew the need to know stuff and only that, I’d bust your balls, but you’d pass your oral. If you knew the need to know and the nice to know you’d pass and we’d talk about some of the trivia and it’d go smoothly. If you knew the need to know, nice to know, and trivia it was a breeze.
Again, I wrote out everything I required and if you knew it you were golden, and I was responsive - there was a couple things on my need to know list early on that some people disagreed we’re need to know, I was persuaded and I changed it - it’s not a contest to see who is smarter, but it’s good to be able to probe the limits of a person’s knowledge and find where that boundary is, that’s where we learn how we can get better at our jobs.
That said, dick head examiners that have a checkride that’s entirely trivia and will fail you for not knowing the pressures of the gear system need to go, but if you know it, great!
There's meeting the minimums, and there is over saturation of information. Somewhere in the middle is probably good to be starting off, with more information and knowledge being gained from operational use, time in the airframe, and experience built.
Also depends on what system or what aircraft we're talking about and the complexity of the same. I don't know if I could ever learn everything regarding an A320s full computer systems and the intricacies of how they're programmed and their full logic, for example. Tried to learn some of that with he 117, and I didn't have the brain bytes myself to fully wrap my head around it all or to store that info. So as aircraft become more and more complex in this way, it makes some sense that the truly important items for the pilot to really know, have to be more emphasized. There becomes more separation of truly need to know, and what mostly is nice to know: or stuff needed to e learned now vs what can be learned later at ones leisure.
Also depends on the operation. 135 in the bush? I fully agree, a darn-near A&P level of knowledge and skill would be very good if not probably very necessary. A 121 operation with mx available all the time? Might not be as necessary. So it does depend on different factors in my opinion.
But your overall point is still sound.
ppragman
No pasa nada.
I fully expect “hurr durr Alaska pilotz are dangler-us” whatever - I’ve come to accept that is the going thought process, and statistically it’s probably correct. Still, I want to be the best I can be at whatever I’m doing, not just “get by.”
That's a sound method, as you've already vetted items and divided them up, and even provided the student with that vetting. The thing you can't do that they need to do, is take the learning and understanding and place that into their brain. Thats on the student to do. You're not spoon feeding them, but you aren't trying to stump them with a bunch of minutia info from out of left field that they've never heard of either.