My book "Angle of Attack" is out!

What's the point of reading the book if we already know they all die in the end?


On the serious note - congrats on the publication.
 
All pilots should be taught these two simple and extremely important points at the first hint that an airplane seems to be doing something weird:

1. Leave that s%#! alone. That's right, take your hand of the yoke or side stick and put it on your lap. Chances are it could have been a PIO-type event. Or that you are over controlling or manhandling it. Just leave it alone! AA 587, AF 447.

2. If situation worsens, leaving controlled flight: Push and roll. Don't care if you're inverted falling to the ground. Push to unload, push to unload dammit! Towards zero G, and roll to the nearest sky pointer.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
All pilots should be taught these two simple and extremely important points at the first hint that an airplane seems to be doing something weird:

1. Leave that s%#! alone. That's right, take your hand of the yoke or side stick and put it on your lap. Chances are it could have been a PIO-type event. Or that you are over controlling or manhandling it. Just leave it alone! AA 587, AF 447.

2. If situation worsens, leaving controlled flight: Push and roll. Don't care if you're inverted falling to the ground. Push to unload, push to unload dammit! Towards zero G, and roll to the nearest sky pointer.
Click to expand...

True, to a point. If you are about to hit the ground the first thing to do would not be to "let go". On the second, pushing and rolling is not always a good option. I can put you in many situations that would kill you.

One factor you might not be considering for AF447 is they went from FL380 (approx) to hitting the water in about 3 minutes. What do you suppose the acceleration was during that time? I can tell you that much of it was at around 0.5g. How many pilots would push when at 0.5g when in a thunderstorm and when the most salient indications are they are overspeeding?
 
I assumed ground contact isn't imminent, but then again, if ground contact is imminent then that means the aircraft had departed controlled flight much beforehand.

In most accident cases of the last 30 years, for loss of control, crews pulled when instead pushing would have very well saved them.

I'm sure your book will be an interesting read. But point remains you had a 2,900 an initio pilot in the right seat who was hired with 250 hrs and built his flight time one 10 hr flight at a time. The left seater relief pilot was a mgt guy doing his one flight every 90 days. The nose was pointed up, way up, while the VSI unwinds down at a terrible rate. They're not overspeeding. They're stalling. The plane even yelled stall stall. Though a few times they did push the nose down, and airspeed came back at 80 knots, the machine yelled stall stall, so maybe reflex he pulled up again and that stall alarm cut out.

A NWA of an A330 had their pitots blocked and they didn't lose control. Even the AF crew CORRECTLY identified the problem ("looks like we don't have good air speed indications") but then failed to follow procedure for lack of speed indication.

So the accident falls under pilot error.
 
Cherokee_Cruiser said:
I assumed ground contact isn't imminent, but then again, if ground contact is imminent then that means the aircraft had departed controlled flight much beforehand.

In most accident cases of the last 30 years, for loss of control, crews pulled when instead pushing would have very well saved them.

I'm sure your book will be an interesting read. But point remains you had a 2,900 an initio pilot in the right seat who was hired with 250 hrs and built his flight time one 10 hr flight at a time. The left seater relief pilot was a mgt guy doing his one flight every 90 days. The nose was pointed up, way up, while the VSI unwinds down at a terrible rate. They're not overspeeding. They're stalling. The plane even yelled stall stall. Though a few times they did push the nose down, and airspeed came back at 80 knots, the machine yelled stall stall, so maybe reflex he pulled up again and that stall alarm cut out.

A NWA of an A330 had their pitots blocked and they didn't lose control. Even the AF crew CORRECTLY identified the problem ("looks like we don't have good air speed indications") but then failed to follow procedure for lack of speed indication.

So the accident falls under pilot error.
Click to expand...

Actually, that is not what you had in the front seats. Both of them actually came from flying families, had glider experience, aerobatic experience and flew on the side. You are missing many key aspects, sounds like you read a Vanity Fair article for much of that, which was mostly wrong. This article might help a bit: https://airlinesafety.wordpress.com/2015/04/07/high-altitude-stalls-how-well-do-you-understand-them/
 
seagull said:
Actually, that is not what you had in the front seats. Both of them actually came from flying families, had glider experience, aerobatic experience and flew on the side. You are missing many key aspects, sounds like you read a Vanity Fair article for much of that, which was mostly wrong. This article might help a bit: https://airlinesafety.wordpress.com/2015/04/07/high-altitude-stalls-how-well-do-you-understand-them/
Click to expand...
I'm really curious, do you have a TL;DR version of recommendations? Because a lot of what I've read from you on these kind of topics bears almost a tone of inevitability to it, as if with our human cognitive processes accidents like this are unavoidable even with what would appear, to a pilot, to be the logical solutions. I know that's not what's intended, so can you explain in "for dummies" a couple bullet points of how we CAN prevent accidents like this?
 
