desertdog71
Girthy Member
THIS....
Is the lower left corner of the big picture you can't see.
Is the lower left corner of the big picture you can't see.
Might not matter. At my company, I'm not required to be stabilized until 500 feet VMC. I like to aim for 1000' anyway, but plenty of others do not.
but you ignore the bigger point...just because you stumbled through what might have appeared to be a stable approach criteria at 500', doesn't mean you WERE stable at 500'. That would require all parameters to be stable...including the correct power setting which was not.
The industry standard for 121 jet operators is 1000' now. Most everyone has adjusted their stabilized approach criteria to that. If they haven't, they probably will in the not too distant future.
ASA/XJT went to 1000 feet a few years ago. Technically, they must be configured by 1000, but on speed by 500. At JetBlue we must be stable at 1000 in all conditions.
expect and monitor? or just expect? Do we just expect that our machines are going to work without checking them? IDK, I'm not an airline pilot any longer, and was never a jet pilot, maybe the airline guys don't monitor their equipment to be sure it's doing what you've commanded or "thought" you commanded. I guess that would be a flaw in the system., the Captain student would have expected .
I wonder if we are talking past each other here...to me this goes with the pilot being able to fly the plane and being sure it is properly stabilized...not passing through a number that is within the criteria of being stabilized at a coincidental time.Flying the aircraft "by the numbers" with certain settings and things on the way in like following a script is all well and good, but the script might get a wrench thrown in it. I'd rather fly with someone that was comfortable holding 250 until near the marker and having it stable at 1000 feet than someone that always flew it by rote. That is not to advocate the former, but just using it as an example so you can understand the more extreme case. The person that can fly it fast knows the airplane and is likely to be more aware of the energy state than the person that flies by script, and so when the former ends up in an unusual corner point (like a slam-dunk busy environment after a Pacific crossing), they would be more likely to handle or, or recognize when its not where it should be.
This.Whatever happened to the idea that Stabilized doesn't happen at one point on an approach, but is a fluid, continuous condition that begins with the beginning of final descent to the runway and ends with the landing rollout? If you put up a single gate, you can go through it on nearly any direction, but if you make it a long, thin tube with spikes on the walls (giggity), to make it all the way through demands precision during the entire transit, not just an "aim for the gate" mentality that many flight schools/departments are going toward.
Whatever happened to the idea that Stabilized doesn't happen at one point on an approach, but is a fluid, continuous condition that begins with the beginning of final descent to the runway and ends with the landing rollout? If you put up a single gate, you can go through it on nearly any direction, but if you make it a long, thin tube with spikes on the walls (giggity), to make it all the way through demands precision during the entire transit, not just an "aim for the gate" mentality that many flight schools/departments are going toward.
Well, regardless of what ASA/XJT does, my carrier, which is a 121 operator, uses 500 feet. We actually have MORE issues when it was 1000. We CHANGED to 500' for VMC a couple of years ago. Why would you think it is "industry standard"?
Look, the point is that stabilized approaches continue to be a leading cause of accidents/ incidents in the 121 world. It's not about "Ergh, Imma pilot and I can fix it." It's about how much risk you are assuming by "fixing" a bad situation. It isn't about the individual, but rather the aggregate risk, and if E'rebody flew that way, the risk would be far outside the acceptable range.
You ignore the point that as an A-320 experienced pilot, the Captain student would have expected the power to come up and maintain the speed. This highlighted a clear flaw in the FCC architecture.
Might not matter. At my company, I'm not required to be stabilized until 500 feet VMC. I like to aim for 1000' anyway, but plenty of others do not.
That's industry-standard because at the Industry Safety Info-Share meetings the airlines (and even military) get together and pretty much agree that what the best-practices are. Stabilized approaches are high on the list of things that need to be addressed as an industry.
Look, the point is that stabilized approaches continue to be a leading cause of accidents/ incidents in the 121 world. It's not about "Ergh, Imma pilot and I can fix it." It's about how much risk you are assuming by "fixing" a bad situation. It isn't about the individual, but rather the aggregate risk, and if E'rebody flew that way, the risk would be far outside the acceptable range.
Would love to see the data on stabilized approaches coming out of your company. I mean the raw data from the QAR or whatever equivalent the aircraft have. I bet it might be enlightening.
TP
I'm sorry, but from a controller's point of view, saying this guy was stabilized at 1,000 because he happened at that precise moment to be at the proper speed and altitude (as he was passing through both parameters . . . rapidly) is a bit like me saying after a late turn to the ILS, "But he was within a 30° intercept at point X, just before he blew through the final. Not my fault."
Ain't buyin' it. This aircraft was never on a stable approach.
And telling Boeing they need to fix the airplane to preclude this type accident? We have a saying in ATC: "You can't make anything foolproof because fools are so ingenious."
Okay, back to the sidelines for me.
You ignore the point that as an A-320 experienced pilot, the Captain student would have expected the power to come up and maintain the speed. This highlighted a clear flaw in the FCC architecture.
Wow, what this really is is a "I'm too good, this would NEVER happen to me" lovefest! I call B.S.
Typhoon, no, the transition could very likely would NOT have covered it. In fact, if you read the NTSB report, you'll see that there is good reason to believe it was NOT covered. In fact, most U.S. 777 pilots were not aware of that cornerpoint, including some test pilots. As you well know, Asia flying is pretty scripted in general, and a much slower pace than SFO during the busy arrival windows. It is a different ballgame. The cornerpoint they found is rarely encountered in the non-linear U.S. environment, let alone flying around Asia.
However, and more to the point, I am quite sure I could get MOST pilots into this corner-point if they did not know it was coming. It is much like the AF447 deal in that respect.
Too much pilot bashing here with little understanding in HF issues and how automation traps set in.