System knowledge

seagull said:
Did you even read my article?

Tell that to the pilots of QF72 and QF32, or Sully Sullenberger. Only having the knowledge to follow checklists leads to the knowledge gaps that resulted in accidents like Air France 447.
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To be fair, the AF447 pilots did recognize the problem correctly in the first 15 seconds which is about as quick as can be expected ("looks like we have no speed indications"). At this point if they had the knowledge to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, they'd probably still be alive today.

I do give Sully credit for immediately putting the engine selector on ignition and starting the APU.

I think systems knowledge is helpful, but not useless info. I was asked on a CRJ oral one time how many holes were on the alternate static port? That's useless knowledge. Knowing whether it has 5 holes or 7 or 9 is irrelevant to any issue that could result from the pito/static system. And more important, irrelevant in helping me deal with the problem/situation.
 
learhawkerbe400 said:
First, you ain’t catching me in no king air player. Unless I win the lottery.

Second, we really making fun of guys for being cautious? If those dudes worked for me I’d say thanks for not crashing.

But then again I don’t fly in alaska soooooo
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It’s not caution to shut down a good engine because you follow the checklist without thinking about what you’re doing. Wouldn’t it be better to make 30 degree heading change and watch the light go out than shut down a good engine because I didn’t understand how the system works?
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
To be fair, the AF447 pilots did recognize the problem correctly in the first 15 seconds which is about as quick as can be expected ("looks like we have no speed indications"). At this point if they had the knowledge to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, they'd probably still be alive today.

I do give Sully credit for immediately putting the engine selector on ignition and starting the APU.

I think systems knowledge is helpful, but not useless info. I was asked on a CRJ oral one time how many holes were on the alternate static port? That's useless knowledge. Knowing whether it has 5 holes or 7 or 9 is irrelevant to any issue that could result from the pito/static system. And more important, irrelevant in helping me deal with the problem/situation.
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Knowing if it’s 5,7, or 9 goes into the “trivia column” but I’d ask a guy that if he aced every thing else - obviously you wouldn’t fail him for not knowing.

A similar useless trivia question on the King Air got me thinking about the way the static system was plumbed.

Out of curiosity, why does it have more than one hole?
 
ppragman said:
It’s not caution to shut down a good engine because you follow the checklist without thinking about what you’re doing. Wouldn’t it be better to make 30 degree heading change and watch the light go out than shut down a good engine because I didn’t understand how the system works?
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Not just that, but (at least how I was trained), you don't fully believe an engine fire/overheat without some supporting indications of come kind. The ole FEVER check from basic pilot training

Fluctuating fuel flow
Excessive ITT/TGT/EGT
Visual indications of fire/trailing smoke
Erratic engine operation
Rough engine operation
 
MikeD said:
Not just that, but (at least how I was trained), you don't fully believe an engine fire/overheat without some supporting indications of come kind. The ole FEVER check from basic pilot training

Fluctuating fuel flow
Excessive ITT/TGT/EGT
Visual indications of fire/trailing smoke
Erratic engine operation
Rough engine operation
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Exactly - you’d be shocked at how many people don’t know this.
 
ppragman said:
When you shut an engine down and divert for a fire light in an early King Air because the sun was setting and the cracks in the cowling let too much infrared light in and set off a photo receptor I’m going to laugh at you.
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Story time!

Our King Air was down getting new -61's and G1000 installed and we were going to bring it home on December 23rd of 2011. Just as we left the terminal to drive around and pick up our airplane, we received a call that the mechanic thought there was a fire and blew the bottle all over the brand new engine. They cracked it open and found no issues, cleaned it up and overnighted a new bottle. We got to leave at 10 PM on the 24th.
 
Crop Duster said:
Prophylactic caveat: I didn't read one word of your book. No dis, just no time right now.