seagull said:
Mike, unfortunately, any current human factors researcher would pretty much disagree with your characterization. Arguing that they made an "error" if they did something they did not know about at all is like telling you that if you had a drink that someone had slipped poison into is your own fault! It accomplishes nothing and actually leads us down the wrong path,even with the caveats you provide in "digging deeper". That is where the very flawed HFACS concepts come from. It is very much rooted in what is now called "the old view" of safety. The problem with the approach is that the "fix" that it leads to. You can see it throughout the aviation industry. We build barriers to keep the human cordoned off to prevent "error". The first choice is change the design so an error cannot be made, if that does not work, we develop policies and procedures, and more immediately we develop training to work around it. Where this leads to is an emphasis on proceduralization and training more and more to well defined problems. We have moved responsibility to the sharp end but have done so without also providing the platform for the sharp end to have the authority. We push things that sound good (cough, stabilized approaches, cough) to the detriment of real skills. All we've done is set the perfect trap so the pilot gets blamed no matter what.
Click to expand...

You are confusing "what" versus "why". When an accident occurs where a perfectly good plane gets flown into the ground, and no external factors are causal and where the crew is found at fault; the "what" encompass the actions or inactions that the crew did or did not do.....omission or commission....that physically put that plane into the ground. The "why" are the secondary factors that are found and analyzed that caused the "what" to occur. "Why"' is not the actual actions of the crew that were causal to the physical act of the plane impacting the ground.

If I have an aircraft accident where I didn't understand a system, didn't handle a system correctly, or didn't understand what the aircraft was doing, my specific actions or inactions would be the causal factors as to HOW that accident occurred...what physically caused the perfectly good plane to become wreckage. Whether I was properly trained or not, is immaterial to the actual cause of what out the plane into the ground as a primary causal factor. Now, if during the investigation of the "why'", it's discovered that I was deficient in systems knowledge, or not trained correctly or enough, or whatever; then that becomes secondary factor(s) in the analysis of the "what" that occurred. And now indeed things like my agency's training and checking department practices and procedures will indeed come under the microscope as to why I was out on the line when not properly trained and ultimately not properly qualified. That's how the process works of primary, secondary and tertiary factors, and what is causal or contributing.
 
seagull said:
Actually, that is not what you had in the front seats. Both of them actually came from flying families, had glider experience, aerobatic experience and flew on the side. You are missing many key aspects, sounds like you read a Vanity Fair article for much of that, which was mostly wrong.
Click to expand...

At what point did any of these crewmembers revert to basic airmanship, with all this prior experience? What their families did or whether an aviator family is nice, but it's immaterial to their actual amount of basic airmanship they had, and the amount of aviation experience they had acquired and had able to access in their bag of SA.

This is not a hit on these guys personally, but it's part of the method of understanding the why behind the what that was their actions and inactions.
 
Roger Roger said:
I'm really curious, do you have a TL;DR version of recommendations? Because a lot of what I've read from you on these kind of topics bears almost a tone of inevitability to it, as if with our human cognitive processes accidents like this are unavoidable even with what would appear, to a pilot, to be the logical solutions. I know that's not what's intended, so can you explain in "for dummies" a couple bullet points of how we CAN prevent accidents like this?
Click to expand...

Excellent question. There are two aspects, the first is that we are operating within a framework that creates problems that we need to solve. As the sharp-end operators, we have no choice but to try to get the "job done" within the resources that we are provided, so if the aircraft design or systems are not ideal, the approach procedure not properly designed, the policy or procedures not correct, etc., it is up to us to fix it. We are like actors in a play, when the prop fails or the set does not work like it's supposed to, or when another actor flubs their lines or cues, it is up to us to "make it work". So, how can we do that? The biggest thing we can do is educate ourselves. Learn meteorology, and not just the rudimentary stuff in our standard training regimens. Learn aerodynamics, learn the mechanics of your airplane inside and out, etc., etc. The truth is that most of the participants here have already set themselves apart. We found in one small study that people who stay engaged regularly actually outperform people that "just fly the line".

A reference was made to the relief pilot in Air France 447. It turns out that a person working that sort of job will generally outperform a person who is "just flying the line", unless that person is engaging themselves in aviation every day. It forces you to keep your "head in the game". The same holds true for many pilots in flight management and union positions. They may be flying a fraction, but their head is engaged every day. It shows. Now, someone that both flies AND has their head in the game each day would be expected to be very good. Both of the pilots up front in AF447 were actually the types that lived, ate and breathed flying every day. What they did not have were certain skill sets. Pilots flying FBW airplanes have often never had experience feeling how their airplanes handle with degraded flight controls or direct law, and if they did, it was often a "one time" sort of demonstration. When the differences in handling qualities are mixed with the other factors the situation becomes very challenging very quickly.

