F-16 midair with small plane in SC

What is the difference between a F16 flying a visual approach, practicing IFR procedures, and an airliner flying a visual approach, practicing IFR procedures ? Does the PF of the Airbus not scan his instruments too? Sans Heads up display?

Seems the same to me.

This is what CC can't understand.

Is this a serious question? First, because of collisions of airliners with GA aircraft (San Diego PSA but especially Aeromexico near LAX at Cerritos), the FAA mandated TCAS on passenger jetliners. And for Part 121 airliners, we are required by FARs to use an instrument loc/gs to back up a visual approach. On a visual this doesn't mean you're heads down all the time. Sure you can scan but primarily on a visual approach we're heads up outside. We aren't "practicing" this maneuver. All our training is done in Level D sims, and we are safer for it. Our instrument/proficiency checks are done in sims. And of course, we're always at minimum a 2-person flight deck so that's an extra set of eyes.
 
Wasn't there a mid-air involving 2 TCAS aircraft over eastern Europe? Think one of them was a DHL aircraft?

Edit: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Überlingen_mid-air_collision

The blood of that crash was on several parties including ICAO for not acting on it sooner. TCAS worked exactly as designed. It told the DHL to descend and the Baskirian to climb. But at the same time, the air traffic controller told the Russians to descend. They were conflicted for a moment, but deep in their manuals it DID say that ATC was primary for traffic avoidance and that TCAS was a good secondary tool. The west had already accepted to follow TCAS always but that wasn't the same in the East. You can't really blame the Russians for following their manuals. These were never changed. This crash was July 2002. Just one year before, over Japan, two JAL 747s came EXTREMELY close to a midair (and if so would have been the worst air disaster in history) for the same reason.... TCAS instruction to climb one, descend the other, and ATC told an aircraft to do something that conflict with TCAS. So both airplanes were still directing towards each other. Only at the last second did one 747 acquire the other visually and the evasive action the pilot took severe evasive action to avoid a collision and ended up injuring several people onboard from the aggressive maneuver. In the aftermath, the Japanese authorities wanted ICAO to clarify TCAS instructions and that indeed TCAS should overpower any ATC instruction to avoid collisions. This was, so-to-speak, on the desk at ICAO and still not acted on when the Uberlingen crash happened 1 year later. Now that there was blood, ICAO and obviously the entire world has adopted the policy that if TCAS goes off and ATC gives an instruction, you always follow TCAS.
 
@ATN_Pilot should back up his concern for safety by installing one of the available ADS-B products now, ground his aircraft until it's installed. Safety is paramount.
 
The blood of that crash was on several parties including ICAO for not acting on it sooner. TCAS worked exactly as designed. It told the DHL to descend and the Baskirian to climb. But at the same time, the air traffic controller told the Russians to descend. They were conflicted for a moment, but deep in their manuals it DID say that ATC was primary for traffic avoidance and that TCAS was a good secondary tool. The west had already accepted to follow TCAS always but that wasn't the same in the East. You can't really blame the Russians for following their manuals. These were never changed. This crash was July 2002. Just one year before, over Japan, two JAL 747s came EXTREMELY close to a midair (and if so would have been the worst air disaster in history) for the same reason.... TCAS instruction to climb one, descend the other, and ATC told an aircraft to do something that conflict with TCAS. So both airplanes were still directing towards each other. Only at the last second did one 747 acquire the other visually and the evasive action the pilot took severe evasive action to avoid a collision and ended up injuring several people onboard from the aggressive maneuver. In the aftermath, the Japanese authorities wanted ICAO to clarify TCAS instructions and that indeed TCAS should overpower any ATC instruction to avoid collisions. This was, so-to-speak, on the desk at ICAO and still not acted on when the Uberlingen crash happened 1 year later. Now that there was blood, ICAO and obviously the entire world has adopted the policy that if TCAS goes off and ATC gives an instruction, you always follow TCAS.
I'm aware, that's why I brought it up. Both aircraft had the equipment installed and it did not prevent a collision.
 
This whole discussion reminds me of the talk following the A-7 engine loss and crash from the D-M Runway 12 final into an occupied car at the University of Arizona. This happened back in '78, and I was working Ground when it happened. Totally unreasonable expectations were heaped upon the surviving pilot, who rode that Corsair II well below ejection safety limits desperately aiming the aircraft toward a vacant area. Alas, upon ejection, the A-7 swerved and stuck a car killing two university students. Nevertheless, that guy was a hero in my book, and he didn't deserve what followed:

So then everyone starts acting as if this were an everyday occurrence rather than a freak, rare accident. One local news anchor (Hank Something-or-Other) climbed atop his editorial pedestal and berated the pilot for not riding the aircraft all the way into the ground so as to keep innocents from being hit. A U of A professor with zero aviation background, or even knowledge, did a major "Study" telling us at D-M tower and the boys in Tucson RAPCON how we should only depart Runway 12 and recover Runway 30 regardless of wind or summertime thunderstorm activity. The newspaper editorial section . . . don't even get me started on that ill-informed mess of opinions masquerading as "fact".

