PSA CRJ-700 AA midair collision
- Thread starter swakid8
- Start date
Cherokee_Cruiser
Bronteroc
Looks like the pass behind the CRJ comment was stepped on in the Blackhawk cockpit? That’s brutal 
Looks like the pass behind the CRJ comment was stepped on in the Blackhawk cockpit? That’s brutal
A factor, not necessarily causal….if the helo had been issued and accepted visual separation. That being the case, it was their job to stay clear of the traffic however necessary. If they saw the correct traffic and still hit it, that’s bad. If they saw some other traffic, it’s still on them.
I’d like to know the CVR transcript regarding what was going on in the Helo cockpit: workload, any instruction, any distractions, any discussion on traffic…especially any uncertainty, what the situational awareness level was, any trouble picking up traffic, any issues with brightness of the surrounding lighting, etc.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
I’m curious what the briefing included. I would think: at or below 200’, heads up for other helo traffic on the river route, and expect traffic landing on 33. I can’t imagine too many items displacing these in the top three.
Like you, so curious if there was a distraction in the cockpit.
///AMG
Well-Known Member
I can't count how many (from my perspective in the seat) time critical comms to ATC or other aircraft, have been stepped on by some dips hit who wasn't paying attention, or just checks on freq without listening for even one second. Not that I haven't made those mistakes myself, but its a real thing. I don't know if that is the scenario we are talking about here. I agree with mike, if they agreed to legally own separation, missing a directive call to fix their F up isn't on ATC, and the accident isn't because of a call being blocked. Though perhaps it could have provided the needed SA for them to do something different than drive straight at the CRJ, or realize they weren't maybe looking at the right lights.
That’s the difficult part; as tower would have to believe they have the correct traffic in sight. Maybe the helo crew heard the pass behind call, but didn’t/couldn’t get an acknowledgment in, but…….seeing the wrong traffic perhaps….thought to themselves that their current heading works fine to pass behind the traffic they were actually seeing. The CVR would capture conversation related to the traffic and what they saw or weren’t seeing, and any uncertainty, which I’d like to see the transcript of.
phill1174
Well-Known Member
Wasn’t there an accident decades ago due to a call being blocked? I’m usually a nerd with this stuff but can’t recall the specific accident. I just remember the fatality rate being high.
Either way idk why folks don’t take a second to just listen before talking. I’ve even had captains just switch and start rambling then get pissed when the transmission is blocked.
Either way idk why folks don’t take a second to just listen before talking. I’ve even had captains just switch and start rambling then get pissed when the transmission is blocked.
///AMG
Well-Known Member
I bet there was, there has to have been.
As for the blocked, flip side to that coin, is waiting a really long time to check in, and then still stepping on someone or being stepped on. Sometimes luck just isn't on your side I guess
ChasenSFO
hen teaser
Blocked calls have been the last hole in the cheese a few times, with the 1977 Teneriffe disaster probably being the most well-known (Pan Am crew's "WE ARE STILL ON THE RUNWAY" call blocked and not heard by KLM as they began to roll). I try to pause a little bit when I switch freqs, but even so I'm sure I've blocked a bunch of calls over the years by mistake. I'm not aware of an accident where a single blocked call was the smoking gun. Usually all that call would have done is given the crew a last chance, at best. In some cases like the 747 collision, it could have actually saved the day. Here? Given how quickly things happened, I am not convinced the Blackhawk crew would have had time to properly spot the threat and react. We'll never know, but anything that may have boosted SA would have helped.
flyingpotato
Well-Known Member
Almost impossible to impress how familiar this route was to the crew. Almost like backing out from one’s own driveway. How often do you brief your significant other to watch out for cyclists, strollers, and passing cars? It’s just ingrained in the head to do so. This particular route is pretty much their own driveway. Heck, if I could go back in time and fly this exact same route, on this exact same helicopter, exactly the same time with the exact same crew, blindfolded, I would, and would sleep like a baby throughout. There is no other explanation of this incident other than it’s was an act of God!
NovemberEcho
Dergs favorite member
Iirc one of the SoCal mid-airs there was an update on the traffic that was blocked. I don’t remember if it was the pilots saying something to ATC or vice versa though
Delete this incoherent nonsense.
GolfChuck
Trustworthy Source
And this breeds complacency
Minuteman
I HAVE STRONG OPINIONS ABOUT AUTOMOTIVE LIGHTING!
For the benefit random site visitors, may I ask you expand on what specifically prompted your objection to the thought and why they should not promote the idea of familiarity?
Blaming it on an “act of god?” That is absurd and downright disrespectful.
The Army crew seemingly made a series of mistakes that, unfortunately, led to the accident.
Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
I lived close to DCA and spent dozens of weekends plane-spotting at Gravelly Point. I am familiar with the volume of helicopter traffic using the Potomac River route
In a battle against complacency, I’m going to continue to brief the two things that could result in headline news, respect the 200’ ceiling and understand the 33 approach.
With regards to 33 traffic, what’s normal, what’s routine? Does ATC usually deconflict approach traffic without asking anything of helicopter traffic? This would explain a lot if that’s the case.
Busting 200’, on a check ride nonetheless, is puzzling to me. So curious what was happening in the Blackhawk cockpit.
Beyond that, it’s not lost on me that most accidents occur during pretty routine operations.
NovemberEcho
Dergs favorite member
I tell trainees it’s often “more difficult” to sequence 3 planes than 6 because subconsciously you don’t expect to have to do as much with fewer planes, but often times they’re a tie.
Lawman
Well-Known Member
I’d be interested in what assist modes were engaged or actively disengaged during that portion of flight. Boeing and Sikorsky have spent a lot of time and money putting in the ability to have the helicopter assist you in flying because it enhances performance and adheres to standards better that way.
There is a culture of “assist modes make worse pilots” amongst some in the Army aviation community. I’d be interested to see if that mentality was going on in this scenario as it being a checkride is where I’ve seen that attitude most prevalent.
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Pilot Fighter
Well-Known Member
Are there any prohibitions against some AP/assist modes during low-level flight?
Lawman
Well-Known Member
No, the holds available in each aircraft type and series vary in ability though.
The other issue is the standardization for their use is SOP dependent. From a previous organization “overwater” operations under NVG required use of the ALT-I or RALT hold and had requirements for precisely what altitude the warnings had to be set at. My current organization has no such standards in the SOP because we don’t do overwater as a regular mission set.
I’m not familiar enough with the path they were on to say whether a specific hold mode wouldn’t cause problems (RALT with multiple return hights as you cross over bridges for example). But I know the intelligent altitude hold mode in the 47 was a godsend for a kind of set it and forget it cruise control capability at holding low altitudes. The 64 however, yeah the hold mode kind of sucks in general but especially at low level so it’s almost entirely manual <200-300 AGL.
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