That said, my understanding of the Air France debacle was that it was based not a lack of systems knowledge, but rather, on a lack of knowledge of: A. basic airmanship, and B. a lack of applicable understanding of the modes of operation of the equipment the pilots were entrusted to understand how to operate; That, in a very literal sense, they didn't know what they were doing as they did things. In other words, it wasn't a so much a systems knowledge issue, but more of a "what does the red button do?" issue, which is more operational than systems, imo.

And that said, did they ever get in Guinness for the world record falling leaf maneuver?
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The AF447 accident was hardly that. They knew how to fly, they didn’t recognize the stalll. Few would. Read my article on high altitude stalls. You should also read my book!
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
To be fair, the AF447 pilots did recognize the problem correctly in the first 15 seconds which is about as quick as can be expected ("looks like we have no speed indications"). At this point if they had the knowledge to follow the unreliable airspeed checklist, they'd probably still be alive today.

I do give Sully credit for immediately putting the engine selector on ignition and starting the APU.

I think systems knowledge is helpful, but not useless info. I was asked on a CRJ oral one time how many holes were on the alternate static port? That's useless knowledge. Knowing whether it has 5 holes or 7 or 9 is irrelevant to any issue that could result from the pito/static system. And more important, irrelevant in helping me deal with the problem/situation.
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In Air France the understanding of the flight control system beyond the basics may have helped, particularly if there was any attempt to go for Clmax.
 
Excellent discussion... It more or less boils down to "what can I control, and when I do control it, what effect is it going to have?" Temps of fuel going through fuel pumps? Doesn't matter. What am I turning on and off (or arming) when I select or deselect it? That is worthwhile.

Mastery of flight guidance and the various consequences of what modes are utilized and when is of the utmost importance these days, and it is so important to include in that mastery the ability to blend in and out from zero automation to full automation without blinking an eye.
 
seagull said:
The AF447 accident was hardly that. They knew how to fly, they didn’t recognize the stalll. Few would. Read my article on high altitude stalls. You should also read my book!
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It also seems (from what I’ve read) that they had a bad case of confusion between the crew members too. If memory serves there were opposite control inputs being made the whole way down and one was getting overrridden.

In any case the old adage of “if what you’re doing isn’t working, try something else.” Seems like it could have saved the day.

Not trying to Monday morning qb but if the airplane is pitched way the hell up with a wicked high descent rate and you can’t arrest the descent, try lowering the nose - you’re dead anyway if you get it wrong might as well try something different to get out of the upset. That said it’s awful hard to will the mind to lower the nose when you’ve got a high descent rate.
 
seagull said:
Hence my recommendation to have the engineers and test pilots for the manufacturers (OEMs) make that determination. They designed it, they have the best idea of what is important to know.
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Having been exposed to test pilots and manufacturer's pilots I would tend to disagree with this. While there are some good people at the manufacturers who can help design the normal and non-normal procedures the actual test pilots and a large portion of the other pilots that a manufacturer employ tend to be very poor at operating the aircraft as it is intended to be in normal airline operations.

Someone with a military test background who then goes into the civilian sector tends to be a very "special" type of individual. They do not tend to think like most normal pilots. Really, they are about the last person you want to have designating what is important to know. Certainly consulting is okay, but not determining what is important.

So, anyone hear about the Boeing pilot who got "stuck" between 04s at JFK a few years ago? He was describing in intricate detail how the brakes must be frozen, locked, blah, blah, blah. Actual problem was he was in a little bit of a depression at max landing weight and was not using enough thrust to get out of it. :biggrin:
 
PeanuckleCRJ said:
Excellent discussion... It more or less boils down to "what can I control, and when I do control it, what effect is it going to have?" Temps of fuel going through fuel pumps? Doesn't matter. What am I turning on and off (or arming) when I select or deselect it? That is worthwhile.

