It isn't the automation, it is the Pilot Monitoring, CRM and Culture

Acrofox said:
Cowboys are best at managing herds of cattle... not so sure 'gunfighting' is a line item on the job req.
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John-Wayne-p25.jpg
 
Chaperone the cattle in the morning, steal the girl from the evil authority figure/evil anti-authority figure in the afternoon, uphold American Virtue against the forces of Tyranny and/or people of non-European descent in the evening! All in a days work, no big deal. I swear, you people are lazy. Put down that book, and you might learn somethin!
 
Seggy said:
Here is the thing with the 1500 hour rule. They are looking at it that it will allow a foundation of experience to be developed that will allow pilots to transition to an ATP Certificate holder. As you gain the experience to 1500 hours, you will be faced with situations were you need to make a command decision, manage a potentially dangerous situation, and go out and learn based upon a variety of situations.

Contrast that to the 'ab-initio' programs you are talking about were learning is in a controlled environment. Yes, it usually works, but when a situations presents itself outside of the box, such as shooting a visual approach into SFO without any vertical guidance, the pilot can't think. The closest thing we have here in the states is the PFT scheme we had at Gulfstream. The Captain of the Pinnacle flight that stalled went there, the Comair FO went there, and the Captain of the Colgan accident went there. Is it ironic or is there something more there? I think it is something more.
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This may not have anything to do with anything, but I knew of the Pinnacle captain (doesn't deserve a capital "C") when he was a flight instructor. I heard from many people that it wasn't a matter of if, but when and how many he took with him.
 
Boris Badenov said:
Now why do I feel like that was directed at me, specifically? I thought we were just having a nice discussion about how to make the national airspace system safer.

In any case, taking it that you're jumping off from my post and suggesting that the road to increased safety lies through programming the computer correctly and responding to any idiot lights in the way that produces a banana for the yoke operator, what do you reckon was the programming-failure on the A300 in New York? Or Colgan? Or, I mean, Asiana, right?
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At no point have I EVER said stick and rudder is unimportant. Your post is very stereotypical of the issues we face going forward as an industry.

What I said was skills for managing a flight are just as important as skills flying those old ratty airplanes. You don't have a sole proprietorship on flying old junk. Also, you took my word of "managing" and falsely translated it to programming.

Managing a flight is multifaceted, and the managing pilot usually changes over the course of a flight. We'll ignore American's accident in New York because there really are few issues other than a pilot over controlling the rudder, a technique that was fine in a previous aircraft type. Asiana definitely was a management issue. From an automated stand point as well as a manual flying stand point. If the PM would have said "airspeed" when below target or "go around" it may never have happened.

The very first step of this process is to get the chip off of pilot's that "managing" a flight doesn't mean programming a box, it truly means managing the energy state and point in space as well as the avionics are managed, and ensuring the task load of the cockpit is a good pace - not overloaded causing loss of SA or properly completed tasks.
 
ERfly said:
This may not have anything to do with anything, but I knew of the Pinnacle captain (doesn't deserve a capital "C") when he was a flight instructor. I heard from many people that it wasn't a matter of if, but when and how many he took with him.
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If you are talking about 3701... @PeanuckleCRJ may have better insight on the guy.
 
CRM doesn't have to be this nebulous, undefinable, illusive, thing.... It isn't a buzzword to make some office betty feel good, neither is safety.

Here's the thing. Flying is, for lack of a better term, easy. I don't mean that from a manual manipulation of the airplane easy, I mean from the standpoint of what is expected of you as a pilot. Part 91, 121, 135, et al lays out what you can and can't do. If applicable, your OpSpecs further lay out what you can and can't do. Your AFM/POH/FOM/GOM lays out how and what to do with the airplane in normal, abnormal and emergency situations. For the vast majority of the flying that an individual will experience in a "professional" career, your actions are laid out before you in tightly bound little books with three and four letter abbreviations scribed on the spine.

YET! We still argue about when to fly an ODP, or when is it ok to dip below the glideslope, or any host of other topics that are clearly spelled out in the aforementioned books. Hell, there are even chapters on checklist/IAI/QRH usage and how to properly use a damn checklist and folks still can't read the things correctly or use them without making up their own procedures on the fly.

This 51%/49% crap about Capt/FO authority has got to stop. The FO hits the ground at the same time the Capt does. If you fly with me and don't speak up when I'm making one of my daily missteps because of some perceived authority gradient, I'm gonna get the chain of command and beat you with it.

This isn't supposed to be some wang waiving/measuring, hey look how awesome I am, I'm smarter than the book, I have more time on the lav than you do total time, back in my day, fracking CONTEST!!!!

