NTSB - Preliminary Report A350 v. CRJ (ATL)

Obviously the A350 crew fault for not seeing this CR9 and realizing it was too close. But a comment/contributing factor has to be that the CR9 did not pull up to the hold short line. It's there for a reason.
 
I thought it was to prevent encroachment into the runway environment?

Yes, but I mean it's there for you to know that - and use it like that. Pull up to the hold short line.


I remember one time landing 24R at LAX (old configuration, not the newest taxiway exits). We exit AA and told to hold short of 24L, departing traffic. Capt held short, but we were well behind the hold bars. If you know LAX, you know there's not a whole lotta room in between the runways. I looked back out my window, and my eyeball estimate was our tail was still over the hold bars for 24R (meaning we had not cleared the runway).

I told the CA, instead of accepting he actually pushed back. How he likes to keep margin from taking off aircraft (um, what?). I had to flat out tell him, we are not clear of 24R. We NEED to move up.
 
Obviously the A350 crew fault for not seeing this CR9 and realizing it was too close. But a comment/contributing factor has to be that the CR9 did not pull up to the hold short line.

If the 350 is on the taxi line, he's not expecting an aircraft to be in an area where it could interfere with his movement. To blame the A350 crew is inane.

This is bizarre.

Don’t taxi past something you can’t clear. Unless the 350’s brakes or steering stopped working, this is 100% unrelated to a nonmoving object.
 
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This is bizarre.

Don’t taxi past something you can’t clear. Unless the 350’s brakes or steering stopped working, this is 100% unrelated to a nonmoving object.
If this had been in the fog, who’s fault would it have been?

A capt is responsible for his ship. On the ramp anything goes I trust nothing. On a taxiway if I am on the line I expect to be clear of all non moving targets. Airplanes light poles or otherwise.
 
If this had been in the fog, who’s fault would it have been?

In fog, the RJ would’ve been told to taxi up to the stop bar lights or runway guard lights, as that would be the only way the crew would know where they are in relation to the runway versus just stopping in some random place on the taxiway; as they’d have the same visual limitations you would have in fog. So the wing clearance would’ve been there, barring some NOTAM about max wingspan or such in that particular part of taxiway. But in VMC, where you can see the other aircraft, you own the safe passing responsibility, no matter where a stopped aircraft is at. The conservative and prudent thing to do is if ever unsure, stop and advise ground. But that requires either being aware, or not pushing things that seem closer than usual if you are aware. The RJ isn’t parked there permanently, it’s going to move at some point.

Similar to asking what if you have a midair collision under IFR in IMC. In that scenario, ATC would be a responsible party for both sequencing and separation. In VMC, even under IFR, separation would only be from other IFR traffic, and you are still expected to see and avoid ultimately.
 
In fog, the RJ would’ve been told to taxi up to the stop bar lights or runway guard lights, as that would be the only way the crew would know where they are in relation to the runway versus just stopping in some random place on the taxiway;
I have never once cleared an aircraft to taxi to stop bar lights or anything else. It is assumed you are going to do so. In IMC as a ground controller I'll give reporting points, such as report turning on to, report passing, or report holding short of. If I taxi you to a hold short point I am expecting you to hold short of that point at a reasonable distance. This holding short nonsense was a contributing factor to the AUS incident as well. In IMC the SWA reported holding short of the runway when they were in fact still 500' from the runway.

I have worked at airports where certain taxiways are restricted by aircraft design group. Aircraft design group is not something I am taught as an ATCer. I am usually just expected to memorize the types. At JFK many long fuselage types cannot make certain turns. The common types and taxi routes I was well aware of, but one particular incident stands out where I told a restricted aircraft to taxi on RY 4L from the southeast side of the runway and the crew gave me the old "unable." Sure enough, the turns had not been paved wide from that side of the runway to accommodate larger heavies to make that turn. It was the crew of that airplane, who no doubt checked their airframe annotated taxi chart, that saved the day. In this situation the worst case scenario would have been the right main gear going through some dirt. My trainer did not fault me and I adapted. The whole point is movement of aircraft is a team effort, no matter what phase of flight.
 
On a taxiway if I am on the line I expect to be clear of all non moving targets.

Well you’re wrong. You don’t just yeet around the airport assuming
BuT i WaS oN cEnTeRliNe

Your Mark I eyeball needs to be outside while the plane is moving.

This:

The conservative and prudent thing to do is if ever unsure, stop and advise ground. But that requires either being aware, or not pushing things that seem closer than usual if you are aware.
 