So, is it up to the pilots to request to see all these sorts of events, to ASK for compound failures in extra simulator periods, to seek out additional knowledge and training on their days off? You asked what you could do. Well, I think this answered your question. By expanding your experience and expertise at every opportunity, to include making opportunities, you are doing as much as you can. One other facet is to constantly challenge your own assumptions. Do not accept things without evidence.
 
MikeD said:
You are confusing "what" versus "why". When an accident occurs where a perfectly good plane gets flown into the ground, and no external factors are causal and where the crew is found at fault; the "what" encompass the actions or inactions that the crew did or did not do.....omission or commission....that physically put that plane into the ground. The "why" are the secondary factors that are found and analyzed that caused the "what" to occur. "Why"' is not the actual actions of the crew that were causal to the physical act of the plane impacting the ground.

If I have an aircraft accident where I didn't understand a system, didn't handle a system correctly, or didn't understand what the aircraft was doing, my specific actions or inactions would be the causal factors as to HOW that accident occurred...what physically caused the perfectly good plane to become wreckage. Whether I was properly trained or not, is immaterial to the actual cause of what out the plane into the ground as a primary causal factor. Now, if during the investigation of the "why'", it's discovered that I was deficient in systems knowledge, or not trained correctly or enough, or whatever; then that becomes secondary factor(s) in the analysis of the "what" that occurred. And now indeed things like my agency's training and checking department practices and procedures will indeed come under the microscope as to why I was out on the line when not properly trained and ultimately not properly qualified. That's how the process works of primary, secondary and tertiary factors, and what is causal or contributing.
Click to expand...

I am well aware, and you are citing the way it is written. I am saying that the way we are looking at it, and the formal "findings" are problematic and not actually conducive to preventing future accidents. I suggest "The Field Guide to Human Error" by Dekker as a good starting point.
 
MikeD said:
At what point did any of these crewmembers revert to basic airmanship, with all this prior experience? What their families did or whether an aviator family is nice, but it's immaterial to their actual amount of basic airmanship they had, and the amount of aviation experience they had acquired and had able to access in their bag of SA.

This is not a hit on these guys personally, but it's part of the method of understanding the why behind the what that was their actions and inactions.
Click to expand...

That is part of the point. Their "basic airmanship" was actually quite good based on all available evidence. That is part of what makes this accident a good case study.
 
seagull said:
Excellent question. There are two aspects, the first is that we are operating within a framework that creates problems that we need to solve. As the sharp-end operators, we have no choice but to try to get the "job done" within the resources that we are provided, so if the aircraft design or systems are not ideal, the approach procedure not properly designed, the policy or procedures not correct, etc., it is up to us to fix it. We are like actors in a play, when the prop fails or the set does not work like it's supposed to, or when another actor flubs their lines or cues, it is up to us to "make it work". So, how can we do that? The biggest thing we can do is educate ourselves. Learn meteorology, and not just the rudimentary stuff in our standard training regimens. Learn aerodynamics, learn the mechanics of your airplane inside and out, etc., etc. The truth is that most of the participants here have already set themselves apart. We found in one small study that people who stay engaged regularly actually outperform people that "just fly the line".

A reference was made to the relief pilot in Air France 447. It turns out that a person working that sort of job will generally outperform a person who is "just flying the line", unless that person is engaging themselves in aviation every day. It forces you to keep your "head in the game". The same holds true for many pilots in flight management and union positions. They may be flying a fraction, but their head is engaged every day. It shows. Now, someone that both flies AND has their head in the game each day would be expected to be very good. Both of the pilots up front in AF447 were actually the types that lived, ate and breathed flying every day. What they did not have were certain skill sets. Pilots flying FBW airplanes have often never had experience feeling how their airplanes handle with degraded flight controls or direct law, and if they did, it was often a "one time" sort of demonstration. When the differences in handling qualities are mixed with the other factors the situation becomes very challenging very quickly.

So, is it up to the pilots to request to see all these sorts of events, to ASK for compound failures in extra simulator periods, to seek out additional knowledge and training on their days off? You asked what you could do. Well, I think this answered your question. By expanding your experience and expertise at every opportunity, to include making opportunities, you are doing as much as you can. One other facet is to constantly challenge your own assumptions. Do not accept things without evidence.
Click to expand...

Excellent points. Would love to see more training on go arounds, alternate/direct law, compound failures etc. But how does one go about this? Companies are profit driven, and we all know we can't show up to the training department on our days off and ask for some sim sessions. I venture to guess more pilots probably would if given a choice.
 
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