Food for thought (LCC vs Legacy)

Back in the day, I was dating a lawyer and she dragged me to some wingding.

I wound up sitting next to, of all things, a theatrical agent.

Her advice? "Save money, it's a short ride"

Richman

I preach this to a lot of people about savings, but dey don't hear me tho.
 
What happened in SYR? Take off, flight control issues, come to 10k to burn fuel, fly more than an hour to burn fuel with said flight control issue and then land? And claim they had lost all hydraulics (highly unlikely, the plane doesn't have manual reversion). Why would one who feels a flight control issue is serious to require going back to departure airport (divert) hold for over an hour?

Can you expand on this? Really interested when I hear flight control issues in a Bus.
 
I wasn't there, and I'm not familiar with the facts, but I can see being in no great rush to come back to the airport until I was absolutely certain the airplane was under control - and either way, I'll want to land at the lowest possible weight too, and give the flight attendants time to prepare in case we aren't under control like we thought we were, and so on.

Think QF32 - "I want to assess the controllability of the aircraft at approach speed - the proper place to do that is not in the flare."

Quite a big difference between QF and this Allegiant. If I read correctly they held over almost 2 hrs from point of having an issue to approaching and landing and the reason for the hold was given as only to burn fuel to get below max landing weight. You may as well go to Florida. Slowing up in flight to ~160 knots and flaps 3 to see if an approach is possible is acceptable. But continuing to hold and fly with a flight control issue is a highly risky proposition. The Bus320 will land just fine at max takeoff weight, and they weren't even close to max. I see Allegiant as a cultural issue. This is an airline that had a plane show up during an air show and the pilots had no plan B despite it all being NOTAMed. Declared an emergency just to get in. Countless other MD88 incidents/issues. Proportionately speaking, I would wager they have the highest rate of diversions from "issues."

Or Alaska 561. They stayed offshore to see about how much control they had, declining to expose people on the ground in Camarillo/Oxnard/Ventura/Thousand Oaks/Santa Monica to an MD-83 falling upon their heads.

I think it was Alaska 261. It was a fully-blamed maintenance accident, but there were a few snippets here and there that the pilots really shouldn't have tried to trouble shoot that much with a jammed flight control surface. Their efforts just made it worse and ripped what little threading was left in the jackscrew by constantly running both the primary and secondary motors to the horiz. stabilizer. Also, their first indication of the jam (stiff control) was still over Mexico and they still continued flying (I believe it was well over one hour) before the problem got worse and the trouble shooting started.

And why would you risk flying over Camarillo/Oxnard/ventura/Thousand Oaks/Santa Monica? I would think the best course of action would to be avoid flying over any land and go for 07R/L at LAX. Maximum time spent over the water, no city/residential areas put at risk that way.
 
Last edited:
Can you expand on this? Really interested when I hear flight control issues in a Bus.

http://avherald.com/h?article=4a2c0ba9

An Allegiant Airbus A320-200, registration N216NV performing flight G4-1711 from Ogdensburg,NY to Fort Lauderdale,FL (USA) with 160 passengers and 6 crew, was climbing through FL330 out of Ogdensburg when the crew stopped the climb and diverted to Syracuse entering a hold at 10,000 feet.

The crew reported they had a partial flight control failure. The crew checked runway conditions to perform their calculations for landing.

About 10 minutes later the crew advised that they had completed their calculations, they needed to bring down the aircraft below maximum landing weight, which would take about an hour. After about 2 hours in the hold the aircraft commenced their ILS approach runway 28 and landed safely on runway 28 at a rather normal speed about 2:15 hours after departure.


After coming to a stop on the runway the crew requested emergency services to check their aircraft in particular for leaks advising "we did lose all our hydraulics, please circle around to make sure nothing is on fire."

A replacement A320-200 registration N229NV positioned to Syracuse, departed Syracuse about 3 hours after landing of N216NV and reached Fort Lauderdale with a total delay of 5 hours.

The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 71 hours, then positioned to Orlando Sanford,FL. The aircraft resumed service the following morning about 81 hours after landing in Syracuse.

The airline reported the aircraft diverted to Syracuse as a precaution following a mechanical issue.



***********************************************************************************************

It worked out and all, but I would hate to have a partial flight control failure turn into a full outright flight control failure while holding over 2 hrs to get below max landing weight. What is that saying, seeing the forest trees through the fire, the bigger picture, IMO, would be to try and land as soon as possible.

Like autothrust said, if the reason is to fly to see how much plane and capability is left in order to make a landing, then sure by all means. But flying around a plane just to burn fuel for 2+ hrs with flight control issues, and the sole reason for prolonging the flight time is to burn fuel......
 
