German Wings A320 crashed

I wholeheartedly disagree with you here. Poor pitch/power management was absolutely critical to both of those accidents.

Those pilots were all great stick and rudder pilots, look at their backgrounds. The Asian pilot flying could have rolled that 777 while flying under the Golden Gate, and the F/O at AF447 was a very experienced pilot with lots of GA time, glide pilot on his days off, etc. I can guarantee that YOU would not recognize a stall at 35,000'. I can also be sure that I could lead you down the path that got the Asiana crew, with a little fatigue and a few automation expectations. BTDT. Careful thinking that either of those could not happen to you because the real factors in both of those are traps that will get the more competent pilots.
 
I'm just curious what design philosophy you're talking about...

Most arguments I see towards Airbus being crap is the fly-by-wire...but the new 777 and 787 are using fly-by-wire. It seems to have quiet down the "If it ain't Boeing, I ain't going" argument. Clearly still running strong.

FBW doesn't bother me (although I did love my Direct Cable 717). The problem is the design philosophy that their airplanes should behave differently than every other airplane. Examples: throttles don't move when the autothrust system is operating; sticks don't move when inputs are being applied to them; averaging of inputs when both sticks are moved at the same time; etc. Boeing FBW doesn't involve this crap. When a 777 autothrottle adds thrust, you see the throttles move. If your hand is on them, you have not only visual, but also tactile feedback. This is how pilots are used to airplanes working. You put pilots in airplanes for 15,000 hours that operate a certain way, then you drop them into an Airbus that has all of these "laws" and the airplane doesn't behave like every other airplane, and you're just asking for trouble.

Oh and to the Boeing lovers airbus haters. You can keep your Boeing, I'll keep the confy of the bus. maybe Boeing will join the rest of the world and get rid of the yoke.

Always the response of an Airbus lover: "but I like my tray table!" I don't care about your comfort, I care about not dying.
 
FBW doesn't bother me (although I did love my Direct Cable 717). The problem is the design philosophy that their airplanes should behave differently than every other airplane. Examples: throttles don't move when the autothrust system is operating; sticks don't move when inputs are being applied to them; averaging of inputs when both sticks are moved at the same time; etc. Boeing FBW doesn't involve this crap. When a 777 autothrottle adds thrust, you see the throttles move. If your hand is on them, you have not only visual, but also tactile feedback. This is how pilots are used to airplanes working. You put pilots in airplanes for 15,000 hours that operate a certain way, then you drop them into an Airbus that has all of these "laws" and the airplane doesn't behave like every other airplane, and you're just asking for trouble.



Always the response of an Airbus lover: "but I like my tray table!" I don't care about your comfort, I care about not dying.
If you were to push forward with 5 lbs of force on the left stick and pull with 5 lbs of force on the right, would the sticks move at all? No of course not, the Airbus philosophy of averaging inputs is the exact same idea behind every other airplane's flight control system.
 
wheelsup said:
If you were to push forward with 5 lbs of force on the left stick and pull with 5 lbs of force on the right, would the sticks move at all? No of course not, the Airbus philosophy of averaging inputs is the exact same idea behind every other airplane's flight control system.

That's ludicrous and you know it. If I'm pulling with 5 lbs of pressure on my yoke in a DC9, and the guy on the other side is pushing with 5 lbs of pressure, I can feel what's going on by tactile feedback.
 
The throttles took some getting used to. However, I have noticed that I bring the E/WD and their symbologies into my visual flow. It takes some getting used to, of course, but after using it, I appreciate the philosophy because it keeps me engaged with the E/WD and the FMA. Primarily why, the best thing you can do when you're learning the Airbus design philosophy is making all FCU changes by looking at your PFD, cross checking what went into the FCU and following up thrust changes with the FMA and E/WD.

WARNING: NON PC ALERT STARTS NOW

The "throttle" position and anything in the FCU is "The Kiosk at McDonalds drive-thru with the pretty pictures" and the PFD and E/WD is the final product. Or, as one instructor said while pointing at the FCU "This is the hot stripper you want" then pointed at the FMA and said, "this is what you're married to". "This is what you want" while pointing again at the FCU, "this is what you got" while pointing at the FMA.
NON PC ALERT OVER

A design feature of the MD-88/90 which I didn't appreciate is my tendency to rely on throttle positioning to give me a cue what the engines were doing because, sometimes during level-off from a descent, the throttles would move forward one engine would spool up, the other would lag and my lazy-man's indication of something being awry is deflection of the yoke.

Having flown the Airbus product for over a year, on a fly by wire aircraft, it's probably a little "more honest" about what's going on without synthetic triggers like moving throttles and control inputs driven by servos to mimic the magic, invisible hand of "Otto" to give you the false impression that you're in a conventional cables, pulleys, fetzer valve airplane.

You have to know what the airplane is telling you, what you want it to do and what it can do in your particular flight phase. That applies to a Piper Tri-Pacer up to the 747-8.
 
If you were to push forward with 5 lbs of force on the left stick and pull with 5 lbs of force on the right, would the sticks move at all? No of course not, the Airbus philosophy of averaging inputs is the exact same idea behind every other airplane's flight control system.

I think the 727 does something you really don't want it to if you do that, I'll have to dig through my manuals in the office to see, but I remember that being a no-no if I'm not mistaken.
 