Mastery of flight guidance and the various consequences of what modes are utilized and when is of the utmost importance these days, and it is so important to include in that mastery the ability to blend in and out from zero automation to full automation without blinking an eye.
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This is one of the biggest lessons I’ve learned in aviation, “if flip a switch or move something in the cockpit there should be some indication that the change you selected occurred.”

Knowing what each switch is actually doing beyond what each switch hopes to accomplish is a big part of mastering the airplane.
 
Roger Roger said:
Or really anything practical.
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I mean, on this I strongly disagree - the engineers in the PC12 developed what is objectively the best Gear Down and Locked fail-safe method I've ever seen (I haven't flown the electric one, so if it's crappy let me know), an awesome "get your clearance switch." The cockpit was amazingly ergonomic and basically diagrammed the electrical system on the overhead (Pre NG /47 is what I flew, so YMMV) - which was cool, and there was this button - which was the best piece of engineering I'd ever seen: the button to close the aft cargo door.
 
typhoonpilot said:
Having been exposed to test pilots and manufacturer's pilots I would tend to disagree with this. While there are some good people at the manufacturers who can help design the normal and non-normal procedures the actual test pilots and a large portion of the other pilots that a manufacturer employ tend to be very poor at operating the aircraft as it is intended to be in normal airline operations.

Someone with a military test background who then goes into the civilian sector tends to be a very "special" type of individual. They do not tend to think like most normal pilots. Really, they are about the last person you want to have designating what is important to know. Certainly consulting is okay, but not determining what is important.

So, anyone hear about the Boeing pilot who got "stuck" between 04s at JFK a few years ago? He was describing in intricate detail how the brakes must be frozen, locked, blah, blah, blah. Actual problem was he was in a little bit of a depression at max landing weight and was not using enough thrust to get out of it. :biggrin:
Click to expand...

Wasn't there some Gulfstream GV (or some large new type) that was on a test flight that ended up crashing on a takeoff (or go around?) when the crew decided to do something completely out of the normal envelope of what they were expected and supposed to do. I'd have to look it up, but IIRC the NTSB came down hard on Gulfstream and their testing/certification/test pilots.
 
Interesting reading some of the responses here! All a good read. I am just a little bit past my first year in the 121 field, coming from the instructor world. My most complex airplanes were a Bonanza and Baron. I had a pretty uncomfortable conversation about all of this with a captain a few months ago.

We were talking about the training at my company and I said I thought it was good. Going to my systems test I had confidence in my knowledge with the aircraft and everything inside the cockpit. Most of our information came from a document that was pretty much condensed information. If you really wanted to dig deeper there was another manual. We were told to not go diving in there as it would confuse you even more and it was more of a not needed to know. Which was fine with us, all new regional pilots trying to drink from the fire hose. We didn't want to open another.

Anyways, when I said I thought the training was good it was like I hit a nerve. I didn't realize he was a A&P and I got blasted with all sorts of questions. "How is the oil system cooled" "Draw the hydraulic system other than the synoptic page" etc etc were some of the questions I got. He then stated that I really don't know anything at all, which I said okay touché! Maybe I don't, I thought? Then he went on a rant about upgrades and asked how I was ready for upgrade without having this knowledge and started asking me Ops Specs off the top of my head. (I never brought up upgrading or saying I'm taking first avail or really anything related to upgrade)

Found this whole short trip to be really odd. The more I wondered why would I need to know as a Captain how to draw the hydraulic system? Have an Op Spec off the top of my head. When I was in a junior base prior all my new captains were awesome. They also verified stuff in the manuals and didn't go off memory and when something arose we did the full QRH procedures. We didn't say "I'm an A&P, I know more than the mechanic" and laugh?

I just didn't understand this logic. Don't get me wrong I think my systems knowledge could grow. I am by far the hardest person on myself for that. I love learning and want to know stuff even more. I'm not trying to sound lazy. I just thought procedures were largely more important than let's say, memorizing a QRH procedure or knowing every schematic drawing of the airplane in my brain.
 
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