Pressing "Start" on the timer when shooting an ILS

That's cool. We're not a fuel-critical, single-pilot combat aircraft. We have lots of gas, and are generally in no hurry. Cultural item that may be of note should you ever come over, lest ye get the sim instructor donkey punch during initial. :D

Thats the thing; we have C-130s etc trained, briefing it, and doing it that way. Same as your planes. Though they may or may not be reprogramming boxes or anything like that, or maybe the Nav is doing it.

Just a difference in philosophy. Thats cool.

Im mostly over in rotary land now........soul is sold. :)
 
And thats the difference with us....we do brief a flex option in terms of reverting to LOC mins if it works. So for us, it is fly what we brief....since we briefed it.

Yes, but you missed part of what I said: only brief what you're planning to do. Briefing multiple possible approaches does not put the crew in the proper mindset for what is going to be happening on the approach. It's a human factors issue. By complicating the approach with extra information that isn't necessary for the type of approach planned, you're creating a greater possibility for error. Not a big possibility, mind you, but it's a possibility, and it's entirely unnecessary, because no situation exists that makes it imperative to continue the approach rather than execute the go-around. The question is, what is the most safe course of action. Both may be considered "safe," but one is certainly more safe than the other, because it reduces the possibility for error, even if only slightly so. In airline operations, with hundreds of people's lives in the back, you go for the safest option.
 
Yes, but you missed part of what I said: only brief what you're planning to do. Briefing multiple possible approaches does not put the crew in the proper mindset for what is going to be happening on the approach. It's a human factors issue. By complicating the approach with extra information that isn't necessary for the type of approach planned, you're creating a greater possibility for error. Not a big possibility, mind you, but it's a possibility, and it's entirely unnecessary, because no situation exists that makes it imperative to continue the approach rather than execute the go-around. The question is, what is the most safe course of action. Both may be considered "safe," but one is certainly more safe than the other, because it reduces the possibility for error, even if only slightly so. In airline operations, with hundreds of people's lives in the back, you go for the safest option.

And thats where the philosophy difference is. I still say it can be situation dependant; but again it's nothing thats required to do one way or another. In your case, your hands are tied anyway by reg, and for your ops thats probably prudent. Human factors-wise, the mindset for military is already on a "flex" option potential because it was briefed. So it's almost like it's expected. And due to that, it's the proper mindset for their ops. As Ive said, and as you agree, if it isn't briefed, then don't do it. And even then, if it takes more than a couple seconds to be able to do it (like reprogramming something), then don't do it.

Im interested to do some research now on approach-landing accidents where this was being done and would've been a factor, just out of idle curiousity.

Btw.....have any of your airlines' OpsSpecs allowed radar approaches?
 
Btw.....have any of your airlines' OpsSpecs allowed radar approaches?

Oh yeah. I'm pretty sure that we could do both ASR and PAR approaches in the BE1900, and I think Pinnacle had authorization for PARs. We don't have authorization for any of it at AirTran, though. We run a pretty conservative operation.
 
This is kind of funny. The 8 initial guys who were arguing have been joined by two more who are arguing and it's getting a bit heated. The helo pilot rejects are sitting around enjoying the entertainment from the weird fixed wing guys, and egging the whole thing on with pointless commentary, making it worse. :)

Oh Army helo guys, when will you learn? Unless they were 64 or KW drivers they don't have an excuse.
 
Yes, but you missed part of what I said: only brief what you're planning to do. Briefing multiple possible approaches does not put the crew in the proper mindset for what is going to be happening on the approach. It's a human factors issue.

How is "if the GS fails, we're going to flex to the LOC" any different than, "If the GS fails, we're going to execute the missed approach", or even "if we lose an engine below V1, we're going to reject"?

It is all part of having a primary plan, and a contingency plan in case the primary doesn't work. In all of my experience, having a well planned contingency -- and briefing it prior to execution -- is part of good airmanship.

How can briefing the backup plan be a negative human factor? I have never heard that in more than 15 years worth of CRM training both in and out of the military.
 
How is "if the GS fails, we're going to flex to the LOC" any different than, "If the GS fails, we're going to execute the missed approach", or even "if we lose an engine below V1, we're going to reject"?

It is all part of having a primary plan, and a contingency plan in case the primary doesn't work. In all of my experience, having a well planned contingency -- and briefing it prior to execution -- is part of good airmanship.