Fly the airplane by the book, obey the damn rules, be a leader not because of the seat you're in but because the responsibility and authority granted you by the chunk of plastic in your wallet.
 
mshunter said:
Since you seem to be very well versed with CRM @Seggy, what is your opinion on the first officer being able to call an abort on takeoff.
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I think it should be the Captains decision. A rejected take-off is probably one of the most dangerous maneuvers and as it is very, very, very, very rare that if you go flying you would be in worse shape than if you make a decision to abort, having one person make that decision is probably the safest course of action.

However, it comes down to proper training and guidance to allow for that responsibility to fall on the Captain alone.

Before every trip or every flight with a new crew we have to brief the rejected take off procedures to get everyone on the same page. We also have a chart of very specific guidance on considerations for rejected take-offs in the low and high speed regime. It is also a big point of emphasis during recurrent training items.
 
jgheggie said:
I suppose that makes sense. I did not know the cap went to gulfstream.
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The aviation rule making committee for the 1500 hour ATP rule did take into consideration your point of view though. If you look at the point that if you go to an 'aviation college' a few hundred hours are knocked off the requirement. I think that is a happy medium between giving credit for the academic knowledge and 'go out and fly' approach.
 
Dugie8 said:
CRM doesn't have to be this nebulous, undefinable, illusive, thing.... It isn't a buzzword to make some office betty feel good, neither is safety.

Here's the thing. Flying is, for lack of a better term, easy. I don't mean that from a manual manipulation of the airplane easy, I mean from the standpoint of what is expected of you as a pilot. Part 91, 121, 135, et al lays out what you can and can't do. If applicable, your OpSpecs further lay out what you can and can't do. Your AFM/POH/FOM/GOM lays out how and what to do with the airplane in normal, abnormal and emergency situations. For the vast majority of the flying that an individual will experience in a "professional" career, your actions are laid out before you in tightly bound little books with three and four letter abbreviations scribed on the spine.

YET! We still argue about when to fly an ODP, or when is it ok to dip below the glideslope, or any host of other topics that are clearly spelled out in the aforementioned books. Hell, there are even chapters on checklist/IAI/QRH usage and how to properly use a damn checklist and folks still can't read the things correctly or use them without making up their own procedures on the fly.

This 51%/49% crap about Capt/FO authority has got to stop. The FO hits the ground at the same time the Capt does. If you fly with me and don't speak up when I'm making one of my daily missteps because of some perceived authority gradient, I'm gonna get the chain of command and beat you with it.

This isn't supposed to be some wang waiving/measuring, hey look how awesome I am, I'm smarter than the book, I have more time on the lav than you do total time, back in my day, fracking CONTEST!!!!

Fly the airplane by the book, obey the damn rules, be a leader not because of the seat you're in but because the responsibility and authority granted you by the chunk of plastic in your wallet.
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^That

I've yet to understand the distinction between the different operations when we talk safety, CRM, or any other "issue". If we're gonna go there, how about we take a look at what part 91 corporate outfits are doing, because they're statistically the safest, by A LOT.
 
Boris Badenov said:
Wait, is that "out of the box" now? A visual approach with *jarring minor chord* NO VERTICAL GUIDANCE?

I liked the rest of your post so much that I started wondering exactly who you are and what you've done with Seggy.
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Come on now. For you and I a visual is not 'out of the box'. But as @BobDDuck said, for that Asiana crew (and a lot of other crews world wide), it is.
 
ERfly said:
This may not have anything to do with anything, but I knew of the Pinnacle captain (doesn't deserve a capital "C") when he was a flight instructor. I heard from many people that it wasn't a matter of if, but when and how many he took with him.
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The worst guys I flew with at Colgan were those that went to Gulfstream or Tab Express and did the PFT route.
 
@Seggy, You've mentioned the Colgon crash a couple of times here. I'm not sure if you knew the crew personally but what CRM error, if any, do you think was a REAL factor in this? If present, what "culture" change occured at Colgon? Not necessarily company policy changes but rather HOW did it change? And how was/is it enforced if non-compliant?

P.S. I'm not a 121 seater and my personal experiance with CRM culture and it's implementation will not and can not work in the airline industry
 
dustoff17 said:
@Seggy, You've mentioned the Colgon crash a couple of times here. I'm not sure if you knew the crew personally but what CRM error, if any, do you think was a REAL factor in this? If present, what "culture" change occured at Colgon? Not necessarily company policy changes but rather HOW did it change? And how was/is it enforced if non-compliant?

P.S. I'm not a 121 seater and my personal experiance with CRM culture and it's implementation will not and can not work in the airline industry
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I actually saw the crew the morning of the accident. Talked to the jumpseater in the back on the drive home after I landed from my commute home.

I also worked on the Colgan crash.

Anyway, there were a ton of errors with the flight crew on that flight, yes it was a real factor. The position of the INCR REF switch was missed, wrong speeds bugged, a trending loss of airspeed, etc are some of the many. The culture of Colgan eventually changed after the accident. It morphed from a punitive safety culture to a just safety culture. It took a lot of time, but it did happen.

I don't get what you are saying with your P.S.
 
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