My book "Angle of Attack" is out!

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

This is a total of 3 minutes. They DID try the opposite, it did not appear to work. The reason is that for it to work would take at least 20 seconds, which is a large fraction of the time. You are pushing to zero g or less during that time. Full forward stick. If you have done high altitude stall in training, who's simulators did you use? Were they modeled for it? Most are not. You are over simplifying the situation here.

They were clueless. At one point Bonin thought they had entered a crazy fast / high speed regime of flight. Th GS on the ND was accurate. One look at that would have shown they were dangerously slow.

Airplanes don't fly in random, new regimes. Part 121 airliners are stable and predictable. The nose is pointed up and the VS is rapidly winding down, the altitude is rapidly decreasing. What else could this be BUT a stall. The fact the airplane was telling them stall, stall, stall 74 times and was not once acknowledged seems to show a selective discrimination by the crew because of an overstress situation.

You are correct we never did much (if any) high altitude stall recovery in sims and as of 2009 the Colgan crash, we were taught initially to recover at stick shaker by adding power and maintaining slight back yoke pressure to minimize altitude los. That was some bulls*** but I cooperated to graduate. It doesn't matter if you're 2,300 outside BUF or at FL350 over the Atlantic. If your wing is stalled you will fall and hit the ground unless you take immediate action to decrease the AOA by push the nose down and unload the wing.

As for the AF crew, I think calculations showed that by 13,000 feet they were doomed. That had they immediately nosed down and held that, manually trim the wheel to zero pitch setting, and keep the nose down to reduce the AOA from the +40 to a flyable value, it would have taken about 10,000 feet to recover plus another 3k feet to pull out of the dive. So when they got to 10k they we're already dead, sadly.

 

[seagull]

Your personal overconfidence is disturbing based on your listed experience. It might make you feel better but if you really think you are not vulnerable to an event like this, I am saddened. Perhaps you have some sort of unusual flight test experience that you base your confidence in? It is fortunate that these types of events are so rare. Like a microburst on final, we mostly get by with luck.

 

[seagull]

Their experience level was in the final report. The main instigator Bonin had about 2900 hrs and most of that was Airbus sidestick time. I think he had almost 1000 hrs on the 330 fleet type at AF, which means he handflew ~ 10 minutes tops every 10 hr flight. How much actual handflying skill did he really have? Very minimal.

Pretty much true. Not unlike a lot of civilian pilots in the same age range in the U.S., actually.... except he had flown aerobatics and had glider time, so perhaps he was more experienced. Plus he earned the top score on every exam he had taken, so there is that also...

Still, the point that I am making is that all that is clearly not good enough. We are skating on an overlap with people that still have broad experience in the mix (who are now beginning to retire), but with the ever increasing of scripted proceduralization in training conducted under a narrow set of parameters (which ensures no surprises and also reduces training accidents), moving straight to the latest generation of FBW regional jets, and we are losing something. Is it the fault of the pilots who are learning all that is required, even acing all of their exams, that it still is not enough?

These two pilots literally represented the best of current curriculums, but it clearly was not enough. More clear to me, after interviewing hundreds of pilots at various airlines, is that the errors in their knowledge base are extremely widely spread.

We teach a scripted response but some scenarios have no script to follow. Recall it was only after this event did the OEMs establish procedures. Prior to that is was fairly ad hoc.

 

[Roger Roger]

Excellent question. There are two aspects, the first is that we are operating within a framework that creates problems that we need to solve. As the sharp-end operators, we have no choice but to try to get the "job done" within the resources that we are provided, so if the aircraft design or systems are not ideal, the approach procedure not properly designed, the policy or procedures not correct, etc., it is up to us to fix it. We are like actors in a play, when the prop fails or the set does not work like it's supposed to, or when another actor flubs their lines or cues, it is up to us to "make it work". So, how can we do that? The biggest thing we can do is educate ourselves. Learn meteorology, and not just the rudimentary stuff in our standard training regimens. Learn aerodynamics, learn the mechanics of your airplane inside and out, etc., etc. The truth is that most of the participants here have already set themselves apart. We found in one small study that people who stay engaged regularly actually outperform people that "just fly the line".

A reference was made to the relief pilot in Air France 447. It turns out that a person working that sort of job will generally outperform a person who is "just flying the line", unless that person is engaging themselves in aviation every day. It forces you to keep your "head in the game". The same holds true for many pilots in flight management and union positions. They may be flying a fraction, but their head is engaged every day. It shows. Now, someone that both flies AND has their head in the game each day would be expected to be very good. Both of the pilots up front in AF447 were actually the types that lived, ate and breathed flying every day. What they did not have were certain skill sets. Pilots flying FBW airplanes have often never had experience feeling how their airplanes handle with degraded flight controls or direct law, and if they did, it was often a "one time" sort of demonstration. When the differences in handling qualities are mixed with the other factors the situation becomes very challenging very quickly.