An observation, if I may: The mere act of transporting a person from Point A to Point B is inherently dangerous, even if the mode of transport is by foot. It's simple physics. Mass x Velocity = Force, and Force — almost any Force — is potentially deadly.

It's not as if this type accident is a daily, or even annual, occurrence. If it were, it wouldn't even be the lead story. It leads simply because it is so rare an occurrence. And while it may sound crass, you don't overload already heavy combat aircraft and overburdened combat pilots for the occasional freak accident in VMC. You also don't add to already massive amounts of restricted airspace with the associated costs in fuel and time to civilian pilots and other users in order to protect against the rare, freak accident.

And then let us recall that most fighter cockpits don't have the luxury of a second crew member, and that the workload in the cockpit requires almost superhuman concentration and ability. Comparing that environment to, say, the environment of an Airbus is a bit like comparing the workload driving the family sedan down a sparsely populated highway to driving a Formula 1 Ferrari through the streets of Monte Carlo surrounded by several other vehicles also traveling in excess of 120 m.p.h.

It was an unfortunate fatal accident. I feel sorry for the families and friends of those who died. But it was an accident, a rare accident, and there is very little logical fix that is affordable on any cost-versus-benefit formula one cares to utilize. Any argument that can be proposed to the contrary could also be used to outlaw the family car . . . or handguns . . . or cruise ships (Costa Concordia, anyone?) or even, I dare say, the airliner.

I know that's going to raise some hackles, but I thought a bit of perspective was in order. I'll now go back to lurking.

Point A to Point B inherently dangerous and simple physics of F=MA. Yeah, true. But then again, the military has the luxury of pulling the ejection handle and removing themselves from that vehicle that was going from Point A to Point B. The civvies don't have an option to eject. So when a civvy goes down, he's going down with the airplane.

As for the other point, I agree with that guy.... in a congested area, where you KNOW there is life on the ground, it is your duty as a military airman to put your plane down avoiding civilian areas and if that means you go down with your plane, then so be it. You signed up for this dangerous job, not the two university students in the car. Or the young Korean mother with her two babies and mother in law in a house in San Diego. Completely unacceptable. In both cases, the outcome would have been far better if these pilots kamikaze'd into the ground in a field or in trees. I give them some credit, in both cases they waited til the last possible second to eject, but the second they pulled that ejection handle, they ensured their own right to live and disregarded everyone else's forward in the path of the crashing aircraft. And in both cases, multiple civilian lives were lost.
 
And for Part 121 airliners, we are required by FARs to use an instrument loc/gs to back up a visual approach. On a visual this doesn't mean you're heads down all the time. Sure you can scan but primarily on a visual approach we're heads up outside..

So are single pilots flying VFR not able to tune Nav equipment and follow it? Is that some impossible unsafe maneuver? Because of that's the case, then every GA single pilot VFR XC better be with no GPS and no Navaids. That's the same thing these mil jets do on whats called an instrument sortie.

The problem I think you and others are having, is the term "Instrument sortie", which to the mil, doesn't denote an actual instrument flight or hood flight; it merely denotes a flight devoid of anything tactical going on. That's what I don't think you're understanding. ATC vectoring a single pilot around in VMC for following an approach is just that: being vectored in VMC and maintain see and avoid, while composite crosschecking a Nav instrument every now and again. It's not the rocket science you're trying to make it.
 
I'm aware, that's why I brought it up. Both aircraft had the equipment installed and it did not prevent a collision.

Only because the TCAS system and its implications were NOT understood by everyone. Now they are.

And in 2006 there was the GOL 737 and Embraer Legacy Jet collision over Brazil, and this was mostly due to ATC's failure in Brazil, but the reason TCAS didn't go off on either plane is that it is suspected the foot of one of the pilots on the foot rest in the EMB jet had pushed a button that goes into SBY (standby) for the transponder and both pilots subsequently missed that it was SBY. Once the transponder was SBY, it wouldn't have sent signals for other transponders to interrogate. Both aircraft collided on the same airway, same altitude, going opposite directions.
 
Point A to Point B inherently dangerous and simple physics of F=MA. Yeah, true. But then again, the military has the luxury of pulling the ejection handle and removing themselves from that vehicle that was going from Point A to Point B. The civvies don't have an option to eject. So when a civvy goes down, he's going down with the airplane.

