Pressing "Start" on the timer when shooting an ILS

I still disagree, Mike. It's simply not as safe, in my opinion, and evidently in the opinion of every airline in the country. The Air Force has a different mission, and they view things differently.
 
I still disagree, Mike. It's simply not as safe, in my opinion, and evidently in the opinion of every airline in the country. The Air Force has a different mission, and they view things differently.

By your logic, Todd, airline pilots are too stupid to remember more than one plan or one set of numbers. It has nothing to do with mission....we're talking the simple act of making a transition happen, not why its happening in a mission sense. If it's not as safe, then why aren't we seeing AF planes flying into the ground left and right? Again, we're talking the simple act and brief....not the aforementioned having to reprogram boxes, etc, which I agree is too much to do. THAT is the reason(s) not to be doing it in 121 operations....simply the act of making it happen IS complex in terms of reprogramming, etc.

In terms of CRM and the brief, if someone can't brief and remember a single contingency to the basic plan, I have to wonder....
 
By your logic, Todd, airline pilots are too stupid to remember more than one plan or one set of numbers.

Mike, that seems like it's bordering on a macho attitude, which we all know is treacherous in this business. It's not about being "too stupid," it's about needlessly adding variables which can lead to confusion close to the ground in a critical phase of flight. It simply isn't necessary, and there are safer alternatives.
 
Mike, that seems like it's bordering on a macho attitude, which we all know is treacherous in this business. It's not about being "too stupid," it's about needlessly adding variables which can lead to confusion close to the ground in a critical phase of flight. It simply isn't necessary, and there are safer alternatives.

It's nothing to do with macho, Todd. You are pulling the safety card in the wrong arena. It's not a CRM issue anywhere.....briefing is briefing, it's as simple as that. Briefs can be too little, or too much....the area in-between is a huge variable and depends on the people involved. So long as everyone understands what is briefed and there are no questions, then the brief has solved what its supposed to do. I don't care if you're briefing an approach, or a pre-bombing plan. A brief is a brief. To me, CRM is not the issue. IF briefing an extra set of numbers was too much for both mil and civil crews, then I could see where you're coming from. But if one arena is able to do it, and for the other it's too much for them to process; hence my question.

Where I do believe that 121 likely should be doing the missed approach plan, is like I mentioned before, with the complexity of systems. THAT is where the safety card comes in, to me. Having to input numbers or do anything beyond remembering a number......or any other complex task to flex to another approach, is indeed unsafe. I fully agree with you there. And that wouldn't just be for 121, it's for any aircraft that has any kind of systems complexity that creates a workload increase when you're down low to the ground. I agree....it's not safe, it's not worth it, it's high-risk, and it's simply best to fly the missed, get away from the ground and make changes to the system when you have a flight path vector away from terrain.
 
Mike, the systems aren't anymore complex with a 717 than they are with a C-141. That's not the issue. The issue is changing the plan halfway through an approach.

We just aren't going to agree that briefing multiple backup plans is just as safe as only briefing one.
 
Mike, the systems aren't anymore complex with a 717 than they are with a C-141. That's not the issue. The issue is changing the plan halfway through an approach.

We just aren't going to agree that briefing multiple backup plans is just as safe as only briefing one.

That's what you're not seeing in my description. IF the plan was already including a contingency as previously briefed and understood, then a plan isn't being changed; as the contingency was briefed as part of the plan. The plan is still being accomplished, just a different fork in the road has been taken....a fork that all have involved agreed they understood. If any part was not understood by anyone, then the plan should've been changed and not exectued.

I agree that if a contingency was NOT briefed as part of the original plan, then flexing to a LOC approach is indeed "changing the plan". Now, one would be doing something "on the fly" and without any preparation or expectation for. I agree with you, that is indeed unsafe and fully falls under the category of "changing the plan".
 
Mike, that's not a plan. Listing several different options and saying you're going to decide what to do later isn't a plan, it's a menu. Sorry, but I don't think it's an equivalent level of safety to be making a decision about which "fork in the road" to take at 500 feet above the ground moving at 140 knots. That decision should already be made in advance so there is no equivocation at crunch time.
 