I have never once cleared an aircraft to taxi to stop bar lights or anything else. It is assumed you are going to do so. In IMC as a ground controller I'll give reporting points, such as report turning on to, report passing, or report holding short of. If I taxi you to a hold short point I am expecting you to hold short of that point at a reasonable distance. This holding short nonsense was a contributing factor to the AUS incident as well. In IMC the SWA reported holding short of the runway when they were in fact still 500' from the runway.

I have worked at airports where certain taxiways are restricted by aircraft design group. Aircraft design group is not something I am taught as an ATCer. I am usually just expected to memorize the types. At JFK many long fuselage types cannot make certain turns. The common types and taxi routes I was well aware of, but one particular incident stands out where I told a restricted aircraft to taxi on RY 4L from the southeast side of the runway and the crew gave me the old "unable." Sure enough, the turns had not been paved wide from that side of the runway to accommodate larger heavies to make that turn. It was the crew of that airplane, who no doubt checked their airframe annotated taxi chart, that saved the day. In this situation the worst case scenario would have been the right main gear going through some dirt. My trainer did not fault me and I adapted. The whole point is movement of aircraft is a team effort, no matter what phase of flight.

Absolutely. My point is, low viz is the only time I’d expect an aircraft to taxi up to a hold or stop bar, as its probably the only thing they’d see when they arrived up to it if viz is that low. In a regular day, planes will stop at a hold line, 5 ft, 10 ft, 20 ft, whatever, from the line. Is 50+ feet pretty far? Sure it is. Farther than normal. But they could be 100 feet behind the line, and it still falls on the taxiing crew to either clear their aircraft, or stop if wing clearance appears questionable. The eyeball has to be used, distances assessed, and judgements made. One can’t just taxi along fat and happy and not pay attention to what is around them that they can see.
 
Re: sitting 50'+ back from the hold bar: I wonder if the Bombardier/Mitsi/whatever they are this week CRJ FCOMs come with any description of visual cues during taxi. The -900 sits pretty low to the ground and you can see pretty well forward of the nose—point being that the hold short bars would only 'disappear' out of the forward view, dead ahead, if you were darn near sitting on them if memory serves.

(Various manuals at various carriers and various fleets do or did include such a thing for ground visibility; I just checked and my Mormon Airways-issued CRJ manuals did not include that.)
 
Well you’re wrong. You don’t just yeet around the airport assuming
BuT i WaS oN cEnTeRliNe

Your Mark I eyeball needs to be outside while the plane is moving.

This:
I fly a single pilot certified airplane how exactly am I supposed to clear a wing I cannot see? It’s best guess. And a faith that when I’m on a taxiway that centerline is designed to keep you clear.
 
I fly a single pilot certified airplane how exactly am I supposed to clear a wing I cannot see? It’s best guess. And a faith that when I’m on a taxiway that centerline is designed to keep you clear.

You clear the wing by knowing where your wingtip will travel while you are looking ahead and directly to the sides. Just being on centerline with a taxi clearance does not absolve you of running into anything.
 
I fly a single pilot certified airplane how exactly am I supposed to clear a wing I cannot see? It’s best guess.
Sure, and I drive a *ugh* Guppy (737-700/800/900/MAX8/9) by no means a big plane. Since they foolishly trust me as the tiller jockey in some tight spots (looking at you SEA N Gates) I've learned to be really conservative in what I decide to continue past.

Use your experience and discretion. If you hit something that isn't moving, it's your fault. If you get some not warm n fuzzy feelings stop, and reassess. In my side of the industry, i wont get flack for not hitting something and delaying an arrival/departure. If i hit it - i'll have some s'plaining to do.

I'm not sure how we are blaming the parked car in the parking lot for getting hit.

And this:

Just being on centerline with a taxi clearance does not absolve you of running into anything.
 
Wouldn't it be cool if we could learn from this incident and the causal factors that led it it, without pointing fingers and saying "it's their fault!"

By saying "it's the A350's fault" or "it's the CRJ's fault" we basically say the pilots were incompetent, thereby ignoring all the other threats that popped up along the way. Stopping far from the hold line, distractions inside the cockpit, etc.

I highly doubt either crew was incompetent. There was just things that went on with each that led to something crazy happening. Next time a crew might pull up to the hold short lines a little closer, and a crew going by will check those wingtips for clearance.
 
Not so much incompetency as a flawed assumption that being in centerline guarantees you clearance from everything. An assumption that based on some of the comments here is more widespread than I thought.

