More pictures from the Asiana Accident

Reading about how his "culture" played a part in people dying really pisses me off. He wouldn't wear sunglasses because it was "impolite" HA. I find not taking peoples safety into account pretty impolite. What does their culture say about that?
 
Having never landed anything over 12,500, I don't know what flying something that remotely big would be like. How hard is a AP off and any other automated system off visual approach in an aircraft that large, sans ILS or VASI?
 
scooter2525 said:
Having never landed anything over 12,500, I don't know what flying something that remotely big would be like. How hard is a AP off and any other automated system off visual approach in an aircraft that large, sans ILS or VASI?
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You fly large aircraft just like you fly small aircraft. Fly a nice stable and on speed approach from the pilot seat forward and the rest of the airplane and passengers will kindly follow you to the runway. Really, It's not that different.
 
CaptBill said:
You fly large aircraft just like you fly small aircraft. Fly a nice stable and on speed approach from the pilot seat forward and the rest of the airplane and passengers will kindly follow you to the runway. Really, It's not that different.
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I didn't think it would be.

Certainly not scary, right?
 
We have a systemic problem of stalling airplanes. Look at the last three 'big' accidents over the last few years, Colgan, Air France, and Asiana. Three different airlines, with different cultures, resources, and crew experiences. However, they are similar as all three have had loss of live and hull losses due to the fact they have all stalled aircraft. This points DIRECTLY to a lack of training and an understanding of stall characteristics.

Luckily, the place I am at now, Spirit, and Colgan (after the accident) has emphasized stall training during different regimes of flight. It is eye opening.

I just had my MV/LOE (yearly recurrent training/sim check). Even though I fly a 'small Boeing' they put us in the scenario (for demonstration) the Asiana crew was in going into SFO automation wise. We then took it to the stick shaker and attempted to recover at a couple of hundred of feet. It wasn't easy but really glad we were able to see it.
 
Seggy said:
We have a systemic problem of stalling airplanes. Look at the last three 'big' accidents over the last few years, Colgan, Air France, and Asiana. Three different airlines, with different cultures, resources, and crew experiences. However, they are similar as all three have had loss of live and hull losses due to the fact they have all stalled aircraft. This points DIRECTLY to a lack of training and an understanding of stall characteristics.

Luckily, the place I am at now, Spirit, and Colgan (after the accident) has emphasized stall training during different regimes of flight. It is eye opening.

I just had my MV/LOE (yearly recurrent training/sim check). Even though I fly a 'small Boeing' they put us in the scenario (for demonstration) the Asiana crew was in going into SFO automation wise. We then took it to the stick shaker and attempted to recover at a couple of hundred of feet. It wasn't easy but really glad we were able to see it.
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While it's great to have understanding of stall characteristics, we need to be focusing on never getting to that point in the first place. It's as simple as pitch and power. Change one, make sure the other one changes or make it change. If you had the power back while descending and you or the autopilot pull the nose up to level off, make sure the power comes up. Maybe some thing as simple as a ding like the altitude alerter. If you go below ref it dings. That's a lot further away from from the shaker. While the shaker is a warning, by that time if you don't react correctly you're probably screwed. If a ding goes off a knot below ref or ref for your configuration, a simple power change should fix it. Even if you're at idle. It's also different than the "sink rate" warning. If I remember correctly those are predicated on more then just speed, but rate of descent as we'll. Bottom line, no one should ever be along for the ride like they were in SFO and BUF.
 
PositionAndHold said:
Bottom line, no one should ever be along for the ride like they were in SFO and BUF.
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All you said is very true.

However, it's happening. Not one of these pilots thought they'd be along for the ride they were that day of their accident, but they were. The next question is, why were they?
 
Seggy said:
All you said is very true.

However, it's happening. Not one of these pilots thought they'd be along for the ride they were that day of their accident, but they were. The next question is, why were they?
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Exactly. How can a whole crew including a jumpseater just not say any thing or space out. It's pretty disturbing in this case.
 
PositionAndHold said:
Exactly. How can a whole crew including a jumpseater just not say any thing or space out. It's pretty disturbing in this case.
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The CVR transcript shows that only two things were questioned, members of the crew thought the plane was too high at a few points on final, and the jumpseater called out "sinkrate" twice but not when the crash was imminent. Yet, with no mention of airspeed or an impending crash, even when the stick shaker activated, I agree disturbing stuff.
 
CaptBill said:
You fly large aircraft just like you fly small aircraft. Fly a nice stable and on speed approach from the pilot seat forward and the rest of the airplane and passengers will kindly follow you to the runway. Really, It's not that different.
Click to expand...

Hmm. In a small airplane, I tend to break overhead the numbers and descend with continuous constant power reduction and a continuous constant 360 turn to the threshold. Over the fence, power has gone to idle, I'm easing the stick back to stall+10. Over the threshold and centerline I start to bring my wings level and squeeze back on the stick 'til the wheels come down so nice and sweet. Am I doing it wrong? 'Cause last night on the visual, I did the same thing in the Lear.
:eek2:
 
Seggy said:
All you said is very true.

However, it's happening. Not one of these pilots thought they'd be along for the ride they were that day of their accident, but they were. The next question is, why were they?
Click to expand...

Cause there is no gravity... the earth sucks.
 
Seggy said:
We have a systemic problem of stalling airplanes. Look at the last three 'big' accidents over the last few years, Colgan, Air France, and Asiana. Three different airlines, with different cultures, resources, and crew experiences. However, they are similar as all three have had loss of live and hull losses due to the fact they have all stalled aircraft. This points DIRECTLY to a lack of training and an understanding of stall characteristics.

Luckily, the place I am at now, Spirit, and Colgan (after the accident) has emphasized stall training during different regimes of flight. It is eye opening.

I just had my MV/LOE (yearly recurrent training/sim check). Even though I fly a 'small Boeing' they put us in the scenario (for demonstration) the Asiana crew was in going into SFO automation wise. We then took it to the stick shaker and attempted to recover at a couple of hundred of feet. It wasn't easy but really glad we were able to see it.
Click to expand...


I totally agree with your observation of same accident / different day. However, I might propose an alternative conclusion.
This points DIRECTLY at a bunch of box-checking, know-nothing, money-grubbing shoeheels who lack the ability or desire to train, and more profoundly, lack the ability or desire to discern, and therefore, pay a quality pilot.
 
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