How can briefing the backup plan be a negative human factor? I have never heard that in more than 15 years worth of CRM training both in and out of the military.


I think this is all just a cultural difference, ie mission orientated (military) vs risk aversion (airlines). Both accomplish the goal and over the eons have developed a "way of thinking" that is in line with that goal. The back up plan for the airline world is the missed as it is briefed with the approach. The approach doesn't work out (for whatever reason) you go missed. With a fair number of accidents being from landings that should have been go arounds there is the push on 121/135 pilots to be primed for a go around instead of primed to make the runway.

We can sit and hash out back and forth all day about where and when the GS fails, what the LOC mins are, etc. At the end of the day with a roster of 6000+ pilots operating at a pretty intense tempo day in and day out, the slightly more conservative procedure is not only easier to standardize but implement across a large pilot pool. It isn't so much for all the reasons we can sit here and think of that we should or shouldn't brief the "flex" plan its for those handful of reasons we don't that will show their ugly heads down the road.
 
How is "if the GS fails, we're going to flex to the LOC" any different than, "If the GS fails, we're going to execute the missed approach", or even "if we lose an engine below V1, we're going to reject"?

It is all part of having a primary plan, and a contingency plan in case the primary doesn't work. In all of my experience, having a well planned contingency -- and briefing it prior to execution -- is part of good airmanship.

How can briefing the backup plan be a negative human factor? I have never heard that in more than 15 years worth of CRM training both in and out of the military.

The problem is that you're briefing multiple backup plans, which means decisions about which plan to execute have to be made close to the ground with a relatively high descent rate and a relatively high ground speed. It's simply not the safest course of action. The safest way is to say what you're going to do: the ILS. If something goes wrong, say what you're going to do: go missed. The decisions are already made before the approach begins, and there is no thought that has to go into it during a critical phase of flight. Either the approach is going as planned, or its not and you go around and properly prepare for the next plan, which very well may be a LOC approach. But if it is, it will be briefed as a LOC approach.
 
MikeD We have all kind if heavy guys here. None seem to have any issues in thendifference in philosophy.

In military world, it is obviously trained to brief multiple approaches, and that's what the crew is expecting. I can also under stand the reason for getting the aircraft on the ground as the baddies also know where the planes land/takeoff from, as well as kniwing that's a very vulnerable time for the A/C so they are going to toss small pieces of metal at you at high velocities. You were trained to brief and fly that way. Everyone has been trained and there is a common understanding which keep the risk low.

Civillian world (even in my freight world), we don't do that. We don't train it, we don't fly that way. If one pilot chooses do deviate from what everyone else expects, it does create confusion, and raises the risk. To an unmanagable level? Probaly not, but to the point where it could be a link. Many airports I fly into, LOC and ILS approaches have different fixes, MAPs, and so forth. So it might not be such a clear cut case of changing from 200' HAT to 450 HAT.

To the decoupling of the GS signal to the LOC. I realize they are independent of one another, but as I've heard a long time ago "Deviation from the normal indicates something is wrong". That being said, I can not remember a time where the GS failure didn't mean something else was going on. Anyway, the GS is also monitored for failure by ATC
 
To the decoupling of the GS signal to the LOC. I realize they are independent of one another, but as I've heard a long time ago "Deviation from the normal indicates something is wrong". That being said, I can not remember a time where the GS failure didn't mean something else was going on. Anyway, the GS is also monitored for failure by ATC

I actually had this very event happen while I was shooting the ILS into KMEM in a T-38 back about 2005 or 2006. I transitioned to LOC mins and it was a non-event.

One occurrence in 15 years of flying obviously isn't statistically significant, but it does happen.
 
MikeD We have all kind if heavy guys here. None seem to have any issues in thendifference in philosophy.

In military world, it is obviously trained to brief multiple approaches, and that's what the crew is expecting. I can also under stand the reason for getting the aircraft on the ground as the baddies also know where the planes land/takeoff from, as well as kniwing that's a very vulnerable time for the A/C so they are going to toss small pieces of metal at you at high velocities. You were trained to brief and fly that way. Everyone has been trained and there is a common understanding which keep the risk low.

Civillian world (even in my freight world), we don't do that. We don't train it, we don't fly that way. If one pilot chooses do deviate from what everyone else expects, it does create confusion, and raises the risk. To an unmanagable level? Probaly not, but to the point where it could be a link. Many airports I fly into, LOC and ILS approaches have different fixes, MAPs, and so forth. So it might not be such a clear cut case of changing from 200' HAT to 450 HAT.

