System knowledge

Cherokee_Cruiser said:
You highlighted some stuff I wasn't aware of:



Thank you for highlighting just how absolutely crappy training, culture, and instructors were at Asiana. Oh dear, 2 out of 4 instructors didn't know what hold mode really does. Well whose fault is that?

Regardless, on ANY approach by 500 ft, the PF hand should be on the throttle levers and a hand on the yoke. And inside the airplane on a visual approach, if you aren't looking at the airspeed then what are you looking at? In the Boeing the thrust levers move when the AT is on right? So on every approach they ever did, they know the thrust levers are half-way(ish) up for approach, and if their hands are on it, it moves under them. This one went to idle and stayed there. The PF hands should have been on the thrust levers. And at any point, a glance at the airspeed below 500 ft would have shown them that they needed to add power. The guy pulled back to stay on the PAPIs. So we know he was at least watching the lights outside. But it is an absolute failure of airmanship to not at least glance a couple times at their own airspeed to make sure they were at Vref. If they had seen that and recognized it a little bit higher altitude, then the next common sense would be to check the power setting and adjust as needed.

I understand their culture and training sucked. I understand they felt scared/intimiated to go around and never did much visual approach work and always tried to fly ILSes. I get the cultural, safety, and training aspects that led to this scenario. But ultimately when you step back, you are the CA of a 777, with a perfectly functioning 777, on a crystal clear calm day, with "this airplane, that runway" and they couldn't land.
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At the time of that accident the US carriers also were not teaching it...
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
AA 757 at Cali. Theoretically in an Airbus, when they hit max power and yanked back, they would have hit alpha prot and then alpha max and if spoilers were still out (as they were in the 757) they would have automatically retracted down. The AA jet almost missed the top of the mountain - and IIRC had the spoilers been down, they would have cleared the top.
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717 automatically retracts the spoilers in such a situation also. That’s an airplane with cables and pulleys. My argument has and always will be that the sweet spot for automation is comfortably between old school and Airbus. Protections like spoiler retract and low speed protection are wonderful safety features. But Airbus silliness like no tactile feedback on the stick or throttles is madness. Pilots aren’t software engineers and shouldn’t be forced to think like them.
 
Definitely concerning on several levels.
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ATN_Pilot said:
717 automatically retracts the spoilers in such a situation also. That’s an airplane with cables and pulleys. My argument has and always will be that the sweet spot for automation is comfortably between old school and Airbus. Protections like spoiler retract and low speed protection are wonderful safety features. But Airbus silliness like no tactile feedback on the stick or throttles is madness. Pilots aren’t software engineers and shouldn’t be forced to think like them.
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I'm a pilot and engineer. It's like they designed my dream plane :biggrin:
 
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