Food for thought (LCC vs Legacy)

Back in the day, I was dating a lawyer and she dragged me to some wingding.

I wound up sitting next to, of all things, a theatrical agent.

Her advice? "Save money, it's a short ride"

Richman
 
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@inigo88
 
Because that's what I implied? I could list a lot of examples of change but people need to find reasons to justify not working there. I've been told that before.
Okay, I have a problem with a trivial and cavalier approach to maintenance.
 
Or conversely, to find reasons to justify working/ staying there.

Okay, I have a problem with a trivial and cavalier approach to maintenance.
I don't have a dog in this fight, but is there a real need to attack the guy when he says that firsthand he's seeing a sea change in the whole approach to maintenance? I mean I get being a little skeptical (leopards and spots and all) but can we at least allow the possibility that a guy that sees it on a daily basis has a bit of an idea what's going on?
 
I don't have a dog in this fight, but is there a real need to attack the guy when he says that firsthand he's seeing a sea change in the whole approach to maintenance? I mean I get being a little skeptical (leopards and spots and all) but can we at least allow the possibility that a guy that sees it on a daily basis has a bit of an idea what's going on?
I suppose that's fair.

Culture is a very difficult thing to change, hence skepticism.
 
I'm genuinely interested what a line pilot knows about the culture in the maintenance shop at an airline.

I started my career in the USAF as a maintenance officer, then later became a pilot. Once I became a USAF pilot, I was quite surprised to see how the perception among the pilots of what was happening in the MX shop differed from what I thought what happening based on having worked there. Essentially, guys were assessing the workings of an entire complex organization based on their superficial interactions with a limited number of people and subjective perceptions about the fleet's health. Their belief primarily came from when something broke on the airplane and observing what happened through the process of either writing it up in the logbook or fixing it on the spot. Essentially, they were embodying "judging a book by its cover" without knowing anything at all about the other 98% of the organization, its culture, and its processes.

At the two airlines I have worked for, my interaction with the maintenance organization is equally as superficial. I see them when something is broken, and observe how they fix it and write it up. I also observe gross measures, like "our airplanes seem to break a lot", or, "our airplanes always seem to be working", but without any actual quantitative data to compare mission-capable rates, maintenance effectiveness rates, hangar queen status, or any of the other multitude of metrics that we actually used within the maintenance organization (in the AF, that is) to judge how we well were doing our job.

Other than that, as a line pilot, I have no actual, objective barometer of how things are going in maintenance. If someone were to ask me to assess my current airline's maintenance program, I would only basically have rumor and gut feeling on which to make that assessment.

So, I'm really curious what @Lunchbox's basis for his statements is.
 
I'm genuinely interested what a line pilot knows about the culture in the maintenance shop at an airline.

I started my career in the USAF as a maintenance officer, then later became a pilot. Once I became a USAF pilot, I was quite surprised to see how the perception among the pilots of what was happening in the MX shop differed from what I thought what happening based on having worked there. Essentially, guys were assessing the workings of an entire complex organization based on their superficial interactions with a limited number of people and subjective perceptions about the fleet's health. Their belief primarily came from when something broke on the airplane and observing what happened through the process of either writing it up in the logbook or fixing it on the spot. Essentially, they were embodying "judging a book by its cover" without knowing anything at all about the other 98% of the organization, its culture, and its processes.

At the two airlines I have worked for, my interaction with the maintenance organization is equally as superficial. I see them when something is broken, and observe how they fix it and write it up. I also observe gross measures, like "our airplanes seem to break a lot", or, "our airplanes always seem to be working", but without any actual quantitative data to compare mission-capable rates, maintenance effectiveness rates, hangar queen status, or any of the other multitude of metrics that we actually used within the maintenance organization (in the AF, that is) to judge how we well were doing our job.

Other than that, as a line pilot, I have no actual, objective barometer of how things are going in maintenance. If someone were to ask me to assess my current airline's maintenance program, I would only basically have rumor and gut feeling on which to make that assessment.

So, I'm really curious what @Lunchbox's basis for his statements is.
All valid points, but a line pilot for that company is more likely to spot differences than line pilots for other companies.
 
Is it really so difficult to believe that someone in maintenance or senior management at Allegiant looked at their KPI's and said "Hey we've got a problem here. We should look into this."?

Things go bad we complain. Things go good we're suspicions.
 
Is it really so difficult to believe that someone in maintenance or senior management at Allegiant looked at their KPI's and said "Hey we've got a problem here. We should look into this."?

Given the track record and the timeframe being claimed, I think the skepticism is totally expected. Especially since there have been numerous opportunities in the past for such a wakeup call that appear to have gone completely unanswered.

Organizations are big bureaucratic beasts. Trying to make substantial organizational and cultural change is difficult even over time and with buy-in from numerous key players. I saw this in the Air Force time and time over, with people in key positions (Wing Commanders, NAF and MAJCOM Commanders, even Chiefs of Staff) who had ideas for substantial change and, even given the prominence and influence and control of their position, they could make no more than a dent in existing culture and practices.

Real change *can* occur, but these are evolutionary, glacial-speed changes, not complete turnarounds that take place in a year. The idea that one or two or three people, over the course of a year or less, were able to perform a complete makeover with the same members of the organization would be very atypical. It is like the old adage of steering the Titanic with swim flippers.

If Allegiant has been able to do it, then good for them. One pilot's adamant testimony on a forum is rather flimsy evidence, though.
 
What happened in SYR? Take off, flight control issues, come to 10k to burn fuel, fly more than an hour to burn fuel with said flight control issue and then land? And claim they had lost all hydraulics (highly unlikely, the plane doesn't have manual reversion). Why would one who feels a flight control issue is serious to require going back to departure airport (divert) hold for over an hour?
 
Why would one who feels a flight control issue is serious to require going back to departure airport (divert) hold for over an hour?
I wasn't there, and I'm not familiar with the facts, but I can see being in no great rush to come back to the airport until I was absolutely certain the airplane was under control - and either way, I'll want to land at the lowest possible weight too, and give the flight attendants time to prepare in case we aren't under control like we thought we were, and so on.

Think QF32 - "I want to assess the controllability of the aircraft at approach speed - the proper place to do that is not in the flare."

Or Alaska 561. They stayed offshore to see about how much control they had, declining to expose people on the ground in Camarillo/Oxnard/Ventura/Thousand Oaks/Santa Monica to an MD-83 falling upon their heads.
 
Oh, very well aware, and obviously time will tell. It just seemed odd for people outside the organization to mount a bit of a dogpile is all.
If XYZ Air goes and augers one in, it hurts all of us - not as much as if we were employees of XYZ Air, but public confidence in the national air transportation system is easily damaged.
 
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