To the decoupling of the GS signal to the LOC. I realize they are independent of one another, but as I've heard a long time ago "Deviation from the normal indicates something is wrong". That being said, I can not remember a time where the GS failure didn't mean something else was going on. Anyway, the GS is also monitored for failure by ATC

This is why I think it is more than ok to go missed in this case.
 
MikeD We have all kind if heavy guys here. None seem to have any issues in thendifference in philosophy.

In military world, it is obviously trained to brief multiple approaches, and that's what the crew is expecting. I can also under stand the reason for getting the aircraft on the ground as the baddies also know where the planes land/takeoff from, as well as kniwing that's a very vulnerable time for the A/C so they are going to toss small pieces of metal at you at high velocities. You were trained to brief and fly that way. Everyone has been trained and there is a common understanding which keep the risk low.

Civillian world (even in my freight world), we don't do that. We don't train it, we don't fly that way. If one pilot chooses do deviate from what everyone else expects, it does create confusion, and raises the risk. To an unmanagable level? Probaly not, but to the point where it could be a link. Many airports I fly into, LOC and ILS approaches have different fixes, MAPs, and so forth. So it might not be such a clear cut case of changing from 200' HAT to 450 HAT.

To the decoupling of the GS signal to the LOC. I realize they are independent of one another, but as I've heard a long time ago "Deviation from the normal indicates something is wrong". That being said, I can not remember a time where the GS failure didn't mean something else was going on. Anyway, the GS is also monitored for failure by ATC

In single pilot freight, you always start time on the approaches. For just the reason in this thread. GS fails, new mins are XXX, takes less brain power than moving the power levers. Heck I took a ride with a company check airman that probably would have failed me if I hadn't started time.

Also, the GS is not always monitored by ATC. Commonly at untowered fields, there will be a NOTAM or something - GS/LOC/ILS un-monitored.
 
In single pilot freight, you always start time on the approaches. For just the reason in this thread. GS fails, new mins are XXX, takes less brain power than moving the power levers. Heck I took a ride with a company check airman that probably would have failed me if I hadn't started time.

Also, the GS is not always monitored by ATC. Commonly at untowered fields, there will be a NOTAM or something - GS/LOC/ILS un-monitored.

Not in all of it, I've been told during training to "just go missed and start over."
 
Not in all of it, I've been told during training to "just go missed and start over."
Hmm, well that's how the old company worked. But they had this weird fondness of making the FAF the highest workload possible for no reason.
 
Hmm, well that's how the old company worked. But they had this weird fondness of making the FAF the highest workload possible for no reason.

I've heard "the company" is like that. The only thing I like to do at FAF or GS intcept in the PA31 is "gear down, flaps 15"
 
In single pilot freight, you always start time on the approaches. For just the reason in this thread. GS fails, new mins are XXX, takes less brain power than moving the power levers. Heck I took a ride with a company check airman that probably would have failed me if I hadn't started time.

Also, the GS is not always monitored by ATC. Commonly at untowered fields, there will be a NOTAM or something - GS/LOC/ILS un-monitored.

That's cool...just generally not something you'd do in a CRM-oriented crew environment.
 
I've heard "the company" is like that. The only thing I like to do at FAF or GS intcept in the PA31 is "gear down, flaps 15"
New company SOP is to be fully configured and stabilized before FAF, not deliberately un-stabilizing yourself. Then you just fly the needles and let the garmin talk you down. It's amazing how easy it is to fly airplanes without arbitrary retardedness.
 
Honest question: Why are there separate DH & MDA knobs on many airliners (e.g. glareshield in the 737 NGs, 747-400, etc) if you should only be flying one type of approach at a time? It seems like the interface lends itself to allowing you to set both ILS and LOC mins simultaneously.
 
That's cool...just generally not something you'd do in a CRM-oriented crew environment.

Curiously, why (besides it not being normal ops)? In terms of CRM stuff, if it's briefed, then everyone should understand it, regardless. CRM/crew should have nothing to do with it, as it'd be a briefing item just like any other briefing item out there for any other procedure. Is it too much to remember? Again, I fully understand having to input new information or reprogram a box....yes, not need to be doing that low level. But briefing anything is the heart of CRM, whether it be a checklist item, or an approach brief.
 
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