Unfortunately it does not, and the documents make it very clear, ESPECILIALLY not for aircraft holding short as that's one exception clearly spelled out in the regs. What it does guarantee is separation with: the runway safety area, aircraft on a parallel taxiway, stationary objects (buildings, fences, antennas, light poles...things already part of the airport but not temporary ones so read the NOTAMs about any temprary wingspan restrictions), anything behind a painted limit line on an apron, and anything in a clearly marked holding bay or de-ice pad if there's a clear limit line. That's it. Everything else is see and avoid. Low visibility you're looking for the lighted markings anyway so you'd be pulled up. So would that 757 that you still couldn't clear. Plus that's why there's LVPs with only certain taxi routes allowed. They design those to avoid places where things like this could be an issue.
 
Wouldn't it be cool if we could learn from this incident and the causal factors that led it it, without pointing fingers and saying "it's their fault!"

By saying "it's the A350's fault" or "it's the CRJ's fault" we basically say the pilots were incompetent, thereby ignoring all the other threats that popped up along the way. Stopping far from the hold line, distractions inside the cockpit, etc.

I highly doubt either crew was incompetent. There was just things that went on with each that led to something crazy happening. Next time a crew might pull up to the hold short lines a little closer, and a crew going by will check those wingtips for clearance.

I don’t think any incompetence was in either cockpit. More likely perhaps some degree or combination of, workload, distraction, situational awareness, assumption, complacency, or any number of human factors that could be identified as prevention strategies for the future. Like any accident, this one will have learning points. None of these points will mean that any individual or either crew are bad people or bad at their jobs. Mistakes happen. We live and learn, constantly.
 
Taxiing a wide body is a lot more difficult than one would think. Sometimes the hardest part of my 16 hour day was the 30 mins on each end getting the aircraft to/from the gate to/from the runway. In the 74, the nose wheel is way behind you, you have to oversteer every turn, and at times all you see is grass out the window and you’re doing it by feel. The 76 was easier and more forgiving but you couldn’t see the wingtips from the flight deck. Taxiing those pigs were a lot of work.

With that in mind, it’s still the pilot that’s moving the aircraft’s responsibility to not bend metal. If there’s a doubt, set the brake. One of my TMAAT questions I have is about a time in CVG during a snowstorm I shutdown the entire DHL ramp when I wouldn’t taxi up the main alleyway. DHL was notorious for having a mess of a ramp and the snowstorm made it exponentially worse. I couldn’t guarantee wingtip clearance and told them I would need to be tugged into my spot. They told me they couldn’t do it and to just taxi in. I shut them both down and blocked the ramp. Turns out when you do that, they can get a tug crew out there pretty quick.
 
If this had been in the fog, who’s fault would it have been?

A capt is responsible for his ship. On the ramp anything goes I trust nothing. On a taxiway if I am on the line I expect to be clear of all non moving targets. Airplanes light poles or otherwise.

I agree with your outlook on the ramp, but I'd personally extend that to any ground ops anywhere. I feel like I'm in a new cycle of telling old stories over again, but this reminds me of one flight when I was in flight school in the T-45, carefully following the taxi lines leading into/out of our covered outdoor parking spots. The base CO, a real old guy, who had a great deal still getting to instruct as a terminal O-6, was in my backseat. We actually flew a lot of flights together when I was in FAM stage. Anyway, the memory is of him asking me, as I'm taxiing around, "ENS ///AMG, what does the yellow line guarantee you?". I replied "I don't think it guarantees anything sir?". He said "very good". For some reason I've always remembered that chat.
 
AIM 2-3-5a1:

When instructed by ATC to, “Hold short of (runway “xx”),” the pilot must stop so that no part of the aircraft extends beyond the runway holding position marking.

7110.65 3-7-4:

Hold a taxiing aircraft or vehicle clear of the runway as follows:
a. Instruct aircraft or vehicle to hold short of a specific runway.

No mention in the P/CG or other published FAA sources that I found.

Human factors aside, the written guidance on hold short lines is concerned with keeping traffic clear of the runway, not other taxiways.

Hypothetical situation. Two aircraft are taxiing. First one makes a turn but has to stop early because they see FOD. Or a coyote run across. Or something goes ding. Or any number of other reasons. The trailing aircraft thinks they’re clear but strikes the tail in the same way.

How’s this one different? Whether the crew saw something or was just loose with their placement, neither relieves the trailing aircraft from verifying they were clear to pass.

I don’t think the CRJ crew is going to be facing the music here. Maybe a read-and-sign asking crews to tighten up their hold shorts.
 
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