As for the other point, I agree with that guy.... in a congested area, where you KNOW there is life on the ground, it is your duty as a military airman to put your plane down avoiding civilian areas and if that means you go down with your plane, then so be it. You signed up for this dangerous job, not the two university students in the car. Or the young Korean mother with her two babies and mother in law in a house in San Diego. Completely unacceptable. In both cases, the outcome would have been far better if these pilots kamikaze'd into the ground in a field or in trees. I give them some credit, in both cases they waited til the last possible second to eject, but the second they pulled that ejection handle, they ensured their own right to live and disregarded everyone else's forward in the path of the crashing aircraft. And in both cases, multiple civilian lives were lost.
Would you, given the choice?
 
So are single pilots flying VFR not able to tune Nav equipment and follow it? Is that some impossible unsafe maneuver? Because of that's the case, then every GA single pilot VFR XC better be with no GPS and no Navaids. That's the same thing these mil jets do on whats called an instrument sortie.

The problem I think you and others are having, is the term "Instrument sortie", which to the mil, doesn't denote an actual instrument flight or hood flight; it merely denotes a flight devoid of anything tactical going on. That's what I don't think you're understanding. ATC vectoring a single pilot around in VMC for following an approach is just that: being vectored in VMC and maintain see and avoid, while composite crosschecking a Nav instrument every now and again. It's not the rocket science you're trying to make it.

Well, then you are not practicing what we civvies call a true "instrument approach." You're half-half-ing it.

Sure, we can tune radios and frequencies single pilot but an instrument approach by definition involves a lot more busy time with less time available to look for traffic. Which is why for practice approaches, I always filed IFR and 80% of the time I was approved. And in the airline world, they learned long ago this sorta thing is best suited for Level D sims.
 
Only because the TCAS system and its implications were NOT understood by everyone. Now they are.

And in 2006 there was the GOL 737 and Embraer Legacy Jet collision over Brazil, and this was mostly due to ATC's failure in Brazil, but the reason TCAS didn't go off on either plane is that it is suspected the foot of one of the pilots on the foot rest in the EMB jet had pushed a button that goes into SBY (standby) for the transponder and both pilots subsequently missed that it was SBY. Once the transponder was SBY, it wouldn't have sent signals for other transponders to interrogate. Both aircraft collided on the same airway, same altitude, going opposite directions.
I'm assuming your knowledge of accidents is based on the Discovery channel, tell me about the Legacy and its transponder.
 
shakes head..........it's fine to have any opinion that one wants to hold, but when that opinion is not based in stats, facts, has no research/data or even personal experience to back it up, then all it is, is just that.....an opinion. May be an ignorant opinion, but still an opinion.

In doing a look around I found that at the base where this fighter is homed, that they do not perform any tactical maneuvering until they are in an assigned military operating areas or in warning areas out over the water. I also took at a look at stats for 10 and 20 years of mid-airs involving military and civilian aircraft. They are extremely rare. GA to GA and commercial aircraft to GA stats are far more high in truth.

All of the Armed Forces are extremely disciplined and regulated about how they operate their aircraft. So here we have current and formed fighter pilots trying to explain these operations, equipment, techniques, training, etc. to GA and commercial pilots who mostly either blow them off, argue with them, reply with rude responses, refuse to believe them and some are even disrespectful. One person has already solved what happened and come to a conclusion. Really? I guess we can tell the NTSB to call off their investigation then.

All that is really known at this time is that F-16s from Shaw routinely practice instrument approaches into Charleston International Airport, a joint-use, civil-military airport that forms, with some U.S. Navy facilities, the recently merged Joint Base Charleston. It appears that the F-16 was practicing approaches at the time of the accident, while the intent of the two people aboard the Cessna is uncertain. They had just taken off from a small airport in the area, and were operating at around 2,000 to 3,000 feet when the impact occurred. The F-16 pilot was also in contact with ATC.

Did the GA plane file a flight plan? Probably not, maybe, who knows? Did they speak to anyone before taking off? (supposedly form Berkley County) Who knows? Dd they speak to anyone after they entered the air space at Myrtle Beach Who knows? Where on planes (that is physical location on each plane) did the collision take place? Who knows? That could tell us something certainly.

What I am trying to say is that it's fine to have a discussion on these matters, but almost nothing is known/been released on this incident yet. Also, I appreciate having the Military pilots contribute to this forum. I learn many things here and there and see a lot of things that I don't even understand/know and have to look up. But really, some of you on here are just really being assy (can you say assy on here?), and ridiculous.