Last edited:
http://avherald.com/h?article=4a2c0ba9

An Allegiant Airbus A320-200, registration N216NV performing flight G4-1711 from Ogdensburg,NY to Fort Lauderdale,FL (USA) with 160 passengers and 6 crew, was climbing through FL330 out of Ogdensburg when the crew stopped the climb and diverted to Syracuse entering a hold at 10,000 feet.

The crew reported they had a partial flight control failure. The crew checked runway conditions to perform their calculations for landing.

About 10 minutes later the crew advised that they had completed their calculations, they needed to bring down the aircraft below maximum landing weight, which would take about an hour. After about 2 hours in the hold the aircraft commenced their ILS approach runway 28 and landed safely on runway 28 at a rather normal speed about 2:15 hours after departure.


After coming to a stop on the runway the crew requested emergency services to check their aircraft in particular for leaks advising "we did lose all our hydraulics, please circle around to make sure nothing is on fire."

A replacement A320-200 registration N229NV positioned to Syracuse, departed Syracuse about 3 hours after landing of N216NV and reached Fort Lauderdale with a total delay of 5 hours.

The occurrence aircraft remained on the ground for about 71 hours, then positioned to Orlando Sanford,FL. The aircraft resumed service the following morning about 81 hours after landing in Syracuse.

The airline reported the aircraft diverted to Syracuse as a precaution following a mechanical issue.



***********************************************************************************************

It worked out and all, but I would hate to have a partial flight control failure turn into a full outright flight control failure while holding over 2 hrs to get below max landing weight. What is that saying, seeing the forest trees through the fire, the bigger picture, IMO, would be to try and land as soon as possible.

Like autothrust said, if the reason is to fly to see how much plane and capability is left in order to make a landing, then sure by all means. But flying around a plane just to burn fuel for 2+ hrs with flight control issues, and the sole reason for prolonging the flight time is to burn fuel......

Thank you. Yeah there is no way in hell I would be cutting circles to burn
15-20k with that issue. Also, how does one fly a bus with no hydraulics or even get into that position in the first place? I can't wait to how how this unfolds.
 
For military trained pilots, taking time at altitude -- instead of "land as soon as possible" -- to sort out a strategy to determine handling characteristics, approach/landing speeds, etc, in the event of a flight control issue (or structural damage, midair, etc) is typical.

Neither of the two jets I've flown at the airlines -- the E175 and the A300 -- have QRH entries that talk about such a strategy, but the USAF airplanes I've flown had the strategy codified into the emergency action checklist (the QRH equivalent) itself.

The only one I have close by that I can show as an example is for the T-38C, but this gives the philosophy and methodology that we're taught to follow, regardless of if it is a checklist-directed procedure or not:

Note: the procedure is on the right, the notes are on the left, so it looks odd without the context of how the rest of the checklist (QRH) is organized.

11AC4B15-969E-4432-ABF0-554D0F929BE4_zps4klohpdz.jpg
 
I don't have a dog in this fight, but is there a real need to attack the guy when he says that firsthand he's seeing a sea change in the whole approach to maintenance? I mean I get being a little skeptical (leopards and spots and all) but can we at least allow the possibility that a guy that sees it on a daily basis has a bit of an idea what's going on?

It's like the old Lucas Electrics company. They made garbage for so many years, that jokes became part of automotive culture.

"Hey, did you hear that Lucas invented the intermittent wiper?"
"Why do Brits drink their beer warm? Because Lucas made their refrigerators."
"Lucas systems actually use AC, it just has a random frequency..."


Sure, later on they made some stuff that worked just fine, but the jokes continued. If they hadn't made garbage for 40 years, there wouldn't have been any jokes. An earned reputation is a hard thing to shake.
 
For military trained pilots, taking time at altitude -- instead of "land as soon as possible" -- to sort out a strategy to determine handling characteristics, approach/landing speeds, etc, in the event of a flight control issue (or structural damage, midair, etc) is typical.

Neither of the two jets I've flown at the airlines -- the E175 and the A300 -- have QRH entries that talk about such a strategy, but the USAF airplanes I've flown had the strategy codified into the emergency action checklist (the QRH equivalent) itself.

The only one I have close by that I can show as an example is for the T-38C, but this gives the philosophy and methodology that we're taught to follow, regardless of if it is a checklist-directed procedure or not:

Note: the procedure is on the right, the notes are on the left, so it looks odd without the context of how the rest of the checklist (QRH) is organized.

11AC4B15-969E-4432-ABF0-554D0F929BE4_zps4klohpdz.jpg


Like the guy said above, the whole equation changes when you have the ability to eject / bailout. :)

Alaska 261 taught the lesson that if there is/are any flight control issues, prioritize landing as soon as practical without undue delay. And don't try and fix it beyond what might be done on the ECAM/QRH.
 
