Learjet 60 crash in West Palm Beach

Inverted said:
I think their incident in TEB back in May is another indicator of that. That video concerns me for a couple of reasons. If they really couldn't maintain altitude, why not declare an emergency and say it was severe? Or was it an airmanship issue, as everyone else was in moderate and nothing else? Is there a pattern of flying into bad weather and dismissing the severity?
Click to expand...
Which then begs the question if the airplane was already damaged before the final flight? I don't think we will ever know that answer.
 
Inverted said:
I think their incident in TEB back in May is another indicator of that. That video concerns me for a couple of reasons. If they really couldn't maintain altitude, why not declare an emergency and say it was severe? Or was it an airmanship issue, as everyone else was in moderate and nothing else? Is there a pattern of flying into bad weather and dismissing the severity?
Click to expand...

The last sentence here, based upon that TEB indicent, makes me wonder this, were I involved in investigating this accident; and whether or not this was a training or operational trend with the company to minimize or be dismissive of turbulence severity. When ATC has to correct you about what kind of turbulence you are in based on altitude deviations and inability to maintain an altitude, that reflects poorly on the flight crew. Any flight crew.
 
MikeD said:
The last sentence here, based upon that TEB indicent, makes me wonder this, were I involved in investigating this accident; and whether or not this was a training or operational trend with the company to minimize or be dismissive of turbulence severity. When ATC has to correct you about what kind of turbulence you are in based on altitude deviations and inability to maintain an altitude, that reflects poorly on the flight crew. Any flight crew.
Click to expand...

A good pilot is always learning, staying curious. Not because they have to, but because they want to. A good pilot wonders what the official reporting criteria is and thinks to open the AIM and investigate for later knowledge. A dangerous pilot leaves the curiosity and learning to someone else. Not much studying is done in this regard. It certainly shows. Attitude, Skill, Knowledge. The important trio.
 
Last edited:
Wardogg said:
So VASaviation backs up the communication back when they were over the Gulf(of A or M, your choice). They asked for direct Freeport to which the controller approves but then subsequently tells them the turn doesn’t look good due to extreme precip 25 miles ahead and 100 miles in diameter. At the time they were at 410. They said they’d look at it and then asked for a fix a little further south and then Freeport which kept them mostly clear.

Seems very strange to me that they couldn’t see the problems ahead at 410 from 25 miles out. So I’m wondering what they were using for strategic planning for getting through a convective SIGMET.

Also finding out the horizontal stab didn’t have deice capability is mind blowing. Tail full of SLD ice and severe turbulence. I guess the question becomes which came first the chicken or the egg. Did the tail come off and it was doomed from the start or did an upset and recovery attempt remove the tail and seal their fate.

I’m flying today through what appears to be a convective line in the Midwest. I can tell you what will be playing through my head today for sure.
Click to expand...

The Challenger 300/350/3500 doesn't have deice on the horizontal stab either. They say that it is aerodynamically impossible for ice to accumulate there enough to adversely affect anything.
 
Kingairer said:
Not in my world. I think when it was a new capability, some people couldn't control themselves, but I haven't seen it lately. In my mind its one of the few things, intentional non-compliance, that could get you fired from a comfortable job. I can't speak to the prevalence of it in corporate part 91 type operations. It surprises me that the text would be during a complex portion of the flight, like wx deviations and routings. It would surprise me if it was at FL410 with a clear blue sky over Kansas.
Click to expand...

Emails and text messages went information pertinent to the job are flowing in the part 91 world. Clients care about getting, where they want on time, the driver being ramp side amd waiting, and the catering being correct just as much as anything else. All this takes a lot of coordination. Emails and text messages are pretty norm.

Back when flew charter at travel management company....it was quite normal for the company to be emailing a crew about diverting to a new destination to pick up a client before the gear was even in the well good.

I don't know a charter crew from any charter company that has not gone back and forward with dispatch about a decision to divert from Aspen to Rifle or Eagle.
 
Ok after a few nights I can to come back to this post.

First off, thanks to those that reached out to me...those 12 hours after the incident wrecked me emotionally. I called off my next two legs and went home. I was driving myself crazy with "what if" scenarios and fleeting mortality questions non stop.

We were already on with Miami Center when N722BD checked on. I'm sure most have heard the transcript, I refuse to listen to it. I've heard hundreds of accident CVR's but to actually hear it live happening was something I just never thought I was going to experience. Not to mention a young girl only 13 years older than my own.

Full honesty when the her voice came over the radio in distress, there was a moment where this can't be real. I can't possibly be hearing what I'm hearing, a distressed airplane in real time??? Then the panicked voice of them going over 20,000 ft/min and that moment of we are going to live this girls final moments

(I know there was the other pilot and the passengers but we were hearing HER voice)

The Captain both looked at each other and we're in utter disbelief. After her 10,000 ft call we knew it was over...the radio frequency seemed to just stop as if everyone on frequency was realizing the same thing instantly. ATC asked a recently checked on Delta to broadcast on 121.5, so for the next 3 minutes we listened to a call for N722BD that we knew would never answer back.

We changed frequencies shortly after and now for the next 2 hours we had to sit there are contemplate what we just heard. We briefed that approach into Punta Cana 3 times because we kept forgetting that we did it. I barely remember getting to the hotel, I was a shell, just reliving the moments in my head. I didn't sleep that night.

I go to upgrade next month and then at 5 am realized that this girl was just building time, there's a chance she could have been my FO in 5 years...I lost it and called out.

Fast forward a day and I'm doing much better, I've spoken to Project Wingman (Americans Pilot support program)

I share this because I know there are dozen of other pilots that heard the same thing and will have vastly different responses to it. Some will go on like it's another Monday, others more extreme.

My point it use the resources that your company/union have and don't be scared to ask for help.

Adam
 
Sorry brother, I’m sure that must have been horrible to listen to.

My thought is that at some point, perhaps coincident with the massive increase in descent rate, they no longer had a recoverable airplane and probably knew it. That magnitude of ROD would be common both to a developed nose low and/or inverted spin, an accelerating downhill spiral, or complete loss of pitch authority (stab came off) and the nose just pitching over. There’d be differences, but probably too nuanced for her to recognize or ADS-B data to confirm. My guess is they got into or close to coffin corner, stalled then immediately oversped, accelerated stall again, some form of departure, and then ripped the tail off trying to recover from that. I imagine a Lear is nasty in a departure, though some of you probably know a whole lot more about that than i do.
 
You must log in or register to reply here.
Back
Top