So, is it up to the pilots to request to see all these sorts of events, to ASK for compound failures in extra simulator periods, to seek out additional knowledge and training on their days off? You asked what you could do. Well, I think this answered your question. By expanding your experience and expertise at every opportunity, to include making opportunities, you are doing as much as you can. One other facet is to constantly challenge your own assumptions. Do not accept things without evidence.

Thank you. That's an informative answer. Sounds like my time served as a 135 DM could pay dividends in the long term.

 

[seagull]

Thank you. That's an informative answer. Sounds like my time served as a 135 DM could pay dividends in the long term.

Absolutely. However, we have a large cadre of pilots coming up the ranks that have no exposure to a broad set of conditions.

 

[mrivc211]

The fact that the FAA "signed off on it" means absolutely nothing, as you indicated. The rule 60 compliance is not required for another couple of years, still, so they approve it based on _current_ requirements. Also, you did not indicate how far into the stall you got into before the recovery, although absent a correctly modeled simulator (and there are still only a handful on the planet for transport airplanes) is really is all practically negative training at best.

After several practice runs, I found that the airplane recovered better with an altitude loss of 5-7,000' if(being the key word) you started out in the mid to upper 30's. We did not try it in the lower 40's as we didn't(and I believe still don't) operate above 390(Pinnacle crash limitation).

 

[seagull]

After several practice runs, I found that the airplane recovered better with an altitude loss of 5-7,000' if(being the key word) you started out in the mid to upper 30's. We did not try it in the lower 40's as we didn't(and I believe still don't) operate above 390(Pinnacle crash limitation).

The problem is the model was bad it is not helpful, consider that AA tried to train using an incorrectly modeled sim which led to AA587.

 

[MikeD]

These determinations still require a heavy dose of hindsight bias. All of this is clear ONLY in hindsight. Again, this sounds to me that if someone has poisoned your drink and you did not know it it is still your fault for drinking it! And, while what you write is true on the face of it, it is also pretty much useless, like HFACS. Also, I would disagree that there was a breakdown of CRM at all, why do you think that? I would also challenge even a test pilot to make the control inputs long enough to have an effect under the conditions they were in.

An aircrew is responsible for knowing their aircraft wnd their job, period. Whether a failure of the training department at Air France or whether a lack of experience on the part of the FOs, or both. The breakdown in CRM came from the situation breaking it down, not from incompetence. The situation going downhill quick, figuratively as well as literally, with nothing they were doing seeming to work, taxed the crew mentally to where each was almost doing their own thing to try and fix the situation they had gotten themselves into and werent able to get themselves out of due to a series of errors they were making. Again, this isnt saying these were bad guys, but only that they worked themselves into a square corner that they couldnt get themselves out of with the level of training, systems knowledge, and aeronautical experience that they possessed sadly. And the further they delved into it and kept making inputs that werent working, the further they worked themselves into a frenzy. The aviation community could serve to learn an important lesson from this one indeed. A sad tragedy.

What is really amazing to me is that even with the benefit of hindsight, a great many pilots would still fall into the exact same trap. They STILL do not understand the systems or what high altitude stall are like well enough to avoid a similar situation, and we STILL know that most pilots do not know how to work their radar or meteorology enough to avoid the scenario in the first place. I am talking about numbers north of 90% of airline pilots. They THINK they have the knowledge, but they don't. They, instead have ad-hoc and incorrect mental models of what occurred, and the reasons it did. These false narratives help them to feel better but have done nothing to prevent a future similar event.

Given the same situation? You could very well be right. If there is a marked deficiency in training in those items that you cite in the airline world, its quite possible. If training departments need to improve sim time or sim fidelity in teachIng stalls or high altitude flight, or systems knowledge of advanced aircraft....such as stall possibility in normal vs alternate law; if there are deficiencies in crew learning, knowing, and understanding these things, then indeed there should be some serious looks at that and possibly changes made in how business is done there.

Too, we have to look at the concept of airmanship, and the understanding of going back to basics regarding aerodynamics when a situation presents itself that may not be immediately understood with the information being presented. Over controlling at high altitude and working the aircraft into a stall, then not recognizing it as such, could also very well go back to experience. And not just experience in reading magenta, but experience in understanding what the airplane is aerodynamically telling you; understanding the language its speaking to you in. Experience or lack of, can directly affect that, which will affect the airmanship ability to respond correctly to what the plane is trying to tell you.