Like the guy said above, the whole equation changes when you have the ability to eject / bailout. :)

My military multi pilot community also ingrained the whole, "gain/maintain/determine aircraft control, burn down/dump gas as needed, land" mentality. Depending on the nature of the malfunction we'd spend a couple hours above 6k in holding if needed to dump gas and burn down to reduce our weight and ensure aircraft controlability at ref + x target airspeed before we landed.

An airborne damage/controllability check was always performed in the event of flight control malfunctions... not because you had the ability to eject (because we didn't) but because you needed to ensure your aircraft was controllable in the landing configuration at a reasonable approach speed at altitude (where you could determine/compensate for negative control characteristics) instead of crashing your plane and killing your crew on final because the aircraft did something unexpected once you configured and slowed to target airspeeds.
 
That might have something to do with being able to punch out

Like the guy said above, the whole equation changes when you have the ability to eject / bailout. :)

Alaska 261 taught the lesson that if there is/are any flight control issues, prioritize landing as soon as practical without undue delay. And don't try and fix it beyond what might be done on the ECAM/QRH.

Spoken like someone who has never flown an ejection seat airplane. Most people that haven't believe that last-ditch option somehow substantially changes the risk management and decisionmaking process.

It doesn't.

Guys, we've discussed this before: ejecting is a very un-desirable, risky outcome -- so much so, that a large percentage of guys have died crashing in airplanes that they *should* have punched out of because the perceived safer option was to try and keep flying and "fix" the airplane. Many guys who've pulled the handles have been fatally injured in that process, or permanently maimed or critically injured in the process. It is such an unpalatable decision that a large segment of emergency procedures training is spent forcing pilots to mentally discard all of that doubt and fear and actually follow the procedure when it says to pull the yellow-and-black striped handles.

So, no, that's not it, as @zippy says.

EDIT: For some reason the pic in the previous post is all distorted. Here's a re post...

11AC4B15-969E-4432-ABF0-554D0F929BE4_zpsjcvjuid4.jpg
 
Last edited:
IMG_3337.JPG
Spoken like someone who has never flown an ejection seat airplane. Most people that haven't believe that last-ditch option somehow substantially changes the risk management and decisionmaking process.

It doesn't.

Guys, we've discussed this before: ejecting is a very un-desirable, risky outcome -- so much so, that a large percentage of guys have died crashing in airplanes that they *should* have punched out of because the perceived safer option was to try and keep flying and "fix" the airplane. Many guys who've pulled the handles have been fatally injured in that process, or permanently maimed or critically injured in the process. It is such an unpalatable decision that a large segment of emergency procedures training is spent forcing pilots to mentally discard all of that doubt and fear and actually follow the procedure when it says to pull the yellow-and-black striped handles.

So, no, that's not it, as @zippy says.
 
I had two cases of "better have some altitude"
- one the engine wasn't performing as it should have on the climb out once the plane accelerated, running way too lean. That plane, however, had a 17 to 1 glide, so a climbing circle around the airport at 1/3 the fpm and final from a couple of thousand feet agl was all that was needed (the engine did quit on final at the first power reduction)
- two was busting a gasket in a Pitts while doing acro (to keep it relevant to the thread - with a dude that went on to become Spirit captain) and having oil streaking all over. We came home at 5-6k agl from the practice area and believe me, if that engine didn't make it I'd rather be riding the silk than taking my chances with a swamp forced landing in a Pitts.
 
Regardless, at least you have an option (as terrible as it is) to bail out of the airplane. Transport category aircraft don't have that ability.

In any case, back to the SYR incident, leBus has ECAM that will prioritize malfunctions and actually give you a 'Land ASAP' in amber or in red. IIRC, 1 out of 3 hydraulic failures will trigger a land ASAP in amber, but lose 2 of the 3 hydraulics, and it will be a 'Land ASAP' in red right there on the ECAM. leBus also complicates matters because when it comes to flight control issues, you're not going to have much in the ways of cables or connections. It's all computerized, and at best you can try to reset ELAC/SEC/FAC computers (which IMO I'd be hesitant to do unless directed by ECAM). That's about the extent of your fixing. Now if you want to fly around and see if 160 knots at flaps 3 is doable in order to land, then go ahead by all means. Holding simply to burn fuel for 2 hrs? If your flight ends up in a bad outcome and you don't make it to airport, the feds are going to scratch their heads about what part of 'land ASAP' did the crew not follow?
 
Regardless, at least you have an option (as terrible as it is) to bail out of the airplane. Transport category aircraft don't have that ability.

Yes, but that's not relevant to this discussion.

You were saying that the capability is what led to the controllability check I mentioned, and as zippy reinforced in his post, that's not true.
 
Back
Top