Back in the day, I was dating a lawyer and she dragged me to some wingding.
I wound up sitting next to, of all things, a theatrical agent.
Her advice? "Save money, it's a short ride"
Richman
What happened in SYR? Take off, flight control issues, come to 10k to burn fuel, fly more than an hour to burn fuel with said flight control issue and then land? And claim they had lost all hydraulics (highly unlikely, the plane doesn't have manual reversion). Why would one who feels a flight control issue is serious to require going back to departure airport (divert) hold for over an hour?
I wasn't there, and I'm not familiar with the facts, but I can see being in no great rush to come back to the airport until I was absolutely certain the airplane was under control - and either way, I'll want to land at the lowest possible weight too, and give the flight attendants time to prepare in case we aren't under control like we thought we were, and so on.
Think QF32 - "I want to assess the controllability of the aircraft at approach speed - the proper place to do that is not in the flare."
Or Alaska 561. They stayed offshore to see about how much control they had, declining to expose people on the ground in Camarillo/Oxnard/Ventura/Thousand Oaks/Santa Monica to an MD-83 falling upon their heads.
Can you expand on this? Really interested when I hear flight control issues in a Bus.
http://avherald.com/h?article=4a2c0ba9
An Allegiant Airbus A320-200, registration N216NV performing flight G4-1711 from Ogdensburg,NY to Fort Lauderdale,FL (USA) with 160 passengers and 6 crew, was climbing through FL330 out of Ogdensburg when the crew stopped the climb and diverted to Syracuse entering a hold at 10,000 feet.
The crew reported they had a partial flight control failure. The crew checked runway conditions to perform their calculations for landing.
About 10 minutes later the crew advised that they had completed their calculations, they needed to bring down the aircraft below maximum landing weight, which would take about an hour. After about 2 hours in the hold the aircraft commenced their ILS approach runway 28 and landed safely on runway 28 at a rather normal speed about 2:15 hours after departure.
After coming to a stop on the runway the crew requested emergency services to check their aircraft in particular for leaks advising "we did lose all our hydraulics, please circle around to make sure nothing is on fire."
A replacement A320-200 registration N229NV positioned to Syracuse, departed Syracuse about 3 hours after landing of N216NV and reached Fort Lauderdale with a total delay of 5 hours.
The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 71 hours, then positioned to Orlando Sanford,FL. The aircraft resumed service the following morning about 81 hours after landing in Syracuse.
The airline reported the aircraft diverted to Syracuse as a precaution following a mechanical issue.
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It worked out and all, but I would hate to have a partial flight control failure turn into a full outright flight control failure while holding over 2 hrs to get below max landing weight. What is that saying, seeing the forest trees through the fire, the bigger picture, IMO, would be to try and land as soon as possible.
Like autothrust said, if the reason is to fly to see how much plane and capability is left in order to make a landing, then sure by all means. But flying around a plane just to burn fuel for 2+ hrs with flight control issues, and the sole reason for prolonging the flight time is to burn fuel......
I don't have a dog in this fight, but is there a real need to attack the guy when he says that firsthand he's seeing a sea change in the whole approach to maintenance? I mean I get being a little skeptical (leopards and spots and all) but can we at least allow the possibility that a guy that sees it on a daily basis has a bit of an idea what's going on?
For military trained pilots, taking time at altitude -- instead of "land as soon as possible" -- to sort out a strategy to determine handling characteristics, approach/landing speeds, etc, in the event of a flight control issue (or structural damage, midair, etc) is typical.
Neither of the two jets I've flown at the airlines -- the E175 and the A300 -- have QRH entries that talk about such a strategy, but the USAF airplanes I've flown had the strategy codified into the emergency action checklist (the QRH equivalent) itself.
The only one I have close by that I can show as an example is for the T-38C, but this gives the philosophy and methodology that we're taught to follow, regardless of if it is a checklist-directed procedure or not:
Note: the procedure is on the right, the notes are on the left, so it looks odd without the context of how the rest of the checklist (QRH) is organized.
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Like the guy said above, the whole equation changes when you have the ability to eject / bailout.![]()
That might have something to do with being able to punch out
Like the guy said above, the whole equation changes when you have the ability to eject / bailout.
Alaska 261 taught the lesson that if there is/are any flight control issues, prioritize landing as soon as practical without undue delay. And don't try and fix it beyond what might be done on the ECAM/QRH.
Spoken like someone who has never flown an ejection seat airplane. Most people that haven't believe that last-ditch option somehow substantially changes the risk management and decisionmaking process.
It doesn't.
Guys, we've discussed this before: ejecting is a very un-desirable, risky outcome -- so much so, that a large percentage of guys have died crashing in airplanes that they *should* have punched out of because the perceived safer option was to try and keep flying and "fix" the airplane. Many guys who've pulled the handles have been fatally injured in that process, or permanently maimed or critically injured in the process. It is such an unpalatable decision that a large segment of emergency procedures training is spent forcing pilots to mentally discard all of that doubt and fear and actually follow the procedure when it says to pull the yellow-and-black striped handles.
So, no, that's not it, as @zippy says.
FIFY.
FIFY.
Regardless, at least you have an option (as terrible as it is) to bail out of the airplane. Transport category aircraft don't have that ability.