I wouldn't begin to tell the Military or their pilots how to fly their aircraft for instance and go off on ignorant rants criticizing them, but that is what I am seeing on here. Asking questions of the hows and whys to gain a better understanding and seems normal and fine to me and educational, but suddenly now we have "experts" on here being snarky with those who have thousand of hours flying in the military. Disappointing.
 
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Would you, given the choice?

I don't have a lot of flight time (~7,200) but by military standards that's almost an entire career. I can ASSURE you I'd have no problem telling a commander to GFH* if he asked me to RTB that was much further away than the airport that the carrier and ATC are suggesting to me when I'm down one engine and not feeling comfortable. Don't know the specifics for that Cors aircraft and the two university students, but you know, this kinda thing should come with the territory. I'd have no problem aiming for trees and then bailing out. Or, worse case, go down with the planes. Asians (Japanese especially) have shown that they are willing to do that. Oh and ha ha ha please no 9/11 jokes.



*Maybe not the exact phrase, but you get the point.
 
Well, then you are not practicing what we civvies call a true "instrument approach." You're half-half-ing it.

Sure, we can tune radios and frequencies single pilot but an instrument approach by definition involves a lot more busy time with less time available to look for traffic. Which is why for practice approaches, I always filed IFR and 80% of the time I was approved. And in the airline world, they learned long ago this sorta thing is best suited for Level D sims.

Not how the mil and FAA see it for instrument practice. And, most all mil aircraft are on an IFR flight plan also, just in VMC.

Even when IFR and on ATC vectors, midairs still happen. A squadron mate of mine was in a T-38 practicing instrument approaches into SKF, in the back seat under the canopy bag, with the IP up front......so time actually able to be logged as sim instrument, and they still had a midair with a C-172 while being vectored for ILS final. It happens. Rare, but it does.
 
I'm assuming your knowledge of accidents is based on the Discovery channel, tell me about the Legacy and its transponder.

?

That's the suspected theory. The RMP on the Legacy jet was above where the foot rest pedal is, with soft pushbuttons on both sides of the RMP unit.


The NTSB further added the following contributing factors:

Contributing to this accident was the undetected loss of functionality of the airborne collision avoidance system technology as a result of the inadvertent inactivation of the transponder on board N600XL. Further contributing to the accident was inadequate communication between ATC and the N600XL flight crew.
 
But then again, the military has the luxury of pulling the ejection handle and removing themselves from that vehicle that was going from Point A to Point B. The civvies don't have an option to eject. So when a civvy goes down, he's going down with the airplane.

Yep. The military has no problem spending $200k on an ejection seat, but $50k on TCAS? Hell no! More weapons!
 
I don't have a lot of flight time (~7,200) but by military standards that's almost an entire career. I can ASSURE you I'd have no problem telling a commander to GFH* if he asked me to RTB that was much further away than the airport that the carrier and ATC are suggesting to me when I'm down one engine and not feeling comfortable. Don't know the specifics for that Cors aircraft and the two university students, but you know, this kinda thing should come with the territory. I'd have no problem aiming for trees and then bailing out. Or, worse case, go down with the planes. Asians (Japanese especially) have shown that they are willing to do that. Oh and ha ha ha please no 9/11 jokes.



*Maybe not the exact phrase, but you get the point.
I can't say that I know what I would do in that situation, and neither do you.
 
I can't say that I know what I would do in that situation, and neither do you.

Not have someone else try and fly my plane? Especially when said person is on the ground and it's my azz strapped into the seat.

Probably the military hierarchy and the fact he was new that contributed to his decision to not land at the airport suggested by both the carrier and ATC, and instead RTB much further away as instructed by his commanders.
 
. Don't know the specifics for that Cors aircraft and the two university students, but you know, this kinda thing should come with the territory. .

You don't know the specifics of that accident; but to sure as heck have an opinion on what the pilot did right and wrong. That's rich CC.

I actually do remember that accident. The pilot did all he could aiming for a field and punched out getting about 1.5 swings in his chute before hitting the ground. The jet impacted on a road next to the field, which was clear at the time, but sadly, the two coeds pulled out from a side street in their Vega, not having seen the jet just impact and sliding down the street towards them. That's not negligence, that's an unfortunate set of circumstances. This wasnt a case of a pilot bypassing other fields with a sick plane and bringing it over he city; his engine failure happened on final pretty instantaneously, with few places to go.

You sure have alot of answers and opinions for someone who hasn't at all ever been there or done that.

Some People have said the crew of PSA182 killed the 172 crew that THEY ran over in 1978 and failed to see, even though they called traffic in sight, then didnt clarify with ATC when they lost sight. But that wouldn't be true either. That was again, another unfortunate accident.
 
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