The manufacturer libraries could be a big help. One would think an accident like this would spur some introspection with pilots regarding a "could this have happened to me?" train of thought, and maybe push people to review things such as this:

http://www.sftentx.com/files/75234188.pdf

 

[seagull]

An aircrew is responsible for knowing their aircraft wnd their job, period. Whether a failure of the training department at Air France or whether a lack of experience on the part of the FOs, or both. The breakdown in CRM came from the situation breaking it down, not from incompetence. The situation going downhill quick, figuratively as well as literally, with nothing they were doing seeming to work, taxed the crew mentally to where each was almost doing their own thing to try and fix the situation they had gotten themselves into and werent able to get themselves out of due to a series of errors they were making. Again, this isnt saying these were bad guys, but only that they worked themselves into a square corner that they couldnt get themselves out of with the level of training, systems knowledge, and aeronautical experience that they possessed sadly. And the further they delved into it and kept making inputs that werent working, the further they worked themselves into a frenzy. The aviation community could serve to learn an important lesson from this one indeed. A sad tragedy.



Given the same situation? You could very well be right. If there is a marked deficiency in training in those items that you cite in the airline world, its quite possible. If training departments need to improve sim time or sim fidelity in teachIng stalls or high altitude flight, or systems knowledge of advanced aircraft....such as stall possibility in normal vs alternate law; if there are deficiencies in crew learning, knowing, and understanding these things, then indeed there should be some serious looks at that and possibly changes made in how business is done there.

Too, we have to look at the concept of airmanship, and the understanding of going back to basics regarding aerodynamics when a situation presents itself that may not be immediately understood with the information being presented. Over controlling at high altitude and working the aircraft into a stall, then not recognizing it as such, could also very well go back to experience. And not just experience in reading magenta, but experience in understanding what the airplane is aerodynamically telling you; understanding the language its speaking to you in. Experience or lack of, can directly affect that, which will affect the airmanship ability to respond correctly to what the plane is trying to tell you.

The manufacturer libraries could be a big help. One would think an accident like this would spur some introspection with pilots regarding a "could this have happened to me?" train of thought, and maybe push people to review things such as this:

http://www.sftentx.com/files/75234188.pdf

Mike, I think we're on the same page with this. Part of the issue is we like to emphasize hand-flying but the regime where we need that skill set enhanced the most is where we are not allowed to hand-fly. Low altitude handling is not really an issue. We do not see many accidents down low in transport airplanes due to stick and rudder skills (trying to think of any?). They come with mixing various degrees of automation, multiple actors trying to control the same thing, each with different requirements.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Your personal overconfidence is disturbing based on your listed experience. It might make you feel better but if you really think you are not vulnerable to an event like this, I am saddened. Perhaps you have some sort of unusual flight test experience that you base your confidence in? It is fortunate that these types of events are so rare. Like a microburst on final, we mostly get by with luck.

I don't have personal overconfidence, half the time I have to pretend like I know what I'm doing. I keep pushing buttons and occasionally hit the right one.

I didn't think I had my experience listed anywhere. I'm probably they typical average experience for a major FO. About 10 yrs at the airlines and about 9,xxx hours. Now flight time is just flight time but it also means some level of experience. 9k is hardly anything, but consider that the combined experience of AF447 FOs was about 9,xxx. Heck, I know ME and Asian carriers with 777 Captains that have less than 9,000 total time. It happens, and at the ME3 for those hired 2009-2013 it was very common. Even now Emirates is hiring DEC 777 with 7,000 hrs total. It is what it is. It's a low total time requirement for that level of a job - especially at a carrier that does have abinitio FOs who are very low time.

I take a personal interest in all aviation accidents. The nerd part of me has watched every single Mayday crash investigation series, followed up to researching the accident online to find links to the crash report, analysis data, etc. to learn from it. For every single one. I see it is a learning experience and that if we as pilots don't learn from their mistakes/mishaps, then they would have died for nothing.

I've never stated that I would never do what they did. And while AF447 is a wakeup call, pulling back and holding the sidestick is something that we were never trained to do except for EGPWS escapes and in cases of windshear (follow the FDs, and you can get yourself in a situation it takes full back pressure). But in all these cases, it's a short-term full back pressure. I can't imagine holding that pressure for a long period of time, and Bonin did so for quite a bit. Of course we changed stall recovery procedures industry wide after Colgan 3407 and AF 447, but this one is still a big head scratcher.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

stuff

Are you suggesting, legitimately, that the organization(s) that make pilots "dumb system operators" legitimately have no responsibility?

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

Mike, I think we're on the same page with this. Part of the issue is we like to emphasize hand-flying but the regime where we need that skill set enhanced the most is where we are not allowed to hand-fly. Low altitude handling is not really an issue. We do not see many accidents down low in transport airplanes due to stick and rudder skills (trying to think of any?). They come with mixing various degrees of automation, multiple actors trying to control the same thing, each with different requirements.

You can still handfly up to cruise FL and then turn the AP on. Right?