That's ludicrous and you know it. If I'm pulling with 5 lbs of pressure on my yoke in a DC9, and the guy on the other side is pushing with 5 lbs of pressure, I can feel what's going on by tactile feedback.
Maybe, maybe not depending on the situation and heat of the moment. You might not even know its the other guy that is doing it, it could be something with the control itself.

"Dual input"' however is a pretty eye opening and no crap indication of what is going on.
 
FBW doesn't bother me (although I did love my Direct Cable 717). The problem is the design philosophy that their airplanes should behave differently than every other airplane. Examples: throttles don't move when the autothrust system is operating; sticks don't move when inputs are being applied to them; averaging of inputs when both sticks are moved at the same time; etc. Boeing FBW doesn't involve this crap. When a 777 autothrottle adds thrust, you see the throttles move. If your hand is on them, you have not only visual, but also tactile feedback. This is how pilots are used to airplanes working. You put pilots in airplanes for 15,000 hours that operate a certain way, then you drop them into an Airbus that has all of these "laws" and the airplane doesn't behave like every other airplane, and you're just asking for trouble.
I assume one of your biggest arguments for these "flaws" in the Airbus are attributed to the AF crash then? Two joysticks pointed in two directions and them not being aware and their slim knowledge on Airbus alternate law?

Can't argue against you there...but for those pilots being thrown in those cockpits spending 15k hours...do a lot of them really transition into a Boeing? This isn't rehtorical...I'm really wondering. The time it takes alone to get to the Airbus then build that many hours...how much career do you have left to really want to transition into something else? I suppose I could see into a widebody but maybe it's more applicable to go from a 320 to a 330-340 then? I'm sure you're suggesting?

As much hatred to the Airbus that streams the Internet I have yet to find 1 Airbus pilot say anything other than they loved flying it. Even some of the most stick and rudder pilot background guys that you'd never imagine in the Airbus love it. I still think it's dramatic to state the safety of an Airbus is that far fetched than a Boeing...don't you?
 
Probably just bitter apples.

Kind of like how if SouthernJets has an incident, out comes all the "see, the double breasted coat and degree requirement didn't save them! yuk yuk yuk"
It's an Internet meme. And since - again - nobody was seriously injured at the last SJI incident/accident, I think it's okay to have a good laugh with it.

I mean, I find it somewhat funny/entertaining, myself. (Things like: Did they get a wind check? Was 121.5 in VHF2 and was it selected to monitor? And other SJI memes.)
 
It's an Internet meme. And since - again - nobody was seriously injured at the last SJI incident/accident, I think it's okay to have a good laugh with it.

I mean, I find it somewhat funny/entertaining, myself. (Things like: Did they get a wind check? Was 121.5 in VHF2 and was it selected to monitor? And other SJI memes.)

Which is hilarious. I've never seen anyone do anything other that de-select COM2 when the jackassery starts on guard.

And I'm sure it's not because I run a fascist flight deck or anything because I certainly don't.
 
I know the guy who broke that news at SFO. He was in AS ops and the flight was and still is(AS222/223 now) a "round robin" with the same crew. Talked to the captain that morning out on the ramp looking up at the tail of the plane ironically as they talked about how close the US Airways 757s got to gate 20. The guy was on the phone with LAX checking up on the rolling delay when the crash was confirmed to LAX with him on the line. He still can't tell the story without crying all these years later.
What crash are you referring to? I googled AS222 and got nothing.
 
Which is hilarious. I've never seen anyone do anything other that de-select COM2 when the jackassery starts on guard.

And I'm sure it's not because I run a fascist flight deck or anything because I certainly don't.
The guard dogs seem to be mostly contained in flyover country, I've found. We don't really DO that out this way.

And I monitor it because I have a 121.5 ELT in my airplane, not because I am worried about getting shot down or frequency-lost.
 
The guard dogs seem to be mostly contained in flyover country, I've found. We don't really DO that out this way.

And I monitor it because I have a 121.5 ELT in my airplane, not because I am worried about getting shot down or frequency-lost.

Seems ridiculous in the southeast and mid-Atlantic region. There's like a constant din of people treating it like a cheap open mic night at a rural TGI Fridays with fart jokes.

Kind of like when a bank gets robbed. Everyone looks at me even though (1) I didn't rob a bank and (b) I was at home watching PBS. :)
 
Looks like one of the pilots was locked out of the cockpit during the descent.

http://www.dallasnews.com/news/loca...re-crash-in-france-new-york-times-reports.ece

As officials struggled Wednesday to explain why a jet with 150 people on board crashed in relatively clear skies, an investigator said evidence from a cockpit voice recorder indicated one pilot left the cockpit before the plane’s descent and was unable to get back in.

A senior military official involved in the investigation described “very smooth, very cool” conversation between the pilots during the early part of the flight from Barcelona to Düsseldorf. Then the audio indicated that one of the pilots left the cockpit and could not re-enter.

“The guy outside is knocking lightly on the door and there is no answer,” the investigator said. “And then he hits the door stronger and no answer. There is never an answer.”

He said, “You can hear he is trying to smash the door down.”

While the audio seemed to give some insight into the circumstances leading up to the Germanwings crash, it also left many questions unanswered.

"We don’t know yet the reason why one of the guys went out,” said the official, who requested anonymity because the investigation is continuing. "But what is sure is that at the very end of the flight, the other pilot is alone and does not open the door."
 
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