Mike, that's not a plan. Listing several different options and saying you're going to decide what to do later isn't a plan, it's a menu. Sorry, but I don't think it's an equivalent level of safety to be making a decision about which "fork in the road" to take at 500 feet above the ground moving at 140 knots. That decision should already be made in advance so there is no equivocation at crunch time.

Yes it is a plan. Have you ever heard the concept of contingencies? Plans are not single-line events always. Plans have contingencies, or "what if's", as part of the plan, that don't require terminating the plan and immediately going to re-planning.

In the bolded part, you are now saying the same thing Ive been saying.......because the decision was made at crunch time, as part of the plan's contingency; meaning no thought needed: it becomes an if/then scenario that takes one second to process, because the decisions were already made.

Again if this is so unsafe, I and many other mil planes and freight planes should've been should've been a smoking hole in the ground many times over.
 
We really going to keep beating this dead horse? :) We ain't gonna see eye to eye on this one, Mike. You look at it as a plan, I look at it as a delayed decision which then has to be made at a very poor time. It's that simple.
 
We really going to keep beating this dead horse? :) We ain't gonna see eye to eye on this one, Mike. You look at it as a plan, I look at it as a delayed decision which then has to be made at a very poor time. It's that simple.

It comes from different ways of training and different ways of thinking. You and I have completely different upbringing in terms of airmanship. I just cringe when I see guys couch something as unsafe because either they've been told it is or haven't experienced it on their own. Im not talking "hey, lets go take off in a twin engine plane on one engine"; Im meaning conceptually speaking.

Whats dangerous to me, is having a singular plan that has zero contingencies. Because you might find a time in life when that supposedly-solid singular plan of yours breaks down, and you might not have anywhere to go, because contingencies weren't considered. Just food for thought.
 
MikeD, I thought we came to a consensus on the last page? :)

121 typically defaults to the most conservative method, and in this case, it's to go missed.

Then we got into a CRM argument of how briefings work, with two different schools of thought. :)
 
Then we got into a CRM argument of how briefings work, with two different schools of thought.

Well, you keep trying to turn this into a question of airmanship, when all of us could very readily do what you're suggesting. A missed approach is typically safer than changing your minimums down low (weather and other factors considered), which is why it's briefed and flown that way in 121. If there's a thunderstorm off the end of the runway, you're on fire, or there's some other emergency going on, we'll do what we have to in order to get the airplane on the ground expeditiously.

I can say that I've flown into one airport in my career where we had a malfunction-free jet with non-convective weather, where I wouldn't have defaulted to missing the approach for a glideslope indication. I can't say where, but it was into somewhere hot and sandy with the lights off. Being that 99.9% of 121 operations are into much safer locations, there's very little need to press on.
 
That's been considered, and discarded as being less important than making sure we stick to the policy of "brief only what you're actually going to do, and only do what you brief." Plenty of study has gone into this, and the airlines all stick to the same policy. I think that says something.
Interesting. Surprises me but I guess that's what studies are for.
 
Well, you keep trying to turn this into a question of airmanship, .

No, we were discussing the concepts of how a briefing works, and what briefing contingencies are.

Anyone is able to physically do it; we were on a tangent of the CRM aspect....Mr late to the game. :D
 
Don't your guys takeoff briefs include contingencies? That's pretty normal. I doubt anyone is only going to abort, or only going to go in every situation.
 
Don't your guys takeoff briefs include contingencies? That's pretty normal. I doubt anyone is only going to abort, or only going to go in every situation.

The takeoff briefings are much the same, not really providing a menu of options and instead keeping it simple so decisions don't have to be contemplated during a critical phase of flight. Emergency before V1, abort. Emergency after V1, continue and address it in the air.
 
I still disagree, Mike. It's simply not as safe, in my opinion, and evidently in the opinion of every airline in the country. The Air Force has a different mission, and they view things differently.
I was just on a legacy jumpseat and they continued on when they lost their glideslope. Obviously it's not every airline.
 
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