The manufacturer libraries could be a big help. One would think an accident like this would spur some introspection with pilots regarding a "could this have happened to me?" train of thought, and maybe push people to review things such as this:

http://www.sftentx.com/files/75234188.pdf

If pilots cared to read history and learn. Going into SAN, I brought up PSA 182 and the CA didn't know about that one. Let me say that again, we're flying a 121 airliner into San Diego, and the Captain has never heard of PSA 182.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

If pilots cared to read history and learn. Going into SAN, I brought up PSA 182 and the CA didn't know about that one. Let me say that again, we're flying a 121 airliner into San Diego, and the Captain has never heard of PSA 182.

bruh, that sounds complicated, and they like, wore ties, right?

 

[Skåning]

Low altitude handling is not really an issue. We do not see many accidents down low in transport airplanes due to stick and rudder skills (trying to think of any?).

Your airline has seen quite a few landing accidents that seem to be pilot-induced. Why do you think that is?
Also all of the Southwest crashes (overruns), AA331, and Colgan off the top of my head all ended badly at low altitude/landing and were pilot error.

 

[Cherokee_Cruiser]

bruh, that sounds complicated, and they like, wore ties, right?

bruh they had a union. And more than a 1% raise.

 

[Autothrust Blue]

bruh they had a union. And more than a 1% raise.

Bruuhhhhhhh

 

[PeanuckleCRJ]

Come on now, it sounds like you are absolving the crew of blame. As I said, pitots froze up on a NWA A330 as well. They lost all speeds. They didn't end up like AF447.

It didn't happen just once... there were something like 5 incidents with the 330 at NW prior to AF447 along with a few other not complete blockages. A lead instructor I've flown with a few times on the 330 is also the grandaddy of modern FOQA. His insights as well as Bill Palmer's are fascinating.

Oh, and: Don't. Pitch. To. 17. Degrees. At. FL350.

 

[seagull]

I don't have personal overconfidence, half the time I have to pretend like I know what I'm doing. I keep pushing buttons and occasionally hit the right one.

I didn't think I had my experience listed anywhere. I'm probably they typical average experience for a major FO. About 10 yrs at the airlines and about 9,xxx hours. Now flight time is just flight time but it also means some level of experience. 9k is hardly anything, but consider that the combined experience of AF447 FOs was about 9,xxx. Heck, I know ME and Asian carriers with 777 Captains that have less than 9,000 total time. It happens, and at the ME3 for those hired 2009-2013 it was very common. Even now Emirates is hiring DEC 777 with 7,000 hrs total. It is what it is. It's a low total time requirement for that level of a job - especially at a carrier that does have abinitio FOs who are very low time.

I take a personal interest in all aviation accidents. The nerd part of me has watched every single Mayday crash investigation series, followed up to researching the accident online to find links to the crash report, analysis data, etc. to learn from it. For every single one. I see it is a learning experience and that if we as pilots don't learn from their mistakes/mishaps, then they would have died for nothing.

I've never stated that I would never do what they did. And while AF447 is a wakeup call, pulling back and holding the sidestick is something that we were never trained to do except for EGPWS escapes and in cases of windshear (follow the FDs, and you can get yourself in a situation it takes full back pressure). But in all these cases, it's a short-term full back pressure. I can't imagine holding that pressure for a long period of time, and Bonin did so for quite a bit. Of course we changed stall recovery procedures industry wide after Colgan 3407 and AF 447, but this one is still a big head scratcher.

If you study human performance and motor response you would see that it not only was not surprising, but actually almost inevitable. While you may not be able to imagine it, this was not the only crew to not identify the event. Were they aiming for alpha-floor to maximize performance? Were they thinking they were overspeeding (almost for sure)? The time in the descent is actually not all that long.

 

[seagull]

Your airline has seen quite a few landing accidents that seem to be pilot-induced. Why do you think that is?
Also all of the Southwest crashes (overruns), AA331, and Colgan off the top of my head all ended badly at low altitude/landing and were pilot error.

I personally did the performance analysis and can state that the pilot response was a direct response to the vehicle. More is outside the scope here, but it was not a pilot ability or stick and rudder issue. In fact, that performance analysis is a large part of why I know that the analysis I did on 447 is sound. The other accidents, again, are not a "stick and rudder" issue per se. I would venture that any of those pilots, had you asked them, could do quite a stellar job at any "stick and rudder" task you might give them. There was a disconnect between energy state and knowledge (hence the CAST ASA JSAT/JSIT on the topic, of which I was a part). Just hand flying more will not fix that.

 

[seagull]

It didn't happen just once... there were something like 5 incidents with the 330 at NW prior to AF447 along with a few other not complete blockages. A lead instructor I've flown with a few times on the 330 is also the grandaddy of modern FOQA. His insights as well as Bill Palmer's are fascinating.

Oh, and: Don't. Pitch. To. 17. Degrees. At. FL350.

Agreed, although it